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ABSTRACT
The first combat experience of many Australian and American infantry battalions in
Papua in 1942-1943 was against the Imperial Japanese Army. It was a contest between
recently raised battalions of citizen soldiers and a professional force of two-year
conscripts with combat experience. The Allied battalions in Papua were not combat
ready when they were first committed. Combat readiness and effectiveness are
examined in the three components of Allied infantry in Papua: the Australian Militia,
the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and the American infantry from the US National
Guard. Their journey towards combat effectiveness was painful, as they faced superior
Japanese fighting power.
Training an infantry battalion for combat has been usually assumed to be a process
which takes men through recruit and basic infantry training, then collectively trains
them in the combat skills of the battalion‟s tactical groups in a generally agreed amount
of time: approximately six months. The battalions committed to combat for the first
time in Papua had this amount of time yet they were not combat ready. The purpose of
the research was to investigate what was lacking in the preparation for combat in Papua,
by comparing the performance of inexperienced battalions from the Australian Militia,
the AIF and the American Army with combat experienced battalions from the AIF. Four
case studies compared two of the three Allied infantry components in the same first
combat experience against the same Japanese force on the same terrain in the same time
period and weather conditions.

The thesis argues that combat effectiveness depended on creating primary groups with
fighting spirit suited to close combat in very difficult terrain, but this was neglected.
Such primary groups existed where the organisational culture of a battalion fostered
cohesive social structures in its primary groups and supported them with a cohesive
secondary group. To achieve this before first combat the primary groups must
viii

rigorously train under their own leaders in physical circumstances which would be
suited to the close country conditions encountered in Papua. Although there was time to
achieve combat readiness, training at primary group level was neglected.

The Papuan campaign offers a rare opportunity. It was a campaign where American
and Australian battalions were involved in the same episodes within the command of
the brigades of the 7th Australian Division. From 1943, Americans would fight
separately from the Australian army, and the Australian army did not mix AIF and
Militia battalions in the same episodes of first combat as they had in Papua.

Some explanations that have been offered for the lack of combat effectiveness of the
Militia and American battalions have been that the Australian Militia contained
conscripts who, for that reason, lacked fighting spirit. Other explanations betrayed an
anti-American chauvinism.

In contrast, it has been assumed that the combat

experienced battalions of the Australian Imperial Force were combat effective. This was
not invariably true and this thesis argues that combat effectiveness is unstable because
primary group cohesion and secondary group cohesion move in different directions
during combat.

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Without the patience, penetrating questions and pertinent punctuation advice of my
Principal Supervisor, Associate Professor John McQuilton, this thesis would not have
seen the light of day. No thanks would be enough compensation for his dedication and
patience. My Co-Supervisor, Doctor Stephen Brown, was there when needed. My
Associate Supervisor, Doctor Karl James, of the Australian War Memorial, despite
reading so many drafts, was still able to offer acute observations on what could be
improved. Thanks Karl. The writing seminars that Professor Brian Martin, Professor of
Social Studies, voluntarily offers students were of fundamental importance to my work.
I cannot recommend them too highly or thank him enough.

The research support staff at the Australian War Memorial and the National Library in
Canberra were extremely helpful, as were those at the National Archives and Records
Administration II in College Park, Maryland who helped me navigate the American
system of records. The mapping technology and other assistance proved by Peter
Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, and his colleague Bill James, the author of the Field Guide
to the Kokoda Track, was indispensible to the Ioribaiwa case study. The Honourable
Charlie Lynn MLC and his colleague Rowan Tracey also helped with ground
reconnaissance on my behalf. Bede Tongs MM gave valuable first-hand confirmation of
some of the events on Ioribaiwa in 1942.

Finally, my deepest and loving thanks to my long suffering wife Kate, who supported
my monastic existence in the end room „tinkering with my Tonka toy‟, when there were
more interesting things she wanted to do.

I dedicate this thesis in memory of the late Major Jim Copeman, MBE, MC, MM who
fought „all the King‟s enemies‟ in the Second World War and served for decades after
it. His tactical insights led me to aspire to the craft of an infantryman.

x

INTRODUCTION
Christopher Pugsley was the inspiration for this thesis. In a study of the armies of
Australia and New Zealand in 1915-1918, he used the metaphor of a painful, bitter and
costly journey of transformation to achieve combat effectiveness as unprepared
democracies organised an army to learn the business of waging war. He also warned
that „…exceptional courage, endurance and sacrifice…should not be confused with
effectiveness in battle‟. 1
At the end of the 1930s the democracies were again ill prepared as they entered into a
major war which required them to train their male citizens as effective soldiers and
organise them for combat as soon as possible. In the Pacific region, Australia and the
United States of America had similar problems of raising training and despatching
ground forces to fight the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) in Papua in from July 1942 to
January 1943.
During the Second World War, the armies of most Allied nations were made up of
„citizen-soldiers‟, a frequently used but rarely defined term. The common thread to the
term „citizen-soldier‟ is that he was not „permanent‟ or „regular‟. Since he could be a
conscript, „voluntary‟ is inappropriate in both Australia and America as a defining
characteristic, because all citizen-soldiers endured the same „…painful process
involving many mistakes‟.2 An additional notion was that a large and demographically
representative cross section of the community served in the army - the citizens rallying
to the nation-in-arms in wartime and reflecting its values. Sociologists have called this a

1

Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, p. 16.

2

ibid.

1

„mass army‟, whether based on volunteers or conscripts; 3 historians have used the term
„citizen armies‟.4
The transformation of citizens into soldiers extends for months in combat beyond first
battle experiences.5 Australian senior officers felt that even after combat in 1941 the
veterans of the Australian army 6 still had effectiveness shortcomings which needed
rectification by better training. 7 These views are supported by a wider review of the US
experience which confirms that the journey to combat effectiveness includes
preparation, fighting the first battle and adapting to the exigencies of combat. 8
This thesis uses the word „combat‟ in its narrower sense – sometimes called „close
combat‟- which involves finding the enemy, closing with and destroying him.9 Hence,
combat is more than coming under enemy fire; it is the individual human being‟s

3

Marina Nuciari, ' Chapter 4 Models and Explanations for Military Organization: An Updated
Reconsideration', in Giuseppe Caforio (ed.), Handbook of Sociology of the Military, Kluwer Academic/
Plenum Publishers, NY, 2003, Table 4.3 p.84.
4

For example, John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire. Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861-1945,

Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1980, p.14, and citing Ulysses S Grant, p.87.
Shelford Bidwell, and Dominick Graham, Fire Power. British Army Weapons and Theories of War 19041945, Pen and Sword Books, Barnsley UK, 2004, pp2-3.
David Horner, „Staff Corps versus Militia: the Australian Experience in World War II‟, Defence Force
Journal, No. 26, January-February 1981, p.13.
5

John Coates, Bravery above Blunder, OUP, 1999, p. 30 -31.

6

Its correct title until 1980 was Australian Military Forces, but because of the wider modern meaning of
the word „military‟, this thesis prefers „army‟.
7

David Horner, High Command, Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, AWM, Canberra, and Allen
and Unwin, North Sydney, 1982, p. 99. They were the then Brigadiers Herring and Vasey.
8

Charles E. Heller and William A.Stoft, America‟s First Battles,1776 - 1965, University Press of Kansas,
1986.p.ix
9

Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2002, subsequently
referred
to
as
LWD
1,
Chapter
4,
pdf
p.
2/13,
and
Glossary,
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWD1/index.htm accessed 4 March 2008.

2

experience of having the duty to kill and of accepting the high risk of being killed.10
Infantry combat can only be conducted by groups, such as sections and platoons, which
manage the fear and the stresses of the battlefield. Cohesion is the essential element,
because without it there is no group at all, only co-located individuals. Pugsley argued
that each group of infantry must learn in combat „…to survive and function as an
organised body… while continuing to fight after opposition stiffens. To do this it must
be forged into „…an instrument harder and more proficient‟ than its enemy. 11 This
requires a moral attribute which is called „fighting spirit‟ in this thesis, The word
„moral‟ has a variety of meanings, but its use in this context refers to individual and
collective mental, emotional and psychological resources, which are intangible.
Clausewitz emphasised the great importance of moral elements as constituting „the
spirit that permeates war‟.12 The historian, John Keegan argued that battle is essentially
a moral conflict because it takes a sustained act of the will by two opposed groups.
There may not be a result, but, if there is, it will be caused by the moral disintegration of
one of the two human groups, though rarely is the result so final.13
Fighting spirit is the product of a number of moral variables. Martin van Creveld
identified some of the more important and used a mathematical metaphor to express
their synergy, when he defined what this thesis calls fighting spirit as
the product, in one combination or another, of the mental qualities that make
armies fight. Its factors are discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative,
courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness if
necessary to die. 14

10

Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: face to face killing in Twentieth Century Warfare,
Granta books, London, 1999, p. 71.
11

Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, pp. 304, 289, and 276.

12

Quoted by Steven Deakin, „Chapter 9, The British Army and Homosexuality‟ in Hew Strachan (ed.),
The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty- First Century, Frank Cass, Oxford 2000, p.
133, where he discusses fighting power.
13

John Keegan, The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, 1978, p. 302.

14

Martin L. van Creveld, Fighting Power, German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945, Contributions
in Military History, Number 32, Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 1982, p. 170. Van Creveld‟s choice of
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Other historians have agreed and added similar factors, though sometimes using
different terms. H. B. (Jo) Gullett, a veteran infantryman and writer, included faith in a
cause, loyalty to each other, and pride in the unit.15 When such qualities existed, they
were reinforced by the courage of the leaders and a few men who support the courage of
the rest. 16 Not wanting to fail comrades is a very strong personal concern,

17

and

comradeship is a deeply emotional wellspring of strength, aid, altruism and often
survival.18
Napoleon is said to have declared that, in battle, the moral is to the physical as three is
to one. Van Creveld expressed Napoleon‟s dictum in a further mathematical metaphor:
„…within the limits of its size, the military worth of an army equals the quantity and
quality of its equipment multiplied by its [fighting spirit]‟. 19 This „military worth‟ is
called „fighting power‟ in Australian, British and American military doctrine; that is:
fighting spirit, when multiplied by intellectual resources which come from training, and
physical factors in a particular setting produces fighting power. This may be greater
than the enemy‟s. However, history records many campaigns in which infantry
battalions continually strived to function effectively despite adverse physical factors and
high enemy fighting spirit. Fighting spirit is necessary but may not be sufficient to
produce superior fighting power.

phrase was „fighting power‟, which can lead to confusion if used beyond the context of his book, because
British, United States and Australian doctrine manuals use those two words with a wider meaning.
Australian Army, LWD 1, Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, pdf p.103. British Army, Design for Operations:
The British Military Doctrine, Army Code Number 71451,Chief of the General Staff, 1996 pdf p 37/
104. Van Creveld also avoids the slipshod assumption that „moral‟ and „morale‟ are synonyms, whereas
morale is only one ingredient in the moral component of his term fighting power.
15

Henry („Jo‟) B. Gullett, Not as a Duty Only, MUP, Melbourne, 1984, p. 11.

16

David Grossman, On Killing; The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Revised
Edition, Back Bay Books, New York, 2009, p 84.
17

ibid, p 89.

18

Gerald F. Linderman, The World Within War – America‟s Combat experience in World War II, Harvard
University Press, 1997, Chapter 7, p. 263-299.
19

Van Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 174.

4

Rigorous training should produce combat readiness adequate at least for organisational
survival, if not for the achievement of the tactical mission to which a battalion is first
committed. Combat readiness is therefore a relative and a hypothetical concept. When
committed to its first combat situation, a battalion should have been assessed by a
responsible senior commander as possessing sufficient fighting spirit relative to the
circumstances of those first episodes of combat, and it should be supported by adequate
physical resources, so that its fighting power will give it a reasonable chance of tactical
survival. The assessment is hypothetical because the senior officer making the estimate
of combat readiness is using a standard grounded in experience, which cannot always
include actual combat, or may not include combat in the campaign for which the
battalion is destined.
In the first combat experience, the estimate of hypothetical readiness is tested relative to
that experience, and then an even greater relativity applies as the journey to combat
effectiveness proceeds beyond the first combat experience. If combat effectiveness
grows with experience, a battalion may be said to be „combat effective‟, but combat
effectiveness might on occasions be unattainable, or after growing, may be eroded and
even lost. Combat effectiveness, then, is also relative to combat at a time and place and
not necessarily transferrable across theatres of war or different enemies.20 In fighting in
Greece in 1941, AIF battalions with experience in the Western Desert were said to have
„cleared out as fast as they could‟ when in combat against the Germans. 21 Individuals in
the 9th Division back in Australia after the Tobruk campaign took opportunities to avoid
being sent to fight the Japanese.22
Van Creveld hypothesised that combat effectiveness is the possession of fighting spirit,
even against an enemy possessing superior fighting power, and it was the critical

20

The relativity to enemy fighting power is well demonstrated by Craig Stockings, „An Abundance of
Riches: Training & Sustaining the Second AIF in First Libyan Campaign, North Africa, 1940-41‟ in Peter
Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), Raise, Train and Sustain: Delivering land combat power, The 2009 Chief
of Army History Conference, AHMP, 2010, p. 94.
21

David Horner, General Vasey‟s War, MUP, 1992 p.188.

22

Coates, Bravery above Blunder, pp 46, 50.

5

explanatory factor in the capacity of the German Army to continue operations against
the US Army in 1944-1945. A combat effective battalion can adapt the techniques of
tactics to each specific tactical situation „with judgement and creativity‟ 23 to take
advantage of opportunities and impose its will on the enemy. Yet, should that not be
possible, it should be able to maintain its fighting spirit while it struggles to deny the
enemy the achievement of his aim. 24
It seems then that the act of the will, of which Keegan wrote, should mean fighting
spirit which can sustain a small formed group of soldiers even when the result is less
than ideal.25 The ideal result is destruction or capture of the enemy, but that is one end
of a range of possibilities: a lesser result is to break his will so that he withdraws; less
ideal again is to deny him his will; and the least which may be achievable is to continue
actions which seriously interfere with the enemy‟s mission and stave off failure.
Combat success, Keegan argued, is not the criterion by which to measure combat
effectiveness. 26 This suggests that the word „defeat‟, often used to describe tactical
failure, should preferably be used only if the tactical result is accompanied by loss of
fighting spirit. Failure is simple and objectively assessable, but defeat at the tactical
level is a complex moral response to failure, which can spread through a unit and
destroy fighting spirit because of a feeling of responsibility for failing to accomplish the
mission. 27 „Defeat‟ is appropriate at the operational and strategic level. Cohen and
Gooch have argued that failure to learn, anticipate or adapt at these two levels results in
„military misfortune‟, but, at the tactical level, battalions (for example) can still take
advantage of limited opportunities to outthink, outsmart and outfight the enemy.28 Thus

23

United States Marine Corps, Warfighting (hereafter MCDP 1), 1997, p.30.

24

Keegan, The Face of Battle, p.303.

25

ibid, p. 50.

26

ibid.

27

Gay M Hammerman, „Chapter 3, Losing Battles: the experience of the combat soldier‟ in Col. Trevor
N Dupuy (ed.), Understanding Defeat, How to recover from loss in battle to gain victory in war, Paragon
House, NY, 1990, p. 46 – 48.
28

Eliot A.Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortune, The Anatomy of Failure in War, The Free
Press,Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, p.24 and p.247.
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in a campaign which ended in defeat, such as the Greek campaign in 1941, there were
many instances of tactical combat effectiveness as units contested the German advance
without success but with intact fighting spirit. These battalions would not have regarded
themselves as defeated.
The face-to-face nature of the infantry role in closing with and killing the enemy makes
infantry battalions the ideal units of an army to examine in case studies for the clearest
understanding of how the concepts of cohesion and fighting spirit operate. There are
many works on the infantry battalions in the Second World War, but this study is placed
below the ordered account of the battle which is constructed by the war diaries, unit
histories and secondary works. Keegan called this lower layer the „how and why‟ of
controlling fears and facing wounding or death in a „very small scale situation‟ where
individuals are driven by a sense of belonging to „the circle of most immediate
comrades‟ and a striving for mutual survival.29 But Keegan‟s layer can be divided even
further, into a lower level of individual responses to the trauma of combat, which this
thesis acknowledges but does not explore, and the level of organisations such as
infantry battalions. Charles Kirke‟s social anthropological approach has explored this
organisational level, but his work has been within the regular British Army of the late
twentieth century, so the opportunity is being taken to use it as a historical tool in the
analysis of the effectiveness of different national armies raised in wartime from the
citizenry of Australia and the United States of America.30
The infantry battalion is an organisation of central importance in any army because of
the close combat capability of its groups. This thesis will examine the combat
effectiveness of sections/squads and platoons in the rifle companies in some Australian
and American battalions during the Papuan31 campaign. However, an infantry battalion

29

Keegan, Face of Battle, pp. 46-51, 77, 303.

30

Charles Kirke, „Military Cohesion, Culture and Social Psychology‟, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol.
26, No. 2, June 2010.
31

Papua is the south-eastern corner of the island of New Guinea, which dominates the north-eastern
approaches to Australia. It was a territory of Australia, taken over from Britain in 1906, but was placed
under a single military administration in 1942 with the League of Nations mandated territory of New
Guinea. That mandate had been granted after the First World War over the former German colony.

7

is a cohesive sum of its parts. In 1942, in Australian infantry battalions, there were 36
sections in 12 platoons; in American battalions 27 squads in 9 platoons. 32 The platoons
were supported vertically through their rifle company by the rest of the battalion and
support sub-units.
Four case studies have been selected from Australian and American infantry units in
the Papuan Campaign involving six infantry battalions, one battalion-sized detachment
and one cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment, which examine the extent to which these
units had developed enough fighting spirit to justify being committed to combat i.e.
whether they were combat ready. Each case study will also examine the concept of
combat readiness, the variables that contribute to it and how it can be assessed,
sustained to become combat effectiveness or lost. The most important variable in
achieving combat readiness was the time available to acquire skills up to battalion-level
combat readiness. The assumption was that exposure to combat would then transform
that combat readiness into enduring combat effectiveness because combat experience
would make the battalion „battle hardened‟.

This thesis questions the relative

importance to combat effectiveness of the acquisition of physical skills and combat
experience compared to the acquisition of the moral variable of fighting spirit.
There were three components of Allied soldiers opposing the Japanese in Papua. The
Australian Army provided two of them, the Militia and the Second Australian Imperial
Force (AIF). The Army of the United States provided the third. The author of the
volume of the Australian Official History, South-West Pacific Area- First Year, Dudley
McCarthy, proposed that the Papuan campaign was a test of the combat effectiveness of
each of these three components against the Japanese invaders. He concluded that,
because of its combat experience, the AIF was the only combat effective force in the
region. Although he also argued that the Militia and the Army of the United States in
1942 were not as far short of being combat effective as the contemporary critics

32

Based on the 1941 AIF war establishment at
http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/structure/army_detailed_structure.asp#Infantry accessed on 23 January
2009, and „United States Infantry battalion‟, Battalion Organisation during the Second World War,
http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/UnitedStates/Infantry/united_states_infantry_battalion%201942%
20to%20mid%201943.htm accessed 17 September 2010.
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believed, the AIF were still the „elite‟. 33 In part, this thesis, by comparing the
performance of inexperienced battalions deemed ready for combat from the Australian
Militia and the American Army with combat experienced battalions from the AIF will
argue that such generalisations are questionable.
The Papuan campaign offers a rare opportunity to review those historical accounts
which have proffered two stereotypes as explanations of combat readiness. One is the
chauvinism in Australian accounts which underestimate the difficulties of American
battalions under Australian command, found in both in Australian records at the time
and in post-war literature. The other is the voluntary nature of the AIF compared to the
Australian Militia. The three Allied components can be examined in this campaign but
not later. From 1943, General MacArthur implemented his earlier intent that Americans
would fight separately from the Australian army,34 and the Australian army rarely, if at
all, mixed AIF and Militia battalions in episodes of first combat as they had in Papua.
To make the comparisons valid, the conditions involved must be similar: battalions
from two of the three components fighting the same enemy force on the same terrain in
the same time period and weather conditions. This governed the choice of units studied.
The choices of battalions for study do not represent all possible combinations because
the only AIF unit to fight as infantry in Papua without any prior combat experience was
the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment. However, to provide contrast, two combat experienced AIF
battalions were selected. The two American battalions were detached from two different
divisions of the United States Army stationed in Australia - the 32nd Division and the
41st Division. The international element of this study is possible only because it is
conducted at battalion level in a campaign where American and Australian battalions
were involved in the same episodes within the command of the 7th Australian Division.

33

Dudley McCarthy, Australia in the War of 1939-45, Series 1(Army), South-West Pacific Area- First
Year, Kokoda to Wau, AWM Canberra 1959. Pp. 1, 29-33. Hereafter South West Pacific Area-First Year.
34

David Horner, „Blamey and MacArthur: the Problem of Coalition Warfare‟ in William M Leary (ed.),
We shall return! MacArthur‟s Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, University Press of Kentucky, 1988,
pp. 23, 28, 41 and 46.
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Chapter 1 sets out the theory and methodology used to evaluate combat readiness and
combat effectiveness. Chapter 2 is a general background to the study and the Papuan
campaign. Chapter 3 reviews the literature and sources of the Papuan campaign with
particular reference to the case studies. Chapter 4 discusses the combat readiness of the
battalions of the Militia 14th Brigade in Port Moresby when its three battalions were
committed to battle under other brigade headquarters as a prelude to case studies of their
combat performance.
The subsequent Chapters are the case studies. Each begins with a description of the
„how and why‟ of the battle as a context for explaining the events and analysing the
combat performance which was displayed by the battalion. This analysis will evaluate
the episode in terms of combat readiness and growth towards effectiveness, what factors
were at work which might explain them, and the influence that any prior combat
experience may have had.
The first case study compares the 2/33rd Battalion (AIF), with five weeks combat
experience against the Vichy French in Syria in 1941, with the 3rd Battalion (Militia) at
Ioribaiwa ridge in the Owen Stanley Range in mid-September 1942. Both were in their
first combat against the Japanese. Because the 2/33rd Battalion entered its first battle in
the new theatre with only about 50 per cent of its personnel veterans of the Syrian
campaign, the ways in which combat effectiveness is transmitted by that veteran core
will be examined. In Chapter 5 the battle is explained and re-interpreted on the basis of
primary sources. In Chapter 6, the battle is analysed.
Chapter 7 describes the common setting for the other three case studies along the
Sanananda road in the battles against the Japanese beachhead towards the end of the
campaign. The enemy positions, the Allied troops and the tactical limitations are
discussed to avoid repetition of material in the case studies themselves. In the second
case study (Chapter 8), a United States battalion-sized force and an Australian Militia
battalion, both inexperienced, will be compared in their first combat on the Sanananda
road at the South West Sector (the Japanese redoubt at the junction of the Killerton
track). There were three attacks by a detachment of the 126th US Infantry Regiment
(„Major Boerem‟s detachment‟) between 26 November 1942 and 5 December 1942,
10

which will be contrasted with the attack of the 55th/53rd Australian Infantry Battalion
(Militia) over the same ground on 7 December 1942. An assessment will be made of
any growth towards combat effectiveness as American combat experience increased.
The focus of the third case study in Chapter 9 is primarily on the 36th Australian
Infantry Battalion (Militia) in its first combat experiences at the Killerton track junction
redoubt. The case study covers the 36th Battalion attacks in the period 19 to 28
December 1942, where the literature overlooks mutinies which were a total, if
temporary, loss of combat effectiveness in some rifle companies. It will be contrasted
with the veteran (but depleted) 2/9th Battalion, experienced in combat against the
Italians and Germans, and then against the Japanese at Milne Bay and Buna. The
debilitating effects on combat effectiveness of the 2/9th Battalion because of its recent
high casualties at Buna, and of prolonged exposure to combat conditions will be
investigated. This case study also includes the second attack of the 55th/53rd Battalion
on 19 December to evaluate any development or erosion of combat effectiveness
between its first and second attacks.
The fourth case study evaluates the well-trained 1st Battalion of the United States 163rd
Infantry Regiment with the highly trained 2 /7th Cavalry Regiment AIF (fighting on
foot). The evidence for the opinion of the American Commanding General that the
battalions of the 163rd Regiment were well trained for battle will be evaluated. Both the
2/7th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st/163rd Battalion were inexperienced in combat when
they separately attacked the same Japanese positions north of Huggins road block on the
Sanananda road on 19 December 1942 and from 8 to 21 January 1943 respectively.
Chapters 4 to 10 each have an appendix setting out the task organisation of the Allied
and Japanese units and sub units which are mentioned in the Chapter to assist the reader
in locating the higher organisation to which they belong. An appendix of maps and
sketch maps is also placed before the Bibliography which reproduces, sometimes on a
larger scale, many of the maps which occur throughout the chapters.
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CHAPTER 1: Theory and methodology
This chapter blends the empirical and theoretical considerations of historians, military
sociologists, social psychologists and social anthropologists into a tool to examine
combat against the IJA in 1942. In the Introduction, it was argued that cohesive bodies
of infantry can engage in combat and become „harder and more proficient than the
opposition‟1 only if their fighting spirit is strong. Military leaders in Australia in 1942
used terms such as „battle worthy‟, „seasoned‟ and „battle hardened‟ to refer to combat
experienced units which had proven fighting spirit.2 Fighting spirit must be acquired by
an infantry battalion as its leaders create the organisational culture when training the
battalion to be combat ready. Major General George Vasey, an Australian brigade and
divisional commander during World War II, linked examples of fighting spirit to
training when he wrote:
[…discipline] means a well trained unit or soldier – who puts the cause before
self-interest, who plays for the team not for himself, who is filled with
determination and who continues to play for the team despite hunger, fatigue,
sickness or even wound. Discipline is brought about by training and results in
esprit de corps.3
Historians, seeking to describe the state of readiness of the units before their first
combat, chose expressions clearly related to fighting spirit. Gavin Long used the term
„fit for battle‟ to describe the readiness of the 6th Division by late 1940 for combat in the
coming battle of Bardia.4 Craig Stockings has explored the physical aspects of how this
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untested combat readiness was reached, proven in that battle, and converted by that
experience into combat effectiveness (although he did not explore the moral qualities).5
However, David Horner summarised the opinions of its senior officers that the fighting
spirit of the Second AIF in the Middle East still had shortcomings after several
campaigns, 6 which suggests that some of the moral variables in fighting spirit were
insufficiently developed.
Vasey‟s link from discipline to training cohesive teams and then to fighting spirit was
echoed by van Creveld, when he listed discipline and cohesion first among the moral
factors in fighting spirit and pointed out that trust and unit cohesion were the keystones
of German doctrine. 7 S.L.A. Marshall supported this when he argued that „battle
discipline‟, which he also called „battle morale‟, arises because human nature needs
companionship with fellow soldiers to give men courage to keep going with their
weapons.8 This will inhibit their fear. It leads to unity of action, communication of plans
and their execution.9 Grossman likened discipline to peer pressure based on a sense of
accountability to each other. 10 Vasey, Marshall, van Creveld and Grossman thus
indentified that group behaviour in combat was tied to moral factors.
The disciplines of military sociology and social psychology have continued to
emphasise the importance of cohesion in bodies of combat troops. When analysing
evidence of cohesive behaviour during first combat experiences, the case studies will
use the concepts of the Standard Model of Cohesion outlined by the social psychologist
and military sociologist Guy L. Siebold. Since an infantry battalion is made up of
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groups, which must „seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him…‟ 11 the
moral factors in fighting spirit require a special organisational culture in a battalion. 12
This culture will be evident in the discipline and cohesion of the groups in it, which
enable them to hold together and pursue their mission under stress.13
Military Sociology: theories of primary groups and cohesion
Sociological studies of combat during, and soon after, the Second World War confirmed
that, although there were other factors, cohesion in a small combat group was the vital
determinant of the group‟s effectiveness because it offset the extreme stress on the
individual. 14 Sections/squads and platoons were termed „primary groups‟, because the
individuals in them operate with „intimate face to face association and cooperation,…integrated into the common life and purpose, disciplined by a common
spirit‟.15 This concept had earlier antecedents.
The American sociologist, Charles Horton Cooley laid the theoretical foundation for the
primary group. 16 Primary groups were the foundation of human social nature because
membership of them fused an individual into „simple face-to-face-groups‟ starting with
the family and neighbourhood groups from which the individual learned co-operation in
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a common spirit and purpose. It was foundational to other social structures such as
clubs, schools, workplaces and other institutions.17 Elton Mayo demonstrated that social
groups affected the behaviour of individuals at work, thus social group solidarity
improved both worker wellbeing and productivity in the workplace.18
T. N. Whitehead agreed with Mayo that human beings form groups with a structure
which has cohesion and a greater likelihood of endurance when they collaborate in
direct face-to face relationships and make an individual contribution. 19 Like Cooley, he
classified such a group as primary. However, Whitehead distinguished the primary
social group from the primary organisational group – which was created by executive
authority, charted and regulated. It did not survive beyond its explicit formal purpose. It
differed from the informal primary social group because of the immediacy of social
contacts and rich variety of social connections, functions and attitudes, including
concern for others in the social group. These characteristics gave the primary social
group long-term stability and cohesion.
Whitehead considered that the next stage in industrial society was to consider not only
the formal organisational groups and their managers (in a vertical „line of authority‟),
but also how they interact with the informal social processes running horizontally which
lead to cohesion, collaboration and success. 20 Without such consideration, progress in
the workplace would be impeded. Whitehead called for practical techniques based on
scientific observation which would assist this by developing working (industrial) groups
which also possessed social cohesion.21

17

ibid.,pp.26-30.

18

Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation, Viking Press, New York, 1960 (first
published 1933), pp.172-174.
19

Whitehead, Thomas North, Leadership in a Free Society, A study in human relations based on an

analysis of present-day industrial civilization, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp.5-8, 87-88.
20

Whitehead, ibid.,pp. 8, 84,114.

21

ibid.,p. 92-100

16

In the modernisation of the US Army in the late 1930s, the idea of cohesion found a
prominent place. The overarching doctrinal document, FM 100-5, Field Service
Regulations, Operations 1941, observed that the dispersion of troops in battle caused by
the influence of modern weapons would strain cohesion and threaten control. „Cohesion
within a unit is promoted by good leadership, discipline, pride in the accomplishments
and reputation of the unit, and mutual confidence and comradeship among its
members.‟ 22 In 1938 and 1939 Major General George A. Lynch, the U.S. Army's Chief
of Infantry, had argued the need for a cohesive organisation, particularly at the squad
level.23 This may have been extension of the ideas of Cooley, Mayo and Whitehead or it
may have been derived from a German Army doctrinal publication of 1933-1934.24
In any case, just as Whitehead had advised business executives to focus on the use the
social structure when guiding progress rather than the organisation structure or
technology, so Section I of the FM 7-5 Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle
Battalion (1940) began with the moral qualities of the individual man as an infantry
soldier in combat, 25 but, noting that infantry units fight in „small isolated groups‟,
Section II emphasised that these men, having learned that they must „place the mission
of the unit above their personal welfare‟ (become „disciplined‟) are grouped for training
and combat.26 The combat groups acquire cohesion through common experience, such
as training, quartering and eating, drilling to „develop a feeling of solidarity‟ which
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enables the individual to identify himself with group, give it his allegiance, take pride in
it and conform to its standards‟.27 „Platoons and squads should be kept intact and have
the greatest possible degree of permanence‟,28 companies were the source of grouped
ideals of conduct, and the infantry regiment „was the object of the soldier‟s deepest
sentimental devotion and inspiration‟ because of its history and battle record. Essential
company and battalion solidarity should not be at the expense of regimental group
feeling. Although this took time, a „military organization only emerges when a cohesive
group united by common military ideals, confident in its skill in arms, has been
developed.‟ 29 In other words, an infantry battalion is more than an organisational
establishment filled with personnel.
It is therefore clear that the ideas of cohesion in primary groups (Cooley and FM 7-5
1940) and the vertical and horizontal dimensions of cohesive social groups (Whitehead)
were to be found in the business world in the United States in 1940 and in the US
Infantry. Shils and Janowitz late in the war (1945), while citing only Cooley, Mayo and
Whitehead, perhaps unwittingly echoed Lynch when they argued that, when isolated
from civilian primary groups, the individual soldier comes to depend more and more on
his military primary group. Shils and Janowitz applied the concept to argue that German
army „units with a high degree of primary group integrity suffered little from desertions
or contrived surrenders‟ and were thus able to continue to resist the overwhelming
Allied force on the Western borders of Germany in late 1944-early 1945. 30 Shils and
Janowitz thus were able to explain how the squad or section had a capacity to avoid
disintegration, because it met the individual soldier‟s basic organic needs, offered
affection, esteem, and a sense of power and brokered his relations with higher army
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authority and would minimise his self-concern for survival. Loss of leadership or
casualties led to a preoccupation with physical survival.31
Junior officers and NCOs are the leaders of primary groups. It has been argued that an
essential part of their training must require leaders and men, if dispersed under fire, to
keep voice contact with each other by a relay of calls and messages.32 Men must know
that this contact will be made and that it is their responsibility to call to each other to
communicate the unified plan that reintegrates the group and restores primary group
cohesion. Above the platoons, in what Siebold called the Standard Model of Military
Group Cohesion, the organisational elements of companies and the battalion are a
„secondary group‟.
The Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion
The Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion evolved out of concern in the United
States about the combat effectiveness of the US Army in the final years (1969 to 1971)
of its involvement in the Vietnam war,33 and doubts about the effectiveness of the allvolunteer US Army then being reintroduced.34 There were to calls for a move away
from the use of simple qualitative and socio-political factors to measure combat
effectiveness, towards a conceptual basis for cohesion and combat effectiveness. 35 Thus,
from the early 1980s, multidisciplinary research into cohesion began in US academic
circles associated with Army institutions in Washington DC. Social psychologists
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collegially developed the Standard Model.36 It was to provide one conceptual basis for
measurement and prediction of performance (readiness for combat).
In 2011, Siebold set out to describe the major theoretical documentation and rationale of
the Standard Model to assist in its interpretation and use. He tabulated its characteristics
and identified the five questions about cohesion that drove its development.37 He then
discussed the theoretical challenges it presented. His description of cohesion theory
began with Cooley‟s articulation of the „primary group‟. He asserted that the first major
military research relevant to cohesion was that of Shils and Janowitz. This may be true
in terms of social science research, but, as we have seen, the ideas expressed from 1938
by Major General Lynch and underpinning in FM 7-5 1940 bear a close resemblance
to industrial sociology, as though Major General Lynch had noted the resemblance of
large armies to industrial organisations.
Siebold in describing the Standard Model indicated some other uses for it.38 It might
„…sensitise observers about what to look for and interpret what they see… in discussing
„the interplay of social structure, military culture and human action‟. Although the
Standard Model is a construct of the discipline of social psychology, Siebold argued
that it could be used as an explanatory tool in other social sciences. 39 For example,
Lerke has very recently used it to examine the militaries‟ role in what is popularly
called the „Arab Spring‟, in which national armies become the arbitrator between the
government and the people in a revolution.40
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Lehrke has pointed out how models of cohesion have been widely applied following
their genesis in World War II, such as to military operations short of war, regime
maintenance and revolutionary threats. In a limited war setting, Norah Kinzer Stewart‟s
historical study used the concept with non-American forces: British and Argentinean
veterans of the Falklands war of 1982. Although her study was done only five years
after that war, it was an opportunity to examine combat readiness and the first combat
experiences. This is the same issue to be examined in this thesis, but the new challenge
is to use the Cohesion Model for a more distant historical study, where the aged
participants are, in many cases, no longer able to make a detailed personal response, nor
are the units able to be subjected to assessment by test instruments devised by social
psychologists.
As a historical study of 1942, this thesis seeks to assess the comparative combat
effectiveness of Australian and American infantry battalions in their first battles using
primary and secondary historical documents. Siebold argues that: „[t]he model would
suggest that the development of cohesiveness during training and deployment would be
a determinant of skill and early combat success‟.41 Was this so in the Papuan campaign?
While the use of the concepts developed in the Standard Model as a methodology in
historical case studies may be novel, the Model‟s theoretical base is a good tool to
gauge the relationship structures.
According to Siebold, the Standard Model has four related sets of bonds based on
different structural relationships. When applied to the context of an infantry battalion,
the model‟s first set is peer bonding horizontally among those at the same hierarchical
level, for example a squad/section; the second set is leader bonding vertically between
different hierarchical levels, (thus the three sections to the platoon commander).
Together, these two types of bonding within a platoon create primary group cohesion.
The third set of bonds is organisational - between the primary group and the next higher
levels in the battalion (for example, the company HQ, the battalion HQ and supporting
companies or platoons). Although not described as such by Siebold, the organisational
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bonds are also personal, from the platoon commanders to their company commander
and upwards to the commanding officer (with a similar parallel link through the
sergeants and warrant officers). The fourth set is institutional bonding to the levels of
the army beyond the battalion, such as the brigade/regiment and division. These third
and fourth levels of bonding make up secondary group cohesion. Siebold writes that
institutional bonding comes first in time – and then creates the bonds in the lower
levels. Secondary group cohesion creates the battalion culture and unit pride based on
trustworthy professionalism in carrying out duties and tasks. Primary group cohesion,
on the other hand, generates fighting spirit. 42 Taken together, primary and secondary
cohesion characterise an organisation which is strongly bonded horizontally and
vertically.
Because a battalion is seeking to become a cohesive and combat effective unit it must
impart military skills to its primary groups through rigorous collective training,

43

secondary group cohesion must exist before primary group cohesion can be developed.
In battle, the battalion HQ provides direction by setting missions and priorities and by
allocating resources. It brings rifle companies to the point of action, during which the
battalion‟s secondary group cohesion must effectively service the needs of the primary
groups for fire support, medical support, weapons, ammunition, rations and other
combat equipment. 44 During battle, at the battalion level, the commanding officer
influences its outcome by manoeuvring the rifle companies, using his reserve and the
battalion‟s organic firepower (in 1942, based on mortars and medium machine guns).
Above the battalion, secondary group cohesion is demonstrated at the brigade and
divisional level by similar command, control, artillery fire support and logistics roles
related to combat, and begins to shade into institutional cohesion throughout the vertical
levels of the army as a whole.
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Van Creveld examined the cohesion of the German Army in the defence of the western
borders of Germany in the winter of 1944/1945 and assumed that it was reflected in
cohesion through every organisational level.

Robert Rush, however, convincingly

argued that the institutional cohesion in the German Army in that period did not
consistently penetrate down through the force. Secondary group cohesion was evident
but many German primary groups lacked cohesion because they were filled with
miscellaneous replacements lacking morale, trust in each other and their leader, and
tough collective training.45 The importance of Rush‟s findings for this thesis is threefold. Firstly, he showed that cohesion is not necessarily a seamless framework
throughout an army organisation and that a cohesive brigade or battalion may have
primary group weaknesses. Secondly, he demonstrated that secondary group cohesion is
more easily achieved and maintained, and might be adequate for combat effectiveness
in certain locations and phases of war, for example defence from fixed fortifications
such as the Siegfried Line. Thirdly, he pointed out that primary group cohesion depends
on intensive collective training of the group, which had often been lacking in the
German Army of the late-war period.
Rush was in effect pointing out that the Standard Model cannot explain all the combat
variables. The Standard Model itself, being a social psychological quantitative
measurement tool of the relationship structures, cannot itself be used because it is not so
designed, but the relationship structures it describes could be useful to identify
important exogenous combat variables.
Further on in this chapter, Table 1.1 identifies other fixed and variable factors in
fighting power. Siebold argues that a small increase in cohesion interacts with these
factors to produce a substantial increase in combat effectiveness. 46 Cohesive combat
behaviour in the infantry battalions will be the physical evidence of the moral quality of
fighting spirit as the thesis, following van Creveld, has defined it, and the extent to
which that evidence explained effectiveness in combat.
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The role of training in developing primary group cohesion and fighting spirit
Soldier- psychologists such as William Hauser explained that collective training within
the unit is more than acquiring physical skills for combat because it has, as moral
outputs, the factors which make up fighting spirit. Vigorous training creates cohesion as
the behaviours learned in an environment of hardship and danger forge reciprocal
relationships of trust between all members of the unit. An organic human relationship
emerges, consisting of mutual trust, interdependency, sense of belonging and
accountability to their small group and mutual survival. These mutually reinforcing
social relationships enable an individual to manage his fear by deciding that the only
appropriate thing to do is to stay with his group members to kill and risk death or
wounds. This decision requires courage because he has a choice to not participate in a
variety of ways, some of which will emerge in the case studies. A group‟s will to fight
is a product of each of its members‟ thoughts and feelings transmitted as learned
behaviours, which are imitated by all the others. Each primary group thus becomes
cohesive and acquires fighting spirit. 47 Many others support this socio-psychological
explanation of the horizontal bond among peers, and with their immediate leader. 48 The
socio-psychological nature of cohesion was confirmed by a former officer in the AIF,
recalling the men‟s determination to do their duty after training for their first combat in
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1941: „You felt it…you just knew…the way the blokes were… You felt it when it was
good, you felt it when it was bad…‟.49
However, this bond was not uniformly felt by everyone in the group. Bill Crooks, the
veteran author of The Footsoldiers,50 the unit history of the 2/33rd Battalion which is
included in Chapters 5 and 6 as part of the first case study, later asserted that only 50
per cent or less have the will to fight in close combat and the others will shirk unless the
eyes of the other team members are on them. In that case, they will join in but, even so,
some will use the slightest of excuses to straggle from the rest.51

Organisational culture and leadership
The fighting spirit thus described is an expression of organisational culture, which
shapes shared ideas, assumptions and practices in the organisation, which, according to
Edgar Schein, are expressed as its rules and conventions of behaviour, and create its
cohesion. These rules and conventions in an infantry battalion are created by the
founding Commanding Officer (CO) or inherited by him when he takes over an existing
unit and, if necessary, adapted by him to new conditions. Once confirmed in the
experience of combat, they become shared by all in the battalion and taught to
newcomers. 52This is because they have „worked‟ in the combat setting and successfully
adapted to its unfamiliar circumstances. The cohesive organisational culture must be
created and maintained by leaders, because culture and leadership are „two sides of the
same coin‟ according to Schein.53
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Leaders exercise their cultural role during collective training, which is conducted under
the leadership of the CO, who is formally responsible for his battalion‟s training and
readiness for war and the instruction of his officers‟.54 The battalion‟s leaders at each
level spread the battalion culture established by the CO down through companies,
platoons and sections/squads, by developing trust and respect as they train their
groups.55 This requires leaders whose competence, rapport with their men and ability to
inspire confidence56 is matched by „iron in the soul‟ that will enable them to give and
enforce orders in combat. 57

Jo Gullett referred to his platoon as being „totally

transformed‟ after the arrival of a new platoon commander, showing the power of the
personal relationship with a leader.58 Combat effectiveness depends on soldiers bonding
to their leader as well as their group.59
According to Lord Moran, leaders must have the ability both to make plans which will
succeed, and to persuade their men to carry them out despite the risk of death or
wounding. 60 They need an understanding of human nature which is appealing to their
men and gains their loyalty. 61 The best leaders in war have the ability to show „a
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supreme imperturbability in the face of death‟. 62 Moran believed that the personal
quality of the officers, especially in a citizen army, is a gift that is highly relevant to
this63 but cannot be fully known before the test of combat.64
These qualities must inspire leaders to make decisions and take actions in combat,
which create, preserve or restore the culture which is essential to cohesion. They must
adapt it to changing and uncertain circumstances. 65 S. L. A. Marshall‟s wartime
interviews led him to refer to these actions as „concentric‟ in re-creating primary groups
or restoring their unity of action once the individuals had lost contact with each other
and their leader.66 Displays of individual personal bravery on the part of leaders cannot
take precedence over maintaining this central culture. Conversely, both Moran and
Marshall reported the damaging effect that poor leaders can have on the morale of the
men.67 Since such leaders cannot command and the men cannot be persuaded to follow,
leadership weakness leads to apathetic performance which cannot be combat effective.68
While every battalion has a standardised hierarchical structure, the battalion‟s culture
cannot be standardised, because it is expressed in personal relationships among
individuals. The horizontal (peer-to-peer) bond at every level, in the Standard Model, is
thus personalised and distinctive. The leaders too have vertical (peer-to-leader) personal
bonds upwards through the command structure to the person who is CO. The link
between the primary groups and battalion effectiveness is the trust created by
„fellowship and true good-comradeship‟.69 A wartime battalion became an emotionally
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tight community of young men.70 Lord Moran referred to „joining a sacred fellowship‟
and „being „a member of privileged brotherhood‟.71 It is a symbol of unity earning the
lifetime emotional bond of veterans.72 Gullett called it a „state of grace‟. For him, six
hundred men did not make a battalion until they had acquired a „state of mind‟ so that it
was possible to say that „the battalion thinks‟ or „the battalion feels‟. 73 Although such
strong ties of affection and identification with group ideals have been likened to family
love, 74 Daddis has argued that such emotional metaphors can understate the more
important relationship of cohesion in meeting basic human needs in combat, such as
managing fear and trust that group survival by co-operating would aid individual
survival.75
Social anthropology: a model to describe and analyse a culture
The concepts of the socio-psychological Standard Model of cohesion can explain the
degree of primary and secondary cohesion in an historical case study, but how that
culture comes about and operates needs another explanatory tool. Charles Kirke, a
soldier and social anthropologist, believes that the Standard Model can be combined
with, and supported by, his approach.76
Kirke extends the Standard Model by providing an analytical framework to describe the
culture of a British regular infantry battalion as he had observed it during the late Cold
War. For Kirke, the culture suited to combat within a battalion‟s primary groups can be
explained by four social structures at work simultaneously in the battalion as they
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generate an „operating group‟ (sic).77 This group must possess a „body of ideas, rules
and conventions of [combat] behaviour‟,78 i.e. an „operating structure‟ (sic) or culture
suited to close combat. This helps the soldier to overcome his fear with the support of
his fellow group members. Kirke explained how the soldier‟s primary group can acquire
this culture through the synergy of four intertwined social structures in a battalion. The
formal command structure (sic) will issue orders and enforce their implementation.
Through the informal structure (sic), the soldier will be a member of a primary group of
closely bonded individuals. The functional structure (sic) will have trained and
equipped the primary group to perform combat tasks. Through the loyalty and identity
structure (sic), the members develop a loyalty to each other and to the unit. 79 The
battalion‟s or the nation‟s historical record of valorous combat can be used as an
inspiration to loyalty. 80 Thus a combat operating structure (sic) emerges from the
culturally important threads of the four social structures to draw the members of each
primary group together. 81 In the chaos of battle, it is quite likely that the informal
structure (sic) will be the operating structure (sic) by default because combat is „the
point at which the fighting group could informally melt away‟, 82 unless held together
by its personal bonds.
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Kirke tested the utility of his model of the late twentieth century British regular army to
historical analysis of the British Army across the period 1700-2000. 83 He found that his
model of four social structures could not be applied over that period without taking
account of the wider social environment of Britain in which the Army‟s organisational
culture was embedded. This was particularly necessary when applying the model to the
mass armies of citizen soldiers raised in the two world wars. These citizens brought
influences from the wider society into the British army which did not entirely fit his
model derived from observations of late twentieth century regular army life. In
particular, Sheffield‟s study of the First World War showed that the Edwardian model
of leadership broke down as tested leaders were found from all classes of society not
just the upper class that attended the public schools. 84 This meant that the formal
command and informal structures of the model were challenged.85
As a result, Kirke has proposed an adaptation to his model using a cultural stripe (sic)
across its four structures to describe the influence on each of the wider social
environment in which the army‟s organisational culture is embedded.86 This makes it
potentially possible to extend the model to Australian armies of citizen soldiers by
developing their cultural stripe. The formal command (at least at the higher
organisational levels) and functional structures in the military culture of the two armies
were essentially the same for historical reasons and remained so. In 1965, the Australian
CGS asserted that „[t]he customs and traditions of the Australian Army are in the main
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based on those of the British Army…‟ 87 This did not arise by accident for the British
Army was a progenitor of the Australian army.88
When British Army garrisons left Australia in 1870, the colonial forces were
commanded by British officers on secondment, with the result that these forces
emulated the British Army. 89 From the Boer War to the Korean War and Malayan
Emergency, and occasionally later, British, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian
armies were interoperable.90 In the Boer war, the British Brigadier General Hutton, who
in the 1890s had been Commandant of the NSW Forces and followed this with a similar
command of the Canadian Militia, commanded a mounted brigade from the four
countries. 91 After Australian federation, the Commonwealth government in 1902
appointed him, now Major General Sir Edward Hutton, as GOC Commonwealth
Military Forces until the end of 1906.92 Hutton was called the „father of the Australian
Army‟.93
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The Imperial Conferences beginning in 1907 led to agreement that the Australian army
(a conscripted part-time citizen force for home defence staffed by permanent officers)
would be organised under a common Imperial General Staff and equipped along
standard British lines.94 There was to be no regular army field force. To staff the citizen
army, at Lord Kitchener‟s instigation, a Military College to train permanent officers was
established, with entry on merit determined by an independently conducted competitive
examination and without fees being required. 95 At Hutton‟s instigation, Australian
permanent officers began to attend the British Army Staff Colleges from 1907. Many
permanent officers undertook exchange postings with the British or British Indian
armies. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Thomas Blamey and other senior officers who
figure prominently in this thesis had similar experience of British service. Lieutenant
General Sir Edmund Herring received his legal education at Oxford University and
served with the Royal Artillery during the First World War. Lieutenant General Rowell,
by 1938, had spent five out of the previous 13 years with the British Army. 96 Major
General George Vasey had served for three years with a British regular brigade in India.
Brigadier (later Major General) George Wootten attended Camberley in 1919 having
served for six months on the General Staff at Field Marshal Sir Douglas (Earl) Haig's
headquarters.

The two armies might have continued this common culture but for the commencement
of the First World War when the home defence army had barely been formed. The
expeditionary force (called the Australian Imperial Force (AIF)), eventually consisted of
two Australian corps, one in France and one in the Middle East, which were
interoperable with the British Army, the Canadians and New Zealanders.
However, in the Australian society from which the AIF came there had been a
distinctive cultural change reflecting Australian immigrant origins in the working class
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of the British Isles, with traditions of mateship and egalitarianism.97 In 1942, Charles
Bean, the Australian official historian of the First World War, stated that Australia in
1914-1918 already had a democratic culture based on „equality which was social and
political, but not economic‟,98 leading to the absence of social barriers and comparative
equality of opportunity.99 Later scholarship among veterans confirmed this opinion.100
Bean asserted that, in the British army of the First World War, military command was
class based, whereas Australian equality of opportunity applied to officer selection
which, after 1915, was from the ranks by their unit commanders whose choices would
remain with or return to his command after their commissioning, contrary to British
practice.101 In contrast to British practice, in the trenches Australian officers ate with
their platoons, and received the same ration scales.102 Too frequent saluting and other
officer privileges did not accord with the Australian democratic quality. 103 Bean
believed at the time he wrote (1942), that the Edwardian attitudes of the British regular
army, had given way to the democratisation of the British officer corps and a post- war
system which was more closely aligned to the Australian system.104
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Sheffield has confirmed Bean‟s proposition about of the democratisation brought about
by the wartime influx of civilians into the expanding British Army of 1915-1918. The
Territorial Army and Kitchener‟s New Army had introduced an „auxiliary style‟ of
leadership, 105 and a culture which was nearly identical to that of the already citizen
based Australian army.106 There was resistance to pointless military procedures,107 and a
closer officer identification with their men than a regular army tradition encouraged.108
Sheffield‟s study shows that Bean‟s claims about the British Army culture at least a
regimental officer level during the War were exaggerated, however the regular army
culture in the British Army gradually replaced the auxiliary style by 1918 and the
meritocratic system vanished in the 1920s. 109 In the Australian army however, that
cultural style continued to reflect the more egalitarian Australian social environment
and the military culture established by the AIF.
The egalitarian ethos that Bean had described continued between the wars. John Barrett
conducted a survey in 1982-84 of 3700 veteran soldiers of the Second World War.110
Some recalled a pre-war apolitical class consciousness (based on choices like „upper‟,
middle and working‟), but a large group were not „class conscious‟.111 Pride in the King,
Empire and the Anzac tradition was general. Love of country and Empire were not seen
as contradictory, reinforcing the idea of a British „race‟, but Australia was the best
country in the world.112
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At the time of the Second World War, Australian culture was still British in many ways.
As an English speaking settler society, the strength of British Isles ethnicity (meaning
close ancestry) was 86 per cent. English ethnicity was 54 percent of the Australian
population. Irish ethnicity was 19 percent and Scottish ethnicity was 13 percent. 113 In
the 1930s, language, kin and ethnicity were reinforced by the link between the
Australian currency and sterling, tariff protection within the British Empire, and
predominantly British finance. There was a shared a common culture because children
were raised on the same English literature and stories at school; and played English
games. Scholars, medicos and artists sought experience in Great Britain, and the
resentment caused by the Britain domination of Australian industry and finance was not
strong enough to overcome the ties of sentiment. 114
The Australian shared values were „a belief in mateship, in the superiority of the white
race, in the responsibilities and freedoms imposed on and due to men, and in the value
of the international British civilisation‟.115 Gullett records that the harshness of living
conditions in Australia had bred loyalty to each other in the community, pride in the
sacrifices of the nation in the First World War and acceptance of the need to fight to
defend it. „The [British] race‟ had always been ready to fight and die and its heroes were
our heroes too.‟ His generation did not see it was extraordinary or unfair to be called
upon to fight for the survival of Great Britain.116
Using the terms of Kirke's model, the Australian army continued its British army based
four social structures with a distinctive Australian cultural stripe reflecting the
surrounding society. This enabled it to remain interoperable with the British army in
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terms of formal command structure and functional structure. Kirke regards the formal
command structure as a 'common apparatus of rank and discipline'. 117 In the Second
World War Middle East campaigns, the Australian force was again fully integrated into
British high command structures, and in Greece, Syria and Tobruk in 1941 Australian
corps or divisional headquarters took command of other formations from Great Britain
or the British Commonwealth.
The Australian army's approach to discipline in the formal command structure and the
conventions of behaviour in its informal structure were greatly modified by a cultural
stripe influenced by Australian society in the 1920s and 1930s. These conventions of
behaviour and relationships had already been tested in the First World War, as Bean had
observed. Any distinction between officers and men above what efficiency demanded
was quickly resented.118 Barrett‟s respondents reported resistance to unnecessary and
petty regimentation that had little clear relationship to discipline.119 There was a fine
line: a combat environment bonded ranks more closely but, in general, officer privileges
were resented by his respondents.120
A British functional structure was maintained in the Australian army between the wars.
Generally, infantry organisation establishments changed to reflect British practice and
weaponry, though not as quickly. 121 In 1940, the second Australian Imperial Force
arriving in the Middle East was re-organised and re-equipped to British
establishments.122 The Australian Militia was not similarly reorganised until after April
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1941 but its re-equipment proceeded slowly.123Australian tactical doctrine throughout
was of British origin,124 and will be discussed in Chapter 3.
In terms of Kirke‟s cultural stripe, the loyalty/identity structure throughout the period of
the two World Wars differed from the British Army, but this structure has little impact
on interoperability or across military cultures. The Australian army did not develop its
loyalty/identity system based on the British multi-battalion regimental system. In
wartime it wore a common national badge. Each infantry battalion during World War I
was identified by a simple ordinal numbering system. Each battalion had a distinctively
coloured felt patch worn on coat sleeves and hat bands. After the First World War, the
battalion numbers were transferred to the battalions in the post-war Militia along with
the battle honours and colour patches. The loyalty/identity structure of Second AIF
battalions with their distinguished First War predecessors was maintained by similar
colour patches and the battalion number prefixed by „2/‟.125
The Australian cultural stripe running across the British army style of the Australian
army's four social structures reflected the compromise between the discipline necessary
to maintain cohesion in the Australian army and the civilian nature of its soldiers raised
in the Australia of the 1920s and 1930s. This thesis will argue that Charles Kirke‟s
social anthropological model can be validly used to examine the specific group culture
of the Australian troops in each case study in this thesis, which provided the background
relationship before and during the first experience of combat.

A method of applying these theories to case studies
This thesis therefore combines Kirke‟s four social structure model and an Australian
cultural stripe with the Standard Model of cohesion. In an infantry battalion in close
combat, the primary groups derive their moral strength and cohesion more from the
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informal and the functional structures, and the secondary group derives its moral
strength more from the formal command and loyalty/identity structures. Even when the
members of the secondary group in combat are only potentially in close combat, they
accept high risks to service the needs of the primary groups. While it has been argued
that it would be appropriate to refer to the moral strength of the secondary group as
„professional spirit‟ rather than fighting spirit,126 the term fighting spirit will be used for
the entire battalion because of the extreme risk to all within an infantry battalion.
However, the quality of the primary groups is so dependent of the quality of the
secondary group that the distinction between them is a matter of degree not a
dichotomy. 127 Kirke would say that, even in the most clear-cut example of close
combat, all four social structures must provide the context for fighting spirit.128 For
example, the primary groups receive orders through the formal command structure.
Cohesion (either primary or secondary) formally includes the task specified in those
orders. In Kirke‟s cultural model, task cohesion necessary for combat predominates in
the functional social structure (from skills training) supported by the tightly-bonded
informal structure, and is reinforced by the loyalty/identity structure. Working in
synergy, the primary groups develop a „culturally centred soldierly attitude‟, which
makes them determined to pursue the military task ordered by their leaders. 129 Thus
Kirke, like Hauser and Daddis mentioned earlier, describes bonding through rules and
conventions of behaviour rather than familial relationships like brotherhood.
In Kirke‟s model, the primary groups have a tightly bonded operating structure which
is particularly influenced in close combat by the informal structure (webs of friendship,
association and trust) interwoven simultaneously with the functional structure of
training in skills, equipment and common tasks involved. Fighting spirit particularly
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expresses itself in each primary group closing with and killing the enemy using fire and
movement tactics based on its light machine gun operators, supported by riflemen and
scouts (some of which might be armed with rifle grenade launchers or with automatic
sub-machine guns). It is just as necessary during a fighting patrol, or holding a post
under attack.
Evaluating the existence of fighting spirit
In summary, then, the analysis of the case studies will use the concepts of the Standard
Model and the work of Kirke. Yet, assessing the existence and strength of such an
intangible as fighting spirit poses a challenge because it is both complex and
speculative.
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It is not reducible to simple win/lose categories or a precise

measurement.131 The relative weights of the many factors in van Creveld‟s definition of
fighting spirit are impossible to resolve into a mathematical formula. 132 Nevertheless,
fighting spirit is an aggregation which must be evaluated when determining combat
readiness because its factors are „crucial determinants‟133 of combat performance in that
they reflect the potential for disintegration under the stress of combat.134 Therefore, any
combat readiness assessment system which does not attempt to evaluate fighting spirit,
and bases readiness assessment solely on objectively measurable elements such as
personnel, equipment and training, will miss the human and social aspects which are the
essence of combat readiness.135 This thesis will evaluate the accuracy of the aggregate
assessments of combat readiness and judgements of fighting power made in 1942.
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Evaluation by percentages of enlistment in the AIF
Rather than examine these constituent factors in the organisational culture of army
units, Australian historians and military commanders have sometimes used a precise
measure of fighting spirit reflecting national social values: the percentage of volunteers
for geographically unrestricted service in the AIF. 136 However, even when they are
unjustified, such social myths influence beliefs, behaviour and decisions. Gavin Long,
the author of the Australian official history of the first Desert campaign, referred to this
belief as an explanation for the high fighting spirit of the 6th Division before its first
combat at Bardia. The division was not only thoroughly trained but also „in splendid
fettle‟. He attributed this to its all-volunteer status, and the additional honour such status
had conferred on the fighting reputation of the First AIF.137 This respect, he believed,
would not be given by Australians to conscripts because of a national belief in the
superior fighting spirit of volunteers.
Even if one accepts Long‟s basic premise, assessing fighting spirit by the use of the
percentage of AIF volunteers in each Militia battalion in Papua was complicated
because the volunteers consisted of three groups. There were individuals who had
volunteered only for Militia service, i.e. in Australia or its territory of Papua.138 From
January 1940, the Militia also contained conscripts, who were legally constrained to
serve in the same area. Some members of both groups had subsequently volunteered for
the AIF, but after Pearl Harbor these volunteers were retained in the Militia unit. The
third group was made up of enlistees in the AIF but who were posted to Militia units.
Hence, Dudley McCarthy, the author of the official history of the Papuan campaign
could write that, because 53 per cent of the men in the 49th Battalion had volunteered for
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AIF service, the battalion had an „uneven temper‟ just before its first combat.
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In

other words, its fighting spirit was uneven because of the 47 per cent who were
conscripts. McCarthy acknowledged that there was an Australian prejudice against
conscript forces because of a fear that they might lower the national reputation for
military excellence earned by the First and Second AIFs.140
This view was not only expressed in the post-war writing of historians. Brigadier
Selwyn Porter, for example, commanded the Militia 30th Brigade from April 1942 and
throughout the Papuan campaign, after being promoted from command of an AIF
battalion which had seen combat in Syria. When transferred to command an AIF
brigade in 1943, Brigadier Porter wrote „…it is marvellous to be back in the AIF again
with free men and voluntary fighters.‟141 In the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment in Port Moresby,
one trooper wrote that the Militia „…had neither training nor guts. Only a volunteer
seems to have that tenacity and initiative necessary‟,142 thus associating these essential
elements of fighting spirit only with volunteers. Some of the troopers at least suspected
that inadequate training affected the Militia units there.143
The Australian army‟s mishandling the pressure on militiamen to volunteer did little to
change these social views. The army conferred administrative and dress distinctions on
volunteers for the AIF which set them apart from their non-AIF colleagues in the same
unit. The latter could not accept that, by volunteering for the AIF, they would overnight
become full of fighting spirit. 144 This worked against the cohesion that was necessary
during preparation for combat. The many AIF-Militia issues are comprehensively
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handled in other works.145 However, the validity of rates of personal AIF enlistment
within Militia units as a measure of fighting spirit has not been tested and ignores a
variety of other possible factors, particularly training. As noted earlier, Hauser and
many others had argued that the socio-psychological relationships that constituted
cohesion depended on rigorous training. The issue of the training that had been given to
the battalions in the case studies will be discussed in Chapter 4 and in the case studies.
Factors in estimating fighting power before first combat
At the point of first combat experience some factors in fighting power of a battalion are
relatively fixed: for example, skill level and fighting spirit acquired in training, scale of
fire support and quality of leadership. In Militia battalions, the AIF enlistment
percentage was also fixed because, not only did administrative pressure to enlist cease
in the combat area, but transfers were impractical. These factors, when aggregated with
physical and measurable components, such as numerical strength and available
equipment, make up a battalion‟s fighting power and thus its combat readiness. This is
an aggregate assessment which a commander subjectively forms by judging the
interaction between the quantitative and the qualitative, 146 and conflating physical
factors with moral factors into a judgement of combat readiness.147 Van Creveld‟s use
of mathematical metaphors, not formulae, aptly expresses the synergy between the
many moral and physical factors that produce fighting power as an aggregate. Military
historians 148 and military commanders have usually reflected this concept of an
aggregate, but inevitably subjective, assessment of combat readiness. In the
Introduction, it was argued that, in the first combat experience, the previously relative
and hypothetical estimate of combat readiness is subject to testing in a concrete
circumstance. This is the only certain test because combat is influenced by emotions
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such as fear, stress, and adrenaline-induced excitability, which are not fully reproducible
outside „real war‟.149
These ideas now assist formulation of a fuller definition of combat readiness than that
discussed in the Introduction. Combat readiness, then, is the state reached by a military
unit after skills training when, in a commander‟s aggregate and subjective assessment, it
has a cohesive culture containing sufficient fighting spirit to combine with sufficiently
positive physical factors to generate adequate fighting power for the situation that it will
confront on entering its first combat. A cohesive combat ready culture, as Pugsley
described its behavioural characteristics, should be evident in leaders with „the skills
and initiative to respond to the unexpected‟, successfully retaining control of their
tactical groups, with the result that the groups can continue to manoeuvre and fight
pursuing the mission.150
Variable factors in the first combat
The variable factors in the context of the specific combat episode include enemy
fighting power and also the physical environment and weather. The relativity of combat
readiness to these circumstances continues as the journey to combat effectiveness
begins. The battalion attempts to respond to unexpected variable factors, using
judgement and creativity inculcated in training. At this point, the battalion‟s fighting
power relative to that of its enemy becomes the important variable factor.
The transition from combat readiness to combat effectiveness
It is desirable that a unit‟s first combat experiences should not be too difficult, as they
will be if the enemy fighting power is too strong. If the commander‟s judgement is
correct, a growing level of combat effectiveness is the result (as at Bardia and in Syria
in 1941). If cohesion is stable or increases, the group possesses fighting spirit. However
the interaction of the variables in van Creveld‟s definition implies that fighting spirit
could never be an absolute state, and it may deteriorate so that reduced cohesion
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becomes apparent. If might even be lost entirely and the group will lose its moral bonds.
Kirke too insists that cohesion is not a constant state but varies among groups, or within
a single group, at different times, because it is the product of a changing context.151
The relationship between the fixed and variable factors during combat is summarised in
the table below.
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Fixed factors which can be aggregated into

Variable Factors during combat

an assessment of fighting power before
combat
Possession of the necessary skills (through Enemy‟s fighting power
training)
Battle experience

Casualties

Importance of the mission

Weather and environment

Fighting spirit (acquired in training of primary Troop reinforcement
groups)
Quality of leadership

Communications

Degree of intelligence on enemy
Logistic support
Scale of fire support
Percentage of volunteers for the AIF

Table 1.1: Factors in fighting power

Enemy fighting power and casualties are the most important variable factors in Table
1.1 because the casualties inflicted by enemy fighting power have both physical effects
(disrupting cohesion) and moral effects (on toughness and morale, thus reducing
fighting spirit). The aggregate assessment of enemy fighting power, either before or
during combat, is not a simple exercise. Intelligence may not always identify whether
the enemy has superior fighting power. Also, even when the enemy has general
superiority, locally superior fighting power over the enemy may be achieved especially
with the aid of surprise, or the discovery of „soft spots‟ in defences. Relative fighting
power is an evaluation of the particular circumstances, including varieties of combat
such as deliberate attacks compared to encounter battles,

and prepared defences

compared to hasty defensive perimeters barely dug in. There is the possibility of
surprise in all types of combat. These create variability, and this thesis will examine just
two such combat settings. Ioribaiwa was a setting of hasty defence and encounter
45

battles, in contrast to the more planned and structured operations against well prepared
Japanese defences on the Sanananda road which gave the Japanese a very high level of
fighting power, and enabled them to inflict heavy casualties.
Mathematicians have tried to reduce the effects of combat to a casualty rate which,
through computer simulations, would determine when an episode of combat must
end.152 Usually, it is expressed as the percentage of battle casualties to troops involved
in a combat episode. Robert L. Helmbold and others, however, have rejected such
mathematical determinism because of the influence of many other factors, exemplified
in Table 1.1, which influence the result in battle including decisions to break off a
combat engagement. 153 Helmbold has expressed the fluid nature of the relationship
between enemy fighting power and the other factors by arguing that each side in combat
continually reviews the many factors to assess its aggregate situation relative to the
situation of the enemy.154 Thus, while avoiding determinism, it is possible to use the
casualty rate as one tool for analysis of combat performance.
Historically, the level of casualties has been used to judge combat performance.
Commanders, no doubt, accepted that suffering some level of casualties was necessary
if dominance over enemy fighting power was to be achieved. After the campaigns in
Libya, Greece and Crete in 1941, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund (Ned) Herring and
Major General George Vasey thought that suffering heavy casualties was necessary to
achieve combat effectiveness.155 By this, Herring and Vasey seem to be recognising
that the necessary toughness only comes with the experience of suffering casualties, not
merely by training. General Sir Thomas Blamey, on the other hand, expressed the view
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that training must impart the „spirit of pushing on at all costs‟ which was necessary for
the combat readiness of assault troops against the Japanese.156 Blamey seems to have
meant by this that combat readiness must include acquiring the moral toughness to
disregard casualties and prosecute the mission. A casualty rate was used by Brigadier
Porter on the Sanananda road to evaluate his tactical alternatives.157 Porter, Vasey and
Herring considered that „too few‟ casualties indicated that attacks had not been pressed
home with „determination‟, that is, with sufficient fighting spirit. The challenge is to
develop analytical criteria to assess the effect of casualty rates in the case studies.
In an infantry battalion most casualties occur in the primary groups. The strength of the
rifle companies can usually be reliably estimated and the battle casualties are accurately
recorded. It is thus practicable to develop good estimates of casualty rates at this level,
and relate them to the judgements made by commanders. The physical and moral
effects of casualties differ, and the moral effects do not inevitably follow the same
physical casualty rate. The physical effect of casualties is their disruption of cohesion
when the reduction of available numbers renders a unit unable to continue the mission
for which it is deployed. Momentum can be restored by reorganising survivors into new
primary groups with fighting spirit to „push on‟. The moral impact of casualties is on
fighting spirit („determination‟) leading to men becoming inert and unresponsive to
leaders or leaving the battlefield, with the result that the primary groups abandon the
operation. The casualty rates in case studies when these distinct effects occur can be a
means of assessment of fighting spirit along with the other fixed and variable factors in
Figure 1.1. This assessment can be discussed using terms coined by the computer
modellers and operations analysts for the situations where combat temporarily or
permanently stops because of casualties.
The useful terms „stall‟ and „stall level‟, were coined by operations analysts to describe
the point when accumulating casualties (expressed as a percentage of assaulting troops)
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have so reduced cohesion that movement forward stalls for some time interval, and
reorganisation of squad/sections or platoons is necessary to restore momentum and
resume the attack. 158 If this restores cohesion and the attack continues, success
(achievement of the mission) is possible. The stall level can be estimated logically as
follows.
There must be a viable number of men in a section/squad to conduct fire and
movement, or who survive to resume it after the attack stalls and is re-organised. This
can be expressed numerically because, at a quite precise casualty rate, a section/squad
will be unable to operate without reorganisation. For example, in an Australian rifle
section or an American squad of nine men in the Second World War, there would be
three in the Bren gun/Browning automatic rifle group, two scouts, and four in the rifle
group (including the section/squad commander). Although some may be rifle grenadiers
or watching flanks, the six men making up the scouts and the rifle group would combine
in the fire and movement stages of an assault, while they were covered by the fire of the
automatic weapon kept in action by the three men in that group. If any of casualties
affected the automatic weapon‟s group, covering fire would cease and movement would
stall. If three men become casualties, i.e. when the casualty rate is 33 per cent, stall time
will be considerable and resuming the assault will be problematic because of the
difficulty, while under fire, of gathering those not wounded together and re-organising
them into a new smaller primary group. At about 40 per cent casualty rate, two sections/
squads would need to combine to have enough men to recreate one primary group
needed to fire and manoeuvre. Ordinarily, this re-organisation would need to be done by
the platoon commander (if he was a survivor), but the stall time would be longer.
Theoretically, then, a reasonable lower casualty rate parameter for the stall level of a
section/squad sized primary group is about 30 per cent, and above that level cohesion
will be difficult to restore even by highly trained and battle-experienced troops. Even
accepting the fact that in real operations, sections would rarely have any more than
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seven, and leaders were often the first casualties because their duties exposed them to
enemy fire, the casualty rate at which an attack stalled provides a basis for evaluation in
the case studies.
If the two leading assault sections in a 30-man platoon stalled, the whole platoon would
stall and it would require the intervention of the platoon commander to re-organise and
restore momentum as quickly as possible. As the platoon stall level had been imposed
by heavy enemy fire in the vicinity, movement would be difficult and very dangerous,
so it is probable that at 33 per cent, (the loss of ten men across the platoon) it would be
practically impossible. An outer parameter is given by David Grossman who believed
that even the most elite and well bonded group would slip into combat ineffectiveness at
a casualty rate of about 50 per cent.159 In the range between 33 per cent and the 50 per
cent that Grossman proposes as an inevitable breakpoint, there is a decreasing chance of
other variable factors assisting to restore momentum.
Whether that chance is taken depends on the moral effect of casualties. Stalling need not
lead to breaking off the attack if there is compensation from other factors set out in
Figure 1.1. For example, as Helmbold pointed out, the enemy fighting power may be
declining because the casualty rate of the enemy is also rising. Re-organising the
attackers would be easier if the primary groups were very well trained and led so that
they were very cohesive with high fighting spirit. An example of a variable factor in
Figure 1.1 which can restore momentum is troop reinforcement. For example, C
Company 2/9th Battalion, attacking at Buna on 18 January 1943, suffered a 53 per cent
casualty rate when attacking Japanese bunkers through kunai grass. 160 The attack stalled
until tanks arrived to restore momentum by reducing the disparity in fighting power,
enabling the bunkers to be successfully captured. Thus reinforced, this highly
experienced infantry company avoided the collapse into ineffectiveness that Grossman
wrote would be inevitable at a casualty rate of 50 per cent, and was able to resume its
attack.
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On the other hand, the moral effect of the casualty rate may be to force, what operations
analysts and computer modellers have called a „breakpoint‟, that is, the point at which
the unit abandons its mission and gives up the battle. 161 A breakpoint is a change,
forced by enemy action, in a commander‟s intention and the related deployment of his
troops. Examples of forced change are: stopping an attack and going on the defensive;
or ceasing to hold a defensive position and beginning to withdraw. 162 A successful
attack means that the defenders reach their breakpoint before the attackers reach theirs;
failure in an attack occurs when the defenders impose a breakpoint on the attackers. It
follows that a successful attack becomes impossible if the defenders can maintain a
higher breakpoint than the attackers. The casualty rate at which a breakpoint occurred in
the case studies is an element of analysis. The evidence would be twofold. Firstly, there
must be evidence of activities of primary groups and leaders which shows that a skilful
attempt was made to regroup and pursue the mission and, secondly, the casualty rate
must support the argument that the attempt was a determined one, as Herring, Vasey
and Porter had required. Van Creveld‟s „willingness to fight and the readiness if
necessary to die‟ was probably what the generals called „determination‟, and would
explain their disapproval of breaking off an attack with „too few‟ casualties. If not, the
case study would indicate Keegan‟s „moral disintegration‟ referred to in the
Introduction.
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This capacity to restart a stalled attack would be due to toughness and morale – both
moral factors in fighting spirit as defined by van Creveld. During the attack, toughness
will be required to endure the high stress of casualties while re-organising in the ways
described above. A way of expressing this using the stall level and breakpoint concepts,
would be that the primary groups in a combat ready battalion must have a stall level and
breakpoint at a casualty rate as high as possible, below which they can react to the
casualties in a way that maintains cohesion. The lower that level, the earlier an attack
will stall or break because of insufficient fighting spirit. If the casualties have been
light, the levels are too low due to some mix of the fixed factors, but most likely a
failure in training to develop sufficient fighting spirit within the battalion culture.
Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a theoretical background to explain how an infantry battalion
expresses its fighting spirit in its personalised culture, and how this is most evident in
combat by the skilful and cohesive conduct of its primary groups, and the behaviour of
its leaders. This will require assessing the likelihood that prior training went beyond
imparting skills to create a socio-psychological bond in primary groups. In the case
studies, assessment of fighting spirit will include whether the primary groups
maintained cohesion, or re-organised to restore it, in order to pursue the mission or deny
the enemy the achievement of his aim. 163 Evidence of low skill, men shirking the
danger, straggling, and becoming inert and unresponsive to leaders, will also be
examined as indicative of the loss of the willingness to fight which Keegan called moral
disintegration. Other fixed factors may offer insights. Case study evidence will also be
sought for the secondary group being able to adapt to circumstances during the
engagement. The variable factors once combat commences, identified in Figure 1.1, will
be evaluated by using the concepts of stall levels and breakpoints imposed by casualties.
Evidence of the enemy fighting power in case studies will be evaluated against the
broad parameter that restarting a stalled attack a casualty rate of 25 percent to 30
percent in rifle companies or platoons is a indicator of minimum fighting spirit and is
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the start of a journey to combat effectiveness. Kirke‟s anthropological model will then
be used to seek the causes for the situation revealed in the evidence.
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Chapter 2: The campaign and the armies in Papua
With the outbreak of war in Europe, Australia (from 1939) and the United States of
America (from 1940) again began to train their male citizens as full-time soldiers and
organise them for combat. In the Pacific region, there was an increasing need for
readiness to fight the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Before the war, both Australia and
America had maintained skeleton part-time armies in peacetime training which was fulltime for less than two weeks a year. In Australia, this volunteer citizen force was known
as the Militia and in America as the National Guard, although America also had a
regular army component, which did not feature in the Papuan campaign. On the other
hand, the IJA had been a large permanent army for decades, led by regular officers and
NCOs with a structure kept filled by the annual conscription of 20 year olds in a rolling
program of two year full-time service with a long reserve service liability. Much of the
IJA had had some combat experience in China, particularly from 1937.
From a theoretical perspective, skeleton frameworks of part-time soldiers were not
intended to be combat ready and it is inappropriate to consider them as having more
than a „latent readiness‟ from which to train to combat readiness with full manpower
and equipment after mobilisation. This latency is often not explicit or even realised. 1 In
contrast, the two-years service of young men in the IJA made them as well trained as
regular soldiers. This meant that long service armies, like the IJA, kept a high level of
combat readiness and would be combat effective much sooner than part-time armies
called out in time of emergency.
The Papuan Campaign
The Papuan Campaign refers to the battles fought to defeat the Japanese advance on
Port Moresby that took place between a beachhead on the north east coast of Papua and
Ioribaiwa ridge on the southern edge of the Owen Stanley Range between July 1942 and
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January 1943. A subsidiary Japanese landing at Milne Bay at the eastern end of Papua
which was defeated in the first week of September is also included in the ambit of the
Papuan Campaign. Milne Bay was to have been a base for a seaborne landing of
Japanese forces at Port Moresby to assist the overland attack.2 The campaign finished
with a difficult battle to drive the enemy out of his fortified beachhead on the north east
coast.
In September 1941 the IJA had created the South Seas Force (a composite group under
Major General Horii Tomitaro 3 based on the 144th Infantry Regiment (hereafter, the
144th Regiment) with various combat support, service and base units) as the Army‟s
support for naval landings at Guam and Rabaul to neutralise Allied air interference with
the naval base at Truk. This force had captured Rabaul on 23 January. Within a week,
Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, ordered landings by the South Seas Force at LaeSalamaua, and the commencement of planning to expand the Pacific offensive by
capturing key locations in Papua and the Solomon Islands, including Port Moresby. 4
From March 1942, the Japanese strategy regarding Australia was to deny its use by the
United States as a base for a strategic counter attack to regain the areas conquered by
the Japanese. To do this the Japanese planned to cut the sea route between Australia and
the United States by establishing air bases down the island chain stretching for 4000
kilometres south east of Rabaul to Samoa. The objective of the Japanese campaign in
Papua was to capture Port Moresby in order to use it as an air base to control the Coral
Sea as protection for this planned thrust beyond the Solomon Islands.
This Japanese strategy was the mirror image of the Allied strategy. In the first week of
April 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington DC, had ordered General Douglas MacArthur to hold Australia as the base
for an offensive to regain Rabaul by amphibious operations supported by the United
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States Navy. For these two tasks MacArthur needed to secure Port Moresby and would
need to construct air bases on the North East coast of Papua. 5 By the end of May, there
were two Australian brigades stationed in Port Moresby to defend it against seaborne
landings. Between May and June 1942, General MacArthur‟s staff had identified
Dobodura near Buna, and Milne Bay at the eastern tip of New Guinea, as airbase sites
for the forthcoming Allied offensives and construction was to begin, protected by small
garrisons. Both were inaccessible by road, and the poorly charted sea route from Milne
Bay along the coast to Buna was dominated by the Japanese sea and air power beyond
Cape Nelson (See Figure 2.1). Australian troops and American engineers landed at
Milne Bay on 25 June 1942,6 followed by an Australian brigade group from 11 July.7
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Figure 2.1: General map of Papua between Port Moresby and Buna

A mix of roads and tracks led from the government station at Buna to Port Moresby
over a route well known to the Australian government administration, whose officers
had used it for decades. A corduroy road led from the commercial jetty at nearby
Sanananda to a sugar plantation at Sangara about half way to Kokoda, then a welldeveloped foot route went on to Kokoda where an airstrip had been built in 1932.8
Various foot tracks comprised the frequently used 100 kilometre link from Kokoda
through the Owen Stanley Range to the Sogeri Plateau from which a road ran to Port
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Moresby. The foot tracks became known as the Kokoda Trail,9 a name which is often
applied to the entire campaign, rather than being limited to the fighting in the Owen
Stanley Range.
A Japanese landing at Port Moresby would require aircraft carriers to protect it from
interference by the US Navy and Allied medium bombers based on the Cape York
Peninsula, but no carriers would be available until the end of April due to other
commitments (such as bombing Darwin and Ceylon). 10 In the first week of May,
however, the seaborne attempt by the South Seas Force to seize Port Moresby turned
back because of the Battle of the Coral Sea.
The Japanese then turned to an overland campaign to capture Port Moresby using the
route described above. This demanded that Allied infantry defend that route. The
Japanese made a series of landings in the Buna area from 21 July to establish their main
base and HQ at Giruwa-Sanananda with an airstrip at Buna.11 The infantry of the South
Seas Force was to be reinforced by a second infantry regiment, the 41st Regiment.
The American landings in the Solomon Islands at Guadalcanal on 7 August pre-empted
the Japanese strategic thrust towards Samoa, but the American threat to the Japanese
base at Rabaul by moving up the Solomon Islands caused the Japanese in late August
to defer plans to attack Port Moresby until Guadalcanal was recaptured. Accordingly,
they restricted their Papuan ambition to the advance of a regimental group of the South
Seas Force, based on the 144th Regiment, mountain artillery and combat engineers, to
the „southern slopes‟ of the Owen Stanley Range, leaving the main force north of it.12
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Man-packing rations and ammunition beyond Kokoda, they advanced across the
Kokoda Trail driving back the Australian resistance.
Unknown to the Australians, events at Guadalcanal forced the Japanese to recall the
144th Regiment to the coast on, or about, 12 September. To secure a covering position
for this withdrawal, it captured Ioribaiwa ridge on 16 September. Parallel events in the
region were the Japanese counterstroke against the well defended Allied air strip at
Milne Bay. This was defeated and the Japanese there were forced to withdraw.
The Allied victory in the Papuan Campaign was not based on winning the ground
battles – a common Australian nationalist belief. 13 The Australian resistance imposed
enough delay to enable trained and combat experienced reinforcements to arrive to deny
passage of the Kokoda Trail in September 1942, and the rough country had slowed the
Japanese advance. Success in the campaign came less from the bitter ground fighting
than from the strategic victory already won in the major naval battles after April 1942
and the diversion of Japanese resources to opposing the Guadalcanal Campaign from
August 1942. Operational victory in Papua was shaped by the 5th Air Force which
interdicted the landings and then, by September 1942, had greatly weakened the
Japanese logistic and reinforcement link between the Japanese Papuan beachhead and
Rabaul.14 The 5th Air Force then acquired just enough air logistic support to make a
ground campaign feasible north of the Owen Stanley Range, and fighter aircraft to
slowly gain air superiority over the Japanese beachhead area. This allowed seaborne
logistic support as far as Oro Bay. However, strategic and operational victories do not
quickly lead to tactical victories, if the ground opponent can maintain high fighting
power.
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The ground campaign in Papua in 1942 was extremely difficult for the Allies. The
Australian infantry could rarely generate sufficient fighting power to stop, and then
defeat, the enemy. Even Australian infantry, experienced in combat elsewhere, found
that their combat effectiveness was very limited in their first encounters with the IJA.
Inexperienced Australian and American infantry units were committed to their first
combat experiences before they were ready. As will be discussed below, they had little
chance of gaining the experience necessary to become combat effective.
Air resupply after the recapture of Myola on 6 October 1942 enabled two experienced
Australian brigades to be deployed simultaneously to drive the Japanese rearguard at
Eora Creek out of the mountains, recapture Kokoda (2 November 1942) and then defeat
the two Japanese regiments in the battle at Oivi - Gorari (11 November). The Japanese
forces fell back across the Kumusi River onto the coastal lowlands and into the prepared
defences at the Gona – Sanananda – Buna beachhead which the Australians reached on
19 November. Most of the 32nd US Division had been flown across by air to fight on the
flank of the 7th Australian Division, but one battalion group walked overland on the
Jaure track. The majority of Americans fought major battles against the Japanese
enclave around the Buna village and government station, but the half of the 126th
Infantry Regiment and the complete 163rd Infantry Regiment fought under the command
of the Australian 7th Division on the Sanananda road. Bitter siege warfare followed
before the campaign ended in January 1943.
Before discussing the training of the Australian and American armies for the campaign
just described, two general points must be established: whether there was an appropriate
doctrine i.e. a set of concepts, procedures and techniques for a campaign in Papua, and
if so, whether these had influenced the content of training in combat skills, weapons and
equipment.
An important principle of war is that campaigns can only be won by offensive action,
but this applies more to the strategic and operational levels of war. It is less apposite at
the tactical level, where any form of military action, such as advance, attack, defence,
withdrawal or patrolling, may be required in pursuit of campaign objectives. The
purpose of the Allied campaign in Papua was defensive, and the Australian troops were
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initially defending it as a base for a forthcoming offensive campaign directed at
recapturing Rabaul. However, as has already been shown in the account of the
campaign, the Australian and American armies were required to act, not merely to
defend Port Moresby in a relatively static role, but to undertake offensive operations to
stop the Japanese advance and then drive them out of the Territories of Papua and New
Guinea. This demanded doctrine for a wide variety of tactical situations adapted to
fighting a new enemy in an unfamiliar tropical environment.
Despite acquiring the Territory of Papua in 1906, and a mandate over New Guinea after
the First World War, neither the Australian Government nor the army had given
consideration to the demands of fighting in the tropics. Australia had long had a concern
about threats from Asia which led to stressing the importance of the islands of New
Guinea and New Britain/ Bougainville for the defence of Australia. This became a
political obsession at the time of the Versailles treaty with the creation of Japanese
mandates in the Pacific. However, achieving a League of Nations mandate to govern
New Guinea and New Britain had not been followed by Australian consideration of
military operations in this theatre. The inter-war political process failed the army and its
citizen soldiers, by restricting the army to consideration of the defence of mainland
Australia against raids.
Instead of considering the problems of littoral operations of ground forces, and their
logistic supply across the Coral and Solomon Seas, or the variety of climate and terrain
once an expeditionary force was ashore, the Australian governments in the inter-war
years directed that the Australian army focus its order of battle and tactics on the
defence of the Australian mainland against raids. This meant that the army confined its
weapons, tactical doctrine and training to warfare in open country. The United States of
America followed a similar path with its National Guard.
One of the places in Papua where the Australian and American open warfare doctrine
could be applied was around the grassy hills at Port Moresby, where medium machine
guns, artillery, tanks and aircraft were available (in principle) to support the infantry.
However open warfare doctrine was conceptually weak for much of the fighting that
developed in jungle environments, or for the off-road sustainment of a ground force.
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The campaign was dominated by logistics and transport problems when close country
warfare was required to counter the Japanese overland advance on Port Moresby
through mountains and jungle. At the battalion level, supporting arms from outside the
battalion (medium machine guns, artillery and tanks) could not easily be transported to
the battle area. Once there visibility was so restricted that observation of targets was
very difficult so that the fire of supporting weapons was less effective. This meant that
even the more modern tactics of the combat experienced AIF were difficult to apply,
where the infantry would fight on its own and depend on the initiative of junior leaders
unsupervised by senior commanders. Primary group cohesion was correspondingly of
the highest importance.
The armies in Papua
From 1929, when compulsory service was suspended, the Australian army was chiefly a
part-time service, called the Militia, populating a skeleton establishment of five infantry
divisions. The Munich Crisis of early 1938 triggered an „astronomical‟ increase in its
funding,15 which, given time, could have been highly beneficial. Between November
1938 and March 1939, the Militia of 35,000 men, staffed by less than 300 permanent
officers, was doubled by voluntary enlistment and equipped with new uniforms; the first
regular field force of 12 officers and 245 men was formed for service at Darwin based
on an infantry company of regular soldiers, supported by artillery, machine guns and
mortars;16 and a Command and Staff School was initiated with two week courses for
promotion of Militia officers to the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel, but could
only conduct four courses before the outbreak of war. Many majors and virtually all
lieutenant colonels and above were World War I veterans.
From the outbreak of war in September 1939 until Pearl Harbor (8 December 1941 in
Australia), Australia developed a two-speed army. At the same time as raising, parttraining and despatching four full-time infantry divisions as the Second AIF, the
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Government increased training time and introduced compulsory training to fill out the
skeleton of the five part-time infantry divisions in Australia. The Government
recognised that an Australian infantry force this size was unsustainable, 17 but it
overstretched the military leadership talent available to the nation even with the recall to
service of World War I veterans in their forties.
The 21 weeks training of the AIF in Australia, Britain, Palestine and Egypt in 1940 may
be taken as a guide to the full-time training time needed to make combat-ready a newly
raised battalion of citizen soldiers for mobile offensive operations under a trained
brigade HQ. If it was part of a new brigade, up to nine weeks training with brigade
supporting arms, such as artillery, was then added. The minimum for this was about
four weeks depending on the nature of the proposed operations. Other favourable
factors for the AIF were a training infrastructure led by skilled officers and the
availability of equipment, both of which were provided by the British (regular) Army. 18
The result in the Middle East by December 1940 was a highly trained force in a time
which may be taken as a minimum under most favourable conditions to reach combat
readiness for a mobile offensive role. This was demonstrated in the battle of Bardia 19
and subsequent operations in 1941, although much experience in combat was needed.
On the other hand, the Militia units were restricted to discontinuous trimesters of
training, to avoid damaging the economy. The discontinuity of training was exacerbated
by a structural weakness in the period 1940-1941. In each training trimester there was
the induction and training of volunteers and of the intake of compulsory trainees to each
battalion, who replaced the discharges of volunteers to the RAN, RAAF or AIF, men in
reserved occupations and those married men who exercised an option to be held in
reserve. 20 The repetitive extraction of talent by the AIF and the other replacements
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created turbulence within the cadre of leaders and private soldiers which meant that the
units could not easily progress past basic training to collective training. The Militia was
not intended to be a combat ready force by either the Government or the army. 21 The
Chief of the General Staff made the reasonable assumption that the part-time units,
having latent readiness, would have sufficient time to achieve combat readiness to
defend Australia or the territory of Papua if Japan entered the war.22
The Australian army, without either a regular field force or long service civilian
conscript army, had giving priority to raising new full time units and higher HQs in the
Second AIF that could be effective against the very diverse Axis powers in different
theatres. It had overstretched its available leadership talent to bring the Militia up to full
strength with compulsory trainees and give it a latent readiness from the part-time
training set out in Figure 2.2. The Militia units were not concentrated until three months
after Pearl Harbor – only then could they train full-time to build on their latent readiness
and achieve combat readiness. Provided a battalion did not face combat earlier than the
21 weeks allowed for the Second AIF battalions to reach combat readiness, it should
have been combat ready to form part of a fully trained brigade.
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Description

Period of continuous training
days

Last quarter 1939
First

intake

of

cumulative days

30
compulsory 90

120

Officer and NCO cadre training 18

138

trainees Jan-Jun 40

June 1940
Second intake of compulsory 90

228

trainees late 1940
Third intake of compulsory 90

318

trainees Jun 1941
Cadre on full time duty from
Sep 1941
Call-up of further classes of 42
compulsory trainees in Jan-Feb
1942
Battalion on full time duty from
mid March 1942

Table 2.2: Table showing the amount of continuous training undertaken by the cadre of officers,
NCOs and senior volunteer soldiers in the period 1939-1941 in a typical Militia battalion.
Participants in one of the three intakes of compulsory trainees completed only that 90 days.23
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Table 2.2 demonstrates that, once the units were concentrated in mid March 1942, the
command elements of a battalion and some volunteer members in key positions would
have had up to 318 days of intermittent trimesters of training and had been on full time
duty since the previous September. Compulsory trainees would have received 90 days
training except for the 1942 group which had only 42 days training so far. Based on the
AIF requirement of 21 weeks, the battalions, with no allowance for latent readiness,
could have been as well trained by mid- August 1942 for offensive operations in open
country as the AIF had been in mid-1940. However, whereas the AIF had then
conducted brigade and divisional training undistracted by other tasks, the Militia
brigades and divisions began to conduct training for their defence role, while
constructing and occupying static defences on the Australian mainland and at Port
Moresby.
The Militia was adequately armed,24 but to become combat ready it needed realistic and
tough collective training by its leaders which, as discussed in Chapter 1, should develop
fighting spirit expressed in an organisational culture of cohesive thought and action. The
Militia was commanded by veterans of the First AIF until younger veterans of the new
war could be released. This core of veteran leaders, experienced in infantry tactics
during the First World War, were still available to train the Militia with some realism
about combat‟s demands,25 although their uneven quality and limited command training
has been criticised.26
These veteran leaders had absorbed the Western Front experience of infantry operations
supported by artillery, tanks and aircraft that had matured in 1918 and which
emphasised company and platoon level fire and movement in the attack as an infantry
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battalion, in flexible formations, infiltrated an enemy position. 27 Conversely, defence
layouts were no longer linear, but dispersed with all round defence and in depth. Militia
battalions were still organised and trained on an establishment that reflected these
concepts.28
These flexible company and platoon tactics from 1918 were extended by the British
Army from 1936 to section level with the availability of the Bren light machine gun,
and confirmed by experience in combat in France in 1940. The organisational changes,
reflecting the one third increase in the number of light machine guns in a battalion, were
adopted by the AIF overseas29 but the Militia did not start to get these weapons until
manufacture began in Australia in 1941. They did not arrive in Papua until July 1942.30
Whereas the AIF had combat experience in the new section level tactics, the Australian
Militia had only a theoretical grasp of how the section/squad light machine guns could
enable section level tactics.
It has already been argued that the training concepts of the battalions down to platoon
and section level were suitable for the defence of Australia and Port Moresby against
Japanese sea-borne landings, reflecting the leaders experience gained during the First
World War. However, the combat readiness of the two brigades at Port Moresby for
mobile defence, or an offensive role in Papua in terrain very different from the open
hills around Port Moresby, would depend on the army adapting the Field Service
Regulations after reaching a common understanding of the demands of infantry fighting
in the jungle and swamp environments elsewhere on the island of New Guinea against
an enemy like the IJA, and planning for logistic support where no roads existed. No
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such understanding of tactics or logistics existed when the campaign began. The army‟s
adaptability would evolve throughout the Papuan campaign in 1942, and a new
doctrinal framework would mature in 1943.31
The approach of the United States to the increasing risk of war was very different in two
ways. Firstly, the component of the United States Army before 1940 which was most
like the Australian Militia was the US Army National Guard made up of part-time
voluntary citizen-soldiers. It was called out in September/October 1940 for full time
federal service and filled out with draftees. This reversed the Australian sequence,
filling out their pre-war skeleton force before seeking to enlarge their army. This made
the best skilled leaders available to immediately begin training the National Guard to
combat readiness.
The second difference between the American and the Australian approach to training
was to conduct major exercises at corps and army level. This meant that individual and
small unit training was neglected. 32 The US Army realised in October 1941 that
although its allocation of time to small unit training (22 weeks) was adequate, basic
skills had not been mastered. Tactics were very weak, as was the deployment of
battalion support weapons, battle procedure and communications techniques. A four
month remedial training period was mandated accompanied by standardised proficiency
tests. Live firing was to be expanded because the men had not been exposed to realistic
conditions with the use of live rounds and their effects.33 Pearl Harbor intervened and
the 32nd and 41st Divisions left for Australia before the remedial training could be
conducted.
This failure to train realistically may have been a result of inexperience. Compared to
the Australian army, whose proportionally larger number of First World War veteran
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leaders knew the demands of combat, the United States Army suffered from weakness
in concepts and procedures for infantry tactics in the inter-war period as it had been
unable to employ the accepted lessons of the First World War. 34

General Douglas

MacArthur had documented this problem in 1933.35 General George C. Marshall, the
US Army Chief of Staff, had believed that the US Army had been engaged too late in
1918 to master the art of employment of supporting weapons and that the infantry had
been „brave but artless‟.36 When Marshall was commandant of the Infantry School at
Fort Benning from 1927 to 1932, he introduced tactics similar to the fire and movement
of the Australian army in 1918 to overcome the American tendency to use frontal
attacks, which Australians had learned to avoid. Further up-to-date infantry tactical
ideas based on squad level light machine guns, infiltration, night attacks and initiative
by junior leaders were introduced from early 1940.37 The manual for Jungle Warfare
issued in December 1941 was based on extensive US experience in the Philippine
insurrection, the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii, and was very sound on the need for
independent action at junior levels. It did not, however, anticipate strong defence
systems such as those built by the Japanese.38
Although MacArthur intended to train both his American Divisions for jungle warfare
at Rockhampton,39 this material was probably too late to influence the training of the
32nd Division before it was sent to Papua, although it may have had some influence on
the training of the 41st Division in Rockhampton.40 Like the Australians, the Americans
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would learn in the Papuan campaign and develop the doctrinal basis for jungle warfare,
for implementation from 1943.41
Mobilisation of the Australian and United States armies in 1940-1942 involved
expanding existing units, raising new ones, then administering and training the rapidly
expanding order of battle. Existing units in the Australian Militia and US National
Guard had to absorb significant numbers of conscripts as late as early 1942. New units,
such as the AIF, were raised by culling the Militia of its leaders and many private
soldiers from the body of the Militia units, then filling them with volunteers without
military experience, or First World War veterans with reduced chances of absorbing the
shocks of active service again later in their lives.
In these circumstances of mobilisation, viewed through Kirke‟s social anthropological
framework, it is not surprising that there was a concentration on establishing the Formal
Command structure; and creating a Loyalty/Identity structure. In Australia, it was based
on an appeal to the record of the First AIF battalions of the same number which applied
to the Australian army (both AIF and Militia); in the United States, it similarly used the
First World War record but also the State identities of the National Guard.42 These two
structures entwined to form the social structure which most characterises secondary
cohesion. This was a big task given the dilution of talent implicit in a large and sudden
expansion. It was probably adequate for some types of fighting, such as in fixed
defences against invasion where close combat might not occur because the primary
weapons were artillery, mortars, medium machine guns and air strikes. On the other
hand, it remains to be seen on the evidence of the case studies the extent to which the
secondary groups had the opportunity to train their social groups at primary level. These
needed a functional structure for the specific purposes of close combat in many settings.
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The Allied part-time armies called out in time of emergency to develop combat
readiness were at a disadvantage compared to the Japanese. The concepts and
techniques of open warfare on European battlefields were inappropriate for the Papuan
Campaign, and their training in them was inadequate. As already noted, the IJA, on the
other hand, was combat ready because of its training, its permanent structure and system
of long reserve service, annually filled out with a selective intake of the fittest 20 year
olds conscripted for two years of very harsh and brutal but effective training. During the
residual reserve period, there were weekly range practices, physical hardening, training
in night fighting and landings from sea. 43 And, as noted earlier, by the time of the
Papuan Campaign, the IJA had also had considerable combat experience during the
Sino-Japanese War.
The long experience of the IJA in China fighting a guerrilla war without road networks
had also made it proficient in off-road mobility. Marching 40 km a day for days on end
was part of its training, each man carrying five days self-cooked rations and personal
camouflage. The IJA had a cadre of long serving NCOs which was very experienced in
platoon level unit tactics employing infiltration by flank movements, covered by
immediately available weapons such as light machine guns, battalion guns and „knee
mortars‟ (grenade launchers), backed up by semi portable artillery pieces. Although
these tactics required manoeuvre in larger groups, they were still very suitable for jungle
warfare, and explain the commonly held contemporary belief that the Japanese had
actually been trained for it.44
However, fighting guerrillas led to some weaknesses. Overconfidence led to
underestimation of logistic difficulties and of Allied strength. There was a temptation to
disperse strength in flanking and enveloping forces which could be more easily
outnumbered by Allied forces when beyond mutual support from their main force, and
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separately defeated.45 In defence, however, the Japanese were adept at digging pits with
overhead protection which protected bunkers containing heavy machine guns firing to a
flank. 46 An example of these defensive systems was found at Oivi, 47 and would be
found at both Gona and Sanananda.
The IJA was also pervaded by a warrior cult of innate moral superiority and, as noted
earlier, hardness, harsh discipline, and random physical brutality in training. The belief
was that such training would produce a spirit that would overcome the material
superiority of enemies and the physical difficulties of field conditions. Shame at
surrender or failure was socially inculcated to encourage fighting to a glorious death.
Japanese infantry regiments were also regionally based which contributed to high unit
cohesion reinforced by a social ethos binding every Japanese in the community to
service and sacrifice for the Emperor.48
The main infantry protagonist of the Australians in Papua, the 144th Regiment, came
from Kochi on Shikoku. It was made up of farmers, fishermen and some urban workers.
The 144th Regiment had seen three years service in China from 1937 to 1940 and was
thus a mix of veteran reservists and new conscripts. While not jungle trained 49 the
regiment was a professional force. 50 It fought the Australians at Ioribaiwa and at
Sanananda. The 41st Infantry Regiment came from Fukuyama City, an administrative
and manufacturing centre near Hiroshima. It had served in Shanghai, as an occupation
force in French Indochina and had fought both the British and Australians defending

45

Dennis Showalter, „Storm over the Pacific: Japan‟s road to empire and war‟ in D Marston (ed.), The
Pacific War Companion, From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2005, p. 22 and
Gordon L. Rottman, Japanese Army in World War Two: Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942, Osprey
Publishing, Oxford, 2005 p 144.
46

English and Gudmundsson, On Infantry, pp. 138-141.

47

McCarthy, South West Pacific – First Year, p.329.

48

, Showalter, „Storm over the Pacific‟, p.22.

49

Collie and Marutani, Infinite Sorrow, pp. 48-52.

50

Showalter, „Storm over the Pacific‟, p. 16.

71

Malaya and Singapore.51 Its arrival in Papua was piecemeal and it was under strength.
The regiment played little part in the fighting in the Owen Stanley Range,52 but was
heavily defeated at Oivi. Remnants opposed the Australians and Americans on the
Sanananda road.
Infantry regimental and battalion weapon systems
The setting of this thesis at battalion level involves comparing the three nations‟ armies
up to that level and the one above – the regiment/brigade. There were many similarities,
but there was an important difference in fighting power. The following summary is not
intended to be a highly technical description: rather it provides an overview of the
physical components of the fighting power of each of the three armies in Papua. The
authorised establishments given below always differ from the strength posted to the
unit. This in turn differs from the actual strength at any point because the number of
men entering and surviving combat episodes varied greatly. The number of heavier
supporting weapons carried into the campaign was frequently less than the number on
issue because of the difficulties of movement or portability and falling manpower.
Where available, the actual number of participants and the type of weapons present will
be given in each case study.
Three battalions made up a regiment or brigade in all three armies. Organisationally, a
battalion is a hierarchy of three levels of sub unit teams, the lowest of which, in the
three armies in 1942, was a section/squad structured around a single light machine gun
or automatic rifle. Three of these made up a platoon and, being considered tactically
indivisible, 53 were intended to be manoeuvred by its commander. The establishment
strength of the primary groups in the three armies in Papua was: an Australian section
of 10, a US squad of 12 and a Japanese squad of 13 men, and platoon strength as
follows: Australian 35, American 45, Japanese 53 men. Three rifle platoons made up a
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rifle company. The adjective „rifle‟ does not refer to weapons carried, but is used to
distinguish these sub units from the supporting weapons sections, platoons or
companies which made up a battalion. An Australian company was 115 strong; the
American was 192; and the Japanese was 177.
US regiments and the Japanese 144th Regiment had three rifle companies per battalion,
but Australian battalions and those of the Japanese 41st Regiment had four smaller rifle
companies.54 Since some battalions had four rifle companies but others had three, the
number of men in the infantry battalion combat element of all three armies was very
similar - usually between 400 and 470. (The balance of the numbers, to a total of about
750, was in the battalions‟ combat fire support and service support elements, and not in
close combat as defined in the Introduction.) The number of squad sized elements with
a light machine gun was 27 in nine platoons in an American battalion or a Japanese
battalion from the 144th Regiment, but 36 in the Australian battalions or a Japanese
battalion from the Japanese 41st Regiment which had 12 platoons. In open country
where targets were easily visible this was a substantial difference in firepower, but in
close country it would make less difference.
However, the fighting power of Australian infantry was relatively weaker because of far
fewer supporting weapons. The Americans and the Japanese had layers of heavier
weapons. An Australian platoon commander had an extra element of fire power in the
form of a 2-inch mortar, whilst the Japanese equivalent had a fourth squad with three 50
millimetre grenade launchers. Visibility and foliage in Papua severely affected the
accuracy of such combat support weapons but their moral effects could be high, as an
Australian company was outnumbered nine to three in such short range indirect fire
weapons. The American platoons had no equivalent, but each US rifle company had a
Weapons Platoon with three 60 mm mortars and four air cooled tripod mounted
machine guns. Neither the Japanese nor the Australians could match this firepower.
There was another layer of supporting weapons at battalion level. Australian battalions
were the lightest of the three with two 3-inch mortars in a Mortar platoon. A
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disadvantage of converting Australian Militia Battalions to the AIF organisation in 1942
was that they lost their medium machine guns and thus a layer of supporting fire. The
Japanese and Americans had a Heavy Weapons Company equipped with six or eight
battalion guns or 81 mm mortars, and a similar number of tripod-mounted machine
guns. A pair of these guns was frequently grouped with a rifle company and carried
forward in an attack.
At the next level up – the regimental/brigade level – the Americans and Japanese also
had another layer of supporting weapons which was not available to Australian
brigades. This consisted of infantry guns and direct fire anti-tank guns which were often
used against infantry and bunkers. While in the interests of logistic economy for the
overland trek, their numbers had been curtailed, the Japanese performed the
extraordinary feat of carrying battalion and regimental heavy weapons into the Owen
Stanley Range, but the Australians left the majority their mortars behind to save troop
and porter loads.
It is apparent that an Australian battalion in the Papuan campaign was considerably less
well supported by its organic firepower, and that every level in an Australian brigade
had lower fighting power than the equivalent level in the American or the Japanese
regiments. This was because the Australians were without the usual (in other theatres)
allotment of artillery, anti-tank and medium machine gun fire from elsewhere in the
division or corps as British doctrine laid down. At this level (that of the South Seas
Force), the Japanese had mountain guns attached, which were also carried into the
Owen Stanley Range. The Japanese superiority in supporting firepower was
considerable and corresponded with an Australian weakness. The limiting factors which
might have redressed this imbalance were the logistic problems of carriage of weapons
with sufficient ammunition and the difficulties of target acquisition in the foliage.
Before proceeding to the first case study, the sources and literature on which the thesis
has depended will be discussed.
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Chapter 3: Review of literature and sources

This chapter begins with the general histories of the Papuan campaign before examining
the specific sources and literature used for the case studies themselves. The United
States participation in the Papuan campaign has not attracted much American coverage
in the historiography of the Second World War, and within that, most attention is given
to the Buna sector. Australian source material is more plentiful. Belatedly, there is a
small, and growing, body of work in English that looks at the Japanese side of the story.
In terms of primary sources, the Australian material was mainly drawn from the
Australian War Memorial (AWM), including the digitised files on its website. The
AWM‟s sources were supplemented by material from the National Library of Australia.
The American records were researched at the National Archives and Records
Administration at College Park, Maryland USA.1 The Japanese primary sources were
drawn in part from wartime translations of captured records by the Allied Translation
and Interpreter Service (ATIS) now held by the AWM or those quoted in recent
scholarly secondary works.
General Histories
The Allied official histories - the American Samuel Milner‟s, Victory in Papua (1957),
and the Australian Dudley McCarthy‟s, South-West Pacific Area- First Year First Year
(1959), provided the early, apparently authoritative, accounts of the Papuan campaign.
They included summaries of the Japanese side of the story, necessarily limited to
captured documentation. Nearly fifty years were to elapse between these works and the
publication of Steven Bullard‟s 2007 translation of the Japanese Official History,
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The filing system at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), in College Park, MD,
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Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, first published in Japanese in
1969-70. Bullard‟s work provides an essential corrective to unreliable assessments of
the Japanese actions in the campaign in the Allied official histories and in the general
published literature.
The authors of the official histories of all three countries exchanged comments or had
access to each other‟s work during their respective writing stages. For instance, Samuel
Milner often cited a draft of Dudley McCarthy‟s work. Gavin Long, the General Editor
of the Australian official history, corresponded with Samuel Milner about criticism of
the performance of the Australian Militia in a draft by Milner, suggesting it was too
influenced by 1942 evaluations biased towards obtaining more American troops for
MacArthur‟s command.2 In turn, Milner‟s opinion of the readiness of the Militia may
also have been confirmed by his post war correspondence with Lieutenant General
Rowell who remained convinced that the AIF should have been sent sooner to Port
Moresby. Steven Bullard notes that the writers of the Japanese official history were
assisted by the already published works of the Australian and American official
historians.3
Because of these collaborations, the three official histories cannot be uncritically
accepted as independently corroborating each other. Furthermore, all were first
published before the 1974 release of information about Allied signals intelligence and
code breaking, which had been kept secret after 1945, necessarily affecting campaign
narratives. It is now known that there was considerable Allied foreknowledge of
Japanese intentions and dispositions which influenced General MacArthur‟s actions.4 In
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this respect, Ed Drea‟s MacArthur‟s Ultra. Codebreaking and the war against Japan,
1942-1945 (1992), is a work of the greatest importance.

5

Reliance on the Allied official histories has influenced the majority of subsequent works
on the campaign. Like the official histories, they overestimate the Japanese strength on
the Kokoda Trail, misunderstand the intentions of the Japanese, including their
decisions to withdraw, leading sometimes to rationalisation of Allied failure, and at
other times, to overstated claims of Allied tactical success. As Hank Nelson argued,
similar reliance on the official histories by unit historians has at times weakened the
valuable first hand experiences contained in their unit histories. Most campaign and unit
histories must be treated with reservations because they lack input from the Japanese
source material.6
Australian official history and secondary sources.
McCarthy‟s South West Pacific Area – First Year, while still used as a source for most
overviews of the campaign, has become dated because of later scholarship. Even at the
time it was being written, the author did not always use all primary sources then
available, leading to omissions and misinterpretations. McCarthy‟s work, while an
indispensible starting point, needs careful checking against other sources. He accepted
the prevailing views of his time about Japanese strength and intentions, which makes
his interpretations of events flawed. His work was not footnoted, making it difficult to
trace some of his material. Files of his research notes, correspondence and consultations
with participants do not appear to exist in the National Library of Australia or
Australian War Memorial holdings, although there are some drafts in both places.

5
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For decades, Raymond Paull‟s Retreat from Kokoda: The Australian Campaign in New
Guinea 1942, published in 1958, has been cited in the secondary literature.7 It, too, is
dated by later scholarship. Heavily influenced by the senior commanders during the
withdrawal phase of operations in the Owen Stanley Range, 8 he is often uncritical of
them. Possibly to emphasise the combat performance of the 39th Battalion on the main
Kokoda Trail, he over emphasised the performance inadequacies of the 53rd Battalion
which was dispersed by companies over wide distances. His representation consciously
placed „the retreat from Kokoda‟ at the centre of the narrative, devoting only one
chapter to driving the Japanese out of the Owen Stanley Range, and covering the battles
of the beachhead in only one page. This lack of balance created a Kokoda myth as an
extension of the Anzac myths. 9 Nevertheless Paull also had access to many of the
journalists and the junior military participants in the Kokoda Trail operations and some
of the Japanese records which had been captured and translated. Some of his
conclusions about Ioribaiwa, which are discussed below, suggest that he collaborated
with Dudley McCarthy or they had common sources.
Colonel E. G. ( Eustace) Keogh, editor of the Australian Army Journal from 1948 to
1964, wrote a single volume history: The South West Pacific 1941-1945. In it, he
provided some sharply critical evaluations of the Australian commanders and events
that differed from the then dominant narratives of Paull and McCarthy.10 He effectively
summarised the logistic difficulties and the influence of the Guadalcanal campaign on
the Papuan campaign. There is a thoughtful critique of the operations in Papua with
trenchant criticisms of some commanders and HQ staff, but Keogh offered alternatives
for consideration. He also gave fair and perceptive treatment to the American combat
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performance at a time when it tended to be disparaged on nationalist grounds by others,
including McCarthy. He filled a void between the detailed and less critical official
history and an accurate, readable but insightful summary of the campaigns.11
There was a pause in professional historical writing until David Horner‟s Crisis of
Command followed by High Command, and The Commanders, which contains his
essays on Blamey, Rowell, and Vasey, and a Horner edited essay by Stuart Sayers on
Herring.

12

They are capped by Horner‟s General Vasey‟s War and Blamey, the

Commander in Chief 13which bring together his earlier work. While pitched well above
the level of study for this thesis, they provide the essential background to the problems
faced by the Australian generalship in the campaign, and their effect on the battalions in
combat.
Peter Brune from 1991 to 2003 made the major recent contribution to the campaign‟s
general historiography. His major work, A Bastard of a Place: the Australians in Papua
constitutes a summary of his thesis14 and three earlier books based on primary sources
and oral history. The rich details at the individual soldier‟s level and the afterthoughts
of the participants were of great value in illuminating the soldiers‟ experience. His
record of the oral history of veterans (gathered from 1988 but particularly over the three
years 1992-1994) was especially important as their advancing age has now thinned their
ranks. By following a painstaking methodology, Brune demonstrated the value of
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detailed checking of the Official Historian‟s findings at Milne Bay,

15

but he

insufficiently checked the official account of the Kokoda Trail and beachhead battles.
Lex McAulay compiled a thorough two volume chronicle of the Papuan campaign,
Blood and Iron and To the Bitter End, published in the 1990s.16 It is an early example of
including the episodic, captured documents translated by the wartime Allied Translator
and Interpreter Section (ATIS)17 to give more Japanese perspectives than other works.
As a chronicle, his work gives little analysis of the information it compiles. Paul Ham‟s
secondary account of the campaign is marred by acceptance of the Official History‟s
inaccurate account. 18 Ham interviewed three veterans of the 144th Regiment and used
McAulay and Japanese primary sources in the AWM. Frank Sublet, a senior officer
veteran and historian, also evaluated command decisions in those parts of the campaign
in Papua in which he had participated in Kokoda to the Sea: A history of the 1942
Campaign in Papua, published in 2000.19 He provided a substantially accurate firsthand account of Ioribaiwa, amplified by an early (1980) translation of some of the
accounts in the Japanese official history, which will be discussed later.
The secondary sources for doctrine need mentioning at this point. The official doctrine
was outlined briefly in Chapter 2. In 1942, the Australian army was operating on British
Commonwealth standard doctrine with only minor amendments. The manuals were
used in every case study to provide contemporary tactical insight into the actual
operations being conducted.20 A thesis by Adrian Threlfall, on „The Development of
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Australian Army Jungle Warfare Doctrine and Training, 1941-1945‟, rounded out those
contemporary sources both by providing Australian detail and by its emphasis on
adaptive learning and its transmission throughout an organisation. His focus on the
Second AIF left a gap to be covered where Militia battalions were concerned. His thesis
was complemented by many papers in the Chief of Army‟s Military History Conference
2003 The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943-1944, which, although
covering the years after the Papuan campaign 1942, reflected the adaptation in doctrine
to lessons earlier learned in Papua.
American Official History and secondary sources
An official account of the campaign by the United States Army Center of Military
History, with excellent sketch maps made after the Japanese positions on the Sanananda
road had been captured, was published in 1945.21 This account deals with each of the
three bridgehead sectors separately, rather than the chronological approach used by the
Australian and American official historians, which makes for clarity. The work,
prepared by professional historians shortly after the events, was based on participant
interviews and primary sources, many of which are now lost because they were not
footnoted.

British Army, Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Organisation and Administration, 1930, HMSO,
reprinted in Melbourne with amendments 1940.
British Army, Field Service Regulations, Volume II, Operations-General, 1935, HMSO and Government
Printer Melbourne, reprinted with amendments 1939.
British Army, Field Service Regulations, Volume III, Operations-Higher Formations, 1935, HMSO
reprinted in Melbourne.
British Army, Infantry Training: Training and War 1937, HMSO and Government Printer Melbourne.
Australian Military Forces, Infantry Section Leading, 1939.
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Samuel Milner‟s thorough and footnoted American official history of the land
campaign, Victory in Papua was comprehensive in its coverage of logistics and the air
situation as they affected the ground fighting. Milner kept detailed records of his
contacts, source documents and the process of editing his work. While he was writing,
he consulted by mail various parties, including Australians, and sought their comments,
which he filed even when he did not use them in the text. These post-war records of
interview include comment on drafts of the volume by important participants and the
staff of the US Chief Historian. Their views were not imposed on the author, which
demonstrates official dedication to critical analysis. The frank staff criticisms and
suggestions for Milner‟s drafts, even if not accepted by him as author, contributed
alternative opinions for this thesis. Examples include the comments of several historians
that the 32nd Division was poorly led and trained. Milner was thought to be
insufficiently sceptical of self-serving comments of senior officers trying to excuse their
decision to send it into combat and their bad leadership. He was also thought to have
overstated the difficulties the Americans were having and to have understated those of
the Japanese.22
Some discussion of American tactical doctrine at battalion level has already occurred in
Chapter 2. It is evident in the Australian accounts that McCarthy, and perhaps the
Australian commanders in 1942, did not understand the US tactical doctrine and
terminology in use at the time, and therefore the methods used by the two US
regimental commanders fighting under Australian senior officers. This common
problem between allies does not place either party‟s tactics beyond criticism, so the
United States Field Service Regulations and related material have guided the case
studies to provide alternative interpretations to those found in most of the Australian
literature. 23 Christopher Gable provided practical insight in The US Army GHQ
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maneuvers of 1941 (1991), with support from essays by Jay Luvaas 24 and Martin
Blumenson25 into the doctrine and post- mobilisation training of the National Guard,
and the problems revealed in the 1941 manoeuvres, including the inability to conduct
remedial training before the American divisions were sent to Australia. These
weaknesses particularly affected the combat readiness of American troops for their first
battle.26
Japanese sources
In 1980 Tanaka Kengoro published Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces
in the Papua New Guinea Theatre during World War II. It used selected sections of the
Japanese official histories of the war in New Guinea, including some battle maps, to
create an English language summary of the Japanese side of the war there. 27 Frank
Sublet‟s Kokoda to the Sea is apparently the only secondary work that used this source.
Tanaka has been supplanted by Bullard‟s translation of the Japanese official history,
Japanese Army Operations, although its structure and style is difficult for English
readers to follow. This work became the raw material in the thesis for a detailed
calculation of the order of battle of the Japanese forces down to company level, which is
further discussed below in the review of literature and sources for the case studies.
In 2008, a thesis by Peter Williams used fresh translations of Japanese primary records
to greatly expand understanding of how the Kokoda campaign unfolded differently from
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the Japanese plan.28 This thesis, now published as The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth
and Reality,29 is of such fundamental importance to an Australian understanding of the
Papuan Campaign, that it renders obsolete the version of Japanese intentions and
strength published in the official histories and commonly accepted by subsequent
authors. It does not attempt, however, as thorough a re-evaluation of the Allied side,
and its lack of insight into how Australian military operations were conducted, does not
match its understanding of the Japanese.
In the last two years, understanding of the Japanese side of the campaign has been
extended. In The Path of Infinite Sorrow – The Japanese on the Kokoda Track (2009),
Craig Collie and Hajimi Marutani used numerous works in Japanese, the ATIS
translations already referred to, and ten interviews with Japanese veterans, six of whom
were survivors of the campaign. The authors‟ reliance on older Australian secondary
sources has led to errors about the Allied side but the Japanese side of the account is
reliable when checked with Japanese Army Operations.30 Charles Happel‟s The Bone
Man of Kokoda relies on unverified narratives in interviews with one veteran Japanese
(Nishimura), it was not relied upon for its account of events, but one photograph of a
map is discussed in the sources for the Ioribaiwa case study below.31 Gordon Rottman‟s
Japanese Army in World War Two: Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942 provided the
technical data about Japanese weapons, doctrine and military organisation. 32
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Infantry

by English and Gudmundsson, a comparative study of different national

approaches to structure and use of infantry forces in the twentieth century, contained
insights into the disadvantages of the light weapon power in Australian infantry units
compared to the heavy weapons capability of Japanese battalions and regiments. 33
Chapter Four of Eric Bergerud‟s Touched with Fire was very useful in bringing out the
practical effects of these differences on fighting in jungle.34
War diaries, unit histories, other secondary literature and sources
This thesis seeks to understand the processes of battalion combat readiness and progress
to effectiveness. To do this, secondary works are usually too general unless they focus
on a single battle in some detail. Even then, many battalion level questions remain
without clear answers. Consequently, each battalion‟s file of its wartime records became
the main primary source used for this thesis. These records are called war diaries in the
British/Australian system. The Americans used a similar system of records though the
use of separate numbered folders rather than appendices to a single file makes it
difficult to be sure that all information can be located. Throughout this thesis, the term
„war diary‟ will be used generally for either nationality‟s records unless the distinction
is important. Their importance to the thesis warrants a brief discussion of their creation,
uses and limitations.
A unit‟s war diary is a file prepared in accordance with regulations on a monthly basis
when on active service, containing documentary material „to furnish a historical record
of operations‟. 35 Forms headed C2118 War Diary were used to record events in
date/time sequence and give a reference to documents arranged as appendices to the file.
The American system of a daily journal was similar. In practice, an initial record of the
routine, pre-planned and apparently spontaneous events was compiled as they were
reported to the battalion HQ, frequently in pencil notebooks or logs. This initial record
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280-347.
35

British Army, Field Service Regulations, Volume I, section 174, pp. 273- 276.

85

was later interpreted, structured, and edited into a coherent and accurate account of
events then chronicled on the sequenced C2118 sheets or Daily Journals (US),
supported by appendices of documents and maps. War diaries rarely recorded events
below company level. Patrol reports were an exception, completed by the patrol
commander whatever his rank and the size of the patrol, but these were rarely kept, even
when patrols had been recorded on the diary sheet.
The war diary sheets were often typed well after the event (sometimes months
according to date stamps). Supporting documents were sometimes found in the files of
later time periods or only as copies in the files of other units. The completeness of
document retention greatly varied across the units studied, which required wider search
through the diaries of adjacent and higher units in the order of battle to find missing
items. Commanders wrote a personalised summary of operations at intervals, reflecting
their views of events and „to provide data upon which to base future improvements in
army training, equipment, organisation and administration‟.36 These were of great value.
Mapping at a scale and detail suited to tactical use is essential for the battalion level of
analysis used in this thesis. Firstly, it enables understanding of the topography;
secondly, in the war diary files, marked tactical maps, overlays or sketches and grid
references in documents usually provide a major resource for understanding a battle, by
revealing the grouping of fighting elements and their location or the routes they used.
As a general observation, there were great variations in the quality and quantity of
primary material in the war diary files at the Australian War Memorial and in the
records at the United States National Archives and Records Administration. The laconic
nature of the entries was often inadequate to create a full picture, making the use of
other sources in the file a necessary part of the study. The original notebooks, written
message forms or logs of phone and radio messages were not always retained on file
after a line record was compiled and summary reports written. When this material was
available to compare the diarised record to the contemporaneous one, it could reveal the
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variations, probably made because of oral input from participants or editing decisions
about relevance.
This highlights the problem with the use of war diaries in a study like this one. They are
constructed records in which there were many opportunities for inaccuracy, distortion
and different interpretations.37 Although secondary works often cite a war diary as if it
was conclusive evidence, the process of recording events in combat challenges
understandings of primary and secondary records as conclusive explanations of what
occurred. Combat mostly takes place as a result of a plan and in accordance with it, or
coherent adjustments to it. These are capable of being recorded with clarity when they
emanate from a commander or through the HQ, but the varieties of experience in the
primary groups within a battalion were less likely to be recorded, particularly regarding
unplanned events or those initiated by the enemy. Despite these caveats, the war diary
files of the battalions‟ own records formed the pivotal material for the thesis.

Unit histories were also a valuable source for this thesis. They provide a view of battle
from the perspectives of a junior officer or soldier, which sometimes provided a
valuable contrast with the views and conclusions filed in the war diary files by staff
officers and commanders. Inevitably, all these sources and works, even the combat
records, are affected by the process of remembering, so that to study combat at battalion
level requires „peeling back deceptive layers of structure and intent‟, in what can only
be an attempt at reaching a faithful record of events. 38
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Ioribaiwa
General secondary sources used
The four most thorough secondary accounts of events on Ioribaiwa ridge curiously do
not provide an accurate or coherent narrative of the battle which culminated in the
withdrawal from Ioribaiwa by Brigadier Eather‟s force on 16 September, and provoked
what David Horner called the „crisis of command‟ in the Australian army when General
MacArthur made representations direct to the Australian Prime Minister about the
conduct of the campaign. It is still the most controversial episode in most Australian
accounts of the campaign. McCarthy‟s South-West Pacific Area- First Year (1959) and
Paull‟s Retreat from Kokoda (1958), described how the Australians were outnumbered
and outflanked at two locations on Ioribaiwa ridge and forced to withdraw. Much later
(2004), this narrative was still accepted in Brune‟s A Bastard of a Place and Ham‟s
Kokoda. However, Paull‟s work, although it incorrectly brings the decision forward by
one day, contains a good analysis of Brigadier Eather‟s reasons from withdrawing from
Ioribaiwa, which he seems to have obtained from Brigadier Porter, who concurred with
the decision. Steve Eather, a relative of Major General Kenneth Eather, and author of
Desert Sands, Jungle Lands (2003), had access to a family-held personal diary of the
then Brigadier Eather but depended for the most part on the secondary sources listed
above and shed little light on the Ioribaiwa narrative.39
These secondary works do not corroborate one another because, although the work by
McCarthy was published the year after Paull‟s, both accounts of the events at Ioribaiwa
contain a number of similar errors, suggesting collaboration between the two authors or
a common source. At other times they diverge. They both described two penetrations of
the Australian positions on the Ioribaiwa ridge, with the more critical one in a platoon
area incorrectly placed on the highest feature at the south eastern end. The Japanese
force on the western side of the ridge is described by Paull as a Japanese patrol, when it
actually was the attack of a Japanese battalion which was blocked by the 2/31 st
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Battalion. Paull, followed much later by Brune, Ham and Steve Eather but not
McCarthy, misplaces the 2/31st Battalion. All support the incorrect understanding of the
senior brigade commanders on the ridge, that the Australian counter attacks to recover
the high feature had merely blocked the enemy, who was continuing to outflank the
Australians there.40
From primary sources, it is beyond dispute that the Australian commander on the ridge,
Brigadier Kenneth Eather, had this understanding and decided to withdraw to Imita
ridge. But the truth of this outflanking, as distinct from a belief that it had occurred,
depends on topographically accurate locations of Australian troops relative to Japanese
troops. This was not available during the battle. A file in the AWM contains one draft
of McCarthy‟s chapter on Ioribaiwa, but there is another in the National Library of
Australia which contains a major correction. This correction was inconsistently applied
throughout the Official History‟s Chapter on Ioribaiwa, leading to the final publication
not reflecting what McCarthy actually wrote, but which Paull‟s account and those
following it reproduce. Details of this are in the case study Chapter 5.
Considerable evidence of the Japanese side of the story has been revealed from
Japanese sources, and has been compared with the Australian version. The strengths and
intentions of the Imperial Japanese Army are set out in Bullard‟s Japanese Army
Operations in the South Pacific Area. They confirm the assertion of Hank Nelson41 that
the Japanese strength facing Australians on the Kokoda Trail had been overstated, and
thus unappreciated in Allied Official Histories, and in virtually all secondary works.
Peter Williams in The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Reality has made a detailed
study of Japanese primary records of the battle for Ioribaiwa ridge to reveal the precise
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Japanese strength and artillery, and how the Japanese attack was modified during
execution.42
Unit histories
The errors in the major secondary sources, and the many subsequent reiterations in the
secondary literature, have remained the accepted view, even though they were
challenged in 1992 when Colin Kennedy, who was present at the battle, collected
surviving veterans‟ recollections to compile and self-publish a unit history of the 3rd
Battalion, Port Moresby to Gona Beach: 3rd Australian Infantry Battalion 1942. 43
Kennedy asserted that a Japanese company attack penetrated an Australian platoon‟s
defended area but was driven out. He provided survivors‟ distinctive topographic
descriptions of where this occurred and which platoon was involved. His narrative is
validated by the work of Williams.
The unit history of the other Australian battalion selected for the case study of the
battle of Ioribaiwa was William Crooks‟ 1971 history of the 2/33rd Battalion, The
Footsoldiers: The story of the 2/33rd Australian Infantry Battalion AIF in the War of
1939-1945.44 Crooks did not seek to shield his unit‟s difficulties, acknowledging that
the battalion‟s performance in both its early campaigns (Syria and Papua) left a lot to be
desired. Focus on his own battalion meant that he depended on South-West Pacific
Area- First Year, for the wider account and locations of the 3rd Battalion, which, it has
been pointed out, are problematic. However, his detailed narratives in the text were very
reliable when tested against other records at the AWM, and the Japanese accounts of the
battle. Crooks let his personal experience come through the vividly detailed account of
the counter attacks by the 2/33rd Battalion and, at the time he wrote he had many
informants about events elsewhere in his unit. Crooks also contributed extended
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interviews, quoted by Eric Bergerud in his Touched with Fire, the Land War in the
South Pacific, which shed light on the workings of an Australian infantry battalion of
the period.
Primary sources
The war diary files of the six battalions and the two brigade HQs on Ioribaiwa ridge,
and those of higher HQs, were necessary to obtain a good understanding of the events.
Only one original HQ log of events at battalion level seems to be on file – that of the 3rd
Battalion.45 It was filed in the war diary file of the short-lived 3rd/22nd Battalion of 1943.
It contained material not transcribed into the 3rd Battalion war diary which is of the
utmost importance in understanding the battle, particularly the successful Australian
counter attack on the Japanese lodgement in a platoon area of the 3rd Battalion which
has usually been described as a failure.
Mapping
Fighting by both sides at Ioribaiwa ridge was conducted without maps at the level of
scaled topographic detail suitable for tactical use.

46

As a result, most Australian

primary records contain descriptions of the terrain rather than grid references which can
make precise locations obscure to later readers. The words used in the primary records
and the understanding of distant commanders are examined in Chapter 5, to uncover the
most probable locations of the Australian battalions and their understanding of the
Japanese attack.
Bill James‟ Field Guide to the Kokoda Track, prepared for trekkers on the Kokoda
Trail, was extremely helpful being based on ground reconnaissance. 47 Its author agreed
that the findings of this thesis could be processed by computer graphics onto modern
maps by his publisher and colleague, Peter Murray. Their assistance was vital to the
Ioribaiwa case study in developing a more accurate topography on which has been
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superimposed the Australian and Japanese locations and a fresh version of the battle
derived from analysis of primary sources and the unit histories of both battalions
involved in the case study. The ground on the ridge which this thesis will argue was
actually occupied by the 3rd Battalion, has been the subject of field reconnaissance
conducted by Rowan Tracey on 26 October 2010. 48 The account of the battle in
Chapters 5 and 6 has also been confirmed by interview with Mr. Bede Tongs MM, who
was an acting platoon commander at Ioribaiwa ridge. An unsourced photograph of part
of a different Japanese sketch map showing the same structure of the attack on the 3rd
Battalion at Ioribaiwa which is consistent with, and adds further detail to, the other
Japanese sources.49
Sanananda
General secondary sources
Historians have described the more-or less simultaneous attacks on the three enclaves of
the Japanese bridgehead between November 1942 and January 1943 by switching their
narratives back and forth in a chronological approach. As the three enclaves were not
mutually supporting, this approach complicates understanding of the battle at brigade
and battalion level at each enclave. Linking the separated narratives of events on the
Sanananda road was essential to give coherence to the case studies there. With the
exception of Keogh, Australian secondary works lack a perspective of logistic
difficulties which dominated the campaign strategically and often operationally and
tactically. The influence on ground operations of problems with air and sea-borne
logistics are better covered by the American Victory in Papua.
Dudley McCarthy‟s account in South West Pacific Area – First Year lacks clarity and
accuracy regarding the activities and locations of the American units at Sanananda. It
omits the first combat attacks which brought the 36th Battalion to mutiny, although they
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are frankly disclosed in the unit war diary. As a consequence many secondary accounts
also omit these episodes yet they are important in this study of the combat readiness of
infantry battalions. McCarthy had little information on the enemy dispositions or the
nature of their bunkers and gave only approximate locations, although the numbers were
accurate. This made it difficult to reconstruct the battle from the enemy perspective.
Milner‟s Victory in Papua was more reliable with particularly good sketch maps. The
enemy intentions made clear in Bullard‟s Japanese Army Operations in the South
Pacific Area led to a re-evaluation of the narrative in South West Pacific Area-First
Year, where American and Militia „failure‟ in these attacks is followed by AIF
„success‟.
Unit histories
The Brigg brothers, in Ike‟s Marines – The 36th Australian Infantry Battalion 19391945,50 provided the unit history for the 36th Battalion. Supervised by a unit committee,
it ignored (in both editions) a brief but frank and revealing history of the unit in an
appendix attached to the 36th Battalion‟s war diary,51 along with the forceful criticisms
of the battalion by Brigadier Porter published in South West Pacific Area-First Year.
The unit history of the 55th/53rd Battalion, That Mob,52 was written by a former platoon
commander, Frank Budden, who participated in the first combat experience of the
55th/53rd Battalion – the attack of 7 December 1942. His account is rich in detail of
events but cannot be relied upon for a wider view because of his resentment of the antiMilitia prejudice prevailing in 1942, and his unbalanced view of Brigadier Porter.
The unit history of the 2/12th Battalion, Alexander Graeme- Evans‟ Of Storms and
Rainbows is a model of research into the relevant literature and archives, consultation
with veterans and inclusion of their anecdotes, followed by a full analysis of the
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material to attempt a final description and judgement of events.53 It demonstrates that,
once the tanks were destroyed, the battalion faced the same limited chances of
advancing against machine guns in bunkers in the Japanese positions as had the
Americans and the Militia. Gordon Dickens‟ Never late: the story of the 2/9th Infantry
Battalion 1939-1945 provided an account of the 2/9th Battalion‟s attack over the ground
previously attacked by the 36th Battalion, providing useful corroborating material on
this point.54
The history of the 2/7th Cavalry‟s battle used as a case study in this thesis was
reconstructed from two secondary sources. The events were particularly well described
by the regimental padre from his personal knowledge of events in Sanananda InterludeThe 7th Aust. Division Cavalry Regiment, published in 1949.55 However, as one would
expect, his book is not an expert tactical exposition. Nevertheless, he sketched in it the
route taken by the Regiment and its squadrons in its battle. This is the only documentary
evidence of that route that was discovered (Figure 10.2). Stuart Coppock, the son of
one of the participants in the battle, maintains a large web site, which contains
transcripts of oral recollections by survivors of the tragic experience.56 They are posted
as they were recorded and required a process of reconciliation with the other sources,
but enabled a detailed reconstruction of the battle.
It has already been observed that American coverage of the Sanananda road operations
of the American regiments is limited. A small section of The 32nd Division in World

53

Alexander L. Graeme- Evans, Of Storms and Rainbows; The story of the men of the 2/12thth Battalion
AIF, Vol. II, March 1942- January 1946, 2/12 Battalion Association, Hobart, 1991.

54

Gordon Dickens, Never late: the story of the 2/9th Infantry Battalion 1939-1945, AMHP, 2005, p 224227.
55

Francis J. Hartley, Sanananda Interlude-The 7th Aust. Division Cavalry Regiment, Melbourne Book
Depot, 1949.
56

Stuart Coppock, First Action: The 2/7th Cavalry at the Battle of Sanananda, October 1942-January

1943, (e-book), http://www.2nd7thcavalry.com/ follow link to „PNG 1942-43‟, last accessed 18
December 2010.

94

War II „The Red Arrow‟, a 32nd Division history by Major General H W Blakeley
covering American units fighting at Sanananda was useful. 57 James Campbell‟s The
Ghost Mountain Boys, a history of the 2nd/126th battalion, was valuable for background
into the 126th Regiment called up in October 1940.58
Martin J Kidston, From Poplar to Papua: Montana‟s 163rd Infantry Regiment in World
War II, is a slim unit history on the experiences of the 163rd Regiment, 41st US Division,
from 1942 to 1945. This work devoted 35 pages to the initial combat episode on the
Sanananda road out of a total of 159 pages. His narrative appears to depend on Victory
in Papua, but contained interviews with veterans conducted in 2003 and 2004. 59 It was
unreliable when compared to the primary records.
Though a more general work, Eric Bergerud‟s Touched with Fire, The Land War in the
South Pacific, contains much material, including veteran‟s interviews, which gave an
insider background to the way an American battalion operated, and some specific detail
on the combat on the Sanananda road which is not found elsewhere.60
Material on American tactical doctrine obtained from websites was extensively used,
both to understand what the Americans were trying to achieve, and to shed light on
strong Australian criticisms of the American tactics.
Primary sources
The Australian primary sources were the war diary files for December 1942 and
January 1943 of the ten battalions which spent some time on the Sanananda road, four
brigade HQs and those of the HQ 7th Division. The discovery in one file of a captured
Japanese map materially helped interpretation of the decisions of higher HQs from mid-
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December 1942 onwards, which otherwise seem to be foolhardy. It reinforces the point
made earlier that copies of documents in the files of other units can be very helpful, but
it also raises the question of why they were not retained by more appropriate units. The
incomplete document retention leaves open the path to new discoveries and
interpretations.
When considering the Australian performance, two sources provide an unusual level of
detail. The first came from the commander of the 30th Brigade, Brigadier Porter. He
wrote two memoranda to HQ 7th Division which provide considerable information, and
some allegations, about the performance of two Militia battalions. The second source is
the particularly detailed war diary of the 55th/53rd Battalion, notably its account of the
attack on 19 December in six and a half C2118 sheets and seven appendices. The
amount of material arouses suspicion that there was some particular motive in
attempting to provide such a full record. A reason may have been because it was known
Porter‟s reports were already on file. The C2118 forms in the war diary of the 55th/53rd
Battalion were date stamped 28 September 1943, ten months after Porter‟s criticisms,
illustrating the point made earlier about the records being a later constructed narrative.
The Commander Officer signed them in person, whereas many war diaries are signed by
staff officer. This decision led to the filing in the war diary of written accounts of the
attack of 19 December 1942 from a number of junior individuals.61 This is rare in the
many war diaries studied for this thesis. Transcription by a single hand of some of these
reports is apparent. The rewriting could be for legibility, as they seem too rich in
graphic detail to be tendentious.
The American primary sources at the National Archives and Records Administration in
Maryland are comprehensive. The civilian style notebook/logs for the detachments of
the regiment on the Sanananda road were part of the files, and provide detailed insight
into the activities and attitudes of Major Boerem‟s Detachment of 1/126th Regiment.
The files also contain some informal company level histories which give valuable detail
of events at that level in the 163rd Regiment.
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Mapping
On the Sanananda road, wartime mapping and sketches were available. Images from
these sources are used to illustrate the arguments in Chapters 7 to 10. As combat at
battalion level took place over little more than four map squares, the Map Gona Locality
(Revised) dated 5 December 1942 was not as helpful to analyse Australian operations as
the battalion enlarged sketch maps were, even when quality was uneven. The map
Gona Locality (Revised) and some others are reproduced in the Map Appendix at the
end of the thesis.
Battalion sketch maps of American operations either were not customarily made or have
not survived. Occasionally, a sketch enlargement drawn by the Intelligence Section of
the 36th Battalion has been used in the case studies. Copies of an American
reproduction of the Australian Gona Locality (Revised) map marked up during or soon
after operations in 1942-43 have been used in the case studies and are reproduced in the
Map Appendix.
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Chapter 4: The combat readiness of the battalions in the 14th
Brigade
In Chapter 1, it was proposed that the combat readiness of an infantry battalion must be
assessed relative to a specific enemy and terrain, as distinct from it being an absolute
assessment. The combat readiness of the battalions in the Middle East in 1940-1941, for
example, was relatively greater than that of Italian army in the Libyan Desert, but not up
to the standard needed to fight the Germans in Greece. It is also possible that a battalion
could be combat ready to defend well prepared positions against a sea landing, but well
short of being combat ready to manoeuvre and attack.
In 1942, three decisions, which have been questioned in the literature, were made about
the Australian 14th Brigade which implied that its battalions were combat ready. Firstly,
the brigade was sent to by General Blamey to Port Moresby in May to assist in
defending it against seaborne landings. The second decision, by Lieutenant General
Rowell in September, was to send one of the 14th Brigade‟s three battalions, the 3rd
Battalion, into combat to assist the 21st Brigade on the Kokoda Trail, and the third,
again by General Blamey, was to send the other two battalions into action under the
command of HQ 30th Brigade on the Sanananda road in December. This chapter will
firstly discuss the decision to despatch the 14th Brigade to Port Moresby in May 1942,
showing how opinions by different officers could exist about combat readiness. The
chapter will then describe the circumstances surrounding the two decisions in the last
quarter of the year when the other two battalions of the 14th Brigade were committed to
combat.
The 14th Brigade before despatch to Port Moresby: 1940-1941
The combat readiness of a brigade can only be achieved after its three battalions are
fully trained. In April 1942, the three battalions of the 14th Brigade were the 3rd
Battalion, the 36th Battalion and the 55th Battalion. The 3rd Battalion had a long
peacetime existence in the Militia home training depots in the Canberra-Goulburn area.
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The 36th Battalion was formed at Ashfield – Haberfield in 1921 in the suburban
training depots of the much older St George‟s English Rifle Regiment. The 55th
Battalion, although linked with the 53rd Battalion from 1937 to 1941, was a long
standing unit with training depots in the inner western suburbs of Sydney from Forest
Lodge to Marrickville. Between 1921 and September 1941, the battalions of the 14 th
Brigade were part time units in the Australian army described in Chapter 2. Amongst
the brigade commanders in the 1930‟s had been Leslie Morshead (1931-1933) and
Arthur „Tubby‟ Allen (1933-1939), who had both also earlier commanded the 36th
Battalion and were now Major Generals in the Second AIF. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth
Eather had commanded the 3rd Battalion in 1937-38 and was now an AIF Brigadier.
These men were likely to have maintained the highest standards achievable in
peacetime.
Like the rest of the Militia, from 1940, the battalions of the 14th Brigade were rapidly
expanded and involved in the discontinuous training periods of the Militia in Australia.
This meant that, while the battalion officers and NCOs would be able to develop
considerable secondary group cohesion, primary group cohesion would be disrupted by
the broken periods of full time duty, induction of intakes of (compulsory) universal
trainees, and transfers out to the Second AIF.1 Primary group cohesion could partially
develop during the trimesters when the battalions were concentrated if they trained hard,
endured hardship, played sports and socialised, 2 but the groups would fracture when
each period ended. However, the departure of senior officers to raise the Second AIF
led to replacement by World War I veterans with less experience of inter-war service.
Standards were inevitably lowered as more junior experienced personnel also
volunteered. McCarthy denied that the Militia was maintained at a „second-line
standard‟,3 but his opinion has been questioned by Horner4 and Pratten, who cites the
opinion of many senior officers.5 The test would come in the Papuan campaign.
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The brigade commander in 1942 was Brigadier William Smith. He had been a
distinguished company commander in World War I. At the level of the battalion
commanding officers, only the 3rd Battalion was able to preserve some consistency. It
had been commanded and trained since August 1938 by a World War I veteran,
Lieutenant Colonel Albert Paul. The other battalions were less fortunate, because their
COs were selected to raise battalions in the Second AIF. While this is testimony to their
command qualities, it led to a weakening of their Militia units.
The 36th Battalion‟s CO since 1938, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Burrows, left to raise
the 2/13th Battalion in 1940, taking with him a large number of his officers, NCOs and
men.6 His place was taken by Lieutenant Colonel Muir Purser, a World War I battalion
commander, who remained until March 1942 until he was replaced, temporarily by a
Major until a Lieutenant Colonel could be found from the returning Second AIF.
Lieutenant Colonel Albert Brown, who had been a company commander in an infantry
battalion in World War 1 and had commanded a pioneer battalion during the siege of
Tobruk, was appointed on embarkation for New Guinea in May 1942, but after three
months in command at Port Moresby he too was transferred back to his old battalion on
7 September. A veteran of the Syrian campaign (Lieutenant Colonel Cedric Isaachsen)
was then posted as CO of the 36th Battalion.7
The CO of the then 55th /53rd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Vivian England, had been
transferred in 1939 to raise the 2/3rd Battalion. He was replaced by another World War I
veteran who also was replaced in October 1941, after his promotion to Brigadier and
command of another brigade.8 That same month, the numeral „53‟ was taken for use by
a new full time Militia unit from New South Wales to serve as part of the 30th Brigade
in Papua. From that point the Battalion was temporarily commanded by a major while
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awaiting a Second AIF replacement. The posting of the CO in the 55th Battalion was not
filled for about a year until Lieutenant Colonel David Lovell arrived on 19 September
1942.9 He was given no opportunity to intensively train his Battalion,10 which was the
reason why new officers with current AIF experience had been posted to Militia units.
The turbulence in the posting of COs to the 36th Battalion and the 55th Battalion would
probably have weakened their culture and secondary cohesion. Yet the importance of
the CO in battalion training, efficiency and discipline was well known.11 The dilatory
approach of the Australian army to the filling of these two postings is remarkable,
considering the vital role of the CO in creating a culture of combat effectiveness, which
was emphasised as part of the discussion of Kirke‟s theory of battalion social structure
examined in Chapter 1.
Despatch to Port Moresby
Strategic background to the decision
From 1941, holding Port Moresby was an essential component of Australia‟s defence. A
pre-Pearl Harbor initiative to increase the battalion garrison at Port Moresby to a full
brigade (the 30th Brigade, newly raised from October 1941 by drafts from other Militia
battalions and some untrained troops) was completed by January 1942 in anticipation of
a Japanese landing from the sea, which was considered the most probable Japanese
course of action. In February and March, the desirability of further reinforcing the Port
Moresby garrison had been recognised by the Australian Chiefs of Staff and the
Advisory War Council, but it could not be met until the sea lanes were secure. 12 The
completion in April 1942 of air bases northward from Townsville gave the Allies air
superiority over the sea supply route to Port Moresby and its approaches, and General
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Blamey began planning to send a second brigade to join the 30th Brigade at Port
Moresby to increase its defence. The warning orders to the 14th Brigade to prepare for
movement reached its battalions on 4 May.13 Throughout this period, the initial security
of Port Moresby was the responsibility of Allied air and naval forces. In this context, the
army was the last line of defence and the garrison was deemed adequate by the
Australian Chiefs of Staff,14 if, despite Allied air and naval opposition, the Japanese
succeeded in landing.
Concurrent with this decision, from 16 April 1942, Ultra signals intelligence began to
accumulate information which enabled the US Navy to position aircraft carriers and
cruisers to intercept a Japanese invasion force which would head from Rabaul towards
the Coral Sea. Although its precise objective could not be determined, 15 Port Moresby
was the highly probable target. To activate the defence of North Queensland and Port
Moresby, warning orders were issued on 24 April.16
Before the 14th Brigade sailed, however, the Japanese regimental-sized landing force
had turned back as a result of the Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May). However, because
since February the reinforcement of Port Moresby had been the „the main preoccupation
of the Army‟, 17 the 14th Brigade continued its planned movement. On 18 May, Ultra
signals intelligence deciphered a message that the Japanese high command had deferred
another seaborne invasion, 18 but MacArthur warned Blamey that it still might occur
soon after 10 June. 19 The Allied strategic success during the battle of Midway from 4
June to 7 June put this possibility out of the question.
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The strategic overview to the end of 1942 can be summarised. As a result of the success
at Midway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive on 2 July which required
MacArthur to seize the Solomon Islands, the north east coast of New Guinea and then
Rabaul. These offensives were to be preceded by the USN seizing the Santa Cruz
Islands, Tulagi and adjacent islands. 20 Accordingly, Guadalcanal was seized on 7
August 1942. While, with hindsight, it would appear that the usefulness of another
brigade in local defence at Port Moresby became questionable, the Americans remained
concerned that they might be defeated in the naval and air operations around
Guadalcanal, which remained inconclusive from August until mid-November. Should
the Japanese prevail there, they could resume sea operations against Port Moresby. As a
strategic contingency plan, the requirement for the development and maintenance of
stronger defences of Port Moresby thus remained until November. The new brigade
position planned in April was still to be constructed and occupied to defend against
landings from the sea, supported by land-based aircraft and two regiments of field
artillery. Naval and air forces remained the first line of defence.
The Combat Efficiency Assessment System
The choice of the 14th Brigade and the Ultra warnings were also concurrent with the
introduction of a system of mid-monthly reporting in terms of the categories of Combat
Efficiency of Army units laid down by GHQ (Australia) on 29 April, superseding a
provisional system that was already in use. The categorisation used in the system for
assessing the Combat Efficiency of Army units is shown in the first two columns of
Figure 4.1 below.21
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Cumulative time taken1

Code

Classification

A

Efficient and experienced for mobile offensive No
operations

B

–

time

combat

experience.

Efficient as a formation for mobile offensive 10-11 months
operations but not experienced

C

Individual brigades are efficient for mobile 8-10 months including one
offensive operations, but higher training has not month with full equipment.
been completed.

D

Individual brigades are efficient in a static role. 30 weeks

27 weeks

Additional brigade and higher training is required

E

Units have completed training. A considerable 21 weeks

22 weeks

amount of brigade and higher training is required
F

Unit training is not complete

Table 4. 1: Table of time taken to achieve combat efficiency (both readiness and effectiveness)
by the 6th Australian Division in 1940-41 compared with the 27th US Infantry Regiment in 194950 (US data in italics).

1
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As argued in Chapter 1, combat effectiveness is only attainable by combat experience.
Combat readiness is reached before entry to combat. Thus the term „efficiency‟ as used
in the system includes combat effectiveness (Classification A), combat readiness
contingent on type of operation envisaged (Classifications B to D), and undergoing
training (Classifications E and F). As the amount of time available to train to reach a
classification was a critical factor, a „Cumulative time taken‟ column has been inserted
in Figure 4.1. It is derived from Australian experience when training AIF battalions to
combat readiness in the Middle East in 1940-41, and some US experience (shown in
italics) when training the 27th Infantry Regiment on garrison duty in Japan in 1949-50.
From Figure 4.1 it can be concluded that about 21 weeks of continuous training was
necessary for a battalion, with some prior training, to be ready to start brigade level
training.
However, the 1942 system used in Australia had four weaknesses as a reliable tool to

assess the standard reached. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 1, essential outcomes of
collective training were the cohesion of the primary groups and their possession of
fighting spirit, but the Combat Efficiency system did not assess these factors. It focused
on easily measurable quantitative factors, such as manning, equipment and vehicles. In
the Introduction to this thesis it was argued that fighting spirit is the essence of both
combat readiness and effectiveness because it multiplies a force‟s physical elements to
generate superior fighting power. The Australian categories of combat efficiency
required an interaction between the quantitative and the qualitative in the mind of the
responsible reporting officer, yet they did not systemise this interaction into a measure
of fighting spirit.
The second weakness in the Australian system of classifying combat efficiency was that
it poorly expressed its relativity to the enemy and the terrain in a particular campaign.
The terms such as „static operations‟ and „mobile offensive operations‟ had the
appearance of objectivity and clarity. However, they were in fact highly relative and
imprecise because defensive operations have offensive aspects. For example in the same
period, the defence of Darwin was based on movement of forces to an enemy landing
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point,2 but in Port Moresby the defence was in fixed positions, and arguably a battalion
required less training to become combat ready for that task.
A third weakness, derived from a lack of relativity, was that the scale appeared to be
linear where classification A meant most efficient, and F least efficient, and thus open to
the interpretation that only formations rated A should be deployed on operations. 3
However, formations or units in both classifications D or C could be deployed after
brigade level training reflecting either static operations or mobile offensive operations,
vague though those terms were. Therefore, a brigade could be combat ready for a static
role at a rating of D (the task of defence of Port Moresby from seaborne landings), nine
weeks after it completed battalion training (category E – the baseline).
The fourth weakness was subjectivity. This was inherent, because an improved rating
by the same superior officer would indicate progress, but if a new superior officer took
over, or the assessments were used as a comparative tool across formations with
different commanders, they were useless. 4 This situation was remedied in September
1942 when, throughout the army, a centralised system of assessors was introduced.5
Application of the Combat efficiency System to the 14th Brigade
Even after taking note of these four weaknesses, from Table 4.1 it should be possible to
calculate a theoretical position for the battalions of the 14th Brigade prior to embarkation
for Port Moresby. Between concentration in mid- March 1942 and embarkation for New
Guinea in May 1942, there had been ten weeks for the battalions to further develop
both primary and secondary group cohesion from their immature pre-concentration
levels, which could take them about half way to completing their unit training..
Moreover, since readiness is composed of both primary and secondary group cohesion,
the battalions would have had some latent readiness as a „credit‟ against the 21 weeks to
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complete unit training. The secondary group, constituting the battalion command
structure, staffs and voluntary enlistees, had up to 56 weeks training with the additional
value that about half of this was continuous since September 1941. This suggests that
secondary cohesion was highly likely to have been much stronger than the primary
group cohesion (and similar to that of the AIF battalions prior to embarkation for the
Middle East as argued by Garth Pratten).6
There may have been some primary group cohesion arising, because the battalions of
the 14th Brigade had prior discontinuous training in 1940 and 1941. In May 1942, ten
weeks after concentration, the newest (compulsory) universal trainees (the early 1942
call up) had 16 weeks continuous training, and the 1940 or 1941 universal trainees up to
23 weeks in two periods of training. Notwithstanding this considerable amount of
training, it was not conducted in permanent sections and platoons. This is necessary to
create and develop the cohesion of the primary groups. The primary group cohesion
must have been considerably weaker than the secondary group cohesion in the
battalions.
These periods are extensive and, for the majority of individuals, considerably exceeded
the 21 week benchmark, suggesting that the latent readiness „credit‟ should have been
quite high. However, the variation in accumulated continuous training makes it
impossible to determine a single measure of training time given to the battalions as
formed units and therefore a theoretical classification from Table 4.1
The commanders in the 14th Brigade‟s chain of command were required by the system
to rate their subordinate formations and units at the middle of each month. Sometime
after mid-April, when General Blamey chose which brigade was to be ordered to move
to Port Moresby, the 14th Brigade had been rated efficient for mobile offensive
operations (C), but in the mid-May report (while it was in transit) it was assessed by the
same commanders as combat ready merely for a static defence role (D). 7 It is not
known if General Blamey personally influenced this lower rating, but it is now known
that he formed a less than favourable opinion which roughly corresponded to a D rating
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an inspection parade on 14 May when he judged that the 14th Brigade was „earnest and
efficient‟ but it „had not reached a sufficiently high degree of training to fit it for active
operations‟.8 After the brigade arrived in Port Moresby, it was reduced to category E,
meaning in terms of Table 4.1 that its battalions remained categorised as fully trained,
but nine weeks of brigade level training would be needed to make the brigade ready for
the static defence role. All these ratings implicitly recognised some latent readiness, but
subsequent assessments changed the category applied. This reflects the subjectivity of
the process.
Criticisms of the decision to dispatch 14th Brigade
The dispatch of the 14th Brigade generated criticism. The Advisory War Council
expressed concern about the 14th Brigade‟s lack of training and experience compared to
veteran AIF units, but the explanation of the Chief of the General Staff was that the
combat veteran troops of the 7th Division AIF (which had just been concentrated in
southern Queensland) were being retained for offensive operations.9 The 14th Brigade‟s
task was, as already described, to defend against seaborne landings should the Japanese
penetrate the Allied air and sea defence because Blamey and the Australian Chiefs of
Staff had believed that an overland attack on Port Moresby was unfeasible. Lieutenant
General Sir Sydney Rowell, who was GOC New Guinea Force in August- September
1942, held that a Japanese force of sufficient strength to capture Port Moresby from the
landward side could not move across the Kokoda Trail.10
However, from the perspective of May 1942, if the Australian veteran units back from
the Middle East were assigned to the planned Allied offensive operations, the decision
to send the 14th Brigade was reasonable, provided that its current skills were maintained
and the nine weeks extra training needed for its combat efficiency classification D was
conducted. This would be urgent because the warning time derived from Ultra had only
been about one month before the Battle of the Coral Sea. Should there be another
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attempt, the Japanese could, with luck, evade Allied air and naval forces and attempt a
landing in about a month.
Another criticism of the condition of the 14th Brigade has dominated the literature. In
his 1974 memoirs Rowell went much further than he had written in 1942, asserting that
the despatch of the 14th Brigade was „astonishing‟ on the part of General Blamey, based
on its lack of demonstrable fighting spirit. 11 Rowell‟s source had been the ABC
journalist, Chester Wilmot, who had seen the Brigade‟s poor parade performance for
General Blamey in mid-April 1942. Wilmot had asked Blamey if the Brigade would
fight. According to Rowell, „all Blamey could say was that he hoped so‟. 12 David
Horner, who has published the definitive accounts of Rowell‟s dismissal by Blamey, 13
accepted Rowell‟s view that this expressed Blamey‟s literal belief that the 14th Brigade
lacked fighting spirit. But Rowell is unlikely to have known Blamey‟s real opinion,
which Horner‟s later research revealed, that the brigade was insufficiently trained for
active operations.14 As argued above, there appeared to be time for that training.
There is a need for more scepticism about the weight that should be given to the secondhand versions of Blamey‟s words to the 31 year old journalist. There is room for
consideration about whether, as the Australian army Commander in Chief, General
Blamey, would, or should, have confided his opinion of the readiness of a formation
about to go overseas. We do not know the tone of his claimed response: „I hope so‟. The
statement by Rowell that Blamey‟s decision to send the 14th Brigade was astonishing
seems more likely to be an expression of grievance with Blamey over his dismissal.
The Rowell-Wilmot criticism of Blamey is derived from the weakness in the 1942
Australian classification system discussed above; i.e. that it did not assess fighting
spirit. Military leaders therefore used surrogate measures. One was parade performance,
because on a parade, the sense of secondary group cohesion is evident to the
participants and the inspecting officer (and indeed, as we have seen, to experienced
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journalists). The details of turnout of dress and equipment show evidence of individual
and unit pride and spirit. Meticulous execution of antique movements is a subtle
measure of pride in arms and in the unit. So it was common for senior inspecting
officers to give praise or express concern over the performance of the unit on parade. As
a surrogate for the secondary cohesion that produced willingness to fight, it was hardly
objective but had validity. 15 It needs to be pointed out that, at best, this validity applied
only to its secondary group cohesion. Rowell also believed in the reliability of this
surrogate measure because he had based his belief that the 14th Brigade lacked fighting
spirit on a second hand report of the pre-embarkation parade.
Problems at embarkation
Absence without leave at the time of embarkation also became a surrogate for assessing
fighting spirit in the 14th Brigade, and concern about it reached Cabinet level. There was
inconsistency in decisions regarding home leave before embarking for overseas, and
many soldiers in the 14th Brigade overstayed their leave. The rate varied in different
battalions, but was highest in the 36th Battalion. Rowell, in his memoirs, used the high
rate of absence without leave in the 36th Battalion as evidence of its unwillingness to go
on active service and fight. While not related to this specific event, but
contemporaneous with it, the then Major General Stanley Savige believed that
absenteeism was not an indication of the lack of fighting motivation on the part of the
men. Rather it reflected the fact that citizens as soldiers do not lose their sense of fair
dealing and their distaste for incompetence in the military hierarchy.16 Two historians
have investigated the absences without leave in the 36th Battalion and seen it in this
light. Horner shows that the incompetence of the higher commanders and staff in
Australia should have been acknowledged by Rowell as a contributing factor.17 Garth
Pratten has blamed an outgoing CO of the 36th Battalion in the matter of its absence
without leave, but may be blaming the wrong individual as Lieutenant Colonel Muir
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Purser, being a World War I veteran deemed too old to command, had already been
replaced on 13 March 1942 with an acting CO, Major W E Rees.18 A wartime opinion
of a junior officer in the brigade later blamed the Commander 14th Brigade, Brigadier W
E Smith.19 Rather than some measure of fighting spirit, the issue seems more like an
industrial dispute in protest over senior officer incompetence or, at least, inconsistency
of leave policy in different parts of the army.
Nevertheless Rowell was pointing to an important moral quality. Absence by
overstaying leave is an indicator of individual impulse being given precedence over
loyalty to the group and its cohesion: the incidence of absence without leave could
therefore be an indicator of a lack of unit cohesion and discipline, and a reflection on its
leadership. However, it is distinguished in the military justice system from the much
more serious crime of desertion, which is absence in the face of the enemy or the
prospect of combat, which does indicate a lack of fighting spirit. Rowell also
exaggerated when he claimed that the 14th Brigade was „about to be sent to the battle
area‟.20 At the time it was chosen, it was true that combat at Port Moresby was highly
likely, but the destination should have been a secret to which the soldiers were not
parties and it should not have influenced their absence without leave. However, by the
time of the embarkation and the absence without leave issue, combat was no longer
imminent and further training for the brigade in the static defence role could be
undertaken. The battalions themselves had been assessed by several commanders as
fully trained and ready to participate in the nine weeks brigade level training needed to
reach category D which was appropriate for the task of defending Port Moresby against
seaborne landings in conjunction with naval and air support.
Regardless of the weaknesses in the assessment system, the varying categorisations of
the brigade, Rowell‟s opinion that combat experienced units should have been sent first,
and his memoirs criticising the fighting spirit of the 36th Battalion, the decisions of the
Chiefs of Staff and General Blamey were reasonable in April and May 1942 from the
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perspective they had of the situation in the region. The Japanese had yet to land in
Papua, Port Moresby remained a likely target for a seaborne invasion, 21 and the army‟s
role was a subordinate one in a region which required a maritime strategy based on
control of the sea and air.
At Port Moresby June - November
Upon the brigade‟s arrival piecemeal from 27 May, it became the responsibility of the
successive commanders of New Guinea Force to maintain or increase the standard of
training in the 14th Brigade, so that it could validly be classified for its role. Initially,
the responsible officer was Major General Basil Morris, the General Officer
Commanding New Guinea Force, at Port Moresby.
However, there were signs that the Australian training of the Militia in 1940-1941 had
not been as effective as hoped, or, perhaps, that the turbulence created by volunteers
leaving for the AIF had reduced the talent pool. Doubts about the level of training, and
thus of primary group cohesion, were evident in June after arrival in Port Moresby when
the 36th Battalion established a course in the use of the battalion‟s weapons. There was a
lack of sufficiently skilled and experienced NCO instructors in weapons training (yet
these were the men who had received the greatest amount of continuous training before
the concentration in March). The students taking the course students were soldiers of
the battalion ( with at least 90 days training), but it was found that their low standard of
individual training indicated serious weaknesses in recruit and initial infantry training
previously conducted by the unit in Australia.22 Remedial action would be needed even
to sustain the previous E categorisation. No action was apparently taken as the poor
weapons training problem persisted in 36th Battalion when it went into combat (see
Chapter 9).
As well as remedial training, the war situation and the brigade‟s role called for at least
nine weeks intensive collective training to be carried out to regain the D classification.
Not only did the successive commanders of New Guinea Force not make time available
to regain the classification D, but there is no evidence in the 14th Brigade War Diaries of
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anything higher than sub unit training and short exercises. These were insufficient to
maintain even the classification E that had been applied to the brigade when it arrived.
As Lewis Sorley has argued, readiness ratings such as those in Figure 4.1 do not reflect
a stable state due to, for example, the passage of time between practices, retraining on
new equipment, and diversion from training onto other tasks.23 At Port Moresby, large
parts of the 14th Brigade units were used as wharf labourers and in the construction of
defences by manual labour. These required secondary group cohesion to organise, and
this was likely to have been higher than primary group cohesion, as has been argued.
Infectious diseases were rampant, further reducing training opportunities. 24 Company
level training, which has the most direct influence on primary group cohesion, was
limited. This must surely have threatened the maintenance of the battalions‟
classifications of unit level of training being complete (Classification E). In fact, combat
readiness was probably declining.
The overland threat – the 3rd Battalion into combat
With the declining combat readiness of the battalions, another risk had emerged
suggesting a standard higher than D might be needed. Allied code-breakers in
Melbourne had detected that Japanese had begun investigations to find out if Port
Moresby could be invaded overland from Buna, and Japanese documents captured by
the Australian army at Salamaua indicated a possible landing somewhere in Papua.25
This intelligence was confirmed in July. 26 However, the Allied intelligence seriously
underestimated Japanese strength and intentions regarding Buna throughout the
campaign. In a slow response indicating no sense of concern, ten days after the Japanese
landing near Buna on 22 July, General Morris was replaced by Lieutenant General Sir
Sydney Rowell, when MacArthur and Blamey agreed to send HQ 7th Division to Papua
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with two of its veteran brigades, the 21st Brigade and the 18th Brigade.27 The dispersal of
the Division, with the 25th Brigade to stay in Australia, the 21st Brigade to go to Port
Moresby and the 18th Brigade to Milne Bay suggests that the Allied command had
concluded that the situation called for a response that was only precautionary.
An advantage of the move of AIF troops to Papua was that it fitted with Macarthur‟s
offensive plans to occupy the Buna area after the US Marines landed in the Solomon
Islands in August. The Guadalcanal landing might force the Japanese Army HQ in
Rabaul, which was responsible for the entire region, to withdraw any force at Buna.28
Possibly because the Japanese risk was underrated, and because combat experienced
AIF troops were being sent, training was not commenced to bring the 14th Brigade and
the 30th Brigade to a standard high enough to either stop the Japanese or drive them out
of any beachhead, although the 30th Brigade was positioning two of its battalions on the
northern slopes of the Owen Stanley range with companies forward of Kokoda. Allied
commanders remained confident throughout 1942 that any Japanese thrust at Port
Moresby over the Owen Stanley Range could not be maintained in sufficient force to
succeed, and, if not, that the 21st Brigade of the veteran 7th Division would be sufficient
to drive it back. While the first assumption was true, one brigade would prove to be
insufficient.29
The progressive degradation of the Militia battalions below the E category was apparent
to Major General Allen, GOC 7th Division, who had taken command of the garrison,
which, by then, included his 21st Brigade AIF, on 13 August. He concluded late that
month that the 30th Brigade (commanded by Brigadier Porter) had dangerously low
morale, training was almost non-existent, the organisation of supply dumps was
deplorable and hygiene was most unsatisfactory. 30 Lieutenant General Rowell wrote
on 29 August 1942 that he and Major General Allen had no confidence in the 14th
Brigade‟s efficiency and standard of training. He asked for the 25th Brigade (then at sea
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en route to Milne Bay) to be diverted to Port Moresby „to make it secure from major
seaborne attack‟. The reason given reveals that he still felt that the battalions of the 14 th
Brigade were not good enough even for defence against the seaborne invasion threat. 31
However, he was not working to remedy this defect.
This focus on the risk of a seaborne landing may have been reasonable, because until 26
August, the leading elements of the AIF brigade sent up the Kokoda Trail (21st Brigade)
had not yet confronted the Japanese who, delayed by Allied air attacks on their
shipping, were still concentrating their force. However, that day the battle of Isurava
commenced before the Australian companies had concentrated, because they were
spaced out at one day intervals along the Kokoda trail for logistic reasons. It would
therefore take about a week to concentrate a battalion at a forward position. A series of
withdrawals by the 21st Brigade began.
Thus, until the end of August, the assessment in the Allied command that the state of
training of the Militia battalions at Port Moresby would be sufficient meant that no
change was required. Had the Allied strategic intelligence estimates been better, or
decision of the General Officer Commanding at Port Moresby, Major General Morris
been different, 11 weeks more training could have been given to 14th Brigade by the end
of August, when Rowell wrote the statement quoted above, taking it up to the 21 weeks
standard in figure 4.1 for category E without any allowance for latent readiness from the
period before Pearl Harbor. The battalions‟ E classifications should have then been well
beyond doubt, and the D classification nearly achieved by the Brigade.
The attacks of the Japanese in the Isurava area caused Rowell to again consider the state
of training of the 14th Brigade. On 8 September (the day before the arrival of the second
AIF brigade he had requested – the 25th Brigade), he reported to General MacArthur
that with that brigade he could regain the initiative on the Kokoda Trail. However, now
that he was using the AIF brigades earmarked for MacArthur‟s offensive plan for
defensive operations, Rowell judged he could not replace them in that plan with the 14th
and 30th Brigades because they had insufficient training for the task of driving the
Japanese out of the area on the north east coast – a task more demanding than resistance
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to seaborne invasion, which he had already said they were not well enough trained to
undertake. In accordance with table 4.1, this new task would require them to be efficient
for mobile offensive operations: at least a C rating. General MacArthur‟s response to
this advice, presumably through General Blamey, was to order a fourth AIF brigade (the
16th Brigade) to Port Moresby.32 For the offensive operations, a United States regiment
(the equivalent of a brigade) would be sent and it began to arrive in Port Moresby
during that month. 33 It is evident that Rowell had decided that the role of the 14th
Brigade would remain defensive and that there was therefore no need to further train it.
It is also evident that MacArthur believed that the US infantry regiments were capable
of offensive operations.
Rowell later confirmed that the battalions of the Port Moresby garrison „…had done no
jungle training as their primary task was considered to be the defence of Port Moresby
against sea-borne attack…‟34 He was quite aware that they were not combat ready for
anything more than that. In a post-war letter to the US Chief of the Military History
Section, Rowell commented on the short period of service and the disruption to training
in Port Moresby „owing to extra- regimental duties in the Base area‟ and stated it would
have been „risking calamity‟ to have used [battalions of] 14th Brigade any earlier on the
Kokoda Trail.35
Meanwhile, further defeats followed during the withdrawal of the Australians from
Isurava as the Japanese steadily advanced towards Port Moresby. This forced Rowell to
deploy another battalion of his defence troops, untrained for close country warfare, into
the mountains. On 2 September he issued the warning order to the 3rd Battalion from
14th Brigade to move into the Owen Stanley Range to cover various tracks from the
north and west that the Japanese might use to cut the Kokoda Trail well to the rear of
the embattled 21st Brigade. The 3rd Battalion went forward to Ioribaiwa to its first
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combat experience with results which will be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. A
possible reason for choosing it is recorded by an officer who had been in the 3rd
Battalion pre-war under its two successive COs, Lieutenant Colonel Eather and
Lieutenant Colonel Paul. His opinion a year later, after he had transferred to the 2/3 rd
Battalion and the 2/4th Battalion and had a good basis for his judgement, was that 90%
of officers in the 3rd Battalion were good and that Paul had trained it well. 36 With less
direct experience of the 36th and the 55th Battalions, he made adverse comments about
them. His opinion may reflect friendly rivalry but more likely suggests that there was
variation in quality of leadership and inconsistent training standards in the brigade. He
was right, as the case studies will show.
Although his opinion of its higher standard had influenced the sending of the complete
3rd Battalion forward on the Kokoda Trail, Rowell chose to improvise rather than use
another battalion of the 14th Brigade to outflank the Japanese to the west of the Kokoda
Trail. He created an ad-hoc force („Honner Force‟) made up of a company of men of
each of the 36th and 55th Battalions of the 14th Brigade and the 49th Battalion of the 30th
Brigade. Rowell‟s and Allen‟s lack of confidence in their troops was shown to be well
founded when serious problems of discipline and morale emerged in Honner Force,37
but their decision to create an ad-hoc force had contributed because it did not build on
the secondary group cohesion in the original battalions which provided composite
companies to form the force. The remainder of the brigade patrolled the Goldie River
and the tracks on the lower slopes of the Owen Stanley Range while holding a backstop
defensive position should there be a Japanese breakthrough. The number of unfit men
left behind when the brigade deployed revealed the deteriorated fitness condition of the
battalions.38
Just as Morris and Rowell had neither maintained or improved the combat readiness
level of the battalions of the 14th Brigade, neither did their successor, Lieutenant
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General Herring, or his subordinate divisional commanders, successively Major
Generals Allen, Vasey, and (temporarily) Brigadier George Wootten.39 General Blamey,
who was present in Port Moresby from late September 1942 to January 1943, must also
have accepted this lack of action, possibly because the Japanese were now withdrawing
to the beachheads. The Operational Instruction issued by General MacArthur on 1
October40 did not envisage operational use in offensive roles of the Australian brigades
in the Port Moresby garrison and they continued to be assigned a „rear area‟ task in
defence of Port Moresby in Blamey‟s rearrangements of command at the end of October
1942.41
Life continued as usual at Port Moresby in the 36th Battalion and the 55th Battalion of
14th Brigade, and the 49th Battalion of the 30th Brigade as they had not so far been
engaged in combat. The 3rd Battalion was still fighting in the Owen Stanley Range with
the 25th Brigade, and the 39th Battalion and the 53rd Battalion were recovering in Port
Moresby from their participation in the battles of August on the Kokoda Trail. The
unique effect of collective training in creating cohesion was discussed in Chapter 1, but
the two brigades were not to experience it. The War Diary notes only one period of
thirty six days planned to bring the 14th Brigade‟s battalions up to combat readiness for
close country warfare and jungle tactics. This was in September- October, but was
disrupted by the deployment into the foothills of the Owen Stanley Range in a reserve
defensive role during the battle at Ioribaiwa. This deployment was then followed by
manual labouring to build yet another new defensive position.42
Disbanding the 53rd Battalion to reinforce the others
In the 55th Battalion there were changes from 19 September 1942 with the arrival of its
first permanent CO since 1 October 1941, Lieutenant Colonel David Lovell. This was
followed on 26 October by an influx of a large number of reinforcements and a change
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of name of the unit to „55th/53rd„Battalion. These changes could potentially damage the
cohesion and culture of the battalion. Since it has been argued in Chapter 1 that
cohesion is vital to combat readiness, and the number of reinforcements must have
some effect on that cohesion, it is necessary to examine this episode in more detail.
Furthermore, although this will be examined in the case studies in Chapters 8 and 9, the
performance of the 55th /53rd Battalion in its first combat six weeks later has been
labelled by Dudley McCarthy and others as inadequate or a failure, with an implication
that its restructure was as least partly to blame. Their opinions have been preserved in
the literature, but little detailed consideration has been given to the changes in the 55th
Battalion that the historians have seen as a causal factor in its poor performance.
Dudley McCarthy in South-West Pacific Area- First Year alleged that the 55th/53rd
Battalion was „curiously shaped and composed‟ when it accepted reinforcements from
the „ill starred‟ 53rd Battalion.43 McCarthy rightly judged that this influx would result in
a lack of cohesion and training as a unit, but his negative reference to the 53 rd Battalion
as the origin of the reinforcements strongly implies that they brought with them the lack
of fighting spirit which had affected its performance on the Kokoda Trail. Gavin Long
criticised the 55th/53rd Battalion‟s combat performance.44 David Horner reported that
the battalion‟s first attack failed, though with „heavy losses‟,45 which apparently implies
that a „better‟ battalion would have succeeded. The Australian War Memorial‟s website
inaccurately calls the linking of the battalions an amalgamation, and stigmatises the
55th/53rd Battalion as a „mob‟.46
The background to the decision to disband the 53rd Battalion is that the Militia and some
AIF battalions in Papua were well below establishment by September 1942. There was
a lack of reinforcements to replace battle losses and evacuations due to the effects on
health of prolonged service in the tropics. In the 14th Brigade, by the end of October
1942, the 55th Battalion was in dire need of reinforcements because it had only 17
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officers and 225 other ranks.47 The disbanding of the 53rd Battalion as reinforcements
for it and other units is a microcosm of the issues facing the Australian army as a result
of its unsustainably large force structure which far exceeded the nation‟s demographic
and economic capacity.
On 30 September 1942, the Government had returned to discussions about reducing the
Militia to return manpower to industry, which it had deferred after the outbreak of war
with Japan. 48 The extended debate ended with a cut in the size of the Australian army in
1943. 49 The Australian Chiefs of Staff, undoubtedly with Blamey‟s concurrence as
Commander in Chief, recommended to the Cabinet on 30 September that, considering
the impossibility of manpower being found to keep them up to strength, no further
brigades should be sent to New Guinea. It would be difficult to maintain the strength of
those already there. The need to disband formations in Australia was foreshadowed.
Nevertheless, continued offensive operations to clear the enemy out of Papua were
recommended.50
It is probable that, because of his involvement with the preparation of the
recommendations of the Australian Chiefs of Staff, General Blamey anticipated the
Cabinet‟s formal decision, because he directed that, with the arrival of the 16th Brigade
(due 21 September), one Militia brigade should be sent back to Australia. 51 As the 16th
Brigade was combat experienced, it was seen to be more appropriate for the clearance
of the Japanese occupied areas of Papua than the undertrained 14th or 30th Brigades.
Rowell certainly held this view and he had so advised General MacArthur on 8
September. Nevertheless, there remained the shortage of reinforcements for all units.
This forced the disbanding of one under-strength Militia unit at Port Moresby to make
up the strength of the others, and the 53rd Battalion was chosen. 52 As a result, the 36th,
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39th and 55th Battalions received varying numbers of men from the 53rd Battalion after a
selection process based on suitability for infantry service.
No precise number of transfers is given,53 but using unit history and war diary data, it
can be estimated that about 160 men and three officers were transferred to the 55th
Battalion, and constituted about 33 per cent of the combined unit. Such a large group of
reinforcements would require absorption into the primary groups to preserve cohesion,
and it could be hoped that the few officers transferred, all of whom had experienced
combat at Isurava, would be unlikely to bring leadership problems with them. Probably
to preserve these soldiers‟ loyalty and identity, but also reflecting pre-war Militia
precedent which sought to preserve the traditions behind the First AIF battalion
numbers, their numerical designation was again linked to the 55th Battalion number.
The selection process was apparently thorough, because even after it, the 55th Battalion
had the right to submit a list of any potential transferees who it deemed unacceptable as
judged by „a course of intensive training‟ conducted in „a special training platoon‟.54
Whether the 55th Battalion submitted any names is not noted in the war diaries of the
battalion or of the 14th Brigade.
The process of disbanding the 53rd Battalion began on September 15, when 98 men,
specially selected from the most efficient troops available in it, were transferred to the
39th Battalion. The remaining strength in the 53rd Battalion was 17 officers and 302
other ranks in only two rifle companies.55 Further transfers followed. Seventy-seven
men judged as unsuited to infantry went to base units, a further 50 were transferred to
Ordnance units, and volunteers for the AIF were posted to the reinforcement pool for
AIF infantry battalions from NSW then in Papua. Medical standards and regulatory age
limits for active service were applied, apparently, for the first time. It is extraordinary
that men medically classified as B class (service at home only) were still in infantry
battalions, but perhaps this is further confirmation that there had been no plans to use
them in combat. The data suggest that a maximum of 225 soldiers deemed „potentially
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suitable for service with an infantry battalion‟ could have been considered for transfer to
the 55th Battalion. As the 36th Battalion received 40,56 and 24 went to the Port Moresby
support services that day,57 the estimated number of transfers drops to 161. When the
55th/53rd Battalion was deployed for combat on 5 December, it had a strength of 26
officers and 493 men.58 Therefore, the 53rd Battalion contributed, at most, 33 per cent
(161 men) to the total of 493, but only three officers.
Because at the start of the process, the number of officers and men in both battalions
was approximately the same, the choice to break up the combat experienced 53rd
Battalion, rather than breaking up an inexperienced battalion in the 14th Brigade to
reinforce the combat experienced core in the 53rd Battalion is prima facie puzzling. The
most likely explanation lies in its combat performance on the Kokoda Trail in late
August 1942 which had been severely criticized by the brigade commander of the AIF
brigade to which it had been attached (Brigadier Arnold Potts of 21st Brigade).59 An
eye-witness AIF officer, and later, historian agreed that it lacked training, fitness,
discipline, morale and commitment. Some of its important operations had been failures
due to poor leadership, yet some leaders had led good patrols and the Japanese had
found the 53rd Battalion to be worthy of respect.60 Brigadier Porter, its brigade
commander since April, did not entirely share Potts‟ sweeping condemnation. He
believed that the impaired fighting spirit of the unit in its particularly difficult first
combat experience could have been repaired by firm leadership.61 In this respect, he
exchanged correspondence with Potts who had formed an adverse opinion about the
leadership qualities. Porter retained confidence in a certain Major Spring from this list,
with an outcome that will be examined in Chapter 8.
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The questions that now faced the CO, Lieutenant Colonel Lovell, were to what extent
the problem of lack of training and fighting spirit existed in the reinforcements he was
being sent, whether it was worse than among his 55th Battalion members, and how new
primary groups could be strengthened. He had some advantages.
One was that this was not an amalgamation in the sense of the folding of two unit
structures into one (and a corresponding blending of cultures) with destructive effects
on secondary cohesion. The 53rd Battalion described itself truthfully as being disbanded
and its personnel widely dispersed. 62 There were 17 available officers of the 53rd
Battalion, 63 but only three were accepted by the CO 55th Battalion, which left his
command structure and secondary group cohesion intact.
A second advantage was that the reinforcements either had combat experience on the
Kokoda Trail, or had been screened for suitability. No numbers of combat experienced
transfers is on record, but Budden says it was „a handful‟,64 so any positive influence on
the 55th Battalion culture would have been slight. The case study in Chapter 8 will
reveal that two former 53rd Battalion officers, Captains Coote and Henderson,
performed very well, but the third transferree, Major Spring, failed to lead effectively.
It is known that those who went to the 39th Battalion did particularly well.65 There is no
record of the performance of those who went to the 36th Battalion except that one 53rd
Battalion officer, Captain Ahern, stood out,66 who will be discussed in the case study in
Chapter 9. Like Ahern, any men who had combat experience at Isurava could be an
asset to their primary groups. Even those without combat experience had been assessed
as suitable for infantry, either by the 53rd Battalion transferring unsuitable men
elsewhere, or by the 55th Battalion‟s „special training platoon‟.
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The third advantage for Lovell was that, although he had only been the 55th Battalion‟s
CO since 19 September, he knew the pre- war culture and some of the personnel
because he had served in the 53rd and then the 55th/53rd Battalion from 1935 to 1938.
Given time, he could build on this to forge new primary groups out of the material he
had and impress the 55th Battalion‟s ongoing culture and secondary cohesion on the
newcomers. However, it would take more time than was to be available, for he was to
have only until 6 December 1942 before his unit was deployed to combat.
Despite what McCarthy and Long claimed, the balance sheet was not all negative for
the reasons given. There is no evidence that the potential fighting spirit of the 55th
Battalion was weakened by this linking. Yet doubts remain because such a large-scale
march-in of reinforcements into a culturally cohesive unit would need to be absorbed
into the existing structure of the 55th Battalion‟s primary groups and the four social,
structures which Kirke identified as essential to combat performance. How this worked
out is the subject of Chapters 8 and 9.
The process of disbanding of the 53rd Battalion was an administrative measure not likely
to seriously affect the rear area task assigned to the 14th Brigade, and its two remaining
units, the 36th and the 55th/53rd Battalions. Work immediately resumed on digging
defensive positions for occupation by the 3rd Battalion when it returned to the Brigade
from its task with 25th Brigade in the Owen Stanley Range.67 Life in a garrison role
continued.68
The decisions of senior officers in Port Moresby regarding the training of the 14 th
Brigade after its arrival in Port Moresby until the end of October can best be explained
by an acceptance that there was no need to arrest the decline, or improve the standard,
as there was no longer any seaborne or landward threat. They must have known that at
no stage had the 14th Brigade been trained even to a D classification indicating combat
readiness for static defence and that the E status (unit training completed) of its 36th and
55th/53rd battalions was questionable. It was known that troops in Port Moresby lacked
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confidence in their weapons, 69 which reflects badly on their recruit and initial infantry
training in Australia, which are essential preludes to training in their battalion.
As to judging fighting spirit and combat readiness, various senior commanders used the
surrogate measure of parade performance, which it has already been argued, was quite
inadequate. General Blamey was the inspecting officer at a 14th Brigade parade to mark
the linking of the 55th/53rd Battalion on 24 October. During November, the brigade was
inspected by Lieutenant General Herring, GOC New Guinea Force, Major General
Allen and Brigadier Wootten (GOC and Acting Commander of 6th Division) and Major
General Vasey, GOC 7th Division. Lieutenant General Herring, on 10 November
complimented the battalions on their defence works and exhorted them, although they
had not yet been in action, to‟ keep themselves very fit for anything they may be called
upon to do‟.70 However, at the end of that month, the 14th Brigade war diary noted that
„During the month the battalions and the Brigade HQ were occupied mainly digging
defensive positions, but route marches were held regularly‟. That is, they were not
training.
MacArthur‟s offensive, initiated on 1 October, was meeting with success. By 12
November, the Japanese had been defeated beyond Kokoda and a pursuit began to the
coast with the 7th Australian Division on the west of the Girua River and 32nd US
Division east of it.71 Because General MacArthur remained anxious about the Japanese
capability and intent to reinforce their bridgehead by sea from Rabaul, he required a
quick victory over the relatively small numbers of Japanese believed to be defending the
beachhead.72 Contact with the main Japanese defences occurred on 19 November, but
the quick attacks were promptly repulsed. It became apparent that the Australian
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brigades were exhausted, and it seemed that the American Regiment at Buna was
ineffective.
Late November 1942 – commitment to mobile operations in jungle
In a dramatic meeting with General MacArthur on 25 November, General Blamey
confronted him with the failure of the US Army in their first combat experiences at
Buna,73 and asserted that he knew that Australian troops would fight.74 Exactly what he
meant was disclosed to his forward commander, Lieutenant General Herring, on 30
November:
I pointed out to General MacArthur that the fault lay fundamentally with the training. It
must have lacked the spirit of pushing on at all costs, which is the essence of dealing
with the Japanese.75

Blamey‟s phrase, „the spirit of pushing on at all costs‟ generated in training meets the
definitions of fighting spirit and combat readiness argued in Chapter 1. This spirit must
be, he points out, sufficient in relationship to a specific enemy – the Japanese.
Furthermore, in the context of the meeting, he meant offensive operations against the
Japanese in a specific situation – the beachheads on the coastal fringe of Papua – where
the Americans had not achieved the expected results, even though faulty Allied
intelligence still suggested that the Japanese were in poor condition and weak in
numbers. Blamey‟s opinion about the fighting spirit of Australian troops brought about
a decisive change in the tasks assigned to the battalions of the 14th Brigade. They would
be progressively committed to combat on the Sanananda road.
The catalyst for the decision was the tenacity of the Japanese in holding Gona, where
Vasey was concentrating his troops so that, after its capture, he could envelop
Sanananda along the coast from the west.76 Herring felt that the Australian force of two
brigades there should be reinforced by adding the 30th Brigade (which by then consisted
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of the 39th Battalion and the 49th Battalion). To reach such a decision, Generals Blamey,
Herring and Allen must have believed that, at least in the situation posed by an
apparently inferior Japanese force and the presence of two AIF brigades, the battalions
of the 30th Brigade were combat ready, unlike the American battalions of the 32nd
Division.
The decision took shape as a result of a letter from Lieutenant General Herring from his
new HQ at Dobodura to General Blamey. Considering his tired AIF brigades, he wrote
that he „would not have a worry in the world‟ if he had the 30th Brigade for use at Gona
where it might „finish off the job‟ should the two AIF brigades be unable to do so.77
Thus Herring shared Blamey‟s judgement of the combat readiness of the 30th Brigade
for a back-up task in what he envisaged would be an operation carried through by the
better trained and experienced AIF brigades. Because Herring, unlike Blamey, had seen
the conditions on the ground, his judgement was better informed. General Blamey
consulted Major General Allen, who had been scathing about the standard of the 14 th
Brigade and 30th Brigade in August, but who had been their divisional commander for
much of the intervening three months. If Allen agreed with Blamey, it is certain that the
Commander of the 30th Brigade, Brigadier Porter did not. He noted in the war diary that
only 14 days of continuous training had ever been allotted to the 30th Brigade
(presumably since its arrival in January 1942).78 As Table 14.1 indicates, 21 weeks of
battalion level training should have been be followed by nine weeks training at brigade
level, to reach the standard required for defence of Port Moresby from the sea. Another
four months training was needed for brigade mobile operations. In view of the
impending deployment, however, he suspended his plan to start more continuous
training.
The involvement of the battalions of the 14th Brigade was an afterthought. It came about
because, after these consultations, Blamey decided that he would restore a third
battalion to the 30th Brigade, by transferring the 55th/53rd Battalion from the 14th
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Brigade. 79 Blamey advised Herring: „All accounts of it [the 55th/53rd Battalion] are very
good and it certainly strengthens the weight that you have there.‟ 80 Blamey thus sent
into combat an ad-hoc 30th Brigade with its two organic battalions, plus the 55th/53rd
Battalion. Later, the 36th Battalion was also detached from the 14th Brigade and
transferred to the 30th Brigade.
General Blamey‟s conclusions about the combat readiness of the troops under his
command were expressed in a letter to Prime Minister John Curtin on 4 December. His
evaluation of the American troops was „that they cannot be classified as attack troops.
They are definitely not equal to the Australian militia…‟ Blamey stated that his faith in
the Militia was growing but it had sunk to zero in the Americans.81 He advised that an
„intensively trained‟ brigade of the Militia was about to be sent forward – a serious
overstatement of the combat readiness of the battalions of the 14th Brigade that will be
examined in case studies in Chapters 8 and 9.
Given his certain knowledge of the lack of training of the Militia brigades at Port
Moresby, Blamey‟s claim that they were intensively trained is difficult to understand,
but there are some possible explanations. He may have relied on the assessment of his
subordinates, and, given his spread of responsibilities, it would have been reasonable to
leave such a concern to the local divisional commander. However, one of his
responsibilities was oversight of the GOC NG Force, and its demand for labour was the
root of the problem. Another possible explanation could be that the claim may have
been simply a chauvinist boast to MacArthur that Blamey could not now withdraw, but
this would not explain its repetition in even stronger terms in his letter to Curtin. A
more likely explanation is that the Militia brigade being sent forward to Gona was
intended as a backup force to strengthen the operations of two AIF brigades and he
concluded that this limited task was within the readiness level of infantry battalions in
the two Port Moresby brigades. This judgement was justifiable because, while there had
been earlier criticisms of the quality of Militia battalions, there had also been evidence
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of their success when operating with AIF units or formations. The 3rd Battalion and the
39th Battalion had done well in the Owen Stanley Range, as had the 7th Brigade at Milne
Bay in September. The 53rd Battalion, downgraded while in action at Isurava, had been
combed out and disbanded. Finally, a reason for the overstatement could have been that,
at the date of the decision, the Allied intelligence staff had failed to estimate the true
strength and intentions of the Japanese defenders on the beachheads. A judgement of
combat readiness is always relative to a particular circumstance.
In the event, for reasons discussed in Chapter 7, the 30th Brigade was used for the far
more difficult task of assault of the Japanese fixed defences on the Sanananda road.
This makes Blamey‟s decision to add the 36th Battalion to the 30th Brigade questionable,
because, by the time it was sent, the task was known to be outside the capability of the
battalions in the 30th Brigade.

Overestimating one‟s own fighting power while

underestimating the enemy fighting power produces, in van Creveld‟s mathematical
analogy, a grave miscalculation of relative fighting power.
Conclusion
The lack of combat readiness of the 14th Brigade at the time of its despatch in May 1942
was not a relevant factor when it was committed to combat months later because there
had been ample time to train it to the same standards as the AIF, and, in the process,
develop cohesion and fighting spirit. The weight of the evidence is that there was never
a command intention to continue training the battalions of the 14th Brigade to a higher
classification standard after their arrival in Port Moresby in June, because their role, set
at the strategic level, was to be static defence against a Japanese landing. While the
fighting around Guadalcanal was unresolved, and until US troops had been in combat
on the coastal plains of Papua in late November, it would not have been apparent that
the remaining two battalions of the 14th Brigade should be brought up to combat
readiness for operations in close country. Sadly, the responsible senior officers now had
no time left for any such training.
The lack of institutional cohesion necessary to give these battalions tough theatrerelevant training would lead to a „military misfortune‟. 82 The shortfall of combat
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readiness was the inevitable result of strategic policy, institutional failure in the Allied
command, and General Blamey‟s operational decision to employ Militia battalions
which probably were adequately trained only for the task intended, which then was
changed to a much harder one. The battalions would depend in their first battles on
adapting the residue of combat readiness they had achieved before embarkation from
Australia to the unfamiliar and unexpected combat setting on the north-east coast of
Papua. Brigadier Porter blamed the men and the commander of the 14th Brigade
(Brigadier W. E. Smith), and McCarthy in South West Pacific Area - First Year has
preserved this injustice.83
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 4: Task Organisation at Port Moresby from August 1942
HQ New Guinea Force at Port Moresby ( Major General Morris until Lieutenant
General Rowell arrived 11 August 1942. Rowell was replaced by Lieutenant General
Herring on 28 September.)
HQ 7th Division (Major General Allen) from 13 August took command of both Port
Moresby and Kokoda Trail operations until 19 September. HQ 6th Division (Major
General Vasey) on 19 September took command of Port Moresby defences, leaving HQ
7th Division to command operations in the Owen Stanley Range and at the Japanese
beachheads. The two divisional commanders changed places on 29th October.
30th Brigade had been at Port Moresby since January 1942
39th Battalion
49th Battalion
53rd Battalion ( disbanded by dispersal to other units during September and
October 1942)
14th Brigade had been at Port Moresby since June 1942
3rd Battalion (detached to 21st Brigade on 2 September)
36th Battalion
55th Battalion (renamed 55th /53rd Battalion from 26 October 1942)
21st Brigade from 12 August
2/14th Battalion
2/16th Battalion
2/27th Battalion
25th Brigade from 9 September
2/25th Battalion
2/31st Battalion
2/33rd Battalion
16th Brigade from 21 September
2/1st Battalion
2/2nd Battalion
2/3rd Battalion
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Chapter 5: Reinterpreting the site and the narrative of the
battle of Ioribaiwa

The battle of Ioribaiwa in September 1942 marked the end of the advance of the
Imperial Japanese Army over the Kokoda Trail. The Australian troops, although
predominantly fresh and battle experienced, withdrew from Ioribaiwa into a defensive
position on the Imita Ridge seven kilometres further back along the Trail, about 40
kilometres from Port Moresby.
On the Ioribaiwa ridge, a troop staging post consisting of eight or nine huts had been
built, which the Australians referred to as a village (Figure 5.1). It was two days march
along the Kokoda Trail from the road at Owers‟ Corner, though the distance in a
straight line is only 10.3 kilometres. Ioribaiwa village stood at a multi-track junction on
the Kokoda Trail in a flat cleared area on a ridge visible from a considerable distance
across the valleys, and dominated on its south-eastern flank by the steeply rising ridge.1
Three subsidiary tracks from the Kokoda side joined the main track of the Kokoda Trail
at Ioribaiwa village; the little-used „Police Track‟ , one from „Spotter‟s Hut‟ along the
ridge from the north west, and one along the front of the ridge from Ponoon village
1600 metres to the east south east. There was another track connecting Ponoon to the
Kokoda Trail behind Ioribaiwa ridge.
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Figure 5.1: 1942 map of Ioribaiwa area plotted from an air photo of 3 September 1942.2 The
area without brown markings on this map was obscured by clouds when the air photo was taken.
The brown markings are not contour lines but land forms which are misleading, and the hand
drawn tracks are not always correctly related to the ground. A preliminary version of this map
with a different grid (See Figure 5.6) became available for planning the routes of the incoming
25th Brigade, but did not reach the commanders on Ioribaiwa until after the ridge was occupied.
The accuracy and detail of this map was quite unsuitable for tactical operations at brigade level
and below.
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The last Chapter described why Lieutenant General Rowell selected the 3rd Battalion
from the 14th Brigade at Port Moresby on 2 September, and sent it to protect the rear of
the 21st Brigade from any Japanese wide outflanking movements down various tracks
in the Owen Stanley Range. The choice of the 3rd Battalion was made on the basis that it
was relatively well led, even though he knew it was not fully trained. On 9 September,
Brigadier Eather‟s 25th Brigade arrived at Port Moresby from Australia, and Rowell
sent it too into the mountains. Both brigades were under the command of Major General
Allen at HQ 7th Division in the foothills. He had ordered 21st Brigade to hold the enemy
as far north as possible, but had modified that order after its replacement commander,
Brigadier Porter, took over. He was to hold the ridge running northwards down from
Ioribaiwa village along which the Kokoda Trail ran to the creek crossing below.3 The
25th Brigade was to take offensive action as far forward as possible, including the
capture of Nauro (a day‟s march beyond Ioribaiwa) which was essential to resupply the
brigade by airdropping.4
The official history narrative goes on to claim that, when the 25th Brigade‟s battalions
began to cross the Ioribaiwa ridge, on the western side of the Kokoda Trail a Japanese
patrol blocked the 2/31st Battalion. On the eastern side, a Japanese patrol got onto the
ridge in the 3rd Battalion‟s area near where the 2/33rd Battalion was crossing the ridge
well to the south east. The 2/25th Battalion and the 2/33rd Battalion were ordered to
dislodge the enemy on the high ground in 3rd Battalion‟s area. Both failed. Soon
afterwards another platoon of the 3rd Battalion was penetrated. „The end of the day
therefore found Eather‟s right [eastern] flank penetrated.‟ Next morning, the Japanese
pressed harder, but further Australian counter attacks did not succeed. Eather decided to

3

HQ 7 Div Operating Instruction No. 9 dated 8 Sep 42 in War Dairy of 7th Division, pdf p.48/197,
modified in a telephone conversation on 10 September with HQ 7 th Division, referred to in AWM 419/3/9
3DRL 2381 Allen‟s papers 3/7 p.31, and in a signal in the War Diary 21 st Brigade AWM 52 8-2-21-017
p. 91/187. In his „Report on part played by 30 AI Bde HQ in Owen Stanley Ranges‟, pages 7 -8, AWM
PR00527 Papers of Major General Porter, file 14 of 43, Porter described how his preference for holding
Imita was overruled by an order to hold the ambiguously described „…ridge N of IORIBAIWA‟. The
ambiguity came from the absence of any tactically useful map. This report is hereafter referred to a
Brigadier Porter‟s Report.
4

„HQ 7 Aust Div Operating Instruction No.10‟ dated 11 Sep 42 in the AWM52 1-5-14-028, War Diary of
7th Division, pdf p. 49/197.
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withdraw to Imita Ridge, believing that he could not hold Ioribaiwa because the enemy
were moving around his flanks. Subsequent secondary sources have accepted this
narrative. Only 71 pages later does an easily missed paragraph in South West Pacific
Area-First Year reveal that the Japanese plan had been to capture Ioribaiwa as a
rearguard position to a cover their withdrawal back to the beachheads. This information
was not included in the section devoted to Ioribaiwa in South West Pacific Area-First
Year, although the General Editor suggested to Dudley McCarthy that it should be.5 Its
placement contributes to a misleading account of the Japanese intentions at Ioribaiwa,
because the narrative that Eather believed he was being outflanked and could not hold
the Ioribaiwa ridge is not balanced by the post war knowledge that the Japanese no
longer planned to advance past Ioribaiwa.
The narrative in South West Pacific Area-First Year contains serious inaccuracies in its
account of what happened east of the Trail in the area of the 3rd Battalion and the 2/33rd
Battalion. As the combat effectiveness of these two battalions will be the subject of
analysis in Chapter 6, a more accurate narrative needs to be established. In summary,
this revised narrative argues that, on the eastern side of the Trail but close to the village,
a reinforced Japanese company overran one platoon of the 3rd Battalion (17 Platoon).
No enemy were sighted in the vicinity of the 2/33rd Battalion which was higher up the
ridge about 1000 metres out to the south east near an outpost consisting of C Company
3rd Battalion established by the 21st Brigade.
Australian counter attacks were successful. The 2/25th Battalion counter attacked and
regained the 17 Platoon area but could not clear the Japanese who moved onto the high
ground beyond. The 2/33rd Battalion sent A Company down the ridge, but it could not
find a route to the 3rd Battalion area. Although it did not contact any Japanese force, A
Company at least found no Japanese on the ridge top. D Company of the 2/33 rd
Battalion advanced westwards along the track linking Ponoon to Ioribaiwa village and

5

Handwritten note referring to page 43 of a typescript of Chapter 7 in AWM 67 Records of Gavin Long,
10/59 Notes concerning South Pacific Area- First Year.
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encountered a substantial number of Japanese on the forward slopes of the Ioribaiwa
ridge.
Next morning, while further 2/33rd Battalion counter attacks coming in from the east
succeeded in clearing the ridge, Eather decided to withdraw. Subsequent research
confirms that the Japanese were not outflanking. They intended to capture Ioribaiwa as
a rearguard position to a cover their withdrawal to the beachheads. Even though the
Australian force on the ridge heavily outnumbered the Japanese, Eather‟s uncontested
withdrawal conceded the Ioribaiwa ridge to them.
This chapter will expand that summary and provide evidence for its accuracy based on
primary and secondary sources (including those of the Japanese). The most likely
locations of the rifle companies, which are different from those described in the Official
History, will be indicated. In particular, the chapter will provide a detailed analysis of
the evidence for the location on Ioribaiwa ridge of the area held by 17 Platoon D
Company within the 3rd Battalion defended area; the locations and strength of the single
Japanese incursion; and the routes taken by counter attacking battalions. The two
battalions selected for comparison of combat effectiveness in their first encounters with
the Japanese are also the ones involved in the two different accounts of the battle.
These are the inexperienced 3rd Battalion Militia and the 2/33rd Battalion AIF with
campaign experience in Syria in 1941.
Firstly, three historiographical issues will be discussed. A series of errors with
important consequences for its accuracy, have been found in the writing, drafting or
typing of the narrative in South West Pacific Area-First Year. These led to the final
publication wrongly identifying an enemy penetration at the location of C Company
(Captain Boag), which was the outpost near the 2/33rd Battalion. A marginal note on
one undated typescript draft in the papers of Dudley McCarthy shows that, at some
stage, the correct place of a penetration was identified (17 Platoon) with its company (D
Company).6 D Company (Captain Beckett) was located near Ioribaiwa village. However

6

National Library of Australia MS 7777 Papers of Dudley McCarthy, Series III Box 7, Box 8 and Box
10 – Folders 69-71 Folio items. Red pencil note in margin on page 3 of the draft chapter. My thanks to
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the editorial preference for using the names of company commanders instead of the
designations of companies seems to have led to a mix-up of names in another draft
which shows that only one of two references from the bottom of page 230 to the name
„Boag‟ were textually corrected to „Beckett‟ by persons other than McCarthy. This
correction implied two Japanese penetrations – one near C Company (Captain Boag)
which is not found in any war diary, and the correct one in D Company (Captain
Beckett) near the village.7
There is evidence that no Japanese penetration occurred at the location of C Company
(Captain Boag). Firstly, the unit historian of the 3rd Battalion was in a platoon of C
Company and records a day without enemy contact.8 Secondly the sketch map of the
attack in the Japanese official history does not suggest that any Japanese force was
directed towards that area.9 Thirdly, the 2/33rd Battalion was stationary in that area from
14 September to 16 September over the time of the Japanese regimental attack, and
neither their war diary nor unit history records a Japanese attack on the co-located C
Company 3rd Battalion (Captain Boag). The unit history of the 2/33rd Battalion confirms
the 3rd Battalion unit history when detailing its own counter attacks. On this evidence, it
is highly improbable that the Japanese made two widely separated penetrations on
Ioribaiwa ridge, and it is almost certain that the only penetration was in part of 3rd
Battalion‟s area and close outside the right flank of the 3rd Battalion (itself the right
flank of the 21st Brigade area), and not near the 2/33rd Battalion up the ridge to the south
east.

Dr Karl James of the AWM for drawing my attention to this archive. It is possible that McCarthy was no
longer involved with the project in its final stages, as his entry in Monash Biographical Dictionary of
Twentieth Century Australia suggests. The other draft is in AWM 229 Items 8 and 9.
7

AWM 229 Item 9 Official History, 1939-45 War, Series 1 (Army) Volume V: Records of Dudley
McCarthy. R Paull, Retreat from Kokoda, pp. 220 – 221 contains the same error. This suggests a common
source or unofficial collaboration as this work was first published in 1958, and the McCarthy volume in
1959.
8

Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, pp. 45-46.

9

Bullard, Japanese Army Operations, sketch map p 257. Reproduced as part of Figure 5.8.
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The second historiographical issue is that the narrative in South West Pacific Area-First
Year incorrectly claims that Eather‟s counter attacks failed, however a misfiled original
notebook kept in the HQ 3rd Battalion provided vital clues not recorded in the 3rd
Battalion war diary.10 This notebook appears to be the source for compiling the C 2118
forms in the AWM 52 8/3/39 War Diary of 3rd Battalion (a process with limitations
which were discussed in Chapter 3). It contains material omitted from the C2118 sheets
relevant to the locations on 15 September, and the route of 2/25th Battalion counter
attack. These primary records confirm that a counter attack by two companies of the
2/25th Battalion drove the Japanese out of the 3rd Battalion area a few hours after they
occupied 17 Platoon area, although the enemy remained overnight on the slope above.
The two companies of the 2/25th Battalion remained in the 3rd Battalion area overnight
and until the withdrawal the next day, thus blocking any further Japanese penetration in
the vicinity. The details from this material will be used in the reconstruction of the
battle which follows.
The third issue is topography and mapping. Much of the information provided in this
chapter about the topography reflects hindsight. In 1942 in this area of the Kokoda
Trail, the absence of tactical maps meant that battalions and brigades could not use grid
references to describe situations and locations of battle events, and used topographical
descriptions in written records such as signal messages and logs. The phrases and
paraphrases of „high feature‟ and „right flank‟ were used in different records to refer to
two different features leading to misunderstanding in rear HQs. Without being able to
see the ground, commanders and staff in HQs used these descriptions to make records
of events and decisions. Had maps been available, precise grid references would have
eliminated this ambiguity. The risk of misunderstanding of what was occurring was
very great.
During his deployment onto Ioribaiwa ridge, Porter had no map, and the one that
arrived during the battle was not tactically useful. Within a fortnight of leaving the

10

War Diary of the 3/22 Battalion AWM 52 8-3-40 contains the original notebook/log. Hereafter cited as
„3rd Battalion notebook‟.
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ridge, Porter, in his report on operations, summarised his defence layout but did not
provide any sketch or overlay. However, Porter‟s choice of the words „right flank‟ and
his use of a grid reference to a newly produced map not available to him during the
battle, describe a linear battalion defence extending 1600 metres to the south east
including not just the knob but, beyond it, the peak. 11 Perhaps, in the interests of
brevity, Porter was trying to synthesise the original plan and two changes to it discussed
in some detail later, but his choice of words gave two possible locations for the „right
flank‟.
Brigadier Eather, however, had the preliminary version of a somewhat better map made
from air photography a week earlier and overlaid with the results of survey operators‟
hasty traverses of the tracks.12 Ten copies of the map were air dropped on the Kokoda
Trail at Uberi and carried forward , but they did not reach Porter at Ioribaiwa until 1600
12 September, after he had deployed his force on the ridge.
These maps do not seem to have influenced the version in South West Pacific AreaFirst Year. In its account, the locations of the Australian companies and the Japanese
penetrations are overlaid, unscaled, on a depiction of the topography.13 The described
location of the alleged first penetration does not exist on the overlay. When a rough
scale is applied, the 3rd Battalion is shown as being a line of companies 1400 metres
long, when perhaps 400 metres would have been more probable in such close country.14

11

Brigadier Porter‟s Report, p 8. „3 Bn occupied the main ridge astride the village with its R[ight] flank
incl[uding]the peak at 312524‟. The grid reference is to the peak on the map in Porter‟s report which was
not in use in the battle, but was the final printed version of the map in Figure 5.1 at a scale of one inch to
one mile. Lacking maps at the time of issuing his initial orders on 10 September, he would have pointed
out the “nearest high feature” (the knob) as the location of the right flank company of 3rd Battalion to
which the CO initially sent D Company on the night of the 11 September, the orders to C Company to go
to the peak could not have been so precise, although the highest point may have been discernible in
daylight.
12

„HQ 7 Aust Div Operating Instruction No.10‟ dated 11 Sep 42 in the AWM52 1-5-14-028, War Diary
of 7th Division, pdf p. 49/197 seems to contain the first references to the map Kagi-Naoro 2.2 inches to
the mile (see Figure 5.6).
13

McCarthy, South West Pacific Area – First year, p. 230.

14

Crooks, The Footsoldiers, p.40.
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In the war diary file of the 25th Brigade is „Sketch 3 1100hrs 15 Sep‟ (Figure 5.2). The
layout and topographic depiction so closely resemble the sketch map and text in the
Australian official history

15

that it is highly likely McCarthy accepted this wartime

sketch as an accurate source, and it then became the accepted view in the majority of
secondary works.

15

McCarthy, South West Pacific Area-First Year, p 230. In the text McCarthy refers to the second
location of C Company at the saddle and peak, as the „high ground on the right‟.
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Figure 5.2 : HQ 25th Brigade sketch 3 showing relative platoon dispositions in 3rd Battalion on
an unreliable depiction of the topography.16

16

AWM 52 8/2/25 War Diary HQ 25 Bde. It is one of a numbered series of sketches of the layout of the
battle area prepared by an unknown draftsman. Pdf page 20/99. Sketch 4 on the other hand is more
topographically accurate but less detailed in layout of troops. Bede Tongs on 19 July 2010 verified the
relative positions of the platoons in his own B Company.
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The document is undated and its good condition suggests that it may have been drawn a

little later. It gives identities of platoons and their locations relative to each other within
the companies of 3rd Battalion but overlays them on an unscaled and inaccurate
portrayal of the topography. Why Intelligence personnel in another brigade would
sketch this layout is unclear, as is their source, although the two brigade HQs were colocated on the Ioribaiwa ridge and the two Intelligence sections were probably
collaborating.
This sketch map and the wording of Porter‟s post-action report appear to support the
account given in the South West Pacific Area-First Year, yet the depiction of an
unrealistic 1400 metre linear layout, and the dispersal of troops in the 3rd Battalion well
away from the village and the Kokoda Trail, cannot be reconciled with the detailed
evidence elsewhere in the primary sources. In the reconstruction of the battle which
follows, this evidence will be examined to develop a more likely layout of the 3rd
Battalion.
As noted earlier, the Japanese strength at Ioribaiwa has been exaggerated in secondary
accounts. The text in South West Pacific Area-First Year describes how a Japanese
force, imprecisely described as a „ hostile patrol‟, „intruding force‟ or simply „intruders‟,
penetrated the „high ground on the right‟ of the 3rd Battalion‟s positions on 15
September 1942. It later refers to Eather‟s fears of being outflanked on the high ground
to the east. The Japanese official history portrays the Japanese plan as a double
envelopment by the 144th Infantry Regiment by crossing Ofi Creek below Ioribaiwa on
a frontage of just over 2300 metres astride the axis of the Trail attack to capture the
village (Figure 5.9) and cut off what remained of the 21st Brigade (formed into a
composite battalion).17 They had concluded that the 21st Brigade had lost the will to
fight because it had been offering little resistance (presumably since the Battle of

17

Bullard, Japanese Army Operations, p. 257 shown on Figure 5.8 gives the layout and time scale of the
Japanese attack which was a piecemeal move forward on a wide front over four days.. I am indebted to
Bill James and Peter Murray for rescaling and overlaying the Japanese plan onto the modern map in
Figure 5.8. The attack plan was modified in execution. Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II:
Conquest of the Pacific 1941-42, Osprey Battle Orders Series No. 9, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2005, p.
39-44 describes and illustrates the standard Japanese tactics.
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Brigade Hill on 8 September) and it seems that they did not know of the presence of the
3rd Battalion).18 The Japanese infantry were to be supported by fire from a section of
three 75 mm mountain guns, the two regimental 75 mm field guns and two 37 mm
direct fire guns, and each battalion‟s gun/mortar. 19 The Australians had no weapons
with which to reply to these.
Williams argues that the plan was modified. Because the 1st Battalion was held in South
Seas Force reserve back near Nauro, the 144th Regiment had only two battalions
available. With only two battalions, there could only be one strong outflanking
movement and this was to the west by the 2/144 battalion to support the main point of
attack on the main Kokoda trail by the 3/144 battalion. East of the Trail, there was no
enemy plan to approach the ridge until, frustrated by the Australian composite
battalion‟s resistance on 14 September, the 3/144 battalion planned an eastern
envelopment the next day with the village as the objective. On this day, 15 September,
the reinforced 8th Company would hook towards Ioribaiwa village. The 8th Company‟s
two platoons were reinforced with half of the 9th Company, a squad, probably with two
3/144th battalion heavy machine guns, and a small number of engineers. 20
Neither the official history version nor the modified plan suggest Japanese interest in
the area of the saddle. This is important because, as has already been argued, South West
Pacific Area- First Year placed one of an alleged two Japanese incursions in that area.
Many later works follow that account, claiming that the Australians were outflanked on
the south-east near the peak.

18

Operation Order 116 in AWM 55 ATIS Enemy Publications, No. 33, File of Nankai Shitai Operations
orders 16 Aug-15 Oct 42.
19

Williams, The Kokoda Campaign, p.143.

20

Williams, ibid, p.144. See also a photo in the unnumbered photographic section between pages 130
and 131 of Charles Happell, The Bone Man of Kokoda : the extraordinary story of Kokichi Nishimura and
the Kokoda Track, Pan Macmillan, 2008. The text in the photograph was kindly translated by the late Dr
Yuki Oe, when a Japanese post- graduate student at the University of Wollongong.
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This chapter will first reconstruct the topography of Ioribaiwa ridge using computer
aided cartography. Using these findings, which have been verified by field
reconnaissance, it will then reconstruct the battle.
The topography of Ioribaiwa
Figure 5.3 shows the 1942 tracks and place names from Figure 5.1 scaled onto the more
precise topographical detail now available.21 Grid references in this chapter refer to this
map without the initial „5‟ in the eastings and the „89‟ in the northings. The names
shown in boxes are used throughout this case study to replace the various unclear
descriptions used in primary and secondary sources. The Kokoda Trail south of
Ioribaiwa village has been altered and the track leading South West from Ponoon to the
Kokoda Trail is now shown as crossing the ridge through the „saddle‟ below the ‟peak‟
reflecting its actual position based on primary and secondary sources, rather than across
the summit. Figure 5.4 is a profile of the ridge developed from these 2010 sources. The
photograph in Figure 5.5 is a photograph of the „knob‟, an important feature in the
reconstructed narrative.
With reference to figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, Ioribaiwa ridge viewed from behind has the
following points of relevance for this study from left (north-west) to right (south-east):
Ioribaiwa village, a moderate slope for 200 metres then a dip at the head of a re-entrant.
At 350 metres, a steep heavily wooded slope began but ended at about 700 metres in the
cliffs of the knob (figure 5.5) so steep that every Australian rifle company that tried to
climb up or down the cliffs failed, although they traversed the slopes on either side of it.
While not appearing on 1942 maps, its existence and steepness is described in two unit
histories.22

23

The centre of this knob, 850 metres from the village and about 200 metres

above it, forms the north western end of 400 –500 metres of a rising and undulating but
unclimbable section after which the ridge dips slightly into a saddle, which is not

21

Thanks to Peter and Diana Murray of DiZign, Lane Cove, with the support of Bill James .

22

Crooks, The Footsoldiers, pp. 163-164, although the map on page 169 is incomprehensible.

23

Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, p 49-50.
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evident on either 1942 maps or current maps, but is described in the same two unit
histories. Through this saddle ran the rear track to Ponoon (grid reference 627701). The
ridge continues then up to a flat-topped peak, 1600 metres from Ioribaiwa village. The
ridge was covered in thick jungle.24

24

The term „jungle‟ is used for any densely tangled growth in a tropical area. Such growth occurs in areas
of high rainfall and sunlight. Other foliage in the area of Ioribaiwa included bamboo thickets and areas of
kunai grass. This is a tough long sharp bladed grass which can grow from knee height to three metres in
height – on page 158 Crooks describes kunai in the rear of Ioribaiwa as being 1.2 metres high. Rain forest
is another form of tropical foliage which has a light-blocking canopy of trees which restricts growth at
ground level so visibility might be as much as 30 metres. However at the edge of rainforest and in cleared
areas, the sunlight will encourage dense “secondary “growth (also called „jungle‟).
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Police track

Knob

Saddle

Peak

Figure 5.3 2010 map of Ioribaiwa area with the 1942 tracks and place names from Figure 5.1
scaled onto the more precise topographical detail available in 2010
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project
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Figure 5.4: The profile of Ioribaiwa ridge south-east of the village (height in metres). The
relative heights of places on the ridge are calculated from the contour lines on Google Maps
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Figure 5.5: The knob at 620702, looking south-east from the location of the 1942 Ioribaiwa
village.25 It is about 200 metres higher than the area around the village.
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Dr.
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with
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permission.
Also
published
on
http://kokoda.commemoration.gov.au/into-the-mountains/action-at-ioribaiwa-ridge.php accessed on 24
May 2011.
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Reconstructing the Battle
To understand the battle, the Australian plans and reported events were re-assessed and
built up for this case study from a combination of first principles and the evaluation
already discussed of the evidence in the War Diaries and other documents held by the
Australian War Memorial and the National Library. Japanese plans were taken from the
sketch map in Steven Bullard‟s translation of the Japanese official history,26 supported
by his text and the evidence in Peter Williams‟ thesis, which is based on his research in
Japanese sources.27
Because it was followed by a withdrawal, the battle is generally described as an
unsuccessful Australian defence. However it was a more complex operation requiring
the holding of Ioribaiwa ridge by the depleted 21st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier
Porter, consisting of one composite battalion28 and the fresh 3rd Battalion.29 The orders
from Major General Allen to the newly arrived Commander of the 25th Brigade,
Brigadier Eather, were to take offensive action as far forward as possible 30 - a different
mission from Porter‟s mission. His orders required him to act offensively to initially
seize Nauro to receive air re-supply but, because of the routes he chose, his battalions
needed to pass through the areas occupied by the troops of the 21st Brigade without
attracting fire from fellow Australians.

26

Bullard, Japanese Army Operations, sketch map p 257. Reproduced as Figure 5.8.

27

Williams, „The Kokoda Campaign, July – November 1942, An Analysis‟.

28

AWM 52 8-3-16-019 War Diary 2/16th Battalion, pdf 44/119. The composite battalion of four
companies was formed on 10 September out of the 307 survivors of 2/14 th and 2/16th Battalions. Entries
concerning it continue in the 2/16th War Diary and some traces and sketches use the 2/16th title. For
simplicity and uniformity, this thesis uses the term “composite”.
29

HQ 7 Div Operating Instruction No. 9 dated 8 Sep 42 in AWM52 1-5-14-028, War Dairy of 7th
Division, pdf p.48/197, modified in a telephone conversation on 10 September with HQ 7th Division,
confirmed by a signal in the War Diary 21st Brigade AWM 52 8-2-21-017 p. 91/187. On page 8 of
Brigadier Porter's Report, he described how his preference for holding Imita was overruled in the phone
conversation. He was to hold the ambiguously described '…"ridge" N[orth] of IORIBAIWA'.
30

HQ 7 Div Operating Instruction No. 10 dated 11 Sep 42 in War Dairy of 7th Division, pdf p.49/197. In
particular seizing Nauro was vital for Eather‟s resupply by air drops (paragraph 5).
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The operation may be more clearly summarised as follows. Eather intended to move up
the Kokoda Trail as far as the rear of the Ioribaiwa ridge, then to advance by flank
routes to Nauro, a day‟s march beyond Ioribaiwa, passing through the 21st Brigade
position in a manoeuvre, technically called a „passage of lines‟. 31 Because the 25th
Brigade‟s passage of the positions of the 21st Brigade coincided with an attack on them
by the Japanese 144th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion), the 25th Brigade instead
became involved in the defence. The stronger Australian force withdrew on 16
September. The Japanese did not follow up but occupied the ridge to cover their
planned withdrawal which was completed ten days later.
Earlier, when Brigadier Porter, considered his 21st Brigade defence of Ioribaiwa ridge
without a tactical map, it would have been obvious to him that should a Japanese force
reach the point on the Kokoda Trail where it dropped into the valley behind the village,
it would trap any Australian force on the spur north of the village, which, according to
his interpretation of his orders, he must hold.32 He would have identified this point as
being essential to his plan of defence and the ground which his battalion commanders
must secure. 33 He probably determined that the most likely approach to it along the
Trail from Ofi creek should be held by the composite battalion, and the most likely
subsidiary approach would be a flank attack somewhere in the sector from the north-

31

A passage of lines is defined as an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through
another force‟s combat position with the intention of moving in or out of contact with the enemy. This is
the US Dept of Defense and NATO standard definition. This and other detail of the manoeuvre is
summarised
from
the
following
web
pages
accessed
on
23
July
2009:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/ and http://mgray.hopto.org/ArmyPubs/Gagetown-Courses/.
32

In Brigadier Porter‟s Report p. 10, Porter explained that he was ordered to hold 'the ridge north of
Ioribaiwa' and he interpreted it as the ridge running down from the village. There is no copy of written
orders in the War Diary or this file, if indeed his verbal orders were confirmed in writing. HQ 7th
Division Operating Instructions 9 and 10 referenced in footnotes 29 and 30 of this chapter support his
interpretion.
33

The brigade level tactical procedure and considerations were laid down in HMSO, Field Service
Regulations Vol II Operations – General 1935, (Reprinted with Amendments 1939), Section 69 1 p. 136.
The tactics were amplified in Infantry Training 1937 – the Battalion from p.147, the rifle company from
p. 165, and the platoon from p.165. Infantry Section Leading (Australia) 1939, Chapter X, completes the
tactical doctrine. See also the Report of Chester Wilmot in 3DRL 2381 Papers of Major General Allen
5/7, where the tactical importance of tracks in the Owen Stanley Range was emphasised over other
topographical features.
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east around to the Ioribaiwa ridge running upwards and away to the south-east peak.34
In this sector, tactical logic suggests that Porter must have regarded the Police Track,
the Ponoon Track and down the steep slopes of the ridge as the next most likely enemy
approaches to the essential ground he had defined.35 He probably tasked 3rd Battalion to
cover these.36
The 3rd Battalion was deployed in the afternoon of 11 September in accordance with
this brigade plan apparently given as verbal orders by Brigadier Porter who pointed out
its initial task and designated company locations. The 3rd Battalion War Diary entry for
11 September gives only partial details from which we might infer the tasks of two rifle
companies. B Company was „on the right forward slope near the village‟, thus probably
covering the Police track leading in from the north east; D Company (Captain Beckett)
was to occupy the clearly visible „high feature right of village‟ i.e. the knob,37 so its
probable task was denying penetration to the village by enemy coming down the crest
along the main ridge rising to the south-east.38 C Company (Captain Boag) was astride

34

„Notes on ops 25 Aust. Inf. Bde 8-28 Sep 42‟ in AWM52 1/5/14 Appendix H to War Diary HQ 7 th
Division (GS Branch), para 6 p. 2. pdf p.136/ 197.
35

These tracks are shown on Figure 5.1, but if he had no map, how did Brigadier Porter know about
them? An entry in AWM 8/3/39 War Diary of 3rd Battalion on 10 September, recounts that the
Intelligence section was ordered to make a reconnaissance of „police track‟. This was when the 3rd
Battalion was on the Maguli range before moving back to Ioribaiwa. This shows that the existence and
name of this track were known to the 3rd Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Cameron ( or perhaps men of his
battalion) had traversed the Police Track at some point according to Sitrep 182 of 12 Sep in AWM 52
1/5/14 War Diary HQ 7 Aust Div (GS Br) pdf page 71/197. It also suggests that Brigadier Porter or
Colonel Cameron felt this track was important enough to get a reconnaissance done of it, and may have
used the findings to influence the location of the battalion on the ridge. The Police Track would be a
likely enemy approach from the north east.
36

Brigadier Porter‟s Report p. 8.
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War Diary of 3rd Battalion C2118 entry at 1530 11 September. According to the ground reconnaissance
by Rowan Tracey on 26 October 2010, the knob feature is clearly visible as the ridge from Ofi creek is
climbed. See also the photograph taken from the track by Dr Peter Williams (Figure 5.5).
38

C2118 entry 11 September at 1530 in AWM 52 8/3/39 War Diary of 3 rd Battalion. Bede Tongs
(interview 19 July 2010) could not confirm the task of B Company but did confirm that his platoon (10
Platoon) was to link up with the composite battalion which was on the Kokoda Trail higher up the slope.
D Company was out of sight to his right.

154

the track on the reverse slope of the ridge at the village.39 It becomes clear from the
platoon numbers marked on the sketch in Figure 5.2, that A Company was covering the
rear of the battalion and brigade area, minus a platoon-sized standing patrol which was
situated on the Spotter‟s Hut track (the small size of this force indicating that Porter
judged this to be the least likely approach). Thus the intended layout of 3rd Battalion is
recovered, but the war diary records two changes of locations from the plan during its
implementation.
The first change concerned D Company (Captain Beckett). The ground rising to the
knob 850 metres from Ioribaiwa village presented the common tactical dilemma of
whether to locate a defensive position well forward or further back along an approach.
The problem for the brigade defence was that, because it was outside a reasonable
frontage for a battalion in such terrain (450 metres), troops on the knob would be
beyond mutual support from the main position, yet enemy fire from it could reach the
village and most of the 3rd Battalion area. Porter had opted to occupy it with a rifle
company, and had ordered CO 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Cameron) to do so.
That evening, however, he concurred with a change of location which pulled the
defence perimeter back so that it no longer included the rising slope or the knob itself.
This came about because, by 1400, the attempt by D Company (Captain Beckett) to
climb the knob revealed that it was impossible to reach the top from the west. After
reporting back, he was told to place his company closer in with the same task i.e. deny
enemy penetration down the slopes of the ridge from the southeast, and provide mutual
support to the right flank of B Company and to the east of Ioribaiwa village. 40 D
Company was probably placed forward of the Ioribaiwa ridge line and east of the
Kokoda Trail where it falls down the rear of the ridge but in a position far enough
forward to cover the track to Ponoon. It seems to have been astride the re-entrant which
was about 200 metres out along the ridge, and thus formed the right flank of the

39

Page 16 „Report of Operations‟ in AWM 52 8/2/21 War Diary 21st Brigade. This is confirmed by
Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, p 44.
40

AWM 52 8/3/39 War Diary of 3rd Battalion 11 1830 and Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, p. 44
and p. 50. 3rd Battalion notebook, 11 Sep.
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defended area. 41 The relocation of D Company has not been noted in most secondary
sources including the sketch map in South West Pacific Area- First Year which
indicates, incorrectly, that D Company had been able to comply with the initial orders.
Establishing the location is of the utmost importance because the battalion war diary,
notebook, Retreat from Kokoda and the unit history, agree that the Japanese penetrated
17 Platoon, one of the platoons of D Company.
By late afternoon on 11 September, the 3rd Battalion was thus deployed in perimeter
defence on the approaches near the village – probably between 200 metres and 450
metres from it. The battalion commenced to dig in using bayonets, helmets and the
single axe allocated to each platoon. Contrary to instructions, it had left shovel heads
behind. The battalion commander, in accordance with the doctrine manuals, should then
have assigned fire tasks into any gaps and sent regular patrols to keep them clear of
enemy, even though there is no record of his having done so.42 One sentry per section
was also laid down in Infantry Training 1937.43
The second change of plan is well documented though the reason for it must be
speculative. Porter detached C Company (Captain Boag) from the Ioribaiwa village area
and assigned it to secure a track 1500 metres away on the peak. As Porter, without a
map, could not have known about the existence of this track, new information over the
phone from the rear is more likely to have caused the change. At 1600 on 11 September
the phone conference which took place between Brigadiers Porter and Eather. This
conversation, very possibly, revealed to Porter that Eather‟s orders referred to a newlymade map (Figure 5.6). It showed a track to Ponoon over the peak 1600 metres
southeast of Ioribaiwa village which Eather intended to use to pass the 2/33rd Battalion

41

Kennedy‟s veterans insist that at no time were any troops on the knob or on the slope on the Ioribaiwa
side of the knob itself. (Port Moresby to Gona Beach, pp. 46, 49-50 and 52) including the accounts of
Holmes, and of CQMS Brown (whose duties would have entailed going the location of C Company).
42

There are many references in the doctrine manuals at each level from brigade down to section to the
essential need for outposts and sentries.
43

Infantry Training 1937, p. 166.
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around the Japanese, through to the Police Track and on to Nauro. 44 It would be
desirable to deny this track to the Japanese until the leading elements of the 25th Brigade
reached the peak led by a guide to the track from its junction with the Kokoda Trail
down behind Ioribaiwa ridge.

44

AWM 3DRL 2381Papers of Major General Allen, Section 2/7 p 16 contains a summary of a signal
I117 revealing that Porter and Eather together discussed Eather‟s outline plan by telephone. A phone
conversation between the two commanders was logged at 1600 on 11 September in the War Diary of 21st
Brigade though the gist of the conversation is unrecorded.
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Main track to Nauro
(Kokoda Trail)

Police track to Nauro

Route over peak

Figure 5.6: Part of the map provided to Brigadier Eather while being given his orders to take
offensive action as far forward as possible along the Kokoda Trail. Scale is 2.2 inches to one
mile.45

45

Map Kagi-Naoro (sic) 2.2 inches to the mile referenced in HQ 7 Div HQ 7 Div typed OP[eration]
INSTR[uction] (confirmatory order) Number 10 dated 11 Sep. AWM 419/3/9 3 DRL 2381, Papers of
Major General Allen, 4/7.
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It is a reasonable assumption that this is why Brigadier Porter that evening sent a patrol
from C Company to find the track. In the dark it failed, so next morning he sent the
whole company. In its place he pulled back the forward company of the composite
battalion (A Company 2/16th Battalion) to a new position just left of Ioribaiwa village,
where it is shown later on a 2/16th Battalion trace. 46
Setting out on 12 September, C Company tried to climb the knob from the southern side
but failed, so it worked around the front of the ridge below the crest until it found the
track to Ponoon that Eather proposed to use as the route for the 2/33rd Battalion. The
company commander of C Company (Captain Boag), having discovered that the track
was actually in a saddle 300 metres short of the peak, adapted his orders by placing 15
Platoon on the peak, 14 Platoon in the saddle and 13 Platoon on the slopes of the ridge
on the same side as the knob, which was just over 500 metres north west of the saddle.
A telephone line was laid by the 3rd Battalion signallers to C Company at the saddle. It
seems unlikely that either the CO 3rd Battalion or the brigade commander ever visited
the saddle; to be out of communication with their HQ for the time it would take to make
such a visit in difficult country would have been too risky. As these commanders could
see little of their front, and were without good maps, they would necessarily be ignorant
of the conditions and exact locations.47

46

C2118 entry for 12 0630 Sep in AWM 52 8-3-16-019 War Dairy 2/16th Battalion. The trace is an
attachment in App C Operation orders summaries etc. Tracing of Isurava Uberi track. Scale 1 in to 1
mile. [1000 yard squares in an unknown grid – not either Kagi-Naoro sheets or the later 1:63360.] Pte R
A Cook Int Section 2/16th 2 October 42. AWM 8/3/39 War Diary of 3rd Battalion ,12 0645 Sep. Kennedy
Port Moresby to Gona Beach,p 45-46 gives an account of C Company‟s journey to the peak, which
confirms much of the topographic detail along the ridge but misunderstands the task given to the
company. The rearrangements of the composite battalion are set out in W. B. Russell, The Second
Fourteenth Battalion: a history of an Australian infantry battalion in the Second World War, Angus and
Robertson, Sydney, 1948, p. 169-171.
47

„Report of operations Owen Stanley Range 16 August-20 Sep1942‟ (signed by Brigadier Potts), p 62
in AWM 52 8/2/21 War Dairy of HQ 21 Bde August to October 1942. See also p.7 of „Notes on recently
expressed concepts of tactics‟ in AWM PRO00527 Papers of Major General Porter 14/43. It is possible
from a comment on page 9, that Porter thought that C Company 3 rd Battalion was closer than it actually
was.
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C Company 3rd Battalion was out of range for mutual support from the remainder of the
battalion which was 1000 metres away and there was an unclimbable ridge line in
between. It was even out of earshot of small arms fire. 48 As a result it cannot be
regarded as the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, but should have been referred to, in the
terminology used in 1942, as an outpost. Other than patrolling locally for its immediate
protection, the 3rd Battalion would not be responsible for the gap between the outpost
and the right flank of its perimeter defence. That responsibility lay with Brigadier
Porter, unless he specifically delegated it.
Porter‟s after-action report has already been outlined. In it, Porter described a linear
battalion defence with its right flank on the peak 1600 metres to the south east.49 In
reality, as we have seen, the right flank of the 3rd Battalion perimeter was near the
village, and there was a gap from the knob to the saddle which Porter had created when
he detached C Company, but his choice of words gave two possible locations for the
„right flank‟.
As previously observed, another source of confusion about this battle is that most
historians have misunderstood the 25th Brigade orders and plan. It has already been
argued that Brigadier Eather was intending a passage of the lines of the 21st Brigade, not
a defence of Ioribaiwa ridge or a reinforcement of Porter, as is usually claimed. In a
passage of lines, locations of a passing force are not pre-planned as they would be if the
force was going into a defence: the aim is to move cleanly through the stationary
defence positions and get clear before encountering the enemy. Commanders
collaborate to ensure a successful passage by co-locating the two HQs to give unity of
command over all troops in the forward area with operational control transferring to the

48

Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, pp. 45-46.

49

Brigadier Porter‟s Report, p 8. „3 Bn occupied the main ridge astride the village with its R[ight] flank
incl[uding]the peak at 312524‟. The grid reference is to the peak on the map in Porter‟s report which was
not in use in the battle, but was the final printed version of the mapping discussed in Figure 5.1. Lacking
maps at the time of issuing his initial orders on 10 September, he would have pointed out the “nearest
high feature” (the knob) as the location of the right flank company of 3rd Battalion to which the CO
initially sent D Company on the night of the 11 September, the orders to C Company to go to the peak
could not have been so precise, although the highest point may have been discernible in daylight.
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passing commander. Eather took operational control of the two brigades at 1600 on 14
September,50 collaborating with Porter and the 21st Brigade which was to remain on the
ridge until the 25th Brigade got clear. Liaison officers and guides are some of the normal
control measures to ensure a clear passage of lines. An exchange of marked maps is
evident in the records.
The marked map shown as Figure 5.7 is a cropped section of what seems to be one of
the ten airdropped copies of the map Kagi-Naoro (sic) 2.2 inches to the mile which has
been marked up in black with some of the positions of the 21st Brigade and the outline
plan of the 25th Brigade in three colours. No part of the 3rd Battalion is shown near the
peak as C Company 3rd Battalion was not then there. The day after the air drop, on 12
September as C Company 3rd Battalion was moving to the peak, an officer carried some
marked copies back to Brigadier Eather who was on the way forward.51 It seems highly
probable that at Eather‟s HQ, the coloured planned movements and timings of the
battalions were added.
If this analysis is correct, the marked map shows that Brigadier Eather‟s outline plan to
pass the 25th Brigade through or around the area occupied by the 21st Brigade was to use
flanking tracks either side of the main Kokoda Trail. On the north-west, the 2/31st
Battalion was to advance to Nauro via Ioribaiwa village and Spotters Hut. On the south
east flank, the 2/33rd Battalion was to pass well outside the area marked as held by the
3rd Battalion and use the rear track over the peak to Ponoon by the night of 13/14
September. From there it would follow the „Police Track‟ to Nauro, to get behind the
Japanese force on the Kokoda Trail. The 2/33rd Battalion route is marked in blue
arrowheads crossing the peak, where no friendly troops are marked but where C
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Eather, Desert Sands, Jungle Lands, p. 61.

51

AWM 52 8/2/21 War Diary 21st Brigade 13 September. Sublet in Kokoda to the Sea, p 81-82, wrote
that Eather‟s routes were only confirmed on 13 September at an Orders Group at which he, Sublet, was
present. He must have been sent back from his forward position in the composite battalion on Ioribaiwa
ridge to brief the incoming commanders. Major Challen carried the maps marked with 21 st Brigade
positions. Perhaps these officers were supernumerary now that their two battalions had been combined,
but they were authoritative advisors.

161

Company 3rd Battalion had been sent on Porter‟s orders. There was a risk of a clash, but
the 3rd Battalion was to provide a guide.

Figure 5.7: The 25th Brigade plan to move around Ioribaiwa and some positions of the 21st
Brigade.
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In the valley behind Ioribaiwa ridge on 13 September, the 2/33rd Battalion was delayed
following the remainder of the 25th Brigade, when it reached its guide from the 3rd
Battalion who would lead it onto the track over the peak to Ponoon, its scheduled
overnight position. Not foreseeing the difficulties of moving at night in the jungle, the
CO (Lieutenant Colonel Buttrose) continued the advance but was forced to stop as the
unit became scattered. The guide from the 3rd Battalion left them on the slopes to the
rear of C Company 3rd Battalion‟s position at the saddle. There are differing opinions
about what happened during the night, though all agree there was much nervous
shooting, and one officer of the 2/33rd Battalion was found dead the next morning. This
episode will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 6.
Next day they quickly reached the ridge top at the saddle and advanced down the
forward slope. D Company 2/33rd Battalion, reached Ponoon – the planned battalion
night location for the previous evening. Figure 5.8 shows the pre-battle layout of the
battalions as built up from the evidence shown on Figure 5.7.
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FIGURE 5.8 Australian unit locations on Ioribaiwa ridge before the Japanese attacked.
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project.
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Figure 5.9: The Japanese depiction of the planned attack on Ioribaiwa superimposed on a
modern map although the execution by the Japanese left flank was changed and its route may
have been closer to the centre.
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project.
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Events of 14 September.
A fierce but inconclusive battle erupted on 14 September, when the main body of the
144th Regiment (essentially the 3/144 battalion) attacked up the Trail at the same time as
the western envelopment force, consisting of the 2/144 battalion, encountered the
Australian 2/31st Battalion advancing towards Spotters Hut. While it assessed the
situation, HQ 25th Brigade ordered the 2/33rd Battalion to stop its unopposed advance to
Nauro and it remained, probably in its advance formation, in the valley 500 metres
below the saddle where C Company 3rd Battalion was located.52 Local patrols of the 3rd
and the 2/33rd Battalions made no contact with the enemy on this day, but the Japanese
gained some ground on the Trail from the composite battalion.
As already noted, on the evening of 14 September, because of the composite battalion‟s
resistance, the 3/144 battalion plan was changed to a battalion-level double
envelopment. The eastern component was the 8th Company reinforced by half of the 9th
Company. It is likely that the route lay nearer the Kokoda Trail possibly like that
portrayed in Figure 5.13. On the same evening, after receiving withdrawal orders from
Rabaul, the Japanese Commander South Seas Force commenced planning to withdraw
the Force after capturing the village of Ioribaiwa as a delaying position, although his
troops were not told this until a few days later.53
The research thus reveals that, on 15 September, the area defended by D Company 3 rd
Battalion was in the path of the Japanese 8th Company group.54 The Japanese probably
carried a pair of the 55 kg “Woodpecker” heavy machine guns and tripods. At 1330, „an
enemy patrol of estimated strength 20, surprised and overwhelmed 17 platoon causing
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Kennedy Port Moresby to Gona Beach,, p. 48

53

Bullard, Japanese Army Operations, p. 184. Major General Horii and the HQ SSF remained on the
Nauro side of the creek.
54

The layout from Japanese Army Operations only suggests this, but the Nishimura photo identifies the
planned assault of 8th Company as directed from the east on the ridge to the point behind the village
where the Kokoda Trail sharply descends.
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them to withdraw‟.55 Achieving surprise is easy in close country and the war diary was
frank about what had happened, acknowledging that it was due to insufficient sentries
being posted whilst digging in. The enemy appeared to also be moving on the higher
ground beyond the company around the flank towards the re-entrant that ran behind the
company position down the rear of the ridgeline. 56 The other two platoons of D
Company 3rd Battalion, seemed to have stayed in their positions and the remainder of
the Battalion held theirs.57 Another account recorded in August 1944 states that about
50 Japanese went towards the knob beyond D Company 3rd Battalion.58 Further detail of
the events at the platoon level is discussed below.
When describing the location of the Japanese penetration, Brigadier Porter underlined
the words „between nearest high peak on R flank and the village‟.59 This is the area
where D Company 3rd Battalion was located. Why he underlined the words is unclear
but he may have been aware that the ambiguous phrase „high peak on R[ight] flank‟
could be incorrectly understood to mean that the Japanese had broken through in the
area of the saddle where C Company 3rd Battalion was located. His description is
confirmed by primary evidence from the 2/16th Battalion war diary and sketch maps
from an engineer unit (the 2/6th Field Company), which have assisted this study to
further define the location of 17 Platoon within D Company 3rd Battalion, and validate
the accounts of the 3rd Battalion veterans in the unit history.
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C2118 entry Sitrep 1800 hours 15 Sep 42 in the War Diary of 3rd Battalion. .

56

3rd Battalion Notebook, Serial 14.

57

Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, on p.50 quotes a menber of the company HQ who said that
Beckett (the company commander) withdrew, although on p. 51, he added that the Japanese did not
follow up. The War Diary situation reports and the 3 rd Battalion notebook are clearer in implying that the
other two platoons remained in place.
58

AWM 67 Diaries of Gavin Long 2/59: interview with Lt D. Brewster who was in 1942 a signals
corporal in the 3rd Battalion.
59

Brigadier Porter‟s Report, p 9. Thus in his report, Porter has used „right flank‟ to refer to two different
areas. As both have significant high features, the risk of confusion is compounded.
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Porter had also written that the Japanese crossed „open ground which was to be a field
of fire, untouched‟.60 His meaning is unclear. Most likely he meant that members of 3 rd
Battalion did not fire on the approaching Japanese.61 However, some members of the
composite battalion saw and fired upon these Japanese from their locations on the
Kokoda Trail forward of Ioribaiwa ridge, 62 therefore the enemy was within range of
their Bren guns. They reported that the enemy with medium machine guns was moving
over an „open patch north of the knob‟ at a range of 400 metres. 63 This is an application
of the standard principle of mutual support by Bren gun fire overlapping the front of a
company of an adjoining battalion in a brigade area. The trace in Figure 5.10 shows the
locations of companies of the composite battalion and a single company sized location
of the 3rd Battalion on the police track.64 The bearing of the fire would have been close
to 90 degrees true from an area 100 metres north of the village and the 3rd Battalion
troops being thus supported would have been a little south west of the open patch.

60

Brigadier Porter‟s Report, p.9.

61

The 3rd Battalion Notebook Serial 13 says the first firing was a long burst from a Bren gun in D
Company area, which implies that one of the Bren gunners in D Company saw the Japanese and fired
first.
62

The 2/16th Battalion War Diary reads: „1430 D coy observed enemy with MMGs moving over open
patch NORTH of high feature previously held by D coy 3 bn. B coy opened fire inflicting between 30 and
40 casualties, range 450 yards. Jap MG opened fire on the village on right flank bullets landing in BHQ
no casualties‟. Malcolm Uren, A Thousand Men at War – The story of the 2/16th Battalion AIF,
Heinemann, Adelaide, 1959, p 154 confirms and adds details.
63

AWM 8/3/16 2/16th Battalion war diary 1430 15 Sep. The diarist erroneously notes that D/3 had been
pushed off the knob first. It is not surprising that HQ 2/16 Battalion (the composite battalion HQ) had not
been informed of the change to D/3s location from the first orders.
64

AWM 52 8-3-16-019 pdf. From attachment in 2/16th Battalion War Diary Aug-Oct App C Operation
orders summaries etc.Tracing of Isurava Uberi track. Scale 1 in to 1 mile. 1000 yard squares in an
unknown grid – not either Kagi-Naoro 2.2 inch to one mile sheets or the later 1:63360. Pte R A Cook Int
Section 2/16th 2 October 42.
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FIGURE 5.10 2/16
Battalion sketch map of
company locations at
Ioribaiwa aligned so the
grid lines run north-south
on the page.
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There is further supporting evidence in two sketches (Figures 5.11 and 5.12) drawn by
the engineer unit in October 1942, after the ridge was re- captured, which depicted part
of the Japanese defence works. The extra contour detail is valuable when interpreting
the counter attack by B Company 2/33rd Battalion to be discussed below. Both figures
show a clearing marked on this sketch, which is likely to be the one which was being
crossed by the Japanese when they were fired on by the 2/16th Battalion. This gives a
good indication of the location of D Company 3rd Battalion as being on the ridge to the
south-west of this clearing.

170

Ioribaiwa

450 metres

village

Clearing

Positions of likely
re-entrants

Knob

Figure 5.11 Engineer sketch of Ioribaiwa ridge showing estimated contours and a clearing It is
aligned to north with the page.65

65

AWM 52 1-5-14-032, War Diary of 7th Division, October 1942, Part 3, „Intelligence summary No 10‟
App B pdf p. 120/164. This more legible section was cropped from the copy in AWM52-8-3-1-028, War
Diary of the 2/1st Battalion, Nov- Dec 42, pdf p.44/160.
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Possible location of 17
platoon of D Company 3rd
Battalion.
Possible

area

of

Japanese

flanking elements and site of
the two HMGs

CHQ

Figure 5.12: A less precise and detailed sketch by the 2/6 Field Company of area around
Ioribaiwa village. It happens to show the rear and forward re-entrants („steep gully‟) and other
terrain features described by CQMS Brown of D Company 3rd Battalion.66

66

AWM 52 8/2/25 War Diary HQ 25 Bde. pdf p. 7/119. Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, p.50.
As CQMS, Brown was at the company HQ at the time.
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Dropping down to the level of the platoons, the findings are less conclusive about their
relative positions within D Company 3rd Battalion. Based on the recollection of the16
Platoon commander ( Lieutenant Geraghty) that 17 Platoon was about 30 metres up the
hill from 16 Platoon,67 three blue circles have been added on Figure 5.12 to suggest the
layout of the three platoons of D Company 3rd Battalion
In conclusion then, the Japanese incursion took place into the perimeter of D Company
3rd Battalion and around the slope of the knob outside its perimeter. The combination of
the primary and secondary evidence would place the company location with two of its
platoons on the forward slope. It is not possible to be absolutely certain which of those
platoons was 17 Platoon, but its location was probably about 250 metres, but not greater
than, 450 metres from the village. A re-entrant in this area was the route of Japanese
penetration, supported by a pair of heavy machine guns and other troops on the slopes
of the knob. Over the crest, on the rear slope, was the third platoon of D Company,
below which another re-entrant led southward down to the battalion HQ and A
Company 3rd Battalion on the Kokoda Trail behind the village. Beyond them on the
Trail, the 2/25th Battalion was in reserve (See Figure 5.8).
As a 3rd Battalion veteran described the attack
…the rifle and machine gun onslaught came from high on the right flank [that is,
well up the slope of the knob] and was very intensive inflicting some casualties.
The withdrawal [which he claims was ordered by the company commander] was
along the depression towards battalion HQ which…was on the main track [the
Kokoda Trail] leading up to Ioribaiwa. This of course meant that a wedge had
been established [potentially?]

68

allowing enemy movement through the
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Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, p 51. This may mean „south of‟ 17 platoon, which would make
it the reserve, or it may mean „west of‟ 17 platoon which would make it the left forward platoon.
68

Kennedy, ibid, p 49 notes the seriousness of the fact that the enemy was potentially „over the crest‟ but
also that the Japanese had failed to follow up.
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depression and behind troops on Ioribaiwa itself. Fortunately, the Japs didn‟t
follow up their advantage….69
The entry in the 3rd Battalion war diary and the account of Lieutenant Geraghty confirm
that the remainder of D Company held their ground, which South West Pacific AreaFirst Year only implies. If the D Company commander ordered a withdrawal (possibly
without authority) there is no record that anyone other than those exposed did so, but
some may have. While an appropriate response within D Company would have been a
quick counter attack into the 17 Platoon area before the enemy re-organised to defend
it,70 this would have been insufficient to solve the problem posed by the enemy higher
up the slope of the knob.
Fortunately for the Australians, the Japanese attack had lost momentum because of the
3rd Battalion‟s defence. However, the Japanese assault force, supported by heavy
machine guns and substantial artillery fire, was a threat to the defence of the battalion
area, particularly where it was without mutual support from an adjoining battalion in the
brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Cameron was faced with a tactical challenge. A quick
counter attack was desirable, yet the Japanese heavy machine guns were weapons that
could not be neutralised by the battalion‟s small arms. He had only one 3-inch mortar
and no Vickers medium machine guns. Perhaps a 2-inch mortar had been issued to each
platoon although they are not mentioned in any source. A Company 3rd Battalion, was
his reserve with a platoon at all times absent on standing patrol to the west, so it was too
small to counter attack the Japanese in 17 Platoon area; B Company was holding too
important a position to the north in mutual support of the composite battalion to be able
to participate; C Company was out on its independent mission to the saddle. Cameron
had shown his aggressive instinct at Deniki in late August when he re-captured Kokoda
but, without resources, an attack on the enemy in the 17 Platoon area and into the
enemy on the slopes of the knob was unlikely to succeed.
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Kennedy, ibid, p.50. Men in the 2/33rd Battalion heard a mountain gun (Crooks, The Footsoldiers, p.
162)
70

Bede Tongs interview 19 July 2010.
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To the north, B Company 3rd Battalion saw no enemy but heard the firing. 71 To the
south-east, at the saddle and peak, C Company 3rd Battalion saw no sign of the enemy72
nor did the 2/33rd Battalion, which was waiting on the slopes above Ponoon with its own
D Company in that empty village. Brigadier Eather, with two battalions uncommitted to
battle, was the first Australian commander on the Kokoda Trail to have sufficient
uncommitted force to counter a regimental-sized tactical threat on a single track– a full
battalion in reserve in the rear of the brigade area, and another out at the saddle on the
enemy flank. The tactical principle was for troops being attacked to hold fast while
disengaged troops counter attacked.73
To Brigadier Eather at Ioribaiwa village, the threat would have been obvious. The
enemy heavy machine guns outside the 3rd Battalion perimeter were firing into the
village and dominating the Kokoda Trail, and the enemy infantry elements were on the
slopes of the knob. A renewed Japanese attack from that direction might penetrate to
Ioribaiwa village and cut off two other Australian battalions. On the other hand the
Japanese had lost momentum. Because the literature often incorrectly claims that
Eather‟s counter attacks failed, it is necessary to describe them in some detail. The first
one was a quick attack to take advantage of the Japanese loss of momentum. Seizing
this opportunity, he ordered a quick counter attack within an hour using two companies
of the 2/25th Battalion– one to recapture the 17 Platoon area and restore the integrity of
the perimeter, the other to sweep up the slopes. He also ordered a converging attack by a
company of the 2/33rd Battalion down the ridge from the saddle towards the position of
D Company 3rd Battalion.
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Figure 5.13: The Japanese incursion and the Australian counter attacks 15-16 September.
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project
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C Company and D Company of the 2nd /25th Battalion, led by the CO, Lieutenant
Colonel Withy (a First World War veteran), moved up the Kokoda Trail to the HQ 3 rd
Battalion then into the D Company 3rd Battalion area. One company retook the 17
Platoon position and the other attacked up the slopes beyond - a 1944 account states that
the 2/25th Battalion chased the enemy up the knob, and the unit history states that the
other company moved up the high ground beyond but could not dislodge the enemy
from the slopes.74 The battalion lost four killed and several wounded after which HQ
2/25th Battalion and HQ 3rd Battalion co-located for the night.75
The primary records confirm that by 1630, 15 September, the 17 Platoon position had
been recovered and was being held by a company of the 2/25th Battalion, but that some
of the Japanese in 8 Company 3/144 battalion were still lower down the re-entrant
(north of the position of 17 Platoon?) and up on the high ground. The converging
company (A Company 2 /33rd Battalion) could not find a way down the unclimbable
cliffs, so the CO 2/33rd Battalion took the initiative to adapt his original orders by
ordering a renewed attack westwards by D Company 2/33rd Battalion in the valley at
Ponoon, hoping it would find the going easier.76
Late in the afternoon, D Company 2/33rd Battalion, had begun moving west below the
cliffs to try to destroy the Japanese infiltration. 77 A significant encounter with the
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Japanese followed as, guided by the Intelligence corporal of the 3rd Battalion,78 it moved
from Ponoon village along the track which led across, and up to, Ioribaiwa village.79
After cautiously advancing for about half an hour (approximately 500 metres) along the
rising track below the cliffs, the company struck 50 or 60 Japanese – probably elements
of 8 Company of 3/144 battalion. In an intense exchange of fire, D Company 2/33 rd
Battalion lost two killed, about six wounded and two missing before darkness forced it
to pull back 200 metres into a night defensive perimeter on the cliff track. The Japanese
did not follow up.80
Illustrating the problem of communication in this country, Buttrose at the saddle learnt
of it at 2000 hours but Eather over near the village did not know that this attack had
occurred. His diary entry that evening reveals that Eather knew that A Company 2/33rd
Battalion had failed to get down the ridge but does not record that D Company 2/33rd
Battalion had made contact with the flank of the 8th company. 81 It was however
recorded in the brigade war diary.
Eather‟s move to counter the Japanese penetration was a significant, though incomplete,
success, despite what historians have written. The two prongs of the counter attack did
hit the Japanese penetration, although at different times because it was not possible for
commanders to estimate difficulty and time of movement and issue co-ordinating
instructions based on time. By 1630 (after the attack by the 2/25th Battalion but before
the D Company 2/33rd Battalion contact) Eather sent a message to the GOC 7th
Division that the enemy was „effectively held on all points‟. At this point, the Japanese
must have known that they had unexpectedly encountered fresh Australian troops, if
only because most were wearing jungle green uniforms which they had never seen on
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Australians before. 82 It is possible to imagine the confusion that they felt that night,
having encountered fresh Australians in an unexpected location, then being driven out
of the area they had captured and finally being struck in their left flank. Brigadier Eather
must have decided to press his advantage because, on the night of 15 September, HQ
25th Brigade ordered another attack next morning by the 2/33rd Battalion westwards
towards the area of the Japanese penetration. D Company 2/33rd Battalion, down the
front of the ridge was to return to the location of its contact the previous afternoon, cut
off any Japanese escaping but not become heavily engaged.83
The preliminary moves of the 2/33rd Battalion‟s counter attack commenced at 0730 next
day, 16 September. After two hours‟ movement, possibly around the rear of the knob,84
B Company 2/33rd Battalion found the position of the companies of the 2/25th Battalion
hemming in the Japanese below and west of the knob and, at 1000 hours, attacked
northwards into the Japanese penetration across reasonably flat ground covered with
dense scrub and kunai. This may be the flat area shown on the 2/6th Field Company
sketch in Figure 5.11. In the intense two hour fire fight, four Australians were killed but
the Japanese withdrew. Although this was the first experience of combat command by
the company commander of B Company 2/33

rd

Battalion, Captain Archer, he led an

attack that adapted to the lack of visibility caused by scrub and kunai to apply pressure
on the unseen Japanese. Their general locations were evident only by their LMG and
rifle fire, which forced his men to ground, but they kept up the pressure by probing until
the Japanese left the area.
Below the cliffs, the D Company 2/33rd Battalion cut-off force also moved out at 0730
and at 0930 was fired on by the enemy who were above it on the forward face of the
ridge, as it got close to the area where it had made contact with the Japanese on the
previous evening. This was a little before the attack by B Company 2/33rd Battalion
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from the other side of the ridge. The Japanese 8th Company, pressed from its front and
left flank, withdrew from the slope above 17 Platoon by a little after noon. No Japanese
were seen by D Company 2/33rd Battalion but they continued to fire on any Australian
movement. The Japanese

primary records claim that they remained in the area and

enlarged their position by seizing some high ground which Williams claims was the
knob.85 Given the topographical ignorance of the Japanese due to lack of maps which
has been discussed in Chapter 3, the evidence for this is not strong. Perhaps they were
not seen in the jungle. They did not interfere with the withdrawal of the Australians if
they were aware of it, yet the knob dominates the Kokoda Trail. As a precise time is not
given, if they did climb the knob, it may have been later that day after the Australian
withdrawal. Furthermore, if the 2/31st Battalion, west of the Kokoda Trail, could bring
the 2/144 Battalion to a halt, it is reasonable to believe that the combined efforts of the
2/25th and 2/33rd Battalions could have forced the 8th Company off the ridge by noon on
16 December, except for the group which had fired on D Company 2/33rd Battalion
earlier.
However, earlier that morning, Brigadier Eather, despite the accuracy of his previous
assurance to Major General Allen that the penetration was held, had concluded that the
enemy was moving farther round his flanks, and decided to withdraw even though the
counter attacks he had already ordered were still in progress and would turn out to be
successful before the withdrawal had actually begun. Historians have assumed that the
real or suspected outflanking of the Australian positions was the reason for the decision.
However, it has been argued in this chapter that there was no actual outflanking of the
position and the loss of the 17 Platoon position was temporary. Certainly, the two
Australian brigade HQs overestimated Japanese strength on the Kokoda Trail but the
Japanese Official History and later research shows that there was only one regiment
(less a battalion) confronting Eather‟s force.
A detailed discussion of his reasons for the withdrawal is beyond the scope of this study
as are its ramifications upwards through the chain of command. The simplest
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explanation is that his mission required him to take offensive action, and to resume it he
needed to regroup his force into its proper units from its dispersed locations at the end
of the counter attacks. He concluded that, as it would be difficult in the face of enemy
opposition to entangle his rifle companies from their positions after the counter attacks,
he could best do this by withdrawing to Imita ridge. Furthermore, he no longer had any
carriers for resupply or casualty evacuation, as they had been used during the battle. The
various war diaries detail the uncontested Australian withdrawal finally clearing the
Ioribaiwa ridge at 1630. The fact that the withdrawal was not fired on from the knob
cannot be explained if the 8th company was, as Williams argues, in occupation.
With hindsight we know that Eather had twenty rifle companies, sixteen of them fresh,
to the six Japanese companies depleted after two weeks of fighting in the mountains,
and these were all committed to the attack rather than passing around his flanks. He may
not have known his force was superior in numbers, but he did know that the temporary
loss of one platoon area was not sufficient to dislodge his brigade of four battalions
(including the 3rd Battalion). The enemy force on the slopes of the knob seemed to be a
threat until the morning‟s counter attacks forced it to withdraw. Had he directed the
complete 2/33rd Battalion to counter attack from Ponoon towards the main Kokoda Trail
rather than using two companies across the rear; or had he chosen to stay and defend,
the Japanese were not strong enough to prevail.
The 144th Regiment was able to occupy Ioribaiwa ridge unopposed because the
Australians had skilfully withdrawn earlier that day. The Japanese developed defences
on it but did not go beyond Ioribaiwa ridge other than to protect it by patrolling until 26
September when they too withdrew unopposed. 86
The absence of maps, rugged jungle covered hills and ambiguous descriptions of where
the Japanese and Australian troops were on the ground, all contributed to uncertainty in
1942. Post-war, this was compounded by flawed editorial decisions in the Australian
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official history which have been carried into the literature. It has been argued that the
Japanese only temporarily secured a lodgement in one platoon area of the 3rd Battalion,
while a passage of lines was being attempted by the 25th Brigade. The common
depiction of this as another outflanking of the Australians by numerically superior
Japanese forces on the Kokoda Trail is exaggerated, as is the claim that the loss of a
platoon area of the 3rd Battalion was decisive. The Australian withdrawal cannot be
construed as reflecting on the combat effectiveness of the troops. In Chapter 6, the
combat effectiveness of the 3rd Battalion and the 2/33rd Battalion during the defensive
battle of Ioribaiwa will be analysed.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 5: Task Organisation

HQ 7th Division (Major General Allen)

21st Brigade
August.

(Brigadier Porter from September ) already in mountains since 29

2/14th Battalion and 2/16th Battalion now combined into a composite battalion
(Lieutenant Colonel Caro).
3rd Battalion from 6 September. (Lieutenant Colonel Cameron)
25th Brigade (Brigadier Eather) from 14 September and took command of both
brigades on Ioribaiwa ridge.
2/25th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Withy)
2/31st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Dunbar)
2/33rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Buttrose)
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Imperial Japanese Army in front of Ioribaiwa from 12 September
HQ South Seas Force
1/144th Battalion (reserve)
Troop of mountain guns (three) from 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment
144th Regiment Pursuit Group (the attacking force at Ioribaiwa, estimated to be 1650
men)
HQ 144th Regiment(Colonel Kusunose)
55th Mountain Artillery Regiment grouped with 144th Regimental Gun
Company
2/144th Battalion ( enveloping force from the west)
3/144th Battalion ( initially all astride the Kokoda Trail)
detachment of 8th Company plus half of 9th Company, engineers and medium
machine guns ( moved on 15 September as an enveloping force east of the
Kokoda Trail)
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Chapter 6: Ioribaiwa battle analysis

The last chapter reconstructed the setting for the combat experiences of the 3rd and the
2/33rd Battalions east of the Kokoda Trail in the battle of Ioribaiwa and described their
first combat against the IJA. This chapter will give further detail of events in the
battalions before they encountered the enemy, followed by an analysis of their combat
readiness during their first encounter and an evaluation of their combat effectiveness
after it.
In 1942, the army did not have appropriate doctrine for jungle warfare with the result
that it did not have effective tactical doctrine and could not supply suitable tropical and
jungle equipment. 1 Neither battalion had been trained to fight the IJA in thickly
vegetated mountainous country, without divisional and battalion supporting weapons,
workable communications and combat service support (administration and logistics).
The IJA carried its supporting artillery, battalion guns and heavy machine guns into the
mountains and had the logistic support to sustain them. A concern for weight carried by
individual men led to the holding back in Port Moresby of the Australian Vickers
medium machine guns and most of the 3- inch mortars. As a result, there was no
weapon to counter the Japanese heavy machine guns which the Japanese man-packed to
Ioribaiwa. The Vickers medium machine gun was lighter and had superior range to the
Japanese Juki, such as the one which fired from the slopes of the knob at Ioribaiwa.2
In the case of the 3rd Battalion, the army failed to continue training of the battalions of
the 14th Brigade even in the prevailing open warfare doctrine, as detailed in Chapters 2
and 4. It certainly gave them no understanding of jungle warfare. The 2/33rd Battalion
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had been trained to the level of combat readiness and also had been committed to
combat in Syria in 1941. However, the question to be explored is the extent to which
the collective training in Australia after its return was not only effective in developing
primary group cohesion but also in adapting to the unexpected demands of infantry
fighting in jungle covered mountains. No useful training had been given for this in
Australia, although attempts had been made.3
One example of the practical effects this had has been recounted in Chapter 5: 17
Platoon D Company 3rd Battalion was scratching at the soil in an attempt to dig when
the Japanese 8th Company caught it by surprise. Brigadier Selwyn Porter, the
commander of the 30th Brigade, reported that the Japanese success in capturing the
platoon‟s location „… was the result of miscarriage of the confused doctrine “against
fixed defence” [his quotation marks]‟.4 By this he seems to have meant that the need to
dig trenches was apparent in the defensive open warfare in which the 3rd Battalion had
been trained in Australia and practiced when digging anti-invasion trenches at Port
Moresby, but word had spread that trenches were not necessary in jungle warfare. The
digging of weapon pits, not trenches, was necessary to avoid casualties from Japanese
mountain guns, regimental and battalion guns, heavy machine guns, company grenade
launchers and small arms fire at very close range. HQ 7th Division did know about the
necessity to dig weapon pits, hence the need for shovel heads to be carried in sandbags
as part of the mens‟ personal equipment, and had stressed this to the CO (then
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Lieutenant Colonel Albert Paul). 5 The troops had thrown the shovel heads away
because they were too heavy.6
As noted in Chapter 2, a myth of the traditional Kokoda Trail narrative is that the
Japanese were trained in jungle warfare. This was not so, but much of their equipment
and many of their tactics practised in China were very suitable for it.7
Experiences before the first encounters
As discussed in Chapter 4, in Port Moresby the 3rd Battalion had continued the antiinvasion role with which it was familiar, but training time was sacrificed to labouring
duties ordered by HQ New Guinea Force. This would, in principle, have caused its
combat readiness to erode by the time it was sent forward into the Owen Stanley Range.
Despite earlier expressing lack of confidence in its training standard and fighting spirit,
Lieutenant General Rowell on 2 September issued the warning order to the 3rd Battalion
to move up the Kokoda Trail.
On the night 4/ 5 September 1942, the 3rd Battalion in Port Moresby was ordered to
establish a patrol base on Ioribaiwa ridge to secure the lines of communication of the
21st Brigade which was falling back having contested the Japanese advance since
Isurava on 29 August. The 3rd Battalion was to hold various tracks which appeared to
allow wide Japanese outflanking of the Kokoda Trail from the north and west, and act
as a „backstop‟ to 21st Brigade. In the „improbable‟ event of the 21st Brigade being
overwhelmed north of Nauro, the 3rd Battalion was to be prepared to hold Ioribaiwa and
Nauro pending the arrival of the 25th Brigade estimated to be a little over 48 hours
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later.8 The 3rd Battalion reached the ridge on the night of 6 September and sent patrols
forward along the tracks from 7 September.
There were two command changes at this time. Before he reached Ioribaiwa, the CO of
the 3rd Battalion since 1938, Lieutenant Colonel Albert Paul , was forced to return to
Port Moresby as unfit for the physical demands of the terrain. He was replaced on 10
September by Lieutenant Colonel Allan Cameron, who had been at Rabaul during the
brief fighting there and had about two weeks experience against the Japanese on the
Kokoda Trail forward of Deniki. On the same day, in accordance with previous orders
from major General Allen, Brigadier Porter took over from Brigadier Arnold Potts as
Commander 21st Brigade, which now incorporated the 3rd Battalion. 9 Porter also had
experience of fighting the Japanese on the Kokoda Trail during his earlier brief period
in command forward at Isurava.
Porter, although these orders had called for him to hold the enemy as far north as
possible, realised that he could not hold Nauro or the range south of it (Maguli), and
acted quickly. He immediately recalled the patrols sent out by the 3rd Battalion,
consolidated it and moved it forward from Ioribaiwa along the Kokoda Trail to the rear
of the Maguli range to act as a battalion- sized extricating force for the 21st Brigade
while it withdrew to Ioribaiwa, which as discussed in Chapter 5, HQ 7th Division had
directed him to hold. On 11 September, the remnant of the 21st Brigade passed through
the rearguard positions of the 3rd Battalion onto the ridge at Ioribaiwa. The 3rd Battalion
then withdrew without contact with the Japanese. Frank Sublet, one of the company
commanders in the 21st Brigade was to write that the 3rd Battalion showed the benefit
of its earlier training under Lieutenant Colonel Paul. 10 This independent evidence
suggests that 3rd Battalion was well enough trained to enter hostile territory and
successfully conduct some battalion level operations and that the E classification had
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been appropriate. The 3rd Battalion certainly had shown secondary group cohesion
under immediate threat of combat while assisting the 21st Brigade‟s withdrawal, but its
combat readiness had not been tested in actual contact with the Japanese. However the
patrolling and withdrawal operations were a useful introduction to the terrain and its
unfamiliar conditions. The secondary group cohesion of the battalion also had adjusted
to the leadership of the new CO (Cameron), probably assisted by a strong unit
loyalty/identity social structure already created by Lieutenant Colonel Paul.
The war diary of the 3rd Battalion notes some inconclusive patrols once on the ridge on
12 and 13 September but there are no patrol reports on file which would enable an
assessment. On 12 September, C Company demonstrated a good level of capability on
its semi-independent mission as an outpost at the saddle, untested, however, by any
contact with the enemy. The lack of contact by 3rd Battalion might be attributed to lack
of patrolling skill or tenacity, or it may simply be due to the difficulty of forces sighting
each other in close country.
In these preliminaries to its first combat action, the 3rd Battalion had demonstrated that
its secondary group cohesion was sufficient to enable it to patrol, hold its ground, and
skilfully cover the 21st Brigade‟s withdrawal into the Ioribaiwa position. This was the
residue of its pre-war training, the long period of full time duty of its officers and NCOs
from September 1941, which was maintained during the period in Port Moresby by the
well-rated CO, Paul, and endured despite the change to the new CO. This was however
in the limited settings of a withdrawal to, and occupation of, a defensive position while
out of contact with the enemy. Both were operations that the unit was likely to have
been well trained for. This lack of opportunity to prove itself more widely makes it
difficult to endorse the opinion of Sublet that the 3rd Battalion had performed as well as
the combat experienced units from the Middle East.11
However, despite the few training opportunities at Port Moresby, the pre-war cohesion
and the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Paul and his officers had created a battalion
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with good secondary group cohesion as its performance in patrolling and the withdrawal
from Maguli demonstrated. It had responded effectively to the new CO Lieutenant
Colonel Cameron, deployed in defence and sent out a company to a distant outpost. The
test of combat on the primary groups was yet to come.
The other battalion in the case study is the 2/33rd Battalion, which was formed in Britain
in 1940 from miscellaneous reinforcements intended for the Australian army then being
formed and trained in the Middle East. It had trained in British Army facilities around
Salisbury Plain, while serving in an anti invasion role in Britain, until it was shipped to
the Middle East. It arrived in March 1941 to complete its training over three months and
was deemed battle ready to take part in the invasion of Syria. It took part in the
campaign against the Vichy French in June 1941for three weeks, fighting in open
mountainous terrain against a first class French-commanded Army, which had lavish
artillery, tanks, and air support. In difficult operations it lost 23 dead and 77 who were
either wounded or so sick that they never returned to the battalion – an approximate
casualty ratio in the rifle companies of 25%. The fighting was dispersed over a wide
area and fought by companies and platoons. There were only 480 men left on the
battalion strength at the end of three weeks but 120 rejoined while it was in garrison and
anti invasion roles on the Turkish frontier after the Allied armistice with the Vichy
French.12
This experience would have made it combat effective, particularly in the primary
groups, before its return to Australia. There, in accordance with the system described in
Chapter 4, the army had, without regard to its relativity to a specific enemy or terrain,
given it an A classification (efficient and experienced for mobile offensive operations).
However, by the time it reached Papua, perhaps 50 per cent of D Company 2/33rd
Battalion at Ioribaiwa did not have any combat experience in Syria having joined it as
replacements afterwards.13 Assuming this to be true of the whole battalion, the question
arises of the durability of a combat experienced classification, not only because of
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possible lack of relevance to a different theatre, but also because of the diluting effect of
inexperienced personnel. These issues will be developed further at the end of this
Chapter and in Chapter 9.
The introduction of the 2/33rd Battalion to Ioribaiwa was dramatic. In the last chapter,
the night movement by the 2/33rd Battalion in single file to Ioribaiwa ridge was only
briefly described and some extra detail is added here. In accordance with the 25th
Brigade‟s plan, the battalion was to spend the night of the 13/14 September beyond the
Ioribaiwa ridge down at Ponoon. Although the marked map (Figure 5.7) does not show
that C Company, 3rd Battalion was at the saddle, the 3rd Battalion had provided a guide
to its location. As the 2/33rd Battalion was running late, the CO (Lieutenant Colonel
Alfred Buttrose) ordered the advance to continue in the dark. Night operations in such
close country are very difficult. Nights are very dark, good control and navigation are
challenging, and movement through dense foliage is noisy.
Commendable though the haste was, the CO‟s inexperience in this theatre meant he did
not know that it was often impracticable to move at night, even along a track, because of
the rugged nature of the terrain and the lack of visibility in the dark of the jungle. The
unit became disorganised as the tired soldiers and their leaders were strung out over
about one kilometre. Crooks says the night advance became „chaotic‟ as the „rot set in‟
until the unit disintegrated into small groups of nervous men without control by
leaders.14 This loss of control was very serious. The CO ordered the attempt to stop and
the unit to stay where it was overnight. However, due to nervousness and inexperience
in the strange darkness, firing began at perceived noises. Such behaviour quickly
spreads, with every shot reinforcing one‟s own nerves and potentially giving away one‟s
location to any nearby enemy. In the area of the 2/33rd Battalion, firing continued all
night. In the morning one of its officers was found shot dead. While mutual
recriminations were later made by the battalion historians and primary evidence does
indicate that firing by the 3rd Battalion may also have occurred, firing by C Company 3rd
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Battalion has been vigorously denied.15 The situation report from the 21st Brigade to HQ
7th Division sent next morning said that the firing came from the 2/33rd Battalion.16
The denial can be given more weight because of the location of the 3rd Battalion
companies as revealed in Chapter 5 and the familiarity of the men of the 3rd Battalion
with night conditions in the Owen Stanley Range after operating there for a week. The
claim in the 2/33rd war diary that there had been a Japanese patrol which they had fired
at is implausible because of the distances to be moved in the dark. It is more probable
that the strangeness of the conditions and the dispersal of the 2/33rd Battalion caused
mild individual panic at times that overcame the battle discipline inculcated by the
training of all, and the experience of some in the Middle East. Pugsley has pointed out
that the journey to combat effectiveness can involve setbacks and this is one example.17
The 2/33rd Battalion, in the night shooting episode, lost its secondary cohesion by
becoming strung out in darkness, then suffered a breakdown of primary cohesion. The
CO was unable to convert his combat experience to this strange environment,
illustrating how relative combat experience is. However, his adaptability once he found
his feet in this unfamiliar terrain was exemplary. He was able to re-impose cohesion on
his battalion. Thus, there was a quick recovery of combat readiness when, early on
September 14, cohesion reasserted itself. Contact was made with the outpost manned by
C Company 3rd Battalion, at the saddle and the battalion moved down the forward slope
until ordered by Brigadier Eather to stop because of developments elsewhere on the
ridge.
The setback on the first night was derived from a set of reinforcing layers of failures. At
the highest level – that of New Guinea Force, 7th Division and 25th Brigade – the sense
of crisis initiated by MacArthur and the Cabinet led to subjecting troops to combat in
such terrain without acclimatisation and familiarisation with its unexpected demands. If
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there was a failure to mark the map with the location C Company 3rd Battalion and this
failure led to the episode of fratricide, it was an organisational failure in HQ 21st
Brigade. This seems unlikely, and a more probable cause of the shooting was
nervousness in the unfamiliar night conditions of the jungle. The catalyst of the loss of
secondary group (battalion) cohesion was the decision of the highly combat experienced
CO to attempt movement at night in this theatre. Finally, loss of primary group cohesion
occurred when the immediate hierarchy of leaders lost control of men separated in the
wet darkness. While the situation seemed to justify haste, the episode shows that a
battalion which is well trained and experienced in a different theatre of war will have
difficulty in retaining its combat effectiveness when entering another theatre.
Analysis of the battle
Three episodes in the battle described in Chapter 5 are worth more detailed analysis.
The first is the overrunning of 17 Platoon and the events near the location of D
Company 3rd Battalion. It is unreasonable to blame the 3rd Battalion for the Japanese
exploitation of the slopes of the knob beyond its perimeter, because the decision to
leave the knob unoccupied was the brigade commander‟s prerogative, as it is his role to
site rifle companies. Porter must have sanctioned the re-location of D Company to the
area below the knob as discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, troops in D Company 3 rd
Battalion may have been moved again by either Brigadier Eather or Lieutenant Colonel
Cameron after about three days of occupation. 18 Considering the obvious proximity of
the Japanese and the lack of tools, it was risky to order them to dig new positions at the
new location not far away. Likewise, it was either Brigadier Porter‟s or Lieutenant
Colonel Cameron‟s responsibility to have a brigade or battalion patrol plan to cover the
Ponoon track and the overlooking higher slopes of Ioribaiwa ridge to the south east.
There was a breakdown of primary group cohesion in D Company which was initially
the outcome of the factors discussed above. Japanese heavy machine guns were able to
gain advantageous positions on the slopes outside the perimeter above the battalion
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defended area, to support the surprise assault across the clearing onto 17 Platoon‟s
position. This assault caused its primary group cohesion to fracture.

The company

commander (Captain Beckett), instead of ordering an immediate local counter attack,
may have ordered a withdrawal, which only some men seem to have obeyed. This was
his first combat experience, and he may have momentarily failed to focus on his defence
mission. By holding its ground, the remainder of the company caused the Japanese to
lose momentum, and supplied a firm base for the 2/25th Battalion counter attack which
led to the position of 17 Platoon being recaptured about one hour later. However, by
preventing the Japanese reaching the ground behind the village which was essential to
the 21st Brigade‟s defence, the battalion was effective because its primary and
secondary group cohesion was at least adequate to deny the enemy his aim. It had, as
Rowell‟s implied rating suggested, fought effectively enough, although no companies
other than D Company had been tested by close combat.
However the effects of the brigade-level decisions are insufficient to entirely exonerate
the unit. The platoons and sections of the battalion were responsible for the mens‟
individual weapons not being to hand and lack of listening posts or sentries, forward of
constantly manned Bren guns. The 3rd Battalion would have been familiar with such
precautions because they are contained in the doctrine manuals, 19 and used in the open
country warfare in which it had been trained, but supervision of individual soldier
discipline by NCOs was apparently weak. As Japanese attacks had been evident close to
the 3rd Battalion area for about 48 hours before the attack on 17 Platoon, battle
discipline in primary groups demanded that weapons be carried at all times. The harsh
lesson for the 3rd Battalion was that, while sentries have limited use in open warfare
when it is impossible to approach a position by day unseen, in jungle warfare an
approaching enemy will be concealed by the foliage. Training lessons must be
maintained and their observance demanded by junior leadership.
It can be argued that the failure to dig efficiently was at least partly a leadership failure
within the unit. An effective formal command structure would include paternal and
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protective supervision by officers and NCOs as part of the mechanism of both primary
and secondary group cohesion in the task of defence.20 They failed in the 3rd Battalion
to insist on carrying tools for digging weapon pits. It is not surprising that Lieutenant
Colonel Cameron had found their digging inefficient and was making them „dig with a
will‟ when the assault began.21 Sadly, the price of these failures was six wounded and
four missing (later confirmed killed as prisoners) in the 3rd Battalion.22 If 17 Platoon
was at full strength, this was a casualty ratio of just over 33 per cent, so it is not
surprising that its defence suffered a breakpoint.
However, the inadequate primary group cohesion was bolstered by the secondary group
cohesion of those within the perimeter defence under the direct control of the CO, and
encouraged by the presence of the rest of Porter‟s and Eather‟s brigades. Companies
acting independently, such as those of the 2/33rd Battalion, were in a more demanding
environment because they were without the supportive cultural frameworks of the
battalion around them.
As a whole, the 3rd Battalion was not, when compared to the 2/33rd Battalion, tested in
manoeuvre, nor widely engaged in combat. In its two uncontested withdrawals it
displayed good cohesion and thus potential effective secondary group cohesion in
combat. Some weeding out of failed leaders and men occurred but most were retained;
battle hardening had commenced. Brigadier Eather showed his confidence when he
assigned a prominent role to the 3rd Battalion in the subsequent advance following up
the withdrawing Japanese, and Lieutenant Colonel Cameron gave Captain Beckett an
important attack role at Templeton‟s Crossing. The 3rd Battalion performed better than
Rowell or Allen had expected and won the confidence of Brigadier Eather.
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The second episode for further analysis is the execution of Brigadier Eather‟s counter
attack on 15 September, which was a demonstration of secondary group cohesion within
and beyond the battalion. Eather‟s prompt response to the Japanese in the 17 Platoon
area of D Company, 3rd Battalion, was to order a two-pronged counter attack using two
of his battalions. At least for the 2/25th Battalion, a firm base was available as a result of
the 3rd Battalion‟s holding its ground. This counter attack was a partial success. 17
Platoon‟s area was recovered, but the enemy were forced up the slopes of the knob and
remained nearby. Eather left the two companies of the 2/25th Battalion in place, thus
extending his security on the right flank. As night fell, the enemy‟s chance of breaking
through was blocked as far as the knob, which is confirmed by his message to 7th
Division that the enemy was held.
The other prong of the 25th Brigade counter attack was to be delivered by 2/33rd
Battalion moving down the ridge from its position at the saddle just over 1000 metres to
the south-east. This could not be tightly co-ordinated as this was not possible on the
scanty information available to Eather and the limited wireless and line communications
in the brigade. He therefore trusted the actions of his subordinate, the CO of the 2/33 rd
Battalion (Buttrose) and his company commanders. The 2/33rd Battalion made two
attempts to comply with Eather‟s orders. Firstly, the attempt by its A Company to cross
to the knob to pinch out the Japanese below it failed because the ridge was impassable.
At least this manoeuvre had shown that there were no Japanese between the saddle and
the knob – an important point in the light of the flawed narrative in South West Pacific
Area – First Year.
Buttrose showed persistence by adapting and trying again to follow the spirit of his
orders. He adapted to the failure of his A Company to find a way down the ridge by
ordering D Company, 2/33rd Battalion to attempt to hit the enemy by using the Ponoon
track to Ioribaiwa. The companies were much dispersed which was an unfamiliar
situation in training, but similar to the battalion‟s prior combat experience in Syria, and
the secondary group cohesion was strong.
D Company 2/33rd Battalion attacked westwards using the Ponoon-Ioribaiwa track on
the forward side of the ridge. While its effect on the Japanese did not force a
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withdrawal, it must have demonstrated to the Japanese force that it was in no position to
resume the attack on the Australian defences, and that any part of the 8th Company in
the knob area was at risk of being cut off. From Crooks‟ detailed account of that
counter- attack by D Company 2/33rd Battalion on the afternoon of 15 September, it
seems that the leadership in the company was effective and so was primary group
cohesion. The lead platoon went into an automatic drill but the platoon commander, not
a combat veteran, was killed before he could make a plan. The platoon sergeant was
hesitant about his correct duty until the company commander (Captain Clowes)
following behind the lead platoon, told him to take over and extricate his platoon from
the Japanese fire. This intervention triggered the Sergeant‟s trained response. Just as
with Captain Beckett, the momentary confusion of a trained soldier is common in the
first combat situation he confronts. The automatic left and right hooks of the other
platoons, despite being led by combat veterans, failed to find routes in the difficult cliff
country and through a bamboo thicket. Nevertheless, D Company 2/33rd Battalion had
demonstrated excellent primary group cohesion.
The conduct of this attack demonstrated that a core of experience could influence
primary cohesion even though 50 per cent of the men and quite a few of their leaders,
including the OC and the leading Platoon Commander, had no battle experience. The
company manoeuvred up to the enemy and promptly implemented battle drills, even if
they had limited value in close country, showing how training must be relevant to the
campaign terrain. It formed a company perimeter overnight and moved forward again
next morning into enemy fire.
The third battle episode for analysis is the counter attack of the following day – 16
September. Brigadier Eather, recognising that the counter attacks of 15 September had
only been partially successful, that night ordered a renewed counter attack next morning
to clear the remaining Japanese from the slopes of the knob. This second counter attack
by the 2/33rd Battalion was a two- pronged but loosely co-ordinated attack. It was well
led in manoeuvre and assault by an officer without combat experience who had trained
with the battalion for a long time in the Middle East, as had about half of his
subordinate officers, and was successful. and the Japanese withdrew. The enemy
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disappeared in the restricted visibility, but the area close to the flank of D Company, 3rd
Battalion, was cleared.23 Part of the 8th Company remained further away and fired down
onto D Company 2/33rd Battalion as previously recounted.
Using Kirke‟s analytical model, in the 2/33rd Battalion, with recent operational
experience and proven leaders, the formal command structure was a strong component
of the culture and helped the core of veterans induct the post Middle East veterans into
the ongoing operating social structures. This must have been due to the core and the
reinforcements training together in reconstituted primary groups in Australia. This
allowed the primary groups in the battalion to perform very well without the CO being
able to directly influence events.
The series of company manoeuvres and attacks by the 2/33rd battalion, despite the fact
that some had been frustrated by the terrain, were a fine example of a well trained and
combat experienced unit relentlessly pursuing the mission, adapting to the
circumstances of the ground, and relying on the initiative of company and platoon
commanders. The confusion and loss of cohesion of the night arrival had been quickly
overcome, and combat effectiveness restored. The operating social groups were most
effective.
Leadership within the battalions
Already the CO and the 2/33rd Battalion company commanders were demonstrating
adaptability to combat conditions which, it was argued in Chapter 1 in terms of Kirke‟s
cultural framework , must be part of a successful culture. Cohen and Gooch also argue
that adaptability is the key to combat effectiveness.24 As a consequence of the effects of
the jungle, command would devolve through use of only general directives with tactical
decisions left to the captains in command of companies and lieutenants in command of
platoons. Trust had been placed in the ability of the 2/33rd Battalion company
commanders, Clowes and Archer, neither of whom had combat experience in Syria.

23

Although this is disputed by Williams, as discussed in Chapter 5.

24

Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, p. 21.

198

(Clowes, a Duntroon graduate, had been the Adjutant in the Syrian campaign and not in
a tactical battle command).
Battalion COs could not always gain an accurate picture of the battle in jungle warfare
so they had to leave the implementation of their plan to their company and platoon
commanders.25 In the counter attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Withy, the First War veteran
CO of the 2/25th Battalion, went with his two companies, but they were moving together
on a known and secure route within the brigade area. In contrast, Buttrose of the 2/33rd
Battalion could not accompany any of his separate companies. The 2/33rd Battalion had
quickly regained the strong cohesion and combat effectiveness acquired in the Middle
East and adapted it to the demands of the mountainous and jungle covered terrain. The
test of leadership is the quality of the decisions in unfamiliar circumstances. All COs
had little chance to carry out their duties and operational procedures.26
Leadership was easier for the 3rd Battalion‟s replacement CO, Lieutenant Colonel
Cameron, because the Battalion was deployed in perimeter defence close to his HQ.
Moreover, the strong leadership of his predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel Paul, had
fostered unit cohesion, even if the defensive deployments and diversion onto labouring
tasks had interfered with the training of the 3rd Battalion. There was no requirement for
independent company manoeuvre and adaptability in the 3rd Battalion, other than in C
Company which showed enterprise and adaptability in getting out to the east to the
outpost position, and making sound adaptations to its unexpected location in a saddle
below the peak. However this company was never tested in combat. The performance of
C Company in securing the saddle gives perhaps a hint of a manoeuvre capability. 27
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In D Company cohesion wavered and the primary group cohesion in 17 Platoon failed
to stand the sudden rush of an enemy with local superiority. However, the enemy did
not have sufficient fighting power to overcome either the company or the battalion in a
brigade setting. The secondary group cohesion was maintained when the remainder of D
Company stood their ground under heavy machine gun fire until counter attacks drove
the enemy out. Thus the Battalion demonstrated that it could deny the enemy his aim
because its secondary cohesion compensated for the loss of primary group cohesion in
17 Platoon.
From the viewpoint of Kirke‟s social anthropological model, the 3rd Battalion‟s
organisational culture could accept the loss of a well liked CO (Paul) and his
replacement by another (Cameron) who had no opportunity to win respect and trust
before operations commenced. On the other hand the battle discipline exerted by the
formal command structure was quite weak and the operating social groups reflected
this: lack of sentries, failure to carry shovels, not holding ground. The process of
formation of a combat operating social structure was embryonic. Possibly what was
strongest was the informal social structure from the Battalion‟s long pre-war existence,
and the loyalty/identity social structure based on its First AIF record. Luckily, the
combat experience had not been so intense as to shake the sound organisational culture,
and the Battalion was able to strengthen it by the experience.
The core of combat veterans
Ioribaiwa showed that too much can be made of prior combat experience: neither
Brigadier Eather‟s combat experience at Bardia and Tobruk, nor the experience of the
Syrian veteran leaders in the 2/33rd Battalion, had prepared them for the Owen Stanley
Range. Their performance at Ioribaiwa in adapting to the unfamiliar terrain and enemy
was exemplary in taking „advantage of opportunities offered by enemy actions and
chance combinations of circumstances to win success or stave off failure‟. 28 From a
theoretical aspect, some experiences of the 2/33rd Battalion in the battle of Ioribaiwa
suggested that the journey to combat effectiveness may not be linear because combat
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experience in one theatre (Syria) did not immediately translate to Papua. Combat
effectiveness is not a single or stable state but must be relearned and adapted to different
theatres. The battalion had done that, after an initial setback. This adaptability was
developed more in training than through combat experience against very different
enemies in diverse terrain conditions, but its existence cannot be certain without
demonstration under fire.29 The wartime phrase „proven leaders‟ sums up this aspect of
„hardening‟, and its relationship to combat effectiveness is worth examining to avoid
simple claims that units with previous combat experience are battle hardened. This
question can be approached in two ways.
The first and pragmatic way to explain the process of becoming „battle hardened‟ was
given by the unit historian. Its combat experience upon entry to the Papuan campaign
was carried by personnel who Crooks, the unit historian and veteran of the battle,
described as a „core of moral strength‟. 30 The durability of its combat effectiveness
would depend on this leaven of men in the primary groups and in the leadership
structure.
Crooks described how the core was created in Syria by the proving and hardening of
individuals: „The rigours of infantry campaigning had been brought home to the unfit or
unwilling or those not fit to lead‟.31 Among some of those who never returned to the
unit after the first combat was „the usual small percentage of first-time-in-action “get
outs‟”.32 Crooks reports the desertion of three or four men,33 and that „as with other
units in action for the first time the few who wanted no part of fighting had now
gone‟. 34 He confirms that individuals must go through their first action to gain
confidence: „…the infantryman‟s most enjoyable fight is his first one – after that it is
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unenjoyable but he gets better at it‟.35 This confirms S. L. A. Marshall‟s point that the
individuals do not necessarily get callous by combat exposure, but they learn to cooperate in primary groups and thus acquire personal confidence. 36 The 2/33rd Battalion
came to the battle of Ioribaiwa in this battle hardened state because of the core within it
that had had weaker men weeded from it, and had learned the determination that was
necessary for combat. This opens up the second, and more theoretical, approach to the
question of the durability and transferability of the „combat experienced‟ or „battle
hardened‟ state to the 50 per cent who were post-Syria reinforcements.
In Chapter 1, Charles Kirke‟s cultural explanation of a battalion‟s combat performance
was that four social structures produce an operating group which takes for granted its
own rules and conventions about the correct way to think, feel and act when in combat.
Schein observed that these are taught to newcomers of the group and even that a strong
culture will define the behaviour of new leaders, who because they were not the cultural
founders, must adapt themselves and the existing culture to new situations. 37 Thus they
are able to join the network of personal relationships in the emotionally tight
community. This durable but adaptable cultural framework, established by the first CO
and his officers and NCOs, is therefore the theoretical underpinning of the „core‟ that
Crooks wrote about. However, Schein‟s point that these cultural rules must be taught to
newcomers,38 means that the core must be given the opportunity to undergo training
with the newcomers, just as Hauser explained in Chapter 1, so that the culture is
transmitted and a new cohesion is forged at secondary and primary group level. In an
apt metaphor, the army refers to this as „absorbing‟ reinforcements. The similar need in
the 55th/53rd Battalion to absorb the transfers from the 53rd Battalion has already been
discussed in Chapter 4, although there the unit was not yet combat experienced, and it
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will arise again in Chapter 9, when the combat effectiveness of the 2/9th Battalion at
Sanananda is discussed.
In the 2/33rd Battalion, the battle experienced core enabled the quick re-establishment of
primary group cohesion and provided the leadership and example necessary for the
uninitiated in battle. The size of the core (50 per cent) in the 2/33rd Battalion, suggests
that the term „battle hardened‟ really refers to the existence of a core of combat veterans
of sufficient size and determined fighting spirit.
In the primary groups, the core must be given training time with the reinforcements to
transmit the experience and fighting spirit to them before first their combat. The 2/33rd
Battalion had this time in Australia before sailing for New Guinea. However, its test in
combat in Syria was poor preparation of its primary groups for war in the jungle, which
its three months training in South Queensland only weakly addressed.39
It is, therefore, a superficial assessment to attribute this adaptability and trust solely to
the combat experience in Syria in three weeks of fighting by dispersed and independent
companies and platoons. The skills and cohesion acquired by rigorous training before
coming to Papua had passed on to the inexperienced men the culture of the core of
veterans. There was a rapid adaptability which sustained the combat effectiveness of the
battalion. This was the socio-psychological outcome of training. The importance of this
over a conception of training as simply imparting skills, is borne out by Lieutenant
Colonel Buttrose‟s statement that the content of the training was not appropriate to
Papuan conditions.40
There had been a necessary hardening of 3rd Battalion in these operations but it varied
by companies. A Company and C Company had no contacts at all. B Company 3rd
Battalion, despite being well forward near the composite battalion, was only probed,
providing limited combat exposure. A veteran recalled that some of his officers in B
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Company virtually deserted before the battle began and their place was taken by NCOs.
One man inflicted a wound on himself to cause his evacuation.41 In D Company, the
weaknesses of primary group cohesion have been described, and may well have applied
across the Battalion if all companies had been equally tested. The secondary group
cohesion had proved to be sound. These anecdotes are the only record in that battalion
of the probable weeding out, deserting or straggling which occurred (similar to those
Crooks recorded in the unit history of the 2/33rd Battalion) and which can be summed
up by the words „battle hardened‟ applied to the remainder.
Brigadier Eather later stated that the experience of a first campaign was needed to round
out a battalion.42 Eather‟s use of the indefinite article conveys that the specific combat
experience was not what he meant, but that a battalion‟s culture was adapted,
strengthened and could then be passed on through the core group of survivors of that
experience. The battlefield culture of the 2/33rd Battalion was passed on by the cadre of
veterans to the men who had not served in its first campaign. In Papua, the
inexperienced were applying their training for the first time and it proved to be
sufficient to bring success when enhanced by that cultural support. The meaning of
„battle hardened‟ as a term reflecting secondary cohesion through a core group will be
further examined in subsequent case studies. When new reinforcements arrive, the
„hardening‟ of primary groups must be strengthened in every battle to create cohesion as
those men under fire for the first time are led by the experienced core.
Ideally, for new soldiers, sound principles are imparted by tough training, including
exposure to the effects and risks of live rounds, improved stamina and physical fitness,
and technical tactical skills/battle drills which will give confidence before entry to the
first battle.43 Ioribaiwa had shown that training can only go so far. The relevance of
training to a particular campaign will be problematic, but its role in building the
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cohesive culture is vital. Papua was not unique in this regard. Stephen Ambrose
observed that although the troops involved in the European theatre faced six different
topographies from a tactical perspective after the landing in Normandy, and a number of
dominant phases of war demanding adaption of the skills to each situation, training had
only concentrated on the first of these (the beach landing). 44 Likewise, the Papuan
campaign started with the need to defend Port Moresby against sea landings and on
open rolling hills in the rain shadow of the Owen Stanley Range (for which the 3rd
Battalion had been somewhat trained and equipped). It then moved to rainy precipitous
mountains along the Kokoda Trail which were mostly covered with dense foliage (and
for which neither battalion was trained or equipped). Good general training to build a
combat focused organisational culture with high emphasis on adaptability and
improvisation was preferable to attempts to modify fundamental principles with the
lessons of particular campaigns.
This is the point that Porter was making when he wryly noted that that “jungle” was a
colour, suggesting that too much was made of the term to describe warfare in Papua. He
did not want the local circumstances to unsettle the long standing principles of tactics
lest adaptation only reflect an immediately preceding campaign. 45 In this he was
pointing to the enduring aspects of the training of individuals for war embodied in the
doctrine manuals.46 These underpinned, it would seem, the performance of the 2/33rd
Battalion.
The more orderly and better structured prior training of the primary groups of the 2/33 rd
Battalion had created a culture which enabled its adaptation of fundamental tactical
skills to the new conditions, and was then passed on through the combat experience of
the core. Thus proper training is just as important as combat experience. The difference
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attributed to the core of combat veterans in 2/33rd Battalion may not have been so
apparent if there had been similar opportunities for consistent training of the officer and
NCO leadership and primary groups of the 3rd Battalion. The role of a combat
experienced core in combat effectiveness will be further examined in Chapter 9.
Part of institutional cohesion is the passing on of lessons learned in combat. One lesson
promulgated by HQ 7th Division and Brigadier Porter was that defence was better
maintained by company sized roving patrols in „no man‟s land‟ than by easily
outflanked fixed positions. The 25th Brigade had been the first force on the Kokoda
Trail large enough to have enough troops to do this. For this reason, Porter had
supported the wide move of the 2/33rd Battalion to the east as being helpful to his
defence should it be needed.47 The counter attack by its D Company on 15 September
towards the west was unexpectedly an example of this new way of fighting defensively.
It would also demonstrate how difficult it would be for such unsupported sub-units to
fight alone in the face of Japanese persistence.
The Combat Efficiency system and its classifications
What is striking is that the brigade and often the battalion HQs were marginalised by the
terrain and distance, becoming, to an increasing degree, more administrators than
controllers of a battle. Conditions in Papua were calling into question the applicability
to jungle warfare of the Australian army‟s Combat Efficiency assessments. As tactics
devolved to within the level of a battalion, the skills already imparted by training at the
E and F level were likely to be sufficient for deployment to combat, putting them within
reach of Militia battalions, provided rigorous training of primary groups was conducted.
Rowell‟s decision to send the 3rd Battalion forward in early September implied that,
within a month of his arrival in Port Moresby, he rated it as not only fully trained as a
battalion (Classification E), but also able to work with a combat experienced brigade
HQ (part of the requirement of classifications D and C). Rowell‟s rating was accurate in
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terms of its secondary cohesion but incorrect in respect of the primary groups. The
compliment paid by Frank Sublet, who had observed its performance as his battalion
withdrew through it to the Ioribaiwa ridge, confirmed that it was as cohesive as Rowell
thought, but Sublet probably only witnessed episodes that required secondary group
cohesion. The weaknesses in primary cohesion indicated defective training at that level
for the reasons explored in Chapter 4.
The episode of shooting on the first night in the 2/33rd Battalion reinforces how relative
combat effectiveness is to circumstances, and calls into question the implied permanent
classification of A because of earlier and distant combat experience. The A
classification may best be considered as principally referring the cohesion of the
primary groups. The primary groups must consist of a combat experienced core and the
reinforcements which they have absorbed during training together. Then in the first new
combat experience, the primary groups will very quickly recover cohesion after any
initial hesitation. Secondary group cohesion is sustained in the leadership structure
when individuals have significant but not universal combat experience. Any momentary
lapses are able to be quickly corrected. The combat efficiency of the 2/33rd Battalion, in
accordance with Table 4.1, was classified as A (Efficient and experienced for mobile
offensive operations) on the basis of possessing such a core. Otherwise it should have
been classified as B (Efficient… for mobile offensive operations but not experienced).
Conclusion
This first case study has evaluated two battalions in the mountainous Owen Stanley
Range. It shows that secondary cohesion was relatively easy to create in an infantry
battalion on full time service which had done considerable training. While both
battalions demonstrated this, their primary group cohesion differed. In the 2/33rd
Battalion it was much stronger than in the 3rd Battalion, but this was because it had been
properly trained both in the Middle East and later in Australia. Nevertheless, the 3rd
Battalion denied the 8th Company its aim- without its secondary cohesion, the Japanese
would have seized the vital ground on the crest behind the village. The overall Japanese
fighting power was not strong enough to overcome the Australian force on Ioribaiwa,
and the integrity of its defence was swiftly restored by counter attacks by well trained
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and combat experienced battalions. This enabled the 3rd Battalion to learn from the
experience and make progress towards effectiveness.
At least in 17 Platoon, the primary group effectiveness of the 3rd Battalion was shown to
be inadequate, and it is reasonable to infer that this was generally true across the
Battalion. It would have to be acquired on the job while the Battalion continued across
the Owen Stanley Range to Gona. In the 2/33rd Battalion, proper training of primary
groups and leaders was shown to be just as important as combat experience in a very
different theatre such as the Middle East. Nevertheless, the existence of a combat
experienced core of sufficient size and determined fighting spirit quickly enabled
adaptation to the unexpected conditions encountered in the close country and jungle
around Ioribaiwa. It also rapidly spread or confirmed the battalion‟s operating social
structure and culture to the newcomers to combat, which Kirke had pointed out was a
vital role. This was what the term „hardening‟ seems to mean, but the temporary
breakdown of night firing discipline in the 2/33rd Battalion shows that, in a new theatre,
it is a term that should be used with some caution.
Because there had been no jungle training in Australia, unexpected tactical problems of
Papuan combat were caused by an inability to move at night, fighting at very close
range, primary groups acting without sufficient caution, and the isolation of all
commanders above the company level. The mountains however had some advantages of
visibility, offset by the absence of weapons with sufficient range to engage the Japanese
but not vice versa. The Australian load carrying ability was well below that of the
Japanese – or at least it was assumed that it was.
The next case studies move forward two months to the battles in the different
topography and foliage in the swamps/tidal lagoons of the Buna-Gona Japanese
beachhead against fortified defences which had been developed since July. These would
be more demanding than Ioribaiwa because of the superior enemy fighting power and
the absence of combat experience.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 6: Task Organisation

HQ 7th Division (Major General Allen)

21st Brigade
August.

(Brigadier Porter from September ) already in mountains since 29

2/14th Battalion and 2/16th Battalion now combined into a composite battalion
(Lieutenant Colonel Caro).
3rd Battalion from 6 September. (Lieutenant Colonel Cameron)
25th Brigade (Brigadier Eather) from 14 September and took command of both
brigades on Ioribaiwa ridge.
2/25th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Withy)
2/31st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Dunbar)
2/33rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Buttrose)
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Imperial Japanese Army in front of Ioribaiwa from 12 September
HQ South Seas Force
1/144th Battalion (reserve)
Troop of mountain guns (three) from 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment
144th Regiment Pursuit Group (the attacking force at Ioribaiwa, estimated to be 1650
men)
HQ 144th Regiment(Colonel Kusunose)
55th Mountain Artillery Regiment grouped with 144th Regimental Gun
Company
2/144th Battalion ( enveloping force from the west)
3/144th Battalion ( initially all astride the Kokoda Trail)
detachment of 8th Company plus half of 9th Company, engineers and medium
machine guns ( moved on 15 September as an enveloping force east of the
Kokoda Trail)
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Chapter 7: Introduction to the Sanananda road

To avoid repeating the similar strategic, operational and environmental considerations,
this chapter will serve as an introduction to the following chapters that concentrate on
the fighting along the Sanananda road from 19 November 1942 to 22 January 1943.
Christopher Pugsley‟s metaphor of a journey to infantry combat effectiveness is a
variant of the „learning curve‟ metaphor used by late twentieth century historians of the
First World War.1 Major General Vasey, in an Appreciation on the 12 January 1943,
alluded to the First World War experience of the Australian commanders, and
bafflement at how to apply it on the well defended battlefield along the Sanananda road
with such difficult terrain and a shortage of resources. Vasey wrote that unsupported
infantry had been ordered to repeatedly attack with their own weapons, and in doing so
repeated „the mistakes 1915-1917‟.2 His specific choice of years is significant.
It was not until 1918 that a formula for infantry attacks on prepared defences was found.
This required combined arms, using artillery, tanks and ground attack aircraft to support
infantry. It was proven again in the European and Western Desert campaigns in the
Second World War. Because battalion combat readiness or effectiveness can only be
assessed relative to a campaign-specific task rather than a theoretical ideal, a fair
assessment of infantry battalion performance on the Sanananda road must acknowledge
that there was, in this campaign, no possibility of achieving this formula. The reasons
will be explored in this chapter.
At the highest strategic level, the restoration of naval superiority in the Pacific Ocean
and Southwest Pacific Areas to the United States Navy enabled General MacArthur to

1

Pugsley, The Anzac Experience,p.16.

2

AWM 52 1-5-51-24 War Diary of HQ NGF GS Branch Appendixes January 1943, pdf p. 213/218, and
McCarthy, South West Pacific Area -First Year, p. 516.
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begin implementation of the directive of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish bases
on the north-east coast of Papua as part of an offensive against Rabaul. The strategic
nature of both Japanese and Allied operations on the north-east coast of Papua was
maritime: contesting control of the Solomon Sea through air power. Japanese fighter
aircraft had daytime air parity over the seas and coastal areas as far as Oro Bay, which
the Allies planned to develop into a new port. If they could retain sea control, the
Japanese could reinforce and logistically support their beachhead from Rabaul, 800 km
north across the Solomon Sea. Allied sea control was a prerequisite for effective
fighting by land forces because transport of artillery, tanks, trucks, and engineering
equipment mostly required safe sea transport to the new port at Oro Bay, as did the
necessary volumes of ammunition, petrol and rations, which were far beyond what
could be delivered in transport aircraft. Achieving air parity delayed the opening of the
port at Oro Bay until mid-December. Even then, the logistic shortages on the Sanananda
road continued until mid-January when the track linking Oro Bay to Dobodura and
Soputa was made trafficable. Although transport aircraft could use rough airstrips in
kunai grass clearings to supply resources to the troops, there were great limitations on
the capacity and availability of transport aircraft, and interruptions due to weather were
frequent.
After the Japanese had abandoned their land offensive against Port Moresby, General
MacArthur‟s chosen course of action to rapidly complete the Papuan campaign was to
interdict the Japanese sea supply routes with the 5th Air Force and destroy the Japanese
bridgehead before it could be reinforced.3 The Americans would fly to grass airstrips in
unoccupied areas south of Buna, while the Australians would drive back the Japanese
over the Kokoda Trail,
After the recapture of Kokoda (2 November 1942) and the battle at Oivi-Gorari (11
November), the Kokoda Trail campaign ended when the Australian 7th Division crossed
the Kumusi River. The 25th Brigade advanced against Gona, and the 16th Brigade

3

Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 122-128, citing NGF O[peration] I[nstruction] No 42, 14 Nov 42,
(implementing MacArthur‟s plan of 11 October).
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advanced along the Sanananda road, forcing back Japanese patrols and outposts. Across
the divisional boundary, the Girua River, the US 32nd Division was closing up to Buna.
The routes are shown on the map below (Figure 7.1)

Figure 7.1: Terrain and disposition of Allied forces approaching
the Japanese beachhead. 4

The Japanese outposts had been left behind to impose delay as the defeated remnants of
the 41st and the 144th Infantry Regiments withdrew into the beachhead defences

4

Milner, Victory in Papua, Map VI downloaded from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-PPapua/maps/USA-P-Papua-VI.jpg.
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prepared by combat engineers, but manned only by base troops and the Special Naval
Landing Parties.5 Each regiment had less than 900 men, some without weapons, and
was without its artillery. 6 As they withdrew into the defended perimeters of their
beachhead at Gona-Sanananda-Buna, Imperial HQ issued orders on 16 November that
the beachhead be held and reinforced for the possibility of future land operations against
Port Moresby, and that the nearby Allied airfields be destroyed. At the same time, the
Japanese recognised that they had about 10,000 troops to supply and Allied air
interdiction was preventing transport ships from reaching the beachhead. 7 Continuing
air interdiction and night attacks by US torpedo boats operating from Oro Bay created
serious supply problems. The 5,000 men to be supplied in the Sanananda enclave had
their normal daily ration of rice cut from 800 grams to 300 grams – even then, stocks
would last only a few weeks. Many Japanese were starving and were short of medical
supplies.8
However, the Japanese frustrated MacArthur‟s strategic intention to destroy the
Japanese bridgehead in Papua before it could be reinforced. Achieving Allied air parity
delayed the opening of the port at Oro Bay until mid-December. Even then, MacArthur
knew that Japanese attempts to reinforce and resupply by sea were sometimes still
getting though as late as 12 December, despite interdiction by the 5th Air Force. 9
MacArthur could not know that his use of air power was adding further pressure on the
Japanese to expedite a strategic decision to withdraw behind the line Rabaul – Lae,10
and he continued his „almost hysterical demands‟ for ground attacks to destroy the

5

Bullard, Japanese Army Operations, p. 202.

6

Williams, The Kokoda Campaign, pp. 216-217.

7

Bullard , Japanese Army Operations, p. 210.

8

Griffith, MacArthur‟s Airman, p.94.
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enemy „regardless of losses‟ and quickly reach the sea.11 Such orders were reiterated to
the Allied ground commander, Lieutenant General Herring, even on Christmas Day.12
This concern was apparently supported by Ultra evidence that five divisions were ready
at Rabaul on 31 December 1942 to reinforce New Guinea,13 but this turned out to be
mistaken. On 5 January 1943, General Blamey, having received another demand from
MacArthur that there be no delay in closing the campaign,14 visited the Sanananda road
front, and dismissed the concerns about casualties if the offensive continued.15
It was not the Allied attacks or the food shortages, however, that had forced the
Japanese Imperial HQ on 21 December to change its November decision to hold the
bridgeheads for later reinforcements: it was the American naval victory in the Solomon
Islands on 12 December.16 As a result, Imperial HQ foreshadowed evacuation of their
Papuan bridgehead to Salamaua and Lae. Nevertheless, by the end of December, the
Allied attacks and encirclements on the Sanananda road led the new Commander of the
South Seas Force, Major General Oda Kensaku, to consider withdrawal of his forces
from the strong defensive positions they had constructed forward along the Sanananda
road (the red circles in Figure 7.1) to await the reinforcements in a tighter defended
perimeter nearer the coast.17 This was a local initiative not a strategic withdrawal.
The strategic decision to withdraw did not come down the Japanese chain of command
until 13 January 1943. Even then its execution using barges at night was delayed by
being scheduled to commence on 29 January and be complete by 7-8 February. This
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The phrase „almost hysterical demands‟ is David Horner‟s in Blamey, p. 369. He continues to give a
complete coverage of the issues at Blamey‟s level until p. 383.
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Horner, General Vasey‟s War, p. 228.
Drea, MacArthur‟s Ultra, p. 57.
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Radiogram from General Macarthur personally for General Blamey dated 3 January 1943, in AWM
3DRL 6643, 2/135. Papers of Field Marshal Sir T Blamey.
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delay, caused by the Japanese priority being given to the Guadalcanal withdrawal, cost
the Japanese and the Allies many lives in Papua and made the chance of a Japanese
withdrawal in any numbers very questionable. It also meant that Allied infantry attacks
were made against a determined defence until mid January 1943.18
Despite Australian and American reinforcements, and the slow starvation of the
Japanese, Japanese fighting power from prepared defences remained strong. In early
January, Allied encirclements pre-empted Oda‟s planned orderly withdrawal to the
beach area, and forced the fit Japanese to break out through the jungles and swamps and
head west to the Kumusi River, leaving the sick to hold out until death. The Allies could
not prevent the withdrawals from 12 January, and the last positions were not destroyed
until 22 January.
As the case studies in the next three chapters involve only the Sanananda enclave, the
focus in this chapter will be on ground combat operations on the Sanananda road, which
were to continue for 64 days from 19 November 1942 until 22 January 1943. The
terrain on the Papuan coast was very difficult for military operations against the 18
kilometre wide Japanese beachhead (Gona – Cape Endaiadere). As portrayed in Figure
7.1, it consisted of three fortified enclaves: usually named from west to east Gona,
Sanananda and Buna, separated from each other by a swampy flood plain formed by the
Girua River and various creeks. Aside from a coastal foot track in parts, there was no
lateral link between them except for the track through Soputa about 10 kilometres
inland, but the Japanese used motorised barges by night. The terrain was dissimilar in
each enclave and the enemy forces different. At Sanananda Point on the coast, sand had
formed a narrow, relatively dry area enabling the development of the main Japanese
base, which sometimes took the name of Giruwa from the nearby village. The point was
the terminus of a pre-war corduroy motor road leading 40 km inland to Soputa,
Popondetta and Sangara. Other sandy but swampy tracks extended inland from Cape
Killerton along similarly low elevations barely above the surrounding swamp. In places
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the swamp was so deep that it was over a man‟s head. The vegetation was thick and
tangled. It was the rainy season, so there were frequent floods and sudden inundations.
Not only was the terrain difficult, but there was a high incidence of tropical disease.
Battle casualties (persons killed or missing in action plus wounded) in this phase of the
Papuan campaign were high because the Japanese enemy was well trained and
determined to hold the beachhead by resisting the attacks. Yet, medical casualties far
exceeded battle casualties in a ratio of 4.8 to 1. The ratio to battle casualties for malaria
alone was 3.6 to 1, and the terrain was highly conducive to dengue and scrub typhus. 19
The incubation period for malaria was about ten days with an infection rate close to
100%. Because the debilitation of the remaining troops both lowered their combat
effectiveness and weakened their resistance to disease, slow methodical tactics would
extend exposure to both battle and medical casualty risk.
The 7th Division, under Major General Vasey, had only two brigades, about 70 per cent
depleted by the fighting across the Owen Stanley Range to the Kumusi River, and now
tiring after two months‟ hard campaigning. As the main Japanese force was known to be
at Sanananda, on 19 November General MacArthur decided to detach the 126th US
Infantry Regiment, then approaching Buna as part of the 32nd US Division, to the
Australian command.
While General MacArthur and General Blamey remained at Port Moresby, Advanced
HQ New Guinea Force, an ad-hoc corps HQ to direct the land battle, arrived at
Dobodura on 28 November. The Australian Lieutenant General Edmund (Ned) Herring
commanded the 7th Australian Division and the 32nd US Division. From 1 December
Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, having dismissed its commanding general,
commanded the 32nd US Division now consisting of one regiment, although its strength
would soon be increased.
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The dependence of the Australians and Americans on air resupply meant that the Allies
fought as light infantry, with much less than the standard allotments of heavier weapons
that normally supported infantry divisions. Small amounts of field artillery could be
flown forward, but ammunition in the customary quantities was limited.
The more-or less simultaneous attacks on the three enclaves in the Japanese bridgehead
between November 1942 and January 1943 have led historians to switch their narratives
back and forth in a chronological view from above. As the three enclaves were not
mutually supporting, a chronological approach creates difficulties in understanding the
evolution of the brigade and battalion battles at each enclave. This narrative will begin
by outlining the intentions of Vasey as his division approached Sanananda and then
summarise the events on the Sanananda road in a south to north sequence of each
Japanese perimeter shown in Figure 7.2.
With the unexpected addition of the 126th Regiment to his force on the Sanananda road,
Vasey was free to concentrate his greatest available strength against the Japanese
western outpost at Gona, intending to envelop the enemy position at Sanananda from
the west. Without the American Regiment, all he would have had on the Sanananda
road itself was the greatly weakened 16th Brigade to directly assault and penetrate the
defences on the Sanananda road in combination with that envelopment. Vasey planned
to use the 126th Regiment, to relieve the 16th Brigade and engage the enemy on his front
at the South West Sector.
Vasey would not have known that senior US generals agreed that the US 126th Infantry
Regiment was inadequately trained, equipped and supported for the campaign it was
entering. The then Commanding General of the 32nd US Division, Major General Edwin
F. Harding, held this opinion as did other senior Generals who inspected the troops,
including the corps commander, Eichelberger. No opportunity was given to correct
deficiencies.
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attributing responsibility, these reservations were apparently overruled by General
MacArthur.21
Lieutenant General Herring, Vasey‟s commander, became anxious that the declining
fighting power of Vasey‟s brigade at Gona might cause the western envelopment of
Sanananda from Gona to falter. Writing to General Blamey between 26 and 29
November, he first obtained the Australian 21st Brigade and then the 30th Brigade to
boost Vasey‟s western strength. The addition of the two brigades and the American
regiment to Vasey‟s force implied that the Allied command recognised that the main
thrust was to be against Sanananda, and that there was a possibility of moving against it
by envelopment from the flanking enclaves of Gona on the west and Buna on the east.
However, two things went wrong during execution. Firstly, because of air transport
difficulties and further command changes, only about half the 126th Regiment arrived
and stayed to fight on the Sanananda road. It consisted of the regimental HQ; about half
of the 1st/126th Battalion; none of the 2nd/126th Battalion; the complete 3rd/126th
Battalion and regimental supporting elements. Secondly, while the 30th Brigade was
arriving piecemeal, the envelopment plan was nullified on 2 December when the tidal
mangrove swamps between Gona and Sanananda proved to be impassable beyond
Basabua (Figure 7.1).22
Vasey accordingly kept the 30th Brigade on the Sanananda road (less its 39th Battalion
which had already reached Gona). The place of the combat experienced 39th Battalion in
30th Brigade was filled by the untested 55th/53rd Battalion, which Blamey transferred
from the Port Moresby based 14th Brigade in circumstances discussed in Chapter 4.
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Thus, by 5 December, to relieve the 16th Brigade on the Sanananda road, part of the
126th Regiment and three battalions under command of the 30th Brigade which he had
not anticipated. This was fortunate as, without the envelopment option from Gona, the
7th Division could only attack frontally on the Sanananda road until it had gained the
Killerton track junction shown on Figure 7.1. Then an inner western envelopment using
the Killerton track might be feasible, but the Killerton track junction was defended by
the Japanese in some strength in what they called the South West Sector.
The effect of increased infantry strength was mitigated by feeble artillery support – one
troop of four 25 pounder guns. The logistical reasons for this low level of support have
already been explained. Compare this level of artillery support with the 26 medium
guns and 64 25 pounders which fired in support of the first battle of the 16 th Brigade at
Bardia on 3 January 1941 under the command of the then Brigadier Herring as chief
artillery officer of the 6th Australian Division.23 Another example of extensive use of
artillery in support of a brigade sized attack against Japanese defences occurred at
Guadalcanal on 10 January 1943 in support of the 27th Infantry Regiment. Here the 25th
Division co-ordinated 30 minutes preparatory fire of six field artillery battalions, which
included a mix of 105mm, 75mm, and 155 mm guns and was followed by ground attack
aircraft. 24 This caused maximum surprise and shock effect on the Japanese in their
defences. No similar ground attack capability apparently existed in Papua.
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Figure 7.2: Indicative layout of the three Japanese perimeters forward of the Sanananda
base area. 25
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different layout and page numbers to the printed version because of the inclusion of detailed references.
The page numbers in this thesis are from the printed version.
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The Japanese had built defences at track junctions inland along the Sanananda road for
five kilometres, shown as red circles on the map Figure 7.1 and as hatched shapes on
the indicative layout Figure 7.2. They were obviously intended to prevent their base
being either outflanked from the west, or directly attacked from the south. Approaches
from the east were barred by the swampy tidal delta of the Girua River. The South West
Sector was the forward redoubt protecting the base, with a main fortification called
Central Sector about 1500 metres closer to the coast.
The construction of these defences reflected the Japanese intent to remain in them.
Vasey referred to them as „perimeter localities in which there are numerous pill-boxes
of the same type as those found in the Buna area‟ i.e. coconut log bunkers. These were
sited along an outer perimeter about five metres apart with an inner perimeter about 15
metres inside them, but offset so as to fire through the spaces in the outer perimeter,
sometimes from a flank.26 The Japanese bunkers, trenches and spider-hole weapon pits,
linked by crawl trenches, were sited on relatively dry ground and every flank approach
was through swamps. Any attacking force would be channelled into waterlogged killing
areas. The formidable defensive works were all the stronger because the approaches
were so limited and therefore easily covered by fire lanes. These were not cut and
therefore not visible until they were entered. Japanese weapons, particularly tripod
mounted machine guns, firing 150 to 200 millimetres off the ground, could hit prone
men or those trying to cross logs cut to fall at right angles to the fire lane. The quickly
regrowing foliage concealed the enemy installations from observation. Visibility
through the foliage was very poor so that one was literally within a metre of a weapon
pit before it could be seen and the foremost Allied pits were about 20 to 80 metres from
the bunkers. 27 A contemporary field sketch of a Japanese bunker is shown as Figure
7.3.
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Figure 7.3: A rear elevation and plan view of a Japanese bunker. The tripod mounted machine
gun fired through the embrasure in the front. Note the strong construction based on earth-filled
44-gallon drums, logs and foliage covered earth. Field gun shells, especially without delaying
fuses, and infantry mortar bombs were too light to destroy such defences, and small arms fire
would have no effect unless aimed at the embrasure. Only a lucky grenade thrown or launched
into such a bunker could destroy the Japanese inside. The front of the bunkers was carefully
camouflaged with quick growing native plants so as to be invisible at 10-20 metres. A crawl
trench is also indicated.28
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The South West Sector was a redoubt surrounding the track junction five kilometres
from the coast where a sandy branch track leading to Cape Killerton could be used to
outflank the base. Based no doubt on the patrol activity of the 16th Brigade, the
Americans described it as an inverted V.29 Although its outer edges were irregular, it
was eventually found to be a triangular redoubt inverted so that the apex made an obtuse
angle pointing south towards the approaching Allied troops.
The Australian 16th Brigade closed up to the Japanese fortifications at the South West
Sector on 20 November. A 90 man ad- hoc company of the 2/1st Battalion (led by
Captain Basil Catterns)

surprised the Japanese and forced its way into the south

western edge, suffering very high casualties but temporarily creating a dangerously thin
salient, from which it was forced to withdraw. 30 The remainder of the brigade
established posts in close proximity to the Japanese positions, where it awaited relief as
it was no longer capable of offensive action after its earlier battles.
The Intelligence staff at HQ 7th Division did not learn from the Catterns episode, which
though heroic, was futile. It had demonstrated the doubtful chances of success by even
combat veterans in the face of Japanese machine gun fire coming from concealed wellbuilt bunkers. A fair assessment by intelligence staff officers of the first attacks against
the South West Sector defences should have led the Australian and American
commanders to discern the unexpected intention of the Japanese to stay and fight. The
Australian commanders continued to assume that the Japanese occupying the South
West Sector were in a delaying position which further attacks would, if delivered with
fighting spirit, dislodge. They did not see that the superior fighting power of the
Japanese was the real problem in subsequent attacks and blamed the relieving Allied
troops for repeated failure. Certainly, as we have seen, Vasey was left with few tactical
options until he could gain the Killerton track junction, but HQ 7th Division proposed
unrealistic objectives and set up a situation for failure with frontal attacks. Using fresh
troops, the Allies resorted to repeated attacks from 26 November to 7 December, again
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on 19 December, and on 12 January. This policy inflicted attrition on themselves as
well as their enemy. The battles are studied in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
The attacks before 12 December were based on the assumption that the South West
Sector was a delaying position, but, after that date this was known to be incorrect. On 8
December the Australians captured a map at Gona and had translated it by 12 December
(Figure 7.4).31 It revealed that the South West Sector was a strong redoubt which, as at
20 November, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hatsuo of 1/144th
battalion, with the main surviving strength of the 144th Regiment and 300 troops of the
41st Regiment. There were also some field hospital patients and a small number of
labourers. The total strength of the „Tsukamoto unit‟ was about 1700 men.32 Just as
significant as the information it gave about the South West Sector, the captured map
suggested that beyond the Killerton track junction there were only base installations. It
did not reveal the main Japanese fortification, called the Central Sector, which was 1500
metres closer to the coast.
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Figure 7.4: Translation of a Japanese sketch map of installations and strength at the
Killerton track junction on the Sanananda road captured when Gona fell to the
Australians on 8 December 194233
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At the South West Sector around the Killerton track junction, the Japanese withstood a
55 day siege despite being cut off from the base at Sanananda Point-Giruwa, except for
small parties filtering through the swamps or using the Killerton track, until it was cut
by an American roadblock (called Rankin – see Figure 7.5) on 9 January. On the night
of 12 January, despite defeating an infantry-tank attack by the Australian 18th Brigade,
the commander of the South West Sector ordered the remaining 300 fit men to escape to
the west through the Allied lines, leaving their sick and dying to hold it to the end,
which came two days later.34
Along the road between the South West Sector and the Central Sector, base units
defended stores and bivouac sites, until on 30 November, the 3rd/126th US battalion
drove „Huggins‟ roadblock‟ (or simply Huggins) into this gap 700 metres south of the
edge of the Central Sector (see Figure 7.6), just south of a junction where another track
led north towards Killerton village. The roadblock became the base for Allied assaults
along the Sanananda road towards the coast.
Huggins was difficult to supply, and remained besieged in hostile territory from 30
November to 14 January. Initially, its tenuous supply track circled through swamps
from the west where the 3rd/126th Battalion maintained a base about 1500 metres from
Huggins. There were numerous patrol skirmishes, particularly when American parties
tried to get rations through to Huggins and carry out casualties. On December 19 this
supply route was abandoned for a shorter and safer one east of the Sanananda road via
an Australian position nicknamed Kessels.
The third pair of Japanese perimeters, shown in Figure 7.2, arose when the 800 strong
reconstituted 3rd Battalion 41st Infantry under Major Murase Gohei sortied from the
Central Sector against Huggins. The Huggins garrison, while strong enough to stop this
counter attack and force the Japanese to dig in, could not destroy the new perimeters,
even though the Japanese defences were not as well constructed as those in the Central
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and South West sectors and there was no inner perimeter to cover gaps. 35 Neither the
American nor the Japanese units, in terms of relative strengths, had much chance of
gaining the initiative. A stalemate ensued until the fit Japanese withdrew one perimeter
on 10 January and the second on 15 January leaving their sick to resist to their death.
On 19 December, the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment, as part of the Divisional plan based on
the captured map previously referred to, attempted to sweep from Huggins around the
western side of the Murase unit perimeters to Sanananda beach through what was
assumed, from the captured map described earlier, to be light opposition. It was blocked
by the previously unsuspected Central Sector defences and was forced to establish
another roadblock (called James), between the Murase unit and the forward edge of the
Central Sector. Figure 7.5 shows the road blocks either side of the Murase unit and its
two perimeters. Even the attacks of the fresh and full strength 163rd US Infantry failed
to break into the Central Sector until the able-bodied Japanese withdrew from it on 22
January.
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Figure 7.5: An American marked map showing the locations along the Sanananda
road.36 The South West Sector in fact extended across to Kessels.
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The methods of attack on such well prepared defences were well known to the
Australian senior officers – Vasey‟s comment about unsupported infantry has already
been noted. Brigadier Wootten, who commanded the unsuccessful 18th Brigade attack
on 12 January, had earlier observed to General Eichelberger that disproportionate
casualties would occur if attacks were made on the axis of tracks covered by bunkers
since „… two Japanese in a bunker could wipe out a company unless the bunker is taken
out by mechanical means.‟ 37 Denied the mobility to bypass enemy positions by the
swamps, and lacking sufficient artillery and effective air power to destroy the
fortifications, he was referring to tanks and direct fire guns. Tanks could only arrive by
sea and move on the swampy tracks with difficulty. The number of available field
artillery fire units was limited by the available aircraft to fly guns in, and there was
insufficient ammunition for the same reason. In any case, bunkers were impervious to
field artillery, and heavier guns could only come by sea and move on well-made tracks.
Thus the mechanical means developed in 1918 to support infantry in attacking defences
were quite inadequate because of the Allied logistic difficulties.
Wootten‟s opinion was based on the doctrine developed by 1918. An army, to create
institutional cohesion, must develop and teach doctrine for infantry attacks that is
capable of leading to combat effectiveness, and must equip and train its forces to fight
in accordance with that doctrine. Each nation‟s tactical doctrine was published in widely
circulated manuals.38 Both were based on First World War experience and gave strong
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emphasis to attacks by combined arms (infantry supported by tanks and covered by
artillery fire and medium machine gun fire).39 When the supporting fire ceased, or if it
was not available, the infantry tactics of fire and movement were basic to close
combat.40
At the divisional level there was considerable similarity in American and Australian
doctrine. The manuals indicated that a combination of envelopment and direct assault
offered the best prospects of a decisive result.41 This doctrine had been behind Vasey‟s
plans from 26 November to concentrate at Gona his three Australian brigades (the 21st ,
the 25th and the 30th ) as they became available, for an envelopment of the Japanese
main base at Sanananda from the west.42 The Australian manuals warned of the risk of
„defeat in detail‟ and the disadvantages of time, natural obstacles and dispersion of fire
support.43
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At the regimental/brigade level, the doctrinal emphases of the two Allies were wider
apart. The Americans at regimental level strongly favoured envelopment, 44 but the
Australian manual advocated a choice between envelopment and penetration. It advised
that enemy defence in depth required attack in depth so that, in a divisional setting,
brigades and battalions would more often confine themselves to frontal attacks as part
of a divisional enveloping manoeuvre.45
This was because, given the number of troops available within a brigade/regiment for
the task, a tactic of envelopment and manoeuvre would split the formation into battalion
or company sized groups. These could be too weak to attack more than an isolated
enemy platoon or company and would be unable to defend themselves if they were
isolated by a strong enemy force. Thus full regiment/brigade frontal attacks on the
South West Sector were the textbook solution to implement Vasey‟s envelopment plan
to gain access to the Killerton track. Subsequent chapters will examine how these
doctrinal differences affected operations.
It has already been explained that Vasey was forced to abandon his planned
envelopment from Gona when operations there revealed on 2 December that there was
no overland route through the swamps, and thus to concentrate his force for frontal
attacks on the South West Sector. The Western Front ideal by the end of 1917 would
have included preparatory artillery destructive fire with medium guns capable of
destroying bunkers, followed by protection for the assaulting infantry by a creeping
field gun barrage. The „shock effect‟ of field guns made the enemy numb and inactive
for some little time after the fire stopped, thus neutralising enemy machine guns as the
attacking infantry approached.46 Provided trained and disciplined infantry stayed within
70 metres of the barrage until it lifted, assaulted rapidly over the last 70 metres, then
fought through the objective supported by battalion mortars, light machine guns,

44

FM 7-40, Rifle Regiment, p. 172-173, and FM 7-20, Rifle Battalion, p. 128.

45

FSR, Vol. II, Operations General, p. 110-113.

46

Perhaps only for 30 seconds in jungle settings according to the veteran John Masters, The Road past
Mandalay, Michael Joseph, London, 1961, p.246. Official British teaching was within two minutes.
French, Raising Churchill‟s Army, p. 254.

233

grenade launchers and hand grenades, they could prevail before the shock effect wore
off. From 1918, it was normal for tanks to accompany the infantry, and sometimes there
was close air support for a ground battle.
However, the experience acquired by 1917 also taught that many enemy pillboxes and
bunkers would survive the destructive artillery fire of medium and heavy guns. The
machine guns firing from them could not be neutralised by field artillery – a fact still
evident during the Vietnam War. 47 Tanks were unreliable (either mechanically or
because of terrain limitations on their mobility). This meant that, for close combat, the
infantry needed a way to fight with its own resources.
The technique became known as „fire and movement‟. By 1918, each platoon used its
two light machine gun-equipped sections to suppress the enemy machine guns and thus
support the movement of the two other sections of infantrymen armed with rifles and
grenades. The success of assault tactics depended on infantry suppressive fire being
successful in providing opportunities to move into the enemy position and could only be
applied if the enemy fortifications were discontinuous, as those of the Germans had
been from 1917.
To kill the enemy in a bunker or pillbox, it was necessary to aim fire or grenades at
every one of the firing embrasures of every pillbox in support, as well as the one being
attacked, unless a route could be found that was not dominated by supporting enemy
posts. If there were mutually supporting posts, these must be neutralised by the rest of
the platoon. In the meantime, other platoons would avoid the strong points, probe for
„soft spots‟ and infiltrate to the flank and rear. A high tolerance of casualties was needed
but momentum had to be maintained if they were to be kept to a minimum until the
enemy withdrew, surrendered or was killed with bayonet or grenade.48
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During second half of the 1930s, the issue for doctrinal discussion was not the efficacy
of fire and movement, but from what level it should be directed – the platoon as in 1918
Allied doctrine or the section/squad as the German army had always preferred. Section
level fire and movement tactics began to become available in British Commonwealth
Armies, as a light machine gun (called a Bren gun) was supplied to every rifle section
and the sections were trained to operate in three groups: a gun group, a scout group and
a rifle group. Learning from its observation of the 1940 campaign in France, the US
Army followed only in 1942. The Allies then became capable of fire and movement
within section/squads similar to that earlier conducted only by the platoon. This was
particularly necessary when visibility was too limited for a platoon commander to
control all his squads.49
The inadequate Allied artillery, the absence of tanks and the strong Japanese defences
meant that the Allied infantry needed the capability to apply fire and movement at the
primary group level almost immediately. This required stronger primary group cohesion
than might be necessary in more open terrain because it devolved tactical authority to
the squad/section level commanded by corporals (Australia) or sergeants (United
States). Training to use flexibility and local initiative required intensive section level
practice.50 As the new doctrine was only applied by the Australian Militia in 194151 and
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the US Army in 1942, it is certain that training for it by the Allied troops in Papua had
not been thorough. This is confirmed by HQ 30th Brigade‟s training instruction issued
after the failures of the Australian and American attacks which will be the subject of
Chapters 8 and 9. 52
Even for troops trained in this section level of fire and movement, these tactics would
have been difficult to apply along the Sanananda road. Not only was the artillery
support much less than ideal, but the foliage was too thick to allow platoon and section
groups to plan manoeuvre. Once men went to ground they could not see to aim their
weapons. While this new application of the tactic encouraged some brave infantry to
stalk some enemy positions looking for soft spots, unseen networks of enemy posts with
machine guns dominated all approaches to the solidly fortified Japanese defences.
General Blamey had called forward Stuart tanks from Milne Bay once the sea route was
open in mid-December. When three were shifted to the Sanananda front with the 18th
Brigade for an attack on 12 January, Vasey was able to plan an envelopment of the
Sanananda positions after a thrust to Cape Killerton using the 18th Brigade via the
Killerton track, while the 163rd US Regiment advanced from Huggins along the
Sanananda road.53 However, the combined arms attack failed because, unlike the firm
ground and good visibility in the coconut plantations at Buna, the swamps at Sanananda
limited the tanks to the road where they were destroyed by a Japanese anti-tank gun
hidden in the foliage. Later in January, a little more artillery was deployed including a
Troop of four 4.5 inch howitzers with a greater potential to destroy bunkers and
earthworks because of their heavier shell weight (34 pounds – 14.4 kilograms) and nearvertical fire characteristics.
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Major General Vasey wrote a despondent appreciation in the evening of 12 January
1943 after the failed attack with tanks. Inadequately supported infantry attacks were
repeating „the mistakes of 1915-1917‟. By selecting those specific years in World War
I, he was correct to note that the only remaining tactical option to implement
MacArthur‟s orders on the Sanananda road, i.e. unsupported infantry assaults against
machine guns in prepared defences, was a failed tactic by 1917. He could abandon the
second and third stages of his Division‟s attack, but he did not feel that the option of
merely encircling the enemy, though it might work in time, was consistent with his
orders. Perhaps there were other options. 54 Vasey requested to see his new commander,
US Lieutenant General Robert L Eichelberger 55 (and sent a related letter to General
Herring, now in Port Moresby and Eichelberger‟s superior in the chain of command).56
Vasey was, in effect, diplomatically questioning those orders by raising their
consequences for infantry tactics and the resulting casualties.
Vasey‟s gloom lifted when patrols reported on 14 January that that the fit Japanese had
gone from the South West Sector. Promptly, Vasey and Wootten claimed to be the
fathers of victory to be later followed by Colonel Doe, Commanding US 163rd Infantry
Regiment (see Chapter 10) at the Central Sector. Their claims demeaned those who
suffered and died in the attacks demanded by MacArthur, with the support of
Australians General Blamey and Lieutenant General Herring. Major General Vasey too
had supported them until 12 January.
The victory being claimed, then, was not due solely to Allied ground fighting, but to the
Japanese strategic decision to withdraw to Lae reaching the Sanananda front at the same
time as the 18th Brigade attack.57 As already noted, the Imperial strategic withdrawal
order of 21 December 1942 had been finally passed to the front line Japanese
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commanders for gradual implementation between 29 January and 8 February. However,
the Allied ground attacks and roadblocks forced the local Japanese commanders to
abandon planned orderly withdrawals and lead escape parties of fit men overland to the
west between 12 January and 25 January. How this affected Allied units in the case
studies is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9 and 10.
Unfortunately, such a Japanese evacuation of the South West Sector made it appear to
General Vasey that determined attacks had worked when the troops were good enough
(and his standard was now Wootten‟s 18th Brigade). He pressed the newly arrived 163rd
Regiment hard to attack the Central Sector so as to clear the road to Sanananda beach in
the final two weeks battle, which is illustrated on Figure 7.6. In the end, the
envelopment from the Killerton track by the 18th Brigade achieved the end of the
Papuan campaign.
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Figure 7.6: Sanananda front – last phase 15-22 January 194358
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Given the Allied inability to generate combined arms fighting power, the combat
readiness and effectiveness of several Australian battalions and two American battalions
attacking the Japanese defences on the road to Sanananda up to 22 January 1943 can
only be fairly assessed in terms of their use of the new operational layer of the 1918
tactical technique developed by 1942. 59 In official British-Australian doctrine there
were two types of attacks, which were referred to as against either organised resistance
or uncoordinated resistance. Between these two types, however, there was considerable
variation depending on the time necessary to prepare for an assault. While a deliberate
and methodical preparation to attack organised defences took considerable time, against
hastily prepared defences, surprise and speed gave greater prospect of achieving the
capture of an enemy position and clearing the way forward. 60 In US doctrine, there was
more emphasis on speed, manoeuvre and flanking action than on deliberate
preparations.61
Because on the Sanananda road the defences were very well prepared, Allied attacks
evolved into three forms. To avoid repetition of their main features in each case study,
this section summarises them. The rarest was when inattentive Japanese sentries
allowed a silent unseen approach and a rush into the Japanese position before they could
react. Once they did, casualties to the attackers were heavy. Examples of such surprise
assaults were those undertaken by Catterns of the 2/1st Battalion, the insertion of
Huggins‟ roadblock after flanking action by the 3/126th Battalion, and the operations of
2/7th Cavalry Regiment from Huggins on 19 December.
The second form was a battalion attack with deliberate and methodical preparation
(formally structured and with a timed fire plan) which degenerated to a skirmish as men
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went to ground in response to Japanese fire. Some men showed determination and
returned fire, but no assault took place. There were some casualties particularly if men
strayed into unseen fire lanes.
The third form was a deliberate and structured attack where men showed determination
and units had enough cohesion to continue the assault despite the casualties until the
enemy resistance became unco-ordinated. On the Western Front by 1918 such attacks
had resulted in enemy surrender or withdrawal, seeming to justify the high losses
involved. There is no instance of such an attack reaching that phase on the Sanananda
road.

On occasions, local manoeuvre under fire was attempted and sometimes

succeeded in overrunning one or two positions. However, the major discovery in these
battles in 1942 was that that the Japanese neither surrendered nor withdrew but stayed
in the defensive positions to fight until killed in place with bayonet or grenade.
For this third form of attack to succeed, there seem to be three intangible competencies
needed. The first is that the individuals have a capacity to manage their fear. When they
emerge from this test successfully, they are confident of their own ability and this
confidence underpins the similar competency of the primary group.
The second competency is the primary group cohesion to be able to conduct fire and
movement when under fire. The section/squad must have developed this when training
to combat readiness level. The platoon and company commanders have the capacity to
plan this while under fire, not just in training. This is „proven‟ leadership. The primary
group then had a way of closing with the enemy by an assault. Of course it did not
always work, and then the grim third competency was needed.
The third competency, also called „battle discipline‟ or „determination‟, is the fighting
spirit to maintain momentum in the assault to capture the objective and kill the enemy –
knowing that the inevitable casualties must be accepted to win, and to win is the best
way to later assist those casualties. Pugsley noted that reaching this competency was an
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„inevitable and costly transformation‟ and a „bitter passage‟ because of the cost in
casualties.62
A battalion with primary groups possessing these competencies had reached the highest
standard of combat effectiveness because of its elevated stall level and breakpoint, as
the discussion in Chapter 1 showed. The individuals were confident that they could
support one other in each primary group, and its cohesion allowed its leaders to conduct
determined assaults by fire and movement, culminating in close combat.

Such a

standard was demonstrated by the first form of company quick attack, referred to
earlier, led by Captain Catterns as the veteran 16th Brigade forced back the Japanese
patrols and outposts along the road to Sanananda. While not one of the case studies,
this exploit was chosen by the author of the official history of the campaign, Dudley
McCarthy, using the conventions of the heroic genre, as the standard of combat
effectiveness. 63
McCarthy provided a list of the characteristics of fighting spirit in an undoubtedly
combat effective force seasoned by much active service – the 2/1st Battalion from which
Catterns‟ force came. They „…had learned swiftness in action. They were hardy and
cunning survivors of many difficult days… [and] had confidence in one another. They
were determined. Their leaders were tried men…proved many times‟.64 Captain Basil
Catterns showed that an outstanding leader works to create cohesion, not necessarily by
his individual spectacular bravery but by fostering the battle discipline and skills of the
group, maintaining focus on the mission and leading them with determination. It seems
evident that this proving of leaders was extraordinarily difficult to predict before putting
them to the test in battle. The men had learned to match the Japanese tactics and were
familiar with the jungle. McCarthy saw that not just individual bravery and self-reliance
were needed, but a unit must possess a group and task cohesion to assault the objective.
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In this description of combat effectiveness, McCarthy lists qualities which he attributes
to a passage of time in difficult combat situations, in so doing explaining what was
meant by „seasoned‟. McCarthy thus implies the limitations of even the most thorough
training to combat readiness standard. This training can only provide individual skills,
provisional confidence in one another, unit skills and a preliminary test of the leaders‟
qualities. The first combat experience puts all this to the test and Catterns‟ men of the
2/1st Battalion had passed that over the nearly two years since their first combat at
Bardia in January 1941. The combat readiness thus displayed was seasoned into combat
effectiveness in the campaigns which followed in Greece, Crete and then the Owen
Stanley Range.
However, there were three flaws in the episode which the heroic narrative mode partly
conceals. The first is that this episode was a failure in terms of penetrating the Japanese
defence, which was no longer based on uncoordinated outposts. Surprise helped
Catterns‟ force rush the enemy perimeter before the machine guns firing on fixed lines
could cut them down. The attack continued to move through the scything fire inside the
position, which suggests they ignored those killed and wounded as they rushed forward
without taking cover. This cohesive „battle discipline‟ is based on the knowledge that
stopping would enable the Japanese to kill them all. But the attack reached breakpoint;
unaided withdrawal was impossible, but Japanese counter attacks were held off. Five
officers died out of 10 (50 per cent) and in total there were 67 battle casualties out of 91
men who took part (74 per cent). Catterns and the survivors were withdrawn through the
2/3rd Battalion, which had moved up and remained the forward edge of the Australian
area until 22 November. From the theoretical perspective explained in Chapter 1, even
the highest possible stall level had been insufficient to prevent the level of casualties
triggering the breakpoint. The limits to the efficacy of fighting spirit were thus revealed
again in the Cattern‟s epic and the heroic genre disguises this.
The second flaw is that McCarthy‟s narrative debases the idea of „fighting spirit‟ by
taking it to an extreme. Van Creveld‟s argument described in the Introduction was that
fighting power is the outcome of the physical factors multiplied by fighting spirit. This
chapter has identified the competency learned on the Western Front to conduct fire and
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movement with battle discipline and determination as an example of such fighting spirit.
However, if the enemy‟s fighting power is greater than your own, your possession of
fighting spirit may be insufficient to overcome your deficit in the physical factors, and
high losses will be the result. There had been a belief in the early twentieth century that
the moral element could prevail despite massive casualties. A „conquering state of
mind‟, a „spirit of self sacrifice‟, could even bring about a transformation of society.65
This belief could delude leaders into thinking that offensive action at all times,
individual demonstrations of bravery and suffering high casualties were indicators of
combat effectiveness. It became a heroic myth summed up in words, used by McCarthy
and other historians: epic, gallant, valour, spirit, dash. McCarthy overemphasised the
moral value of the Catterns operation by the use of such language. Robin Prior has
called for realistic history to avoid such language because, in modern war, „…the
virtues of the warrior… count for nothing in the face of unsubdued firepower‟. 66 Other
military realists had seen the limits of these mystical notions in 1915-1917 with a
practical understanding of when a call by commanders for brave and aggressive action
was worth the risk, and when it was irresponsible.
The third problem with the account of the Catterns episode is that McCarthy
insufficiently distinguishes combat readiness from combat effectiveness. He uses the
Catterns standard of combat effectiveness as the measure of the performance of the
American troops who had not yet seen combat. This is quite invalid. Catterns‟ group
had shown an extraordinarily high level of fighting spirit and skill which could only be
achieved with combat experience. McCarthy‟s expectation should have been that the
American troops would have had sufficient fighting spirit to enter their first combat
operation, adapt to its demands, and thus begin to become combat effective.
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In Chapter 1, Kirke‟s described this combat readiness in cultural terms. It was the
expression of the battalion‟s expectations of appropriate behaviour absorbed by the
operating social groups as its leaders trained them. Hauser, with others, had identified
that the possession of fighting spirit is the socio-psychological output of intensive
training. Fighting power was an aggregate of the fixed factors in Table 1.1, and
determined before the first combat experiences. Once that began, the limits of fighting
spirit in terms of stall levels and breakpoints emerged, but successful honing of combat
skills over time led to combat effectiveness such as that which Catterns‟ men displayed.
In Chapter 1, the analysis of the effect of casualties was that fighting spirit is not an
absolute, but relative to the concrete set of circumstances in the first combat. The
aggregation of physical and moral factors is summed up as fighting power. It is also
subjective to the perspective of the assessor. It points to the variable factor of the
enemy‟s fighting power, perhaps being more pertinent than the factor of the training of
the Americans in Australia and of the Australians in Port Moresby (which, as Chapter 4
argues, was quite limited).
Whereas the Ioribaiwa case study in Chapter 5 and 6 had shown that a battalion in its
first combat could emerge with its cohesion restored and lessons learned, when enemy
fighting power was only locally superior to one platoon, the next chapters study
battalions confronted with greatly superior enemy fighting power in their first combat. It
will explore the combat readiness test this relativity in fighting power imposes and its
effect on the battalions‟ movement from readiness to effectiveness.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 7:Task Organisation on Sanananda road

HQ Advanced NGF opened Dobodura 28 November 1942. (GOC Lieutenant General
Herring from 28 November 1942; Lieutenant General Eichelberger from 13 January
1943).
HQ7 th Australian Division (Major General Vasey)
16th Brigade (Brigadier Lloyd) until relieved on 6 December 1942 by 30th Brigade.
18th Brigade (Brigadier Wootten) from 10 January 1943 to 22 January 1943.
21st Brigade ( Brigadier Dougherty) with only the 39th Battalion at Huggins from 22
December 1942 to 3 January 1943.
30th Brigade (Brigadier Porter) from 6 December 1942 until relieved by 18th Brigade on
10 January 1943.
126th Infantry Regiment elements
HQ (Colonel Clarence M. Tomlinson) from 22 November to 4 December 1942.
Major Boerem‟s detachment of 1st/126 Battalion from 22 November 1942 to 9
January 1943.
3rd/126th Battalion from 22 November to 9 January 1943.
Regimental Cannon Company (81mm mortars) and Anti tank Company
(medium machine guns) from 28 November to 9 January 1943.
163rd Infantry Regt (Colonel Jens A. Doe) from 3 January 1943 to 22 January 1943.
2/7th Cavalry Regiment from 18 December 1942 to 3 January 1943.
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Imperial Japanese Army in the South West Sector ('The Tsukamoto Unit')
Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto ( the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 144th
Regiment)
Remaining strength of 144th Regiment
Part of 41st Regiment (300 men cut off there when Huggins roadblock was inserted on
30 November)
Field Hospital patients
A small number of Takasago Volunteers ( Taiwanese labourers)
Total strength of the Tsukamoto Unit at the beginning of December was about 1700.
The 'Murase Unit' in perimeters Q and R
Part of 3/41st Battalion
In the Central Sector (perimeters S - V and Y)
15th Independent Engineer Regiment (approximately 300 troops commanded by Colonel
Yokoyama)
3/41st Battalion (Major Murase) less troops in perimeters Q and R
Elements of South Seas Force Mountain Artillery Battalion
Elements of 47th Field Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion
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Chapter 8: American and Australian infantry battalions in
attacks on the South West sector on the Sanananda road

The objective of this case study is to compare the combat readiness of an infantry
battalion-sized unit of the US Army with that of an Australian Militia battalion in their
first combat experience. This chapter will study the three attacks by a detachment of the
1st Battalion and other elements of the American 126th Infantry Regiment („Major
Boerem‟s detachment‟) between 26 November 1942 and 5 December 1942 and their
aftermath. It will contrast the American experience with the attacks of the Australian
55th/53rd Infantry Battalion as part of 30th Brigade on 7 December and 19 December
1942. The American regimental attack plan and its implementation including the attacks
by Major Boerem‟s detachment will be described and analysed. This will be followed
by the 30th Brigade plan and a narrative of the attack by the 55th/53rd Battalion on 7
December. The 7th Division plan for the attack on 19 December and the second attack of
the 55th/53rd Battalion will be then be described and followed by analysis of the
performance of the 55/53rd Battalion. Finally, the chapter will make a comparative
evaluation the readiness of each battalion.
The American regimental attack plan
The mission assigned by Major General Vasey to the 126th Regiment for 22 November
was to gain the Killerton track junction.1 This was, in Australian terms, a brigade level
operation, based on the assumption that the Regiment would be complete. After parts of
the Regiment did not arrive, Colonel Clarence M. Tomlinson‟s force was roughly one
and a half battalions short, but he still planned his attack using the preferred American

1

C2118 entry of 22 November in AWM 52 8/2/16/020 War Diary of 16 Bde, Nov 42. pdf p. 24/94.

Milner. Victory in Papua, p. 154.
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doctrine of attack by envelopment as described in Chapter 7. He therefore chose to
restructure his mixed force into three groups. The first was the 3rd/126th Battalion (less
Company L) but reinforced by parts of the regimental Cannon Company (re-equipped
with 81 mm mortars) and Anti Tank Company (re-equipped with medium machine
guns). The second consisted of Major Boerem‟s detachment of the 1st/126th Battalion
with a Heavy Weapons detachment from Company D. The group was named after its
commander, the Executive Officer (in Australian terms, second in command) of the
1st/126th Battalion, Major Richard D. Boerem. The third group was the detached
Company L from 3rd/126th Battalion.
Tomlinson planned a regimental double envelopment, but concentrated his effort by
outflanking with his strongest force, the 3rd /126th Battalion group, from the western
flank towards the Japanese rear.2 The Company L group of the 3rd/126th Battalion was to
envelop from the southeast in a secondary attack, while the enemy was engaged by a
secondary or holding attack to the front. 3 This plan would result in attacking the
triangular or V shaped redoubt on the sides rather than simply a frontal penetration at
the apex.4
Such envelopment tactics, also frequently used by the Japanese, were predicated on
attacking the enemy on a flank or rear where least expected. They exploited the
likelihood of an outflanked enemy withdrawing, but, if there was resistance, an assault –
called a penetration – would be necessary. This required the holding attack element to
wait until the enveloping elements were in positions on the flank or rear to cut off the
enemy retreating either before or after its attack.5 Thus the two envelopments by the

2

Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 159.

3

McCarthy, South West Pacific Area – First Year, p. 394.

4

Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 155. Where the Americans obtained this description of the South West
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5
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Infantry
Field
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at
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3rd/126th Battalion were to be co-ordinated with an assault by Major Boerem‟s
detachment in the centre near the road.

Enemy main supply route along
the Sanananda road marked in
gold.

Killerton track junction
within South West Sector
redoubt outlined in red.

Figure 8.1: American sketch map from a period later in 1942 shows the terrain and the
left flanking attack by 126th Regiment which created Huggins‟ road block (centre top)6.
The location near the Killerton track junction, incorrectly marked on this map as
„Riley‟, was most likely the location of an Australian outpost from which the 126th
Regiment‟s right flanking attack by Company L was launched.

6

Folder „Photos Maps Charts‟ in NARA RG 319,Entry P53, VICTORY IN PAPUA, Interviews – Bulk
File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner,in Box 5.
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Implementation of the regimental plan
The regimental plan misjudged the time it would take to deploy in the flat, swampy
terrain and the difficulties of accurately navigating in it. From 22 November, the
American flanking forces struggled through the swamps and clashed with alert Japanese
patrols while Boerem‟s detachment waited for them to get into place. When the
envelopment had not been achieved after three days, Major General Vasey concluded
that the 126th Regiment was inactive and unsatisfactory – a matter he claimed was
recognised by its commander, Colonel Tomlinson. 7 Rather than recognise that
navigation in that flat swamp with thick foliage was very difficult, and that the
Americans were ill-trained and had much to learn, the criterion Vasey seemed to have in
mind when making his judgement was based on his experience with the fully trained
AIF in the Middle East and his earlier attachments to the regular British Army.
Although patrols he had ordered from the 16th Brigade AIF were also failing to
penetrate the same swamps,8 he unfairly used an excessively high standard to judge the
Americans, and his lack of sympathy for their difficulties was unwelcome to them. He
acquired a reputation as a chauvinist for not liking American commanders and „yapping
about the tools which have been given him‟.9
Apart from the time it was taking, Vasey was critical of the envelopment manoeuvre
itself, describing it as having „people who are out in the blue and doing nothing very
useful‟, and wanted Tomlinson to „concentrate his main strength (the 3rd/126th
Battalion) for close-in co-operation which will be staged for 30 Nov[ember]‟.10 In doing

7

Letter Vasey to Blamey dated 25 November in David Horner, Crisis in Command, p. 227. General
Herring had seen Vasey that day, and Blamey used Vasey‟s opinions to criticise the quality of the US
troops to Generals MacArthur, Sutherland and Kenney in Port Moresby. Horner, Blamey, p. 360.
8

McCarthy, South West Pacific Area – First Year, pp.397-398, 400.

Ken Clift, War Dance, A story of the 2/3rd Battalion AIF, P M Fowler and 2/3rd Battalion Association,
Kingsgrove, 1980, p.339.
9

Copy of a letter of General Eichelberger (Commanding General I Corps) to Major General Sutherland
(General MacArthur‟s Chief of Staff) dated 30 Dec 42 , in Box 5.NARA RG 319 Entry 53, Interviews
Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner.
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Letter by Major General Vasey to General Blamey dated 27 November 1942, in AWM 3DRL/6643
Series 2 Papers of Field Marshal Blamey.
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this, he was showing a preference for the Australian-British doctrine of concentration at
the regimental/brigade level (though not necessarily at division level) which was
discussed in Chapter 7. He was also reflecting the mutual misunderstanding likely
between Allies who had never trained together. Lieutenant General Herring had the
same lack of understanding and supported Vasey in a letter to Blamey the following
day. He endorsed Vasey‟s description of the American tactics as „milling about‟.11
Another element of confusion was the American terminology of referring to the start of
the envelopment manoeuvre as the start of an „attack‟. In Australian-British
terminology, such activity would have been termed a „preliminary operation‟, and
regarded as an advance to an „assembly area‟. The attack would begin from the forward
edge of the assembly area, which in 1942 the Australians called the „starting line‟ and
the Americans the „line of departure‟. Both Milner‟s and McCarthy‟s accounts reflect
this confusion. A line of departure marked by the letters 'LD' is visible on Figure 8.1
crossing the 17 Easting at 170263, which is at least 1500 metres from the objective of a
two-company attack - much greater than Australian practice.
Vasey‟s judgement, while accurate about slow execution and poor navigation skills, was
revealed as premature when this two company attack permanently cut the Japanese main
supply route on 30 November, as shown in Figure 8.1. The 3rd/126th Battalion had
established a base 1500 metres to the west, then despatched the two- company
enveloping force from it. Although intending an envelopment and attack on the rear of
the South West Sector, they had actually achieved a turning movement. Although they
had missed their objective (the South West Sector), the Americans had surprised the
Japanese with a quick assault which inserted „Huggins‟ roadblock‟ (centre top on figure
8.1) into a Japanese bivouac area at a bend of the Sanananda road 1000 metres above

11

Letter by Lieutenant General Herring to General Blamey dated 28 November 1942, in Wallet 135/14
in AWM 3DRL/6643 Series 2 Papers of Field Marshal Blamey.
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the Killerton track junction. An American historian called the Huggins roadblock
„…one of the best moves made by the 32nd Division‟.12
The next day, Company L of the 3rd /126th Battalion, which was the other enveloping
force, attacked from the Australian outpost due east of the Killerton track junction
towards the north west and cut the road about the 26 northing. Hard pressed by the
Japanese in the area, it could not join up with Huggins, but blocked the road until
ordered to withdraw to allow safe Allied fire on the enemy there.13 One Australian
soldier-historian, writing in 1965, called the achievement of the 126th Regiment „a
notable one‟,14 but his different view has escaped most Australian writers who follow
the nationalist explanation of the Australian Official History. The Americans were
indeed slow in execution, but Dudley McCarthy makes light of American inexperience,
reflecting the chauvinist tone which colours his narrative of the Americans‟ difficulties.
The substantial achievement of the American manoeuvre was to place one temporary
and one permanent roadblock behind the Japanese; however the actual mission of
gaining the Killerton track junction failed because the Japanese did not withdraw. While
these roadblocks had shown that the Japanese fortified positions were not continuous
right through to the beach, they also revealed to the Allies, for the first time, that
encirclement of the individual sectors would not trigger a withdrawal by the Japanese.
As a forced withdrawal, with or without an attack, was the premise of such envelopment
tactics,15 the attackers were left exposed in an isolated position with a tenuous supply
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Bergerud, Touched with Fire, p. 223.
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Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 163-165. The Company L pencil log is in NARA RG 407 Entry 427,
332-INF (126)9-0.7(3443), Co L, 126th Regiment- Buna (Papua) campaign, Journal, 10 Nov 42 – 7 Jan
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route (as the Australian/British doctrine warned could happen). The third part of the
regimental plan - the frontal attack on the Japanese defences protecting the junctionwas the task of Major Boerem‟s detachment. If successful, it might force the Japanese
out of their defences and capture the track junction.

Attacks by Major Boerem’s detachment
Major Boerem‟s detachment was the centre of the three groups in the double
envelopment plans of the 126th Regiment for 22 November. Its initial strength was 12
officers and 257 men, which was about 45 per cent of the normal battalion strength of
about 600, because the remainder had been landed near the American front at Buna. The
standard battalion of a US infantry regiment, as described in Chapter 2, would have had
an assault element of three rifle companies, in total about 450 strong – much the same
as an Australian battalion using its four rifle companies, but its Heavy Weapons
Company, which was equipped with machine guns and mortars, gave an American
battalion greater supporting fire.

However, Major Boerem‟s detachment consisted of

only rifle Company C of 98-120 men, in two platoons instead of three, supported by the
greater part of Heavy Weapons Company D with mortars and machine guns. 16 The
detachment, being without the HQ, the Headquarter Company and its other two rifle

16

Where there are discrepancies between the strength of the detachment given in Milner, Victory in
Papua, pp. 122-123 and p.156, and the details given in Boerem‟s notebook dated 26 November 1942, the
latter has been preferred. NARA RG 407 Entry 427, File 332-INF(126)-0.9 to 332-INF(126) 7 -0.7, Box
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Daily Journal‟.
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companies (Company A and Company B), may, in principle, have lacked the secondary
cohesion that a battalion should possess. Artillery support was provided by only one
troop of four Australian 25 pounder field guns, although its fire was not always allotted
in support to Major Boerem‟s detachment because it also supported the Australian
operations at Gona, and the Americans at Huggins.
While the enveloping components of the 3rd /126th Battalion were outflanking the
Japanese defences, Company C of Major Boerem‟s detachment had dug in astride the
road between the 2/3rd Australian Battalion and the enemy positions awaiting the order
to attack in support of the envelopments. The detachment made three attacks between
26 November and 5 December. All were made all frontally along the road from the area
in the top right of grid square 1724 (Figure 8.2).

256

2/3rd Battalion outpost
later called „Hutchison'
then „Kessels‟.
the

General line of 2/3rd Battalion
troops with attacks of Major
Boerem‟s detachment shown as
blue arrow

Figure 8.2: Sketch of the area of the South West Sector at the Killerton track junction with the Sanananda
road. The V shape in red shows the understanding at the time that the general line of the Japanese South
West Sector redoubt was V shaped although it was triangular. The red V represents the edge of the
17
bunkers in the Japanese redoubt which actually had irregular outer edges.
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The coloured base detail is from a sketch by Private J Neenehan, 36 Bn I[ntelligence] Section dated 5
Jan 43. The green markings are foliage changes reflecting tree lines, clearings and jungle. he whole area
was flat and swampy. Appendix H „Map showing area of 36 Battalion attacks Reference Gona 4 inch to 1
mile‟ in AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion pdf p. 64/86.
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Boerem‟s detachment made its first attack on 26 November at 1320, straight up the
Sanananda road onto the tip of the V shaped enemy positions. Company C had sent out
a patrol at midnight which reported a definite Japanese machine gun position to its
front.18 No doubt supported with machine gun and mortar fire by the detachment from
Company D, the two platoons of Company C attacked at 1300, encountered sniper fire,
and were stopped by both a heavy machine gun on the right of the road and mortar
fire.19 A platoon attempting to flank the machine gun was attacked by mortar fire and
another machine gun. There were a number of incidents of American mortars firing
short and killing Australians and Americans due to the base plates sinking into the
swampy ground.20 In the face of „mounting casualties‟ the attack halted while grenades
came forward.21 Among the six killed were one NCO and both platoon commanders.
Next day, „the remnants of two platoons‟ were temporarily organised into one (until
replacement officers were obtained).22 It was on the other side of no man‟s land but still
outside the strong defence perimeter of the Japanese. In terms of clearing the road and
track junction, neither the regimental envelopment nor Boerem‟s attack were successful.
On 30 November, synchronised with the continuing regimental envelopment which
inserted Huggins roadblock that same day, Boerem made a second attack with Company
C, but the platoons were stopped „almost dead where they stood‟.23 The American daily
journals record that Company C sent a platoon on a right envelopment manoeuvre, but it
navigated poorly and took no part in the battle. Boerem records that the mission was not
completed. The war diary of the 16th Brigade recorded that the day was one of limited
success.24 Neither primary source reports any participation by Australians of the 2/3 rd
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Battalion inserted into the American unit, as claimed by the unit historian of the 2/3 rd
Battalion. 25 Next morning, to support the 126th Regiment‟s eastern envelopment by
Company L, Boerem resumed the frontal attack with one platoon of Company C
supported by machine gun fire from Company D. This attack claimed to gain some
ground, but there was no assault. There was active patrolling all day seeking to locate
enemy positions, and this activity continued over the next few days. 26 It would later
emerge that they had discovered four or five enemy positions.
On 4 December, the HQ 126th Regiment (including Colonel Tomlinson) reverted to the
command of the US 32nd Division. It left the area, leaving the 3rd/126th Battalion to the
west (with its Company I and associated elements at Huggins) and Major Boerem‟s
detachment on the road to the south. Each reported to the commander of the Australian
16th Brigade, Brigadier John Lloyd. Before going, Tomlinson increased Boerem‟s
detachment to two rifle companies by attaching Company L (the part of the 3rd /126th
Battalion which had been the right envelopment force) to Boerem‟s command.
Company L was by then located about 400 metres to the east of the rest of the
detachment, with contact patrols monitoring the gap. The assault strength of Boerem‟s
detachment thus was increased to two rifle companies: Company C of 1st/126th Battalion
(strength 105) and Company L of 3rd/126th Battalion (strength 95), with the HQ and
Heavy Weapons detachments making a total of 275.27 This was about 70 per cent of the
strength of the 55th/53rd Infantry Battalion which forms part of this case study.
The next attack was scheduled for 5 December, to coincide with one in the American
sector at Buna where Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger was now Commanding
General. It was clearly judged to be an important attack as, during 4 December, HQ 16th
Brigade received very senior American and Australian generals as visitors: from the US
Army, Eichelberger, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, and the G2 (senior Intelligence

25
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officer) from HQ SWPA, Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby; and from the
Australian army, Herring accompanied by his Chief of Staff, and Vasey. 28 On the
Sanananda road, this attack, like the two previously, sought to exploit the American
achievement of inserting the Huggins‟ roadblock on 30 November by forcing the
Japanese to withdraw. The attack was to be a single envelopment on the rear of the
South West Sector from the north west by Company K of the 3rd/126th Battalion with 80
men, with the main effort from the south by Major Boerem‟s enlarged detachment of
about 140 in two rifle companies. Company C had only two, not three, rifle platoons of
32 and 35 men. Company L also had only two platoons, consisting of 31 and 39 men.
Company D would have supplied mortar and medium machine gun fire.
The generals‟ belief in the prospect of Japanese withdrawal is evident in the orders
issued. Boerem‟s mission29 was to break through to Huggins by attacking on the right of
the road using Company C and Company L, and destroy an assumed four or five enemy
positions thought to contain machine guns, 30 but he was not to advance „beyond
Huggins‟ position‟. 31 Unless the enemy fled, it would be a difficult task to reach
Huggins which was1800 metres away.
The artillery and mortar fire plan which supported this attack demanded a lot from men
whose training had not included the skills described in Chapter 7, or the experience of
the confusing noise of artillery and mortars exploding in close proximity. At zero hour
(0730) the preparatory fire lifted 50 metres beyond the foremost Japanese positions.
These men then had to cross the gap to those positions, assault any enemy positions that
could be seen and mop up all defenders in five minutes, while the rounds and bombs
falling 50 metres in front of them neutralised the deeper enemy machine gun positions.
There were two weaknesses in this fire plan. Firstly, one troop of guns could never
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create a „curtain of shells‟ but would leave gaps in the artillery fire. Secondly, the
Japanese log bunkers were impervious to field artillery and mortar shells, and the
occupants could continue to fire while being shelled, although the concussive effect
would be considerable.
The attack by Company C, near and to the right of the road, was held up at the rear line
of the artillery barrage, 32 which suggests that the artillery had not suppressed the
Japanese machine gun fire. One squad had moved forward under light enemy fire, but
there was ‟some difficulty moving the rest‟ [of the left assault platoon]. The right
assault platoon (Lieutenant Frost) got close enough to see a dugout with two machine
guns, which it was „ordered to attack vigorously at once.‟ It got close enough to throw
grenades but was running out of ammunition, and had only 11 remaining men.33 Frost
himself came into the HQ for more ammunition but his platoon‟s manoeuvres over two
hours had stalled. Soon after, the commander of Company C (Captain Bush) was
wounded and evacuated.
There is little reference in the archives to Company L in the attack of 5 December. It is
recorded as being in position for the attack, moving forward in alignment into
abandoned enemy positions, 34 and one of its platoons being reorganised. It may be the
„right flank unit‟ referred to in the notebook as holding its position with 15 men or that
may refer to one of its platoons. But the evidence does suggest that a right flanking
manoeuvre was being attempted by Company L.
About this time, Boerem reported that he would need about 45 minutes to re-organise
and resume the attack, because the country was very thick, snipers were active, and it
was „taking some time to round up troops‟.35 They had gained about 100 metres.36 The
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stalled attack in the face of a reported single dug- in machine gun supported by three
light machine guns was summarised by the Australians: „Major Boerem‟s troops were
somewhat disorganised. They had evidently become scattered in the thick undergrowth,
and it was taking some time to get them re-organised. 37 Many of the scattered
Americans were actually casualties, for by noon there were 33 known dead.38
By that evening, Major Boerem‟s detachment had confirmed the day‟s casualties as 57,
including about 33 killed.39 The maximum size of the four-platoon assaulting force was
137, which yields an average casualty rate of 42 per cent. This rate is a minimum for
Company C, given that Company L reported abandoned enemy positions, and may not
have incurred as many casualties as Company C. Twenty six men were reported to be
still holding positions close to the enemy.
On 7 December, Major Boerem assumed command of all the 126th Regimental elements
in the Australian divisional area including the 3rd/126th Battalion with its companies in
Huggins and their associated supply base and route from the west. This was a bigger
command than that of a battalion, and must have tested secondary cohesion again. Also
on 7 December, Lieutenant Haan of Company L gave competent support to the 55th/53rd
Battalion, as did the members of the Heavy weapons teams.
However, secondary group cohesion had already begun began to waver after this series
of attacks. The losses in battle casualties, illness, and the declining health of the
survivors through the month of December made Major Boerem‟s detachment
ineffective. To the losses of leaders, which had been inordinately high in combat, were
now added evacuations through illness.
The resulting decline in secondary cohesion was apparent to the new Australian brigade
commander. By 15 December, Brigadier Porter recorded that Boerem objected
whenever he was ordered to occupy a forward position or conduct offensive
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operations.40 Major Boerem‟s detachment was not given any offensive role during the
7th Division attack on 19 December that was intended to break through to its American
colleagues at Huggins. Rather Boerem‟s task was to hold ground as a firm base, or
provide American platoons to co-operate in Australian operations. American mortar and
medium machinegun supporting firepower was also in support for Australian operations
throughout the period. There is no insight in either the American or Australian records
into the reasons why there was no plan to use Major Boerem‟s detachment in this
attack. After the war, Boerem made the false claim to the US Official Historian that his
troops had eliminated the Japanese east of the road by the time they left on 8 January.41
Boerem also seemed incapable of providing determined leadership, and the secondary
cohesion of his force through its leadership structure became weak. The officers
commanding supply trains showed no determination to fight their way through the
Japanese held areas to resupply the men isolated at Huggins. The chief staff officer of
HQ 7th Division twice went with the American resupply force and felt that it did not
fight to get the food and ammunition through.42 It proved necessary to give Boerem an
unambiguous order to carry out his duty by fighting through to them if necessary.43
The weakness of the US tactics was, in principle, dispersal of strength. This was true in
fact, but Major Boerem‟s detachment was also much smaller than one battalion until 7
December. Regrouping it into a single unit was not practicable while the western supply
route to Huggins was under threat. It remained to be seen whether a larger Australian
force could achieve more.
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Analysis of the performance of Major Boerem’s detachment
The first attack by Major Boerem‟s detachment on 26 November had pushed their line
forward and could be regarded as a limited success as the 16th Brigade recorded.44 The
incidents of fratricide from American mortar fire suggest inadequate training of the
mortarmen. The attack was not costly by the standards that would prevail on the
Sanananda road. Allowing for some unrecorded wounded, the two platoons of Company
C may have suffered a casualty rate of about 20 to 25 per cent, without making a
determined assault. Against the broad parameter argued in Chapter 1, this was the
minimum level to stall, but it had reached breakpoint. Men had gone to ground
prematurely indicating weak primary group cohesion. Insufficient grenades for an
assault had been carried, and a platoon commander came back for more, indicating a
non-functioning supply system and a failure on his part to understand his job as leader.
An estimated 20 men were unaccounted for, if there were only remnants of the two
platoons (each just over 30 strong), allowing for personnel in the HQ and LMG squads.
The possibility is that the recording in the notebook or daily journal was deficient, or
that there may have been stragglers, implying inadequate primary group cohesion,
exacerbated by the casualties among leaders that would be a feature of such attacks.
By the attack of 30 November, Boerem‟s men had learned that detailed patrolling was
needed if the enemy positions, with interlocking arcs of fire, were to be discovered
before they walked into the fire lanes. During the attack, they were troubled also by
inept leadership, such as the platoon commander who failed to accurately navigate.
There was no recorded assault of an enemy position. A comparison of data from 26
November and 30 November in the rough company notebook shows that a 25 per cent
casualty rate had been incurred in the two attacks. It is not possible to apportion them,
but the inference could be taken that there were no casualties in the second attack, either
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because it was not pressed with determination, or because it was diversion to help the
concurrent envelopment attack by Company L.
The main attack on 5 December incurred a high casualty rate of 42 per cent. This alone
accounts for the breakpoint, but does not explain why the remainder of the detachment
was so scattered that Major Boerem‟s efforts to re-organise and continue the assault had
no effect. This indicates inadequate primary group cohesion, casualties among leaders
or the men ignoring them. There had been an assessment of American performance
during this attack by a relatively junior Australian officer, Lieutenant B H MacDougal
DCM, who had been attached from 2/3rd Battalion, with Colonel Tomlinson‟s consent,
to assist Boerem‟s detachment to make more progress.45 In the early afternoon after the
attack had stopped, Boerem had escorted US Brigadier General Willoughby down from
Brigade HQ to talk to MacDougal and assess the American situation. MacDougal gave
the General a plain and frank opinion of why the attack failed.46 Unfortunately the war
diary does not give even the gist of the remarks and any written report made by
Brigadier General Willoughby was not located. 47 The unit historian of the 2/3rd
Battalion described MacDougal as telling Willoughby that the US troops „lacked
everything that good troops should have‟. They went to ground every 10 metres and
waited for the barrage to stop. This was because they had never been trained to follow a
barrage or mop up enemy positions they had overrun.48 This opinion suggests that they
were brave but untrained. McCarthy claimed that MacDougal was referring to „what he
considered the Americans lack of fighting qualities‟. This phrase unfortunately suggests
lack of courage, but the casualty rate is evidence to the contrary. If he meant fighting
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spirit, his implicit but unrealistic criterion of judgment is the battle wisdom of the
veteran 16th Brigade and outstanding leaders like MacDougal.49
The length of McCarthy‟s account and its phrasing suggest an anti-American bias or at
least the application of an impossibly high standard to green troops. The 42 per cent
casualty rate shows that fighting spirit had increased since 26 November when the
attack had reached breakpoint at 25 per cent, and that, as individuals, the men were
brave. MacDougal‟s opinion seems to have been that insufficient training was the cause
of undeveloped primary group cohesion. Due to lack of familiarisation, the men were
probably apprehensive about artillery fire landing close to them and did not keep up
with it, as MacDougal reported. In the left hand platoon, some men went to ground and
would not respond to their leaders attempting to re-organise them for a renewed assault,
indicating a lack of primary group cohesion and little trust in unproven leaders. In the
right hand platoon, they even got close enough to throw grenades at a bunker, but ran
out of them. In this platoon, there were only 11 men left out of over 30 indicating a lack
of primary group cohesion. Based on the average casualty rate there would have been
about 13 casualties. The other three or so were either casualties, inactive or stragglers.
It is perhaps significant that Boerem was not dismissed for failure to succeed, as other
US leaders at Buna had been dismissed by Lieutenant General Eichelberger. This
suggests that he, and Brigadier General Willoughby, were satisfied with Boerem and
that the secondary group cohesion of his ad-hoc detachment was seen as satisfactory,
although, as noted earlier, Porter had reported that it was wavering. Eichelberger was
perhaps even quite pleased that Boerem had fashioned a unit with secondary cohesion,
because he was not satisfied with Tomlinson‟s tactical grouping - „he had scrambled his
units with the Australians in a horrible fashion‟. 50 Perceptively, while Eichelberger
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criticised the tactical skills of the US company commanders, he also noted that the
Australians had also failed in such attacks.51
The Australian overall commander, Herring, also attributed the American failure to poor
grouping by Tomlinson,52 and had noted the US Army tendency to deploy their forces
by companies,

53

thus breaking up battalion command structures and secondary

cohesion. The grouping of Company L, 3rd/126th Battalion, with Major Boerem‟s
detachment is an example. While it increased the detachment‟s strength, Company L
and the 3rd Battalion lost the secondary cohesion acquired through training together.
Company L now came under an acting commanding officer (Major Boerem) who was
less familiar to its men. Its support needs became the responsibility of unfamiliar
personnel from his battalion (the 1st /126th Battalion). Secondary cohesion needed to be
reforged.
Boerem‟s men, by their lack of skills and primary group cohesion had shown that they
had not been adequately trained. However, it is unreasonable to attribute the failure of
the 126th Regiment‟s mission to lack of training alone, because the Japanese, their
fighting power undiminished, showed no sign of withdrawing, despite the roadblocks
behind them.
The 30th Brigade plan and attack by the 55th/53rd Battalion on 7 December
On the evening after Major Boerem‟s last attack, 6 December, the 16th Brigade was
relieved by Brigadier Porter‟s 30th Brigade. As Boerem‟s location was the assembly
area for the Australian attack, which Major General Vasey had set for the following
morning, the 55th/53rd Battalion conducted a relief in place. The commander and the
staff of the HQ 30th Brigade were experienced from battles on the Kokoda Trail, but its
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30 November,

in AWM

two Militia battalions were new to combat. Porter must have known, as a brigadier at
Port Moresby since April 1942, that these men had not been trained for such warfare –
in fact, their level of training had been declining since their arrival at Port Moresby as
Chapter 4 discussed. The 49th Battalion was grouped with one battalion detached from
the 14th Brigade – the 55th/53rd Battalion, for reasons discussed in Chapters 4 and 7.
Major Boerem‟s detachment remained in the area under Porter‟s operational control.54
Vasey‟s hurried timing meant that preliminary procedures for the attack on 7 December
were rushed. The brigade objective was to clear the enemy positions all the way to
Huggins roadblock, which was the same objective as that of the last attack by Major
Boerem. The intelligence information still assumed that the Japanese position in front
was a lightly held delaying position which could be forced to withdraw when frontally
attacked in strength. Brigadier Porter‟s plan suggests that the Intelligence staff had not
told him that the South West Sector was an inverted V, because both his battalions
would strike at the apex, and any overlapping troops would not assault enemy positions
but be deflected along the sides through enfilade fire. This would weaken the strength
and depth of the assault, yet cause casualties.
In the otherwise featureless terrain, a clearly noticeable big white tree stood inside
enemy territory near the tip of the V (grid reference 179248). This tree was used as a
reference point in the documents in 1942 and will be a repeated reference point in the
next two chapters. Apparently, it was hoped that the gaining of the big white tree by
frontal attack would set the Japanese withdrawal in motion. The 49 th Battalion‟s
objective was east of the road; the 55th/53rd Battalion‟s objective was on the west.
Brigadier Porter, because he had no third battalion to hold in reserve to respond to any
Japanese counter move,55 attacked one battalion at a time five and half hours apart.
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In the first battalion attack (by the 49th Battalion), inexperienced troops would have to
cope with the noise of a fast lifting barrage which could not suppress Japanese fire. The
artillery did not fire in support of the 55th/53rd Battalion, because no communication
could be established with the forward observation officer whose observation was
necessary to accurately direct the fire.56

Figure 8.3: The location of the white tree at the tip of the South West Sector.
In the otherwise featureless terrain, a clearly noticeable big white tree stood inside enemy
territory near the tip of the V (grid reference 179248). This tree was used as a reference point in
the documents in 1942 and will be a repeated reference point in the next two chapters.
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The 49th Battalion attacked at 0945. The troops, close to the east side of the Sanananda
road, followed the artillery barrage into the fire of the enemy machine guns near the
white tree, but could not keep up with the barrage moving on its timed program.57 The
battalion reached the white tree, but was deflected down the eastern side of the inverted
V. The total remaining strength that night was 158, after 229 battle casualties (a
minimum of 57 per cent) out of 360-400 assault troops. 58 The casualties were unevenly
distributed. They were worst in the forward companies (91 per cent and 89 per cent).
The left rear company lost 62 per cent; the right rear company, while furthest from the
point of attack, nevertheless lost 40 per cent. While other battalions in New Guinea had
higher casualty rates, they were extended over two to three weeks. 59 This attack had
lasted for only two hours.
The first attack by the 55th/53rd Battalion
Within the 30th Brigade attack plan, the 55/53rd Battalion‟s attack objective on the
western edge of the Sanananda road was to align with 49th Battalion at the white tree. B
Company (Captain Gilleland) was sent out to protect the battalion‟s left flank, about 75
metres forward of its overnight positions and on a line level with the white tree. There
were two assault companies. The objective of A Company (Captain Reid), with the
post-war unit historian Lieutenant Budden as one of his platoon commanders, was the
Japanese positions to the right of the white tree. C Company (Major Spring) was to
capture Japanese positions to its left.60 D Company (Captain Coote) was detached as
Brigade reserve. From the area now held by the 49th Battalion, heavy weapons fire
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would be provided by Major Boerem‟s detachment 61 – probably tripod mounted
machine guns.
Zero hour was 1515, 7 December. Using early First World War tactics, which were all
they knew,62 the two companies of 55th/53rd Battalion advanced in extended line, each
two platoons up and one back.63 They encountered fully alert Japanese artillery, mortars
and heavy machine guns firing on fixed lines from positions so cleverly concealed in
such heavy jungle undergrowth that, in Budden‟s phrase, it was „like wearing a
blindfold‟ trying to locate them. The troops, in too rigid a formation to get forward
through the jungle to the enemy, were split and bunched into groups.64
Enfilading fire struck A Company from the area to its left. Not only was the US
machine gun fire unable to suppress it, but C Company did not assault that area
simultaneously with A Company.65 The enfilade fire prevented A Company reaching its
objective and linking up with the 49th Battalion near the white tree. The war diary
recorded that A Company would not have been held up by enfilade fire coming from its
left, had C Company maintained direction as instructed.66 It is likely that the two assault
platoons of C Company would have been deflected down the western edge of the V and
caught in enfilade fire from their right. Alternatively, they may have stopped short of
their objective. After two of his platoon commanders had been killed, Major Spring and
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22 men of C Company arrived in the area of B Company of the 49th Battalion,67 (i.e. to
the right of the road, probably back near the starting line). They had left perhaps 70 men
behind in the area of fighting, no doubt mostly casualties. The specific mention in the
war diary of the 49th Battalion may indicate some surprise that part of C Company had
been led out of battle by the company commander.
The failure of the attack by C Company to reach its objective led the CO, Lieutenant
Colonel Lovell, to order a difficult manoeuvre. B Company (Gilleland), still over on the
left flank, was ordered to attack towards the white tree through the area intended as C
Company‟s objective, thus at right angles to the axis of the battalion attack and across
the front of both the enemy and the survivors first of C Company then of A Company.68
One company from Major Boerem‟s detachment was now used to provide flank security
and extra fire support. Captain Haan with Company L took up a position to protect the
Australian left flank by moving into the location from which B Company was to
attack.69 To provide extra fire support, other troops from Major Boerem‟s detachment,
probably with heavy weapons from Company D, were already in position in the 49th
Battalion area on the right of the road, to try again to neutralise Japanese positions on
the left of the road which otherwise would enfilade B Company, 55th/53rd Battalion as it
crossed their front.70
In this attack by B Company, 11 Platoon, having lost its officer platoon commander and
sergeant, was led by Corporal Ison. Twelve Platoon then lost its officer during this
attack, whereupon Corporal Ison led the survivors of both platoons until dark. 71 As
ordered, Gilleland‟s B Company took the objective at the line of the white tree. The
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CO‟s able use of the battalion reserve achieved the battalion‟s mission by reaching the
line of the white tree, despite the casualties.
Lieutenant Colonel Lovell placed Captain Gilleland (rather than the senior company
commander, Major Spring) 72 in command of the remnants of the two other assault
companies to hold the front while he brought up the fresh and whole D Company
(Captain Coote), which Porter had released from brigade reserve. These men filled the
gap on the left of the road between the 49th Battalion and the American troops of
Captain Haan‟s L Company. The survivors of the assault companies (A, B and C) were
then sent back a short distance to recover.
In the 55th/53rd Battalion, 130 men were killed, believed killed or wounded - eight
officers, 28 NCOs and 94 ORs.73 If the three assaulting companies were 300 in number,
this was a loss rate of 43 per cent in two hours. A reasonable conclusion to draw from
the accounts is that they were greatest in A Company: within days, A Company was
broken up, probably to balance the shortages of battalion manpower. One nominal
platoon in terms of numbers went to B Company and the other two to C Company.
Budden states that the battalion was proud of its performance in pressing forward „with
splendid determination‟ despite the casualties. This may be a post-war opinion as
Budden was one of the wounded that day, and was probably not there at the time.
The HQ 7th Division Situation Report that evening recorded that „both [battalions]
made very fine performances‟.74 Herring wrote to Blamey that night that „Vasey is full
of praise for the efforts [of both battalions]. The wounded speak very well of their
officers…‟75 General Vasey had been at HQ 30th Brigade part of the time during the
day. The HQ 30th Brigade war diary recorded the attack as a limited success, but
McCarthy in South West Pacific Area – First Year described this attack as a failure
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because Porter did not achieve Vasey‟s unrealistic objective of breaking through to
Huggins. 76 McCarthy‟s verdict was repeated by the American Historian and the
subsequent literature devoted to the campaign. Certainly, the success of the battalions in
reaching their set objectives astride the road at the white tree did not trigger a Japanese
withdrawal. Yet, these descriptions of failure at the brigade level, do not recognise that
the battalions had fulfilled their orders with fighting spirit in the face of determined
opposition from the Japanese in bunkers, and ignores the widespread individual bravery.
Men in both Australian battalions reported that dead Americans lay on the ground testimony to the similar courage of Major Boerem‟s men.77
After the heavy casualties in its A, B and C Companies in its first day of battle, the
55/53rd Battalion regrouped to hold, patrol, infiltrate and raid on the western side of the
Sanananda road. Budden claims morale was high even though conditions in the water
filled weapon pits were appalling.78 The battalion conducted many patrols and at least
one raid over the next days. A Japanese soldier was taken prisoner and interrogated.
Herring, Vasey and Porter agreed to a pause in the attacks, which lasted until 19
December. 79 This may have been because, as discussed in Chapter 7, they now had
intelligence from the map captured at Gona on 8 December (Figure 7.4) which indicated
that that the Japanese position at the South West Sector was far stronger that had been
believed, and contained approximately 1700 troops. Porter introduced a policy called
„stalk and consolidate‟80 which he intended to use during the pause.
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The tactical techniques that Porter introduced were similar to the „bite and hold‟ tactical
techniques learned at high cost during 1917 and applied in 1918 . 81 The brigade would
build a small number of bunkers with overhead protection capable of being manned in
rotation by a platoon of troops with machine guns bearing down fire lanes. This would
release others to rest while a third segment patrolled. The patrolling would probe for
„soft spots‟ near pinpointed enemy strong points which were to be targets for artillery
and mortars. Instead of attacking in extended line, slower gains would be sought by
slow infiltration of troops into the soft spot.82 Then, after a short bombardment, the
troops would unexpectedly attack the strongpoint using fire and movement, and capture
the enemy installation in order to „consolidate‟ the infiltration. This process assumed, of
course, that the Japanese had left soft spots not covered by fire from neighbouring
weapon pits. Probably to relieve 30th Brigade troops for use in this new approach, Porter
was given two half-companies of the 2/3rd Battalion. These were led by Captain Herwig
on the western flank and Major Hutchison on the eastern flank and their names were
applied to posts in those locations (See Figure 8.4).83 These would secure some of the
ground on both flanks.
Porter‟s new policy would require the primary groups in his battalions to be highly
cohesive and skilled at fire and movement. If they were successful, the „stalk and
consolidate‟ activities would improve skills and develop confidence in leaders,
increasing combat effectiveness. However, the policy was flawed, the conditions were
taking their toll and sickness was increasing.84
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The difficulties in implementing Porter‟s policy were demonstrated when, after four
days of reconnaissance patrolling, two platoons of C Company were to attack an enemy
post on 12 December, after which B Company would move forward and consolidate the
ground gained. 85 The attack on the enemy post was to be preceded by a 15 minute
mortar bombardment. This was very short, probably to provide for surprise. However,
the safety distance between the troops and the mortar explosions would have been
considerable, and the attacking troops were unable to cross the ground quickly enough
when the mortar fire lifted. The attack reached breakpoint and the men were forced to
take up a defensive position for the night in no-man‟s land, with the remainder of C
Company moving up to support them.
Resuming the attack next morning, some men in the two platoons would not move
forward through the dense jungle undergrowth or went to ground prematurely thereby
precluding fire and movement co-ordinated by primary group leaders, so C Company
was ordered to halt the attempt. Another attack, this time by a platoon from B
Company, was set down for 1900 hours employing a deception plan. As C Company
moved clear of the danger, a 40 minute mortar bombardment was fired. The Japanese
would conclude that the Australians had withdrawn under cover of the mortar fire.
However, a pause of 10 minutes was planned to be followed by a quick attack by the
platoon of B Company. This also failed to surprise the enemy. B Company reported
three Japanese machine guns with fire lanes, so they crawled back in the oncoming
dark.86 The CO called the operation off.
These events in the period after 7 December had demonstrated the failure of the tactics
of stalk and consolidate in such close country against a concealed enemy whose control
of all the approaches to his defences meant that they were undiscovered, perhaps
undiscoverable. Even if some were pinpointed, the difficulty of keeping up with lifting
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mortar or artillery fire in thick scrub was also confirmed. By 15 December, Porter had
recognised that these tactics had failed because „the well constructed MG [machine gun]
positions defy our firepower‟ and, mutually supported by other positions, „present a
barrier of fire through which our troops must pass‟.87

The divisional attack of 19 December and the second attack of the 55th/53rd Battalion
The divisional and brigade plans
The revelation from the captured map that the Japanese defences at the South West
Sector were so strong, led Vasey, though General Herring, to ask for the 36 th Battalion
from the 14th Brigade to be sent to 30th Brigade. Vasey also called forward the 2/7th
Cavalry Regiment. With the arrival of these fresh troops, the twelve day pause on the
Sanananda front came to an end on 19 December 1942. Because the captured map
showed only base troops beyond Huggins, HQ 7th Division tasked the 2/7th Cavalry
Regiment to brush aside resistance between Huggins and the Sanananda beach area (the
subject of the case study in Chapter 10). At the same time, the 30th Brigade (with the
fresh 36th Battalion added) was to again attack the Japanese defences at the South West
Sector. It would then link up with the 2/7th Cavalry at the beach. The events in the 36th
Battalion are discussed in Chapter 9. Any emerging effectiveness of the 55th/53rd
Battalion learned during the first attack would be tested in this attack.
The sources for the 30th Brigade plan and subsequent events are contained in Porter‟s
appreciation dated 15 December, 88 and his opinion of the result is in two memoranda to
HQ 7 Division a few days later.
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Porter‟s plan is illustrated in the Figure 8.4.
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simultaneously on both sides of the South West Sector.90 In other respects, however,
his plan shows that his intelligence information was inaccurate. Although the captured
map (Figure 7.5) showed that the surviving strength the 41st Infantry Regiment was
located outside the redoubt position, in reality, 300 of its men were inside the redoubt. 91
The redoubt position, in hindsight, was discovered to be 700 metres deep and thus
triangular. As a result, the attack plan directed the eastern attack (by 49th Battalion and
now only four platoons strong) too far north, and the eastern side was not attacked. The
36th Battalion was in reserve for the attack, then was to lead the advance north to
Huggins. 92

90

Brigade Operations Order no 13 dated 16 Dec 42, Annex F to War Diary of 30th Brigade, AWM 52 82-30-009, pdf p. 22/142.
91

Bullard, Japanese Army Operations, p.209.

92

Appendix 22, 30th Brigade Operation Order No 13, 16 Dec 42, AWM 52-8-3-91-008, War Diary of
55/53 Battalion, pdf p.65/185.

278

49th Battalion: Objective
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Figure 8.4: The upper map shows the plan for the attack of the 30th Brigade on 19 December
1942. The place names in tan arise from the names of officers of 2/3rd Battalion who
commanded outposts in those locations from 10 to 20 December.93 The lower map shows that
patrolling had increased Australian knowledge of the forward edge of the enemy defences
which is shown in blue.94
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The 55th/53rd Battalion‟s second major attack 95
The 55th /53rd Battalion on 19 December (see figure 8.4) was to attack from the west
through the area which it had patrolled for most of the two weeks‟ pause. Knowledge of
the enemy outer perimeter had greatly increased. Patrols looking for soft spots had
moved along the axis of attack into the area of probable objectives, so that many saw
something of the terrain over which they would assault.96 Two creeks and a clearing
were obstacles to movement and were covered by enemy fire.
The objective for the battalion attack was just over 400 metres of the Sanananda road
inside the South West Sector, extending from the Killerton track junction to the white
tree at grid reference 179248.97 This was an extraordinarily wide frontage which would
require an assault force of two companies to fully cover the objective. This would
threaten the enemy at as many places as possible, probably reflecting Porter‟s attempt to
counter the enemy‟s ability to concentrate fire on a narrow assault. However, Lovell
only had three companies because, as noted earlier, he had been forced by the casualties
of 7 December to break up A Company. One nominal platoon had gone to B Company
and the other two to C Company, but it must be supposed that these nominal platoons
were not very strong and must have been struggling to create new primary groups under
surviving leaders. These transfers also diminished secondary group cohesion, as there
was neither time nor opportunity for the existing OCs in B Company and C Company to
work with them.
In the attack, Lovell, with only three companies, deployed D Company as the left hand
(northernmost) assault company with B Company assaulting on its right. C Company
was positioned in the centre behind the starting line in reserve. This was D Company‟s
first participation in a formal battalion attack against prepared positions because it had
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been the brigade reserve on 7 December.

Budden, afterwards, wrote that the D

Company commander, Captain Coote (a 53rd Battalion transfer), was „very brave and
competent‟. Possibly the company was still numerically strong, because it was given a
about 250 metres of the objective, with B Company the remaining 150 metres. The
starting line was generally along the track by which positions Brown and Herwig were
reached, and compass bearings were set for each company‟s axis of assault eastwards to
the road. Scaled off from Figure 8.4, the distance to be traversed varied from 340 metres
on the north in front of D Company, to 275 metres at the intercompany boundary with B
Company, and 230 metres on the south at the big white tree.
Zero hour was 0730. The combined fire support appears to have been substantial but,
considering the few weapons, difficulties of observation of targets and the large target
area, was not likely to have been effective. In D Company on the battalion‟s left, the
leftmost platoon, 17 Platoon, reached the company objective on the road. Names
mentioned in the following narrative will appear later in Brigadier Porter‟s memoranda
on this attack. Following behind 17 Platoon, the company HQ, including the OC
(Captain Coote) and the 2IC, quickly became casualties, leaving the company without
leadership and communication. 16 Platoon, on the right front, got well ahead, silencing
with grenades several enemy rifle posts beyond the second creek when its platoon
commander (Lieutenant Wood) was wounded about half way to the road. The platoon
sergeant, unable to find D Company HQ, sent a runner to obtain further orders from the
Battalion HQ, and was told to dig in where his platoon was and that 17 and 18 platoon
would close up to it. The rear platoon was 18 Platoon. One of its sections, led by a
private soldier (Dale), also reached the objective on the road but lost touch with its
platoon and, after a wait for an hour, returned to the starting line. The Platoon
Commander (Lieutenant W.J.A. Payne) had been killed clearing the enemy from
weapon pits: Porter wrote that „The remainder of the party survived by NOT following
him‟.98
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On the right (south), B Company (Captain Gilleland) had trouble with the dense
undergrowth. He and his men had performed very competently on both 7 and 13
December. Now, held up by a machine gun, Gilleland manoeuvred his two leading
platoons to outflank it, but the platoon transferred from A Company did not perform
well – which may have been the result of the reorganisation or remaining battle shock
after its experiences on 7 December. As the Japanese machine gun moved to an
alternate position, others opened fire in mutual support. Then Brigadier Porter ordered
mortar fire to assist B Company. Lieutenant Colonel Lovell objected because he was
uncertain of the locations of his troops; he was over-ridden. The mortar fire forced 11
Platoon B Company to withdraw. This fire similarly affected D company‟s 17 Platoon
on the road north of B Company nearer the Killerton track junction.
Lovell, as he had done on 7 December, now sought to use his reserve to clear the
remaining opposition. By pushing Major Spring‟s C Company through towards the
centre of the battalion objective, Lovell hoped to take the pressure off D Company. The
normal procedure would have been for Spring, with a small party, to move ahead to
reconnoitre, make a plan and then take his place leading and controlling the subsequent
attack (as Coote and Gilleland had done). Instead, Spring moved only far enough to set
up his HQ in the second creek, directing his platoon commanders to go forward from
there.
This may be the event described by Sergeant Clarrie Meredith (and others) in 1987:
I have memories of him in action on the Sanananda Track sitting behind a large
fallen tree in a small creek, purely dead scared, which we all would have been to
some degree, just telling us „Keep moving forward boys, you mustn‟t stop‟. He
did not lead us in at all…99
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Not only did Spring fail to lead, but the men would not follow two of the platoon
commanders. As these were replacements from elsewhere within the 55th/53rd Battalion
for the two killed in action on 7 December, the men in C Company may not have known
them very well, and had insufficient trust to follow them. An attempt to lead 14 Platoon
C Company by Private Daniels was unsuccessful, as the men „vanished‟ after he gained
an enemy post, according to Porter. The company disintegrated, according to this frank
description by the attached member of the battalion Intelligence section, Lance Corporal
Sullivan:
From the very start the men appeared to be very nervous and on various
occasions would not move for Pl[atoon] commanders and towards the end men
were coming back and would not go in and join their platoons. 100
The war diary records that men still went to ground prematurely which „contributed to
their inability to extricate themselves by fire and movement‟, although some enemy
bunkers were attacked.101 The premature going to ground was recorded as particularly
evident in the regrouped C Company,102 although Porter claimed that it was widespread
throughout the battalion.
Major Spring was judged to be failing to prosecute the attack with vigour and was
dismissed in the middle of the battle by Brigadier Porter. His successor, Captain
Henderson (like Coote and Spring, originally of the 53rd Battalion) was killed showing
extreme individual heroism leading between 10 and 14 men against a machine gun post
according to the war diary, but this narrative is contested. Brigadier Porter would later
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claim that nobody followed Henderson; Budden, possibly seeking to contradict Porter‟s
slur on the members of the battalion, would much later write that Henderson was killed
as he approached the forward positions of C Company and thus was dead before he
could take a leadership role.103 As, neither Porter nor Budden were eye-witnesses, but
the sources for the war diary entry were more likely to have been, its description of
Henderson‟s leadership is preferred. His successor, a platoon commander, was ordered
to try to follow the route taken by D Company to the Sanananda road, but there was
confusion about the route and the company was then told to remain at Herwig. On
orders from the Brigade HQ, the survivors of the other companies withdrew to the
starting line. The casualties had been six officers, 18 NCOs and 51 men. As the number
of men taking part was not recorded, a precise casualty rate is not possible, but was
probably nearly 40 per cent.104
HQ 30th Brigade reported merely that the battalion had failed to reach its objective,
without mentioning that several groups had reached it including the part of the battalion
forced out by the mortar fire ordered by Porter. HQ 7th Division inaccurately reported
that 55th/53rd Battalion made no progress during the day. That evening, Herring wrote to
Blamey that the 55th/53rd Battalion had not done well. He attributed its „comparative
incapacity‟ to the need for „a good deal of training‟, instanced by a fear of throwing
grenades.105 This opinion was very different from the opinions, described in Chapter 4,
that he and Blamey had held before it was tested in combat, and Vasey being „full of
praise‟ of its performance on 7 December.
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On 20 December, morale in the 55th/53rd Battalion fell caused by the nervous strain of
the attacks of 7 and 19 December. The heavy losses and extreme discomfort of the
environment were given as the cause.106 Although patrolling continued to keep in touch
with the enemy, the war diary C 2118 recorded low morale brought about by the strain,
the harsh conditions and the general health of the unit.107 According to the war diary,
„[t]he standard was not high‟.108
Analysis of the readiness of the 55th/53rd Battalion
In their first day of combat the two battalions of the 30th Brigade had lost 22 officers
and 337 as battle casualties. As McCarthy wrote, „Even for experienced battalions the
heavy blows which the 49th and 55th/53rd had sustained would have been almost
stunning…what these men had attempted, and the manner of it, was greatly to the men‟s
credit‟.109 No-one seems to have noted that the casualties had been very similar to those
at the Nek at Anzac in 1915, and that raw courage of individuals is not an answer to
superior enemy fighting power. A Company and C Company were the two sub-units of
the 55th/53rd Battalion most affected by casualties on 7 December, when they had lost
nearly 100% of their officers, at least 50% of their NCOs and over 43% of their
strength.
The staff at HQ 30th Brigade did not see that the primary cause of brigade level failure
was superior Japanese fighting power from their well protected hidden bunkers which
enabled them to hold their defences. The HQ staff accused the leading assault elements
of the 49th Battalion of passing over the well concealed posts rather than mopping up the
area it had penetrated, 110 which, the staff claimed, left machine guns to fire on 55th/53rd
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Battalion.111 This suggests that the staff, not recognising the V shape of the South West
sector bastion and thinking of it in linear terms, saw the 700 metres travelled by parts of
the 49th Battalion as a successful penetration. The staff did not realise that much of the
49th Battalion had not entered the Japanese main position, but was deflected along its
eastern face, its extended lines passing through highly effective enfilading machine gun
fire from their left. When 55th /55rd Battalion struck the apex at the white tree, its
extended lines were caught in the cross fire of machine guns, and the two leading
companies rapidly reached breakpoint. Possibly its C Company was deflected along the
western face in a similar way to the 49th Battalion. The staff misinterpretations had
grave consequences. They concluded that further training in the need for mopping up
would correct this defect. Once this was corrected, more attacks would work.
By attributing the failure on 7 December to the 49th Battalion not mopping up, the staff
at HQ 30th Brigade showed that they did not understand that the textbook approach
using fire and movement was difficult to apply on the Sanananda road in the swamps
and thick jungle. It was a sound combat drill in relatively open places where an enemy
post could be identified and engaged by a Bren gun group while others approached the
post from a different direction with rifles, Owen guns and grenades. 112 Budden
described the tangled undergrowth where so little could be seen, and where the enemy
weapons were firing on fixed lines from hidden positions in depth.113 Japanese snipers
in trees also took a toll, which could not be addressed by fire and movement tactics
designed to stalk observed enemy posts on the ground.
Brigadier Porter, dissatisfied with the failure of the renewed attacks from 19 to 22
December, wrote two memoranda to HQ 7th Division. In these memoranda, he declared
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to Major General Vasey that the battalions from the 14th Brigade were „not fit for war
under the present conditions‟. 114 It is evident from the examples he gave that the phrase
„fit for war‟ was a crisp synonym for not being combat ready because they lacked
fighting spirit. Brigadier Porter‟s specific criticisms of the 55th/53rd Battalion will be
dealt with in this Chapter – the issues common to both battalions from the 14th Brigade
will be dealt with at the end of the next Chapter. The account of the second attack on 19
December in the war diary of the 55th/53rd Battalion is particularly detailed, with six and
a half C2118 sheets signed by the Lovell, and seven reports by junior personnel in
appendices.115
Porter and Lovell provided a believable account of a difficult battle in unusual detail.
Since the files contain disclosure of much negative behaviour it is unlikely that there
was avoidance of the truth or editing of negative events to construct a positive narrative,
beyond that which is inevitable to make a logical and comprehensive account out of
numerous individual perspectives of a chaotic attack in dense foliage.
Secondary group cohesion in the 55th /53rd Battalion
The Australian attacks of 7 December showed that the secondary group cohesion of the
55th /53rd Battalion was sufficient to plan overnight and execute an attack the next day.
Lieutenant Colonel Lovell‟s use of B Company demonstrated that secondary group
cohesion at battalion and company level was effective under fire, except in C Company.
In the raid of 12-13 December, the co-ordination of the companies by the CO in the
series of complex events was of a high order, and their responsiveness indicates good
secondary cohesion, even though there was weakness in the cohesion of the primary
groups.
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On 19 December, the cohesion of B and D Company in executing the battalion plan was
good. Again, B Company manoeuvred under fire (except for the faltering A company
platoon now under its command). The CO was able to judge the point at which to
commit his reserve, but its execution was marred as C Company disintegrated at both
secondary and primary group level.
Success had seemed to be close in the attack of 19 December because the road had been
reached in several places. But for the unfortunate intervention of the Brigadier, whose
orders for mortar fire caused its 11 Platoon to withdraw, B Company might have also
got to the road. With determination, the reserve (C Company) might have reached the
road to reinforce the elements of D Company there, but Major Spring lacked
determination and two thirds of his force was from the debilitated men of the disbanded
A Company. Even in the hands of an outstanding leader, C Company would have
possessed little primary group cohesion and fighting spirit.
It seems from these events that secondary group cohesion is more slowly affected by
casualties than primary group cohesion. The secondary cohesion of the 55th/53rd
Battalion was shown to be far higher than might have been expected after its experience
in Port Moresby, which was described in Chapter 4. The seven-month period of full
time duty of the command structure from September 1941 until embarkation in
Australia in May 1942, had paid dividends for secondary cohesion, not all of which had
been lost while labouring in Port Moresby.
Primary group cohesion in the 55th /53rd Battalion
The good secondary group cohesion on 7 and 19 December, had carried the assault
echelons of the 55th/53rd Battalion into the zone where heavy casualties would result
unless cohesive primary groups with fighting spirit could resume the assault. These had
gone forward upright with bayonets fixed in extended line116 and had not lost cohesion
while they could see each other, but once forced to ground by the intensity of the enemy
fire, they could no longer see others or ignored the leaders they could see.
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On 7 December, emerging primary group cohesion in A and C Company was all but
destroyed by battle losses that day. Although the enemy could not be seen in the
undergrowth, and groups still moved forward according to Budden (A Company), 117 the
attacked stalled and could not be reorganised. The attempts by the junior leadership to
reorganise caused the very high leadership casualties. The casualty rates in the intense
enemy fire on 7 December meant that primary group cohesion in A Company and two
platoons of C Company was never able to be demonstrated, but B Company was able to
reorganise into new primary groups, assault and secure the battalion objective.

On 7

December, B Company could re-organise primary groups. Two of C Company platoons
suffered heavy casualties. Both A and C Companies rapidly reached their breakpoint
without gaining the enemy positions because of the average 43 per cent casualty rate
and the loss of leaders.
In the raid on the enemy post on 12-13 December, the casualties in C Company were
very low considering the intended intensity of such an attempt at consolidation. There
were only 3 killed and 6 wounded out of three platoons the precise strength of which is
not recorded. Assuming 25 to 30 men in each, the casualty rate was ten to twelve per
cent, despite the loss of surprise and the many adaptations of the initial plan no doubt
alerting the Japanese. The mens‟ failure to respond to leaders in fire and movement near
the enemy post confirms that the primary group cohesion and fighting spirit of the
troops in C Company remained weak. On the other hand, the platoon of B Company did
resume the attack and was skilful enough to detect the fire lanes of the three Japanese
machine guns before suffering the heavy casualties that an assault through them would
have incurred.
The primary group cohesion in the 55th/53rd Battalion on 19 December was again
variable across the companies, but they went forward again into the heavy enemy
machine gun fire. Captain Gilleland‟s B Company, which had done very well on 7
December and on 12-13 December, repeated the performance on 19 December and
manoeuvred to attack a bunker. However, the platoon of survivors of A Company on 7
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December who went to B Company did not perform well on 19 December. Thus,
despite Gilleland‟s evidence quoted by Porter about the difficulty of getting men to
continue moving forward, his own company had demonstrated primary group cohesion
several times. Major Spring‟s C Company, now including two platoons of survivors of
A company, was committed to support the D Company elements on the road on 19
December but disintegrated. The influence of Major Spring on C Company was
obviously negative. He lacked credibility as a combat leader. He did not form the link to
the secondary structure that it is the role of a company commander to provide, and could
not provide encouraging leadership to the primary groups. Having been the reserve on 7
December, D Company‟s first attack was on 19 December. Its platoons showed high
primary group cohesion. They pressed on without the wounded HQ personnel, perhaps
half the company reached the road, and a substantial portion of 16 Platoon dug in about
half way to it facing strong enemy posts.
Porter‟s memoranda gave frank evidence of the lack of primary group cohesion, but,
because they were written in the aftermath of the second failure of a brigade-sized
attack on 19 December, they may not be a fair assessment of the entire period since 7
December. By 19 December, the combined total of 205 casualties in just twelve days
was a rate of about 50 per cent of the assault elements of the original battalion. These
casualties included 14 officers and at least 46 NCOs, whose loss was catastrophic for its
primary group cohesion, as Pugsley had warned, yet some good alternative leaders had
come forward such as Privates Dale and Daniels, and Corporal Ison, who led 11 and 12
Platoons in B Company on 7 December.
As a result of this combined casualty ratio, in the later stages, but not on 7 December,
there had been premature aimless firing and going to ground „by reason of fright‟ even
before suffering casualties. Going to ground caused an immediate stall, and required
leaders to take action. Porter cited the observation of Captain Gilleland (OC B
Company) that, once on the ground, men „buried their faces‟ to avoid seeing what was
required by leaders (both men with rank and „better types‟) who were trying to organise
forward movement. The unwounded survivors immediately lost contact with each other
and became individuals. However, Gilleland‟s company had manoeuvred with recreated
290

primary groups on 7 December, so he was describing events on 19 December. Porter
did not mention that the mortar fire that he had ordered made a negative contribution to
B Company‟s attempts to re-organise.
Porter‟s memoranda implicitly broke each battalion it discussed into three segments.
The first segment was „a percentage of personnel who [were] brave in the extreme‟.
However these „better types‟ had „unskilful aggression‟ and by 22 December had been
„almost exterminated‟. The casualties among leaders and the high casualty rate would
suggest that the number which was „unskilfully aggressive‟ was quite large though not a
majority. The second segment contained those who were not confident in themselves
and their weapons and lack discipline due entirely to lack of training…‟. They also
lacked training in minor tactics, which he claimed, was not true of the original
battalions of his brigade, such as the 49th Battalion. 118 Despite the lack of coherent
numerical evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the majority were in this segment
and that they would not have had confidence in the skills of their peers and thus lack a
sense of accountability to comrades. The third segment contained a few cases of
„cowardice‟. 119 It will be recalled that, in Chapter 6, the unit historian, Crooks, had
reported that in Syria that there had been a small number of such cases in the 2/33rd
Battalion‟s first combat. Some had also been recorded in the 3rd Battalion, so it is
reasonable to conclude that cases of „cowardice‟ in the first combat experience are to be
expected.
Brigadier Porter added another much less plausible criticism of the 55th/53rd Battalion
when he claimed that men had discarded their weapons and run away on 19
December.120 His evidence was the number of Bren guns and Owen guns lost by the
55th/53rd Battalion since 7 December. The number and type of weapons he gave as lost
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is about 50 per cent of the Brens and Owens on issue to rifle companies. This evidence
of a count of lost weapons could be seen as conclusive, yet the loss of weapons can be
better explained by the number of casualties suffered in the two attacks: by 19
December the unit had lost 50 per cent of its men either killed or wounded. And while
not every weapon of a casualty is lost, in that terrain where men lay wounded under fire
in swamps, and where lives were lost attempting to recover them, a very high loss rate
of weapons is explicable. On this swampy terrain with action occurring at very short
range, the dead were mostly left unburied, and evacuating the wounded incurred the risk
of further casualties and was physically difficult. It is not surprising that collecting the
weapons of the dead and wounded did not have any priority.121 The thickness of the
jungle is another contributing factor. It would be easy to put a weapon down and be
unable to locate it. Yet Porter alleged that the lost weapons had been thrown away as
men fled, which could only have been done by unwounded riflemen.
Surely Porter could not have been alleging that, in addition to the 50 per cent who were
casualties, another half of the battalion ran away. If that were true, there would be a
detailed record of such large numbers. He had already said that cowardice was limited
to „some cases‟. This case study has found no evidence in the war diary file, which
records many negative things, of a large number of men running away other than,
possibly, the reference made by Corporal Sullivan to men from C Company coming
back. There is a reference to a party getting lost, misunderstanding its instructions and
going to Herwig, 122 which Porter said was the site of the incident of men running
away. 123 This was the section of D Company which, having spent an hour on the
objective (the road) without seeing its platoon, went back to the starting line. It is also
probable that some other individuals got separated from their primary groups and went
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back along the axis of attack to the track from Herwig. Some of these would be
legitimate stragglers for whom returning to the starting line is the appropriate action.
This may be a source of a story which Porter believed. It seems reasonable to reject
Porter‟s evidence of men running away, and to regard the lost weapons as one of the
hazards of combat in such close proximity to the enemy‟s defensive system.
However it is important not to entirely dismiss Porter‟s criticisms. Even when his more
emotional statements are set aside, they describe primary group inadequacy in skills and
fighting spirit, and its source – lack of training. He called this spirit „fitness for war‟.
His memoranda reported that lack of training had led to defects in the leadership and
skills within the platoons and companies, in other words, in the primary groups. The
55th/53rd Battalion‟s low state of training had caused loss of life and materiel but he
lamented the negligible gain. An inference could be drawn that such losses could be
acceptable if there was battlefield success. While he would give the men more training,
so that they could profit by their experience, Porter was without much hope that it
would produce success.124
Leadership
It will be recalled that „Quality of Leadership‟ was one of the factors listed in Table 1.1
as fixed, meaning that, at the point of entering into first combat, it was a factor that
cannot be changed. Because of the availability of detailed information, episodes in the
battle on 19 December will be used to examine the leadership factor in the 55th/53rd
Battalion. The CO, Lovell, in his first command, showed competence and adaptability.
The leaders in the two assault companies (B and D) displayed a high order of leadership
initiative, as did some private soldiers,125 which showed that the leadership was sound
in those companies. D Company reached its stall level when its leadership structure
was destroyed. The high casualties when leaders such Coote, Henderson and many
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others attempted re-organisation, suggest that their example was not „concentric‟ in
restoring unity of action in the sub-units once the individuals had lost contact with each
other and their leader.126 Men staying in cover drove junior leaders to set an example by
risky courageous action. When leaders acted alone (Porter‟s exemplars on 19 December
were Captain Henderson,127 Lieutenant Payne and Privates Dale and Daniels) the men
did not follow them, and some leaders were unnecessarily killed (Henderson and
Payne). The performance of C Company was influenced by having unfamiliar platoon
commanders and the culmination of the leadership problem that had first surfaced on 7
December concerning the OC, Major Spring, but which had not been dealt with at the
time.
Porter was expecting too much of the untested new platoon commanders in C Company
on 19 December, who had not been given the opportunity, described by Kirke in
Chapter 1, to develop the tightly-knit culture founded on a relationship with their men.
That some failed the leadership test at Sanananda should not have been surprising, nor
that the men had not developed enough trust in them to follow their orders.
Doubts about the leadership qualities of Major Spring, however, were of much longer
duration. Three instances of unusual conduct by Major Spring have been described on
and after 7 December, the third leading to his dismissal in battle on 19 December. His
leadership qualities contrast with his untested but successful peers Coote, Gilleland,
Reid and Henderson. There was an even earlier record of his failure as a leader. Before
Sanananda, Spring had been an officer in the 53rd Battalion in the 30th Brigade from
November 1941. As the Brigade Commander since April 1942, Porter had been
responsible for Spring‟s training and assessment. Correspondence to Porter about
officer performance in the 53rd Battalion on the Kokoda Trail had expressed doubts
about Spring.128 Porter had not acted on those doubts. Lovell had accepted as transfers
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Marshall, Men against fire, pp. 132, 192-199.
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The reliability of accounts of Henderson‟s actions was discussed earlier in this Chapter.
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Demi-Official Letter from Brigadier Potts discussing a list of officers of the 53 rd battalion who had
„failed‟ at Isurava. AWM PRO 00527 Papers of Major General Porter, 14/43,
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only three officers from the 53rd Battalion in October, who would have had, no doubt,
the recommendation of Porter, which suggests that any weakness in their leadership
within the 53rd Battalion evident on the Kokoda Trail had been eliminated. Now, Porter
had finally dismissed Spring while his company was under fire. When his replacement,
Henderson, was soon killed personally attacking a machine gun, Porter blamed the men
for not following Henderson‟s lead. 129 Ironically, Henderson was, like Spring, Coote
and Reid (who led A Company until wounded on 7 December), transferred in from the
53rd Battalion, yet only Spring had shown himself to be incapable of infantry combat
leadership.130 Porter‟s memoranda did not acknowledge his own error of judgement
regarding Spring‟s unsuitability, which was the cause of the lack of cohesion and
combat readiness of C Company on the Sanananda road on and after 7 December,
especially its failure on 19 December.
The leadership of primary groups - section and platoon commanders – failed in two
ways according to Porter.131 Again, he may have been more strongly influenced by the
failure of 19 December than the attack of 7 December when the casualties among the
leaders had been so high that they had been „almost exterminated‟ by the date of his
memorandum. 132 Firstly, he wrote that they, and also their men, lacked training in
minor tactics (the military term for the tactics used by sections and platoons in fire and
movement). Their second failure flowed from the men going to ground. This forced the
leaders to spend too much time „urging their personnel to leave cover‟.
In Chapter 1 it was pointed out that the individual training of leaders must give them
this knowledge of tactics, so that in the collective training, they are able to conduct
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Appendix I „Fitness for War‟ pdf p. 30/142. AWM 52 8-2-30-009 War Diary of 30th Brigade,. Both
the War Diary of the battalion and the account of Budden differ from Porter‟s allegation about the men
not following Henderson. Probably some men did follow him until he was killed, but obviously the
majority did not.
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According to Brigadier Carey, email 20 June 2010, this was not seen as a damning character fault;
Spring served out the war as a legal officer.
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Appendix G, Paragraph 2, „Fitness for War‟, AWM 52 8-2-30-009, War Diary of 30th Brigade, pdf p.
31/142.
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rigorous training of their primary groups. From this hard training, an organic human
relationship emerges, consisting of mutual trust, interdependency, sense of belonging
and accountability to their small group and mutual survival.
American leadership is not so well described in the sources. However, the Australian
Lieutenant MacDougal's report has already been noted as implying that the Americans
were not in cohesive primary groups and did not respond to leaders who were unproven
and unskilful.
A comparative evaluation of both units
Major General Vasey took only a few days to reach a chauvinist interpretation of the
failure of the American manoeuvre tactics at the South West sector, rather than attribute
it to their lack of training and the difficult terrain. This led the Australians to conclude
that what Americans could not do, Australians could. Thus the Port Moresby Militia
battalions, also ill-trained for the task, were sent into combat. The attempts by
Australians to force a Japanese withdrawal fared no better than the Americans and
caused greater proportionate loss of life.
The insufficient training of Major Boerem‟s detachment was evident in three attacks by
its inadequate fighting spirit and skills. This demonstrated that the committal of the
126th Regiment to combat by senior American commanders was a blunder that had led
to high casualties without result.133 As noted in Chapter 4, Blamey told MacArthur that
the fault with the American Army lay fundamentally in its lack of training, which „…
must have lacked the spirit of pushing on at all costs, which is the essence of dealing
with the Japanese.‟ 134 Blamey was thus summing up the role training plays in the
creation of fighting spirit – a matter which was given a theoretical framework in
Chapter 1. Blamey went on to claim to the Australian Prime Minister that the Militia
were relatively better attack troops. This relativity claim, if correct, would not
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Eichelberger quickly learnt this lesson, and reformed the training in Australia of subsequent American
divisions. He emphasised the jungle training of primary groups, live firing and leadership. Luvaas and
Shortal, „Robert L. Eichelberger‟, p.166.
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Letter from General Blamey to Lieutenant General Herring to dated
3/DRL/6643 2/135. Series 2 Papers of Field Marshal Blamey.

296

30 November,

in AWM

necessarily amount to a claim that the Australians were sufficiently trained, yet Blamey
added that the 30th Brigade was intensively trained.
On a reasonable evaluation of the evidence in this case study, General Blamey had been
right to regard the Australian Militia as relatively better attack troops, but this
evaluation has slender justification, because it is based on the casualty rates that could
be tolerated before slipping into ineffectiveness or moral collapse, which happened very
quickly. Major Boerem‟s detachment only once, its third battle on 5 December, had
incurred a casualty rate of 42 per cent compared to that of the 55th/53rd Battalion in its
first experience on 7 December (43 percent). However, after 5 December, American
secondary group cohesion broke down, as did Boerem‟s leadership (shown by his
resentment of being asked to conduct operations, and the failures to fight resupply
columns through to his command at Huggins).

The 55th/53rd Battalion recovered

sufficiently after 7 December to mount a second attack on 19 December, in which the
casualty rate was again nearly 40 per cent of the troops then taking part. By 20
December, after two attacks with high casualties, but after only two weeks of difficult
operations, the 55th/53rd Battalion became effective only in ground holding roles.
Rather than casualties making the a battalion combat effective as Generals Herring and
Vasey believed, 135 it would seem that too many casualties in the first combat
experiences had the opposite effect: they weakened the essentials of primary group
cohesion, particularly leadership. Instead of hardening units or moving them towards
effectiveness, they weakened the embryonic primary group cohesion, particularly its
leadership, and caused both units‟ morale to collapse within one to two weeks. This
severe introduction to combat meant that the survivors could not make progress towards
effectiveness in the face of such losses.
Comparative secondary group cohesion
Both American and Australian attacks were apparently well planned. The secondary
cohesion of the Major Boerem‟s detachment was quite high considering its ad-hoc
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Horner, High Command ,p.99. They held that view as Brigadiers in the Middle East.
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composition but there were no reported examples of manoeuvre by companies such as
in the Australian battalion. Porter used two elements of Boerem‟s force on 7 December
to support the Australian attack, but he declined to use Boerem‟s force as a whole on 19
December, having judged that none of it could be regarded as combat ready for
anything more than a positional role.136
The secondary cohesion of the 55th/53rd battalion was shown to be good. The battalion
could manoeuvre under intense fire, and men went forward as long as they could see
each other (in extended line). Its high secondary group cohesion would explain how the
55th/53rd Battalion could twice carry out formal attacks in extended line. However, due
to the inadequacy of the training, operating social structures suited to primary group
combat were less strong, and the informal social structures were not an adequate
substitute. Once extended lines broke up, the attack stalled and then reached breakpoint.
It is a reasonable conclusion from this case study that secondary group cohesion is
easier to achieve and maintain than primary group cohesion. However, good secondary
cohesion in the circumstances on the Sanananda road delivered both units into a first
experience of combat which they had insufficient training to manage because their
primary group cohesion was undeveloped. Secondary group cohesion, taken alone, may
be pointless because primary group cohesion is essential to enable closing with the
enemy in the face of hostile fire.
Primary group weakness was evident in both Allied units. In the 55th/53rd Battalion this
was a direct result of the diversion into labouring tasks after arrival at Port Moresby so
that, through lack of training, primary group cohesion and fighting spirit had not
developed.

Primary group cohesion was good only in parts of Major Boerem‟s

detachment, as shown by the co-operation of platoon sized detachments to assist
Australian units throughout December, which will be described in Chapter 9.
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Porter‟s „Report on Situation 15 Dec[ember 19]42‟, paragraph 3 in Appendix E to AWM 52 8-2-30009, War Dairy of 30th Brigade, pdf p. 19/142.
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Even if, on the evidence of this single comparative case study, Blamey was correct to
rate the Australian Militia relatively superior, his claim that the Militia he was sending
was intensively trained, is a claim of absolute combat readiness. This was incorrect, in
the case of the 55th/53rd Battalion. Porter, Vasey and Herring believed that the problem
with the Militia units they were sent was lack of training leading to primary groups
without fighting spirit and thus to high loss of life for little gain.
Even so, the high standard envisaged by Vasey, MacDougall, and (post-war) by
McCarthy‟s description of the Catterns episode, led to a literally fatal blindness in the
Australian senior commanders. While correctly attributing lack of skills to inadequate
training, they failed to see that lack of training would also explain lack of primary group
cohesion. This prevented the generals reaching the proper conclusion, which was that
the vastly superior Japanese fighting power was the real issue, and that it was likely that
even the highest quality troops would also fail.
The equalisers of fighting power in principle were more artillery and use of tanks.
Herring decided to use the expert 18th Brigade with tanks as soon as it could be brought
over from Buna. In Chapter 9, the combat readiness of the 2/9th Battalion AIF, and that
of the other battalion from the 14th Brigade, the 36th Battalion, and Blamey‟s claim
again evaluated. The issues common to both battalions of the 14th Brigade raised in the
memoranda by Brigadier Porter will be taken up there.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 8: Task Organisation
American units
The American units ( all elements of the 126th Infantry Regiment) were from 19
November under command of Australian brigade headquarters. These were HQ 16th
Brigade (Brigadier Lloyd), then from 6 December to 9 January 1943, HQ 30th Brigade
(Brigadier Porter).
HQ 126th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Clarence M. Tomlinson,) from 22 November
until 4 December when it (including Tomlinson) returned to the 32nd US Division.
When Tomlinson left, Major Baetcke briefly took command American troops in
the 7th Division area. From 7 December Major Boerem took command.
Detachment of 1st/126th Battalion ('Major Boerem‟s detachment')
Major Richard D. Boerem (XO of 1/126)
Co. C less one platoon
Co. D (Weapons) less one squad (including Lt Haan.)
3rd/126th Battalion
Co. I
Co. K
Co.

L (Capt

Lee

then

Major

Zeef),

located

with

Australians

at

Hutchison/Kessels until 4 December, then came under command of Major
Boerem's detachment.
Co. M (Weapons)
Regimental Cannon Company (81 mm mortars) arrived from Wairopi on 28
November.
Regimental AT (anti-tank) Company (medium machine guns) arrived from
Wairopi on 28 November.
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The American units were disposed as follows:
Force at Huggins roadblock from 30 November
Co. I
Co. M (Weapons)
AT Company
Force in support base west of Huggins roadblock
HQ 3rd/163rd Battalion
Co. K
Cannon Company
Major Boerem's detachment astride the Sanananda road from 22 November
Major Richard D. Boerem (XO of 1st/126th Battalion)
Co. C less one platoon
Co. D (Weapons)
Co. L from 4 December.

Australian units
16th Brigade (Brigadier Lloyd)
30th Brigade (Brigadier Porter)
49th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Kessels)
55th/53rd Battalion (detached from 14 Bde ) (Lieutenant Colonel Lovell)
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Imperial Japanese Army in the South West Sector ('The Tsukamoto Unit')
Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto ( the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 144th
Regiment)
Remaining strength of 144th Regiment
Part of 41st Regiment (300 men cut off there when Huggins roadblock was inserted on
30 November)
Field Hospital patients
A small number of Takasago Volunteers ( Taiwanese labourers)
Total strength of the Tsukamoto Unit at the beginning of December was about 1700.
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Chapter 9: Australian Militia and AIF battalions in the
attacks on the South West Sector

Part 1 of this Chapter examines the combat readiness demonstrated by the 36th
Battalion in its first combat experiences during attacks in the period 19 to 28 December.
In Part 2, a limited comparison will also be made with the attack of the 2/9th Battalion
of 18th Brigade on 12 January 1943 over the same ground as the earlier 36th Battalion
attack. An analysis of the residual combat effectiveness of the 2/9th Battalion will shed
light on the meaning of combat effectiveness and how it could be preserved despite
casualties and reinforcements. In Part 3, the criticisms in Brigadier Porter‟s memoranda
common to both the 36th Battalion and the 55th/53rd Battalion (former 14th Brigade units)
will be evaluated. Part 4 briefly describes the end of the allied siege of the South West
Sector. and the inflated Allied claims to success at the South West Sector.
The first combat and mutinies in the 36th Battalion
The 36th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen) was the last battalion of the 14th
Brigade to be committed to action in Papua. Even in terms of skills training, it was not
combat ready, because, within days of its arrival at Soputa, Brigadier Porter discovered
that there were men in the Battalion who had never fired their weapons or thrown
grenades in training, and ensured that they promptly did so.1 Its combat service from 19
December 1942 was also marked by first combat experiences in very difficult attacks

1

Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen, interview with Peter Brune, June 1989, in Brune, The Spell Broken,
p.230.
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against Japanese fortifications. On 19 December, the 36th Battalion was in reserve for
the attack illustrated in Figure 8.4.
As the attack developed on 19 December, it appeared to Brigadier Porter that 49th
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Kessels) had made progress towards its objective on the
Sanananda road in an area where the enemy 41st Regiment had been suspected. Strong
resistance to the attack by Company L 3rd/126th Battalion had been encountered there on
1 December. However, by 1050, D Company 49th Battalion had reached the area just
south of Huggins, and at 1600 a patrol got through to Huggins. 2 This was a major
achievement as, from the next day, a much shorter and safer resupply route was in use
via Hutchison to Huggins.
To secure the success of the 49th Battalion, Porter ordered at separate times each of the
two companies of the 36th Battalion in brigade reserve to come under the command of
the 49th Battalion. A Company 36th Battalion (Major Douglas), moved into a position
east of the Sanananda road in the 49th Battalion‟s area. After dark, B Company 36th
Battalion, was in position west of the Sanananda road.
On 20 December, B Company 36th Battalion, attacked southwards west of the road. A
Company unsuccessfully attacked an enemy pocket at 186254 in the east corner of the
South West Sector (See Figure 9.1). Casualties were light (three killed). 3 This suggests
that these were not sustained attacks although the opposition was strong. After these
attacks, Major Hutchison‟s men of the 2/3rd Battalion were relieved, and the 49th
Battalion took over the post, renaming it Kessels after its CO. 4 Brigadier Porter decided
to bring the rest of the 36th Battalion into the attack on the enemy position that A

2

AWM 52-8-3-88-007, War Diary 49th Battalion, pdf p.106/110.

3

AWM 52-8-3-88-007, War Diary 49th Battalion, pdf p.107/110. The casualties come from James, Field
Guide 08, p. 463,Table „The 429 who fell at Huggins‟ and James‟ Roadblocks, in the Battle of the
Sanananda Track‟. The narrative is based on Appendix M „Brief history of 36 Aust Inf Bn in action in
the Sanananda and Gona areas‟, (hereafter „Appendix M Brief History‟) AWM 52 8-3-75-,War Diary 36th
Battalion, Oct-Dec 42, pdf p.74/86.
4

AWM 52-8-3-88-007, War Diary of 49th Battalion, pdf p.108/110.
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Company had confronted. He ordered Isaachsen to re-group his 36th Battalion in the
vicinity of Kessels and attack before dark that day.
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18
Hutchison/Kessels

Layout of the 36th
Battalion attack is in
black and red. Known
enemy machine gun
positions are in blue.
'SL' is the starting line.

25

18

26

Figure 9.1: The attack by the 36th
Battalion on 21 December.
The red and purple lines show the top
section of the Japanese South West
Sector redoubt as it actually was. The
largest purple shape encircles the
Killerton track junction with the
Sanananda road (gold). Each small
black circle with an arrowhead
indicates a Japanese machine gun.
5

5

The top sketch comes from AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion Oct-Dec 1942 pdf p. 66/86.
The lower map comes from AWM 52 War Of 7th Division GS Branch Jan 1943.
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However, with two companies under command of 49th Battalion and in contact with the
enemy perimeter, Isaachsen‟s regrouping could not be achieved in the time available.
The attack was delayed until 1510 the next day, 21 December. It would be the initial
combat experience of C Company and D Company.6 Because of poor battle procedure,
there had been two false starts before the attack crossed the starting line 300 metres
from the enemy („S.L.‟ on the overlay in Figure 9.1). Thus the fire plan was repeated
three times. Their intelligence on the enemy position was depicted in the lower map of
Figure 8.4 in the previous chapter, indicating that the battalion would strike the enemy
defences facing east from the north i.e. end on - a considerable advantage. The harsh
reality, as known the next month, is shown in Figure 9.1.
On the right where the enemy were not assessed as strong , D Company, with a
maximum strength of 96, came under heavy fire.7 It suffered heavy casualties including
one platoon commander, and was stopped by the fire of three machine guns. On the left,
C Company, with a maximum strength of 92, was in a „desperate‟ situation. Its
company commander was dead, the full company HQ were casualties8 and one platoon
commander was wounded. The company struggled forward in the very thick jungle
unable to see the Japanese positions. 9 Once it lost cohesion and became temporarily
leaderless, the company 2IC withdrew the remainder of C Company to a less exposed
position causing D Company to fall back in line. Battalion HQ and B Company moved
up to join them in a perimeter for the night.

6

This account comes from Brigg Ike‟s Marines, p. 78-79 and the War Diary of the 36th Battalion
„Appendix M Brief History‟and C2118 entries; and the War Diaries of the 49 th Battalion and 30th
Brigade.
7

This was its strength on arrival at Soputa. „Appendix M Brief History‟, p 2.

8

Ken Hamilton account quoted by Brune, A Bastard of a Place, p 572.

9

Brune, ibid., p 572.
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The casualties were very high, probably 20 killed and 35 wounded with seven missing10
in two companies, giving an average company casualty ratio of 32 per cent. It is
difficult to ascertain which of the two companies sustained the higher level, but it is
most likely to have been C Company as it was nearer to the strong Japanese post that
separated the attack from Kessels. In 2003, one survivor called the attack a disaster.11
The effect on C Company would be profound.
The performance of the 36th Battalion in this first attack deeply disappointed Brigadier
Porter. He reached the conclusion that it was not „fit for war‟. Porter sent to HQ 7th
Division a number of strong criticisms of the situation in the 36th Battalion. 12 His
critique will be examined in Part 3 of this Chapter.
Despite their casualties, and unlike the assault companies of the 55th/53rd Battalion on 7
December, the companies of the 36th battalion were not relieved for three days
depriving them of the opportunity for psychological recovery. 13 The unit history
described how, during this period, C Company on the left and B Company on the right
attempted to work forward by sections, strongly opposed by the enemy. Eventually they
created a salient which was enfiladed from the left and right. Night patrols were tried
but were of little use in the pitch dark and rain. On 23 December, a fighting patrol was
sent to raid a Japanese medium machine gun post, but found it had been evacuated. The
patrol found a wounded member of A Company who had lain in the vicinity since the
attack of 21 December, and was able to give detailed information. 14 Based on this, a
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James, Field Guide 08, p. 463,Table „The 429 who fell at Huggins‟ and James‟ Roadblocks, in the
Battle of the Sanananda Track‟. Similar data is found in „Appendix M „Brief History p. 74/86. There are
not more than three deaths in the 36 th Battalion on any other day of its deployment in the campaign.
However, dates of death are not always the same in the unit history by Brigg.
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Brune, ibid., p.572.
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Brigadier Porter, Memorandum to HQ 7th Divison „Fitness for war – 55/53 Aust Inf Bn and 36 Aust Inf
Bn‟‟, Appendix G, AWM52 8-2-30-009 War Diary 30th Brigade Dec 1942, dated 22 December.
13

Marshall, Men against Fire, p. 118 emphasises the importance of a recovery period to ongoing
effectiveness after difficult fighting.
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C2118 entry of 23 December AWM 52 8-3-75-,War Diary 36th Battalion, Oct-Dec 42, pdf p. 38/86 and
Appendix O, pdf p. 86/86.
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second fighting patrol found the enemy post re-occupied. Other fighting patrols also
encountered heavy machine gun fire. On 24 December, C Company stalked and
attacked a post at 0500 without success.15 These were Porter‟s „stalk and consolidate‟
tactics, and although he had decided, as discussed in the previous chapter, that they
could not work, he was still critical of the lack of results in the 36th Battalion from these
difficult operations.16
On 24 December, Porter pulled most of the 36th Battalion out to attack in a different
location on 26 December. The actions over the previous days had revealed that the
Japanese redoubt was less triangular in general shape and had a strongly defended
northern side. It was observed in the last chapter that Brigadier Porter, perhaps not
knowing about the northern side, had not attacked the eastern side of the triangle on 19
December but sent the 49th Battalion‟s attack in a north-westerly direction. Accordingly,
despite his written criticisms of the 36th Battalion‟s combat readiness, he moved it down
to attack from the east on 26 December (see Figure 9.2). Later maps show that the
enemy redoubt was comparatively shallow there and with considerable artillery and
mortar support, the Battalion achieved its objective of cutting the Sanananda road. The
36th Battalion unit history said that both C and D Companies wiped out enemy positions
and dug in on the roadside. From the 55th/53rd Battalion positions on the track to
Herwig, a composite platoon was pinned down attacking in support of the 36th
Battalion, with six killed.17 The American Company K of the 3rd/126th battalion reported
moved forward about 150 metres - in the process capturing a machine gun and a
forward trench.18 C Company lost its only remaining officer platoon commander in this
attack leaving the replacement OC, Captain F. J. Ahern, the only officer. The cost to
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Brigg, Ike‟s Marines, p. 81-85, „Appendix M Brief History‟, p. 4.
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Page 2 of Appendix I dated 24 December 42 AWM52 8-2-30-009 War Diary 30th Brigade Dec 1942.
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C2118 entry for 26 Dec in War Diary of the 55 th/53rd Battalion Sep – Dec pdf p.126/131 and App 41A
in AWM52 8-3-91-008 War Diary of 55th/53rd Battalion, pdf p.104/185. Budden, That Mob, p.85.
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Boerem Daily Journal, 26 Dec, serial 4 and serial 9. The detail of what was captured comes from
Boerem notebook, p 86.
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both companies was only three killed, 19 confirming that the opposition was light
because they struck a gap, rather than faced the usual successive lines of Japanese
bunkers. Because it was difficult to evacuate casualties, C Company was pulled back a
short distance at nightfall. Patrols tried to get through during the night to Company K
(estimated to be only 100 metres to the south) but could not penetrate the Japanese
positions.20
However, the battalion had created an exposed salient into the Japanese positions
facing Company K. The salient was headed off by Japanese positions west of the road.
Beyond them about 200 metres away, the 55th/53rd Battalion still manned its perimeter
along the track south of Herwig. A glance at Figure 9.2 suggests that the Japanese at the
apex of the South West Sector triangle were isolated on three sides but this had not
persuaded them to cede any further ground without strong resistance. The salient was
exposed to fire from them and from from Japanese positions to the north which
extended from the Killerton track junction out to Kessels and down to the south east.21
30th Brigade rightly reported to 7th Division that the attack of the 36th Battalion on 26
December was a success, but for some reason the attack is not recorded in South West
Pacific Area – First Year.
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James, Field Guide 08, p.471..
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Brigg, Ike‟s,Marines, p. 89-90 and „Appendix M Brief History‟.
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Brigg, ibid., p 87-89 and „Appendix M Brief History‟. The 30 th Brigade Message Register in AWM52
8-2-30-009 War Diary 30th Brigade Dec 1942 pdf p.116/142 corroborates the American and Australian
battalion records when reporting success to HQ 7 th Division.
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18

Kessels

25

Section of overlay of attack.
A platoon from 55th/53rd
Battalion and Company K were
to co-operate by providing
pressure on the enemy from
their
positions.
Enemy
positions are in dark blue.

Company K
3rd/126th
battalion
(US)

Kessels

According to this sketch map
on which the above overlay
was to fit, this track formed the
axis of assault for about 500 m
to the objective on the
Sanananda road. The starting
line ('SL' above) was at right
angles to this track at the arrow
head.

Figure 9.2: the attack plan of the 36th Battalion on 26 December. 22

22

The coloured base detail is from Appendix H „Map showing area of 36 Battalion attacks Reference
Gona 4 inch to 1 mile‟ in AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion pdf p. 64/86 sketched by Private J
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Next morning (27 December), Porter ordered the battalion to attack, later that day, the
enemy holding the northern shoulder of the salient about 500 metres to its right. D
Company was to remain at the head of the salient under command of Major Riley, 2IC
36th Battalion, plus the American Lieutenant Davis with a platoon of Company I of the
3rd/126th Battalion. The location of the HQ of this group was then named „Riley‟ (see
Figure 9.3). Major Riley then began discussions with Major Boerem for joint action to
eliminate the Japanese on the southern side of the salient between them.
C Company was ordered to withdraw to join the new attack. Ahern, the company
commander, discussed the withdrawal order with Isaachsen, the CO, over the phone – a
party line, on which Sergeant Carey, the acting Signals Officer, could hear all
conversation. Fearing that a daylight withdrawal would incur severe casualties, Ahern
asked for a delay until nightfall, which Isaachsen agreed to request of Porter. According
to Carey, Porter flew into a rage and ordered Isaachsen to pull them out immediately.
When Isaachsen still pressed the point, Porter directly ordered Ahern to withdraw.
The pressure of MacArthur‟s demand for continued attacks was being felt right down to
company level. It was more damaging because secondary cohesion was under strain in
this ad-hoc brigade. This was compounded by Porter who was adhering to his tactical
approach of multiple flanking thrusts to disorganise the Japanese, without understanding
the effect on morale of the survivors of pulling out of ground captured at a price in
Australian lives. Now he was overruling the CO and giving direct orders to one of the
company commanders.
C Company, under intense machine gun fire, took about four hours to extricate itself in
small groups. With considerable difficulty, Ahern got his men out a few at a time,
finally joining the battalion one hour before the planned zero hour of 1700.23 The strain
of events then hit home. The men of C Company refused to join the attack in a mutiny
discussed below, and the attack was postponed until the next morning.

Neenehan, 36 Bn I[ntelligence] Section dated 5 Jan 43. The top diagram is one of the overlays to the base
detail: „Sitmap 3 26 Dec 42 1230 hrs‟ from AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion pdf p. 63/66.
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„Appendix M Brief History‟, p. 5. pdf p. 75/86.
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The objective of the next attack on 28 December, depicted in Figure 9.3, was the
northern shoulder of the salient in the area between the battalion‟s previous two attacks
- a strongly fortified tongue of jungle which reached out east and southeast from the
Killerton track junction (See the bottom sketch in Figure 9.1). In this area the Japanese
dugouts had layers of logs on top and 44 gallon drums filled with earth and sand.24 The
axis was south-east to north-west with A Company on the right and B Company on the
left, with its flank protected by the platoon of Americans commanded by a Lieutenant
Davis (under the command of Major Riley. Figure 9.3 also shows the „ladder‟ of the
artillery lifting barrage. Zero hour on 28 December was missed and then deferred from
1130 to 1200, showing that slow battle procedure still affected battalion combat
effectiveness. Secondary group cohesion was poor.
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Brigg, Ike‟sMarines, p. 91.
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The foliage depicted in green
reflects an air photo. This
sketch is rotated to align the
north-south gridlines with the
edge of the page. The locations
of the grid lines and scales are
imprecise. The next sketch
(Figure 9.4) depicts the result.

Figure 9.3: the attack plan of the 36th Battalion on 28 December. 25
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Appendix I to AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion.
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Figure 9.4: the result of the 36th Battalion attack on 28 December. An enlargement of the area
from the start line and shows that the attack stopped at a clearing dominated by Japanese
pillboxes and machine guns.26

26

Appendix J depicting locations after the attack. AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion.
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A breakpoint had been reached quickly in two out of the three attacks by the 36th
Battalion. The first battalion attack had incurred high casualties predominantly in C
Company, but its poor execution had caused Porter to declare that the battalion was not
combat ready. The second attack by two companies had the good fortune to reach its
objective (the road) with low casualties, but C Company‟s withdrawal from the salient
thus created was difficult. The third attack by the 36th Battalion had stopped without
heavy casualties, suggesting that it had not been pressed with determination against the
heavy defences.
Mutiny: The breakdown of combat effectiveness
The mounting of three attacks over seven days by the 36th Battalion brought about a
grave collapse of any embryonic combat effectiveness. On 27 December, C Company
mutinied, and the link to casualties and lost leadership seems obvious.

Later, A

Company also mutinied, but in the other companies the men seem to have avoided
casualties by not assaulting into enemy fire. The casualty ratio in the companies of the
36th Battalion in their first attack on 21 December seem to have been concentrated in C
Company at greater than 32 percent, and it is possible that they were as high as the
casualties in the 55th/53rd Battalion which, as shown in Chapter 8, lost 43 per cent. C
Company 36th Battalion lost all its original officers and was led after 21 December by
an OC from another company.27
While these casualties would have been a considerable shock to the cohesion of the 36 th
Battalion, Porter and Isaachsen had reached the conclusion by 24 December that the
battalion was not combat ready on the basis of what they had seen in its poorly executed
first attack. Porter also greatly disadvantaged what secondary cohesion had existed in
the culture of the 36th Battalion by detaching companies and placing them under control
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either his HQ or the 49th Battalion, separating them from their battalion HQ. He also
publically overruled their CO. This meant that two companies went alone into hostile
territory in their first experience of combat. This was a considerable achievement even
though their isolated attacks incurred light casualties without pressing the attacks home.
Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen in 2003 remained critical of Porter‟s haphazard use of the
companies and placing them under the command of the unfamiliar 49th Battalion CO.28
New leaders from other companies (like Ahern) did not have time to earn the trust of
their new subordinates, or restore secondary cohesion.
Research in primary sources found that there were three refusals to obey orders in the
36th Battalion on the Sanananda road in December1942. Only two are recorded in the
war diary file of the 36th Battalion. The bland, possibly sanitised, 36th Battalion C2118
entries about the first two mutinies were date stamped August 27 1943 and personally
signed by Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen, yet a more comprehensive, frank and open
narrative by an unknown author was retained as Appendix M in the file. A third mutiny
in the 36th Battalion, found in the American archives of Major Boerem‟s detachment,
led to finding corroborative evidence in the 7th Division war diary and message logs of
HQ 30th Brigade.
The first mutiny
We have seen that by 27 December, C Company had taken part in the attack of 21
December in which it suffered a casualty ratio probably greater than 32 per cent. It
remained where it was to patrol and raid on the following three days. On 26 December
it suffered few casualties when it was an assault company in the successful battalion
attack which created the salient, but withdrew under heavy fire afterwards to join the
battalion back in the brigade area. On receiving orders for another attack in one hour, all
but five men of C Company refused to go, „claiming their nerves were in too bad a
shape as a result of their experience that day‟.29 The C2218 line refers to this merely as
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„the delay‟. The CO, Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen, spoke to the men and then went to
Brigade HQ (no doubt to speak to Brigadier Porter). The attack was deferred to the next
day with A Company ordered to take the place of C Company in the attack. On 28
December, while this attack failed to achieve useful results, C Company waited nearby
at Kessels. If Isaachsen hoped that this respite would assist C Company to recover its
fighting spirit, he must have been disappointed because, while the social cohesion
remained strong enough for collective action against taking part in the attack, the next
day‟s orders were also collectively refused indicating that task cohesion had broken
down.
The second mutiny
After holding Kessels during the attack, C Company was ordered late on 28 December
to go from Kessels to Riley to relieve D Company in the salient which had been the
place of the attack and contested withdrawal by C Company two days before. Being
ordered to return to the site of that nerve shaking experience may explain why, after the
company moved out to do the task, but only part way along the track, a large number of
the men refused to go on to carry out the relief. The C2118 entry merely states that C
Company „did not move‟.30 A Company, which had taken C Company‟s place in the
failed attack that morning, was ordered to relieve D Company at the head of the salient.
Thus, A Company had twice been ordered to substitute for C Company.
The third mutiny
Next morning (29 December), Major Riley, 2IC 36th Battalion, with the co-operation of
the US Major Boerem and a US company, wished to implement the plan first discussed
on 27 December to use the Australian company in the salient, now A Company, in a
combined attack on the Japanese positions that lay between their locations. Entries in
the original notebook and the Daily Journal of Major Boerem‟s detachment state that A
Company „refused to‟ advance.31 This refusal to attack the enemy is recorded by the US

30

C2118 entry AWM 52 8-3-75-,War Diary 36th Battalion, Oct-Dec 42, p. 44/86 and „Appendix M Brief
History‟p.6, pdf p.76/86.
31

Boerem Daily Journal, entries at 1308 and 1329 on 29 December. Boerem Notebook on same date.

318

unit, but is unrecorded in the 30th Brigade war diary C2118 pages, the 36th Battalion war
diary or the unit history. It is referenced in the war diary of 7th Division.
As noted in Chapter 2, not all log entries were noted in the C2118 pages of a war diary,
and logs were rarely retained, but on this occasion they were. Confirmation of this event
was discovered in a handwritten „Phone and Verbal‟ log kept at HQ 30th Brigade, which
records that Major Riley did inform HQ 30th Brigade that the „Show [was] off. Troops
will not go forward…‟ and that Boerem informed HQ 30th Brigade that „he [the US
troops] will go on with his part of the show‟. These log entries confirm that A Company
refused to attack, even though they were not carried into the C2118 pages.32
Furthermore, the log entries also relate that, on 29 December, Major Douglas, OC A
Company, sent a message to HQ 30th Brigade stating that artillery and mortar fire during
the previous afternoon was too close to his troops, some falling within ten yards.
Douglas provided a credible primary account which apparently gave a different and
acceptable reason for not going forward: his troops were inside the supporting barrage
meant to neutralise the Japanese. On the other hand, perhaps Major Douglas was „rewriting‟ the record to cover for his troops‟ refusal and/or his own failure in leadership.
This speculation is impossible to confirm. Certainly, in the context of C Company‟s
refusal of duty, he would be anxious to record that his men had not refused to go
forward but, rather, that they were unable to do so. While, as a company commander
within a battalion, Douglas would have no ordinary means of sending a phone or
wireless message to the brigade HQ, the various HQs were in this case on a party line. It
is logged in the „Phone and verbal log‟ that he did so and he was recorded, unusually, as
the sender in his own name, in a log where call signs and codes are normal. His version
was recorded by duty personnel at HQ 30th Brigade, who were trained to write what
they heard or read. They most likely recorded faithfully the different versions of Majors
Riley, Boerem and Douglas – three versions of one event: two adverse and one
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doubtful, and spread over different levels of Australian war diaries and the American
unit records.
This mutiny is confirmed by HQ 7th Division war diary. It notes that Vasey called
Isaachsen to HQ 30th Brigade on 29 December in respect of mutinies in C and A
companies and '…made it quite clear that there must be no recurrence of this nature'.
Thus, he held the CO accountable for future remedial action, but did not apparently
consider him responsible for the events that had occurred - perhaps because, as noted in
Chapter 4, his tenure was comparatively short. He ordered Isaachsen to secure evidence
for disciplinary action. He was less forthright, when, on 2 January 1943, he spoke to
some troops from the 36th Battalion and, while referring publically to the instances of
refusal to attack, exhorted them '…to do their utmost at the present stage of the
campaign'.33
In contrast to the record of the episodes with C Company, the lack of a record of the A
Company mutiny in the 36th Battalion war diary is possibly due the command
arrangement under which Major Riley was operating separately from the rest of his
battalion under control of HQ 30th Brigade and in command of US troops as well as one
Australian rifle company. He was killed soon after, and before the war diary was
written. It is surprising, however, that Brigadier Porter did not refer to these mutinies as
they certainly corroborate his opinion of the unreadiness of the 36th Battalion for combat
which he had recorded after its first battalion battle in his memoranda.
There also appear to be no references to mutinies in the correspondence between
Lieutenant General Herring and General Blamey. This silence may reflect a realisation
of culpability, or alternatively, for those who had experienced similar events in the First
World War, recognition of the truth that Pugsley expressed: democracies face a painful
journey when trying to match better prepared enemies.
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None of these mutinies are mentioned in either nations‟ official histories. It is very
surprising that the Australian historian, McCarthy, does not mention them.

The

American, Milner, relied on McCarthy's drafts for much of his account, and the subject
is not mentioned by Boerem (by then a Lieutenant Colonel) in their post-war
correspondence. Neither do the authors of the unit history of the 36th Battalion (the
Brigg brothers and their guiding committee) mention them. This, though
understandable, is not surprising considering the influence of the heroic mode of writing
about Australian soldiers that prevails in Australian war literature.34
Assessment of the mutinies in 36th Battalion
Mutiny is any action by two or more people to subvert or resist lawful military authority
and is considered one of the gravest of offences. In 1942, it attracted the harshest
punishments including long term imprisonment. 35 Mutiny represents the extreme of
combat ineffectiveness because it maintains the social cohesion (interpersonal bonds) of
the primary group but fractures the group‟s commitment to behave appropriately in
combat (task cohesion). Kirke has argued that this distinction in the social psychological
literature ignored the formal command and loyalty/identity social structures which
reinforce commitment to combat tasks.36 These flow predominantly from the secondary
group. Kirke‟s framework is useful to analyse how this lack of cohesion occurred, by
considering evidence about his four social structures, out of which an operating social
structure suited to close combat should be created in the primary groups.
The formal command social structure (Kirke‟s term) did not treat the men coercively
after the mutiny, but Chapter 4 provided evidence that the battalion previously had
weak leaders and thus a weak formal command structure. In May 1942, as discussed in
Chapter 4, there had been high absence without leave when the battalion was preparing
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for embarkation, and, although staff incompetence in the HQ Lines of Communication
in NSW, inconsistent leave policies and a harsh training regime imposed by the
Brigadier all contributed to the disaffection, it seems that the Major Rees from the 55th
Battalion, who was acting as CO, was held responsible for the high absence without
leave. He was re-posted on the night of embarkation and discharged on 17 September
1942. 37 He was replaced by a CO with AIF experience (Lieutenant Colonel Arnold
Brown)38 who was, according to Lieutenant General Rowell in 1975, highly critical of
the unit when he commanded it for three months (June –August). Brown may not have
fixed the defects he described to Rowell in the time he had before going back to his old
unit. Neither did Rowell take action to remedy them, either directly or through his
subordinates.
As the fourth CO since March 1942, lieutenant Colonel Cedric Isaachsen, took over in
unpropitious circumstances on 7 September. He had only 15 weeks to influence the
formal command structure by imposing his own conventions and guidelines for
behaviour before the first combat, due to the labouring duties the battalion was
undertaking. 39 Isaachsen, a combat veteran from the AIF, did not have the same
background in the NSW Militia as the battalion, having come from the Militia in South
Australia before the war, and he may have been seen as an outsider. However the unit
historians wrote that he was „[q]uiet, calm, efficient,…[and] quickly gained the respect
and admiration of the troops…‟.40 In such a short time, he was unlikely to have yet
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gained the legitimate, expert and referent bases of social power which sustained him in
command until 1945.41
Little is known about Major Douglas, the OC of A Company which mutinied, but the
formal command structure was unable to assist because it was isolated from A
Company in its first battle, when Porter placed it under command of the 49th Battalion.
The replacement OC of C Company, Captain Ahern, had proved himself in 53rd
Battalion on the Kokoda Trail. Since he had been posted into the 36th Battalion only on
4 November and served elsewhere in the battalion, he was not known to the men of C
Company. He was a replacement for the much liked pre-war OC, Captain A Powers,
whose body had not been recovered from the battlefield after the heavy casualties in the
first battalion attack. The formal command and the loyalty/identity structures obviously
were not working together to bind the battalion.
Kirke‟s loyalty/identity structure recognises that a battalion‟s reputation and tradition
can motivate the current operating group to aspire to similar performance. The 36th
Battalion had been on the order of battle since 1921 and, like all Australian battalions,
embodied the heritage of the First AIF battalion with the same number, carrying the 36 th
Battalion‟s Battle Honours and colour patches from World War I. It had carried out its
role under the trimester system in 1940/1941, so loyalty and identity should have been
satisfactory, if properly utilised.
The mutinies in the 36th Battalion are examples where the informal structure was
socially cohesive enough to persuade most of the men in two companies to disobey
orders: A Company and C Company (twice). Kirke would say that this meant that these
men did not possess cohesion with the battalion and had formed a new operating group
which disregarded the formal command and functional structures, but not the informal
structure within their platoons and companies. As we have seen, Kirke had not favoured
a distinction proposed by the Social Psychologists that cohesion could be seen as having
two parts: task cohesion in contrast to social cohesion, preferring a definition of
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cohesion which entails pursuing the military task. However, he conceded that this may
not be entirely satisfactory in a context of cohesive disobedience, 42 in this case, a
mutiny. There must have been natural leaders in the groups however, to explain the
considerable social cohesion during each mutiny.
The mystery is how any commander could have considered this battalion as even
approaching combat readiness. Obviously, Porter and Isaachsen showed in writing that
they did not. In Kirke‟s terms, they were writing about the under-developed functional
structure of bonded primary groups. The functional structure described by Kirke relates
to a combat focus, based on training and equipment for the close combat task. Porter
reported that the 36th Battalion was untrained in the tactics that primary groups must use
and had not organised its sections to carry them out.43 There is direct evidence from the
CO that these structures did not exist. A very large number had not fired sub machine
guns or thrown grenades.44
It is therefore obvious that effective operating social structures for combat did not exist
in the 36th Battalion, but this was also true of the 55th/53rd Battalion which did not
mutiny. One is left to speculate that the reason for the difference is the effectiveness of
the leaders throughout the secondary group over the long term, combined with the early
losses of the best of them, such as Captain Powers, in combat. Thus the command
structure had never provided a context for the men, who were socially cohesive enough
to mutiny, to develop primary groups with fighting spirit.
Major Joel Hamby argues that two important distinctions need to be made about the
term mutiny. 45 Firstly, it is collective, not individual, disobedience. The second is
whether it is outside combat or in combat. Much has been written about the majority of
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mutinies which have occurred in bases and demobilisation centres, but these exhibit
more of the characteristics of industrial disputes. A hybrid variety is that of fighting
units in rest areas refusing to return to the combat line. These too exhibit some of the
characteristics of industrial disputes (for example unfair overexposure to combat),46 but
may have some elements of combat mutiny. There is also literature on mutinies due to
„war weariness‟ after exposure to several campaigns.47 What is different about the 36th
Battalion events is that they occurred when the participants were in their first experience
of combat.
Hamby has specifically written on the type of mutiny that is of interest in this case study
– a collective refusal of line infantrymen who are actually engaged in combat. He has
developed a model to show the relative importance of the leadership, training and
military discipline by identifying six factors which impact upon leadership of the
primary groups and the motivation of their members. Hamby sees leadership to be the
heart of the problem because it sets the structure and actions of the primary groups. It
either focuses or dissipates the effects on them of the six factors which, if negative,
foster mutiny and, if positive, foster combat motivation or its synonyms, fighting spirit
and morale. The management by a battalion‟s leaders of these six elements is critical to
sustain the willingness of the primary groups to fight. 48
The first of these elements is alienation: The alienation of the primary group from its
leaders and the organisation (secondary group) leads to a divergence of aims. The 36th
Battalion, like the 3rd Battalion at Ioribaiwa and the 55th/53rd Battalion, was fighting
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under a brigadier who was a stranger, and a CO who was comparatively new to the
battalion – three months. But it is possible that, in the 36th Battalion, the leaders were
weaker than in the 55th/53rd Battalion (or others in the same campaign) and Isaachsen‟s
influence was muted by the dispersal of the battalion and the detachment of individual
companies to another commander on Brigadier Porter‟s orders. Hamby notes that the
loyalties of primary groups to the secondary group falter when they are isolated from
the secondary group. 49 However these members of the secondary group would have
been of much less importance to the men than the death of the OC C Company from
pre-war days, Captain A. Powers, and the death or wounding of the three platoon
commanders. These influences broke up the leadership leaving it to the survivors in the
primary groups. The breakdown of norms of conduct and discipline should not surprise
and would have been beyond the power of the little-known new OC, Captain Ahern, to
quickly repair. The mutiny in A Company occurred after twice doing the duties of C
Company after its mutinies. Nothing is recorded about motivation. The leadership factor
may have been an element: Major Douglas in A Company seems to have been
competent enough, but was he another unproven leader like Major Spring?
The second dispiriting element in Hamby‟s model is the environment: on the Sanananda
road, not only was it a combat environment with heavy casualties in hopeless attacks
against concealed enemy machine guns, but there were swamps, heavy rain, thick
foliage and many unburied dead of both sides. There had no time for familiarisation
with the area before committal to a company battle which had been particularly heavy in
casualties. The withdrawal from ground gained at the salient was under harassing
pressure from Japanese machine guns.
These events had an impact on Hamby‟s third element: values and hope. The basic need
for survival is met by the primary group. Strong primary group relationships help to
manage fear and provide the best hope of survival, but the 36th Battalion‟s primary
groups were weak. The deaths of platoon commanders removed a source of reassurance. When the company was under the command of a different HQ to that of the
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36th Battalion, the secondary group cohesion was broken. In the foliage and swamps, it
would have been easy to feel concern about lack of ability to contact the battalion from
which casualty evacuation would be organised, and supporting mortar fire could be
brought down. As a result, the orders to attack and to relieve another unit were refused –
two breakdowns of task cohesion. Yet social cohesion existed that was sufficient to
collectively refuse those orders. The changing and repeating of sites of attack on the
South West Sector would easily be interpreted as wishful and unrealistic thinking on the
part of the commanders above the company level, and seen as futile because there was
little hope of success.
There was one documented insight into motivation for the mutinies in 36th Battalion –
their „nerves were too bad‟.50 We might reasonably conclude that the battle stress of
heavy casualties, including lost leaders, followed by days of sustained skirmishing had
already thinly stretched their resilience before the four-hour withdrawal of C Company
in small groups under machine gun fire occurred on 27 December. While the other three
companies had served as long or longer, they had suffered far less casualties than C
Company. The „bad nerves‟ reflected psychological stress, suggesting that this mutiny
was a demand for a recovery period before another round of exposure to combat. The
troops had reached a breaking point for a psychological reason which they perceived to
be more important than the disciplinary or reputational consequences of mutiny, and
could not continue to perform their function. It may be thought that reaching this
breaking point so soon is unlikely, but Lord Moran recorded that it could happen,51 and
the 36th Battalion provides an example.
The men of C Company had slipped back from the lowest level of combat readiness to
not being combat ready at all, and so the CO had given them a day to recover. Late on
28 December, when they were ordered back into the salient at Riley, they had second
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thoughts after setting out to go. As this was back to the area from which they had
withdrawn under fire, it may have been too soon to overcome their fears. C Company
went back into the perimeter at Herwig on 31 December,52 which suggests that it did
eventually regain its cohesion and some effectiveness.
Training and combat experience are Hanby‟s fourth and fifth elements. Not only did
these men have no combat experience (Isaachsen and Ahern excepted) but also they had
insufficient training as Isaachsen‟s report had detailed. Without battle familiarisation
training, the effect of their own weapons frightens inexperienced troops. All these
things made the men prone to go to ground unnecessarily. 53 This breaks up primary
group cohesion as the men become individuals and, according to Hamby, the same
happens if a primary group is physically or emotionally cut off from the secondary
group.
Hamby‟s sixth and final element is discipline in combat. This is a synonym for fighting
spirit as defined in the Introduction and Major General Vasey‟s definition of this same
quality, which he called discipline and esprit de corps, was quoted in Chapter 1. He
referred to it as putting the primary group‟s interest and the task before self interest,
having no fear of being let down by leaders or fellow soldiers, and he emphasised selfconfidence in the use of one‟s own weapons and in an ability to kill the Japanese
without being killed or wounded. Both Porter and Isaachsen reported that primary
groups with such fighting spirit were not to be found in the 36th Battalion, and the
details of their written submissions to HQ 7th Division will be discussed later.
Refusals by Australians to close with the enemy had occurred in 1918. 54 While parallels
between the veterans of 1918 and the newcomers to combat in 1942 are impossible,
there are two links. One is the optimism of Porter and Vasey, coupled with their haste in
mounting attacks in response to General MacArthur‟s demands for a quick resolution of
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the campaign. In 1918 Brigadier General Elliot said that haste, bred of over optimism at
senior levels, had a very depressing effect on confidence. The second link is Porter‟s
and Vasey‟s continued belief in the possibility of success rather than recognising that
that superior Japanese fighting power meant that any attack was beyond the powers of
any Allied troops in the conditions of the Sanananda road.

Elliott declared that

repeatedly giving troops a task beyond their powers created such a sense of failure that
morale dropped and men no longer tried to accomplish the tasks given to them.55
Neither Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen nor Brigadier Porter threatened the men with the
severe disciplinary consequences possible under military law. In 1918 Elliott, like
Isaachsen in 1942, treated the men firmly but recognised that psychological exhaustion
by lack of proper training, overwork and lack of relief needed redress. Elliot too was
supported in his approach by his senior commanders, Major General Hobbs and
Lieutenant General Monash.56 Karl James has described a similar approach taken on
Bougainville in 1945 by Lieutenant General Savige, Major General Bridgeford, and
Brigadier Field.57
Both battalions of 14th Brigade, given a reasonable opportunity to develop strong
cohesion, may have been capable, but the rush into severe battle deprived them of the
chance. Mutinies were the result in the 36th Battalion, and a slow slide into
ineffectiveness was the outcome in the 55th/53rd Battalion. These declines were
comparatively rapid in contrast to the service in several campaigns of the two battalions
on Bougainville discussed by Karl James and Gavin Keating. However there are
common threads in the elements that Hamby models: leadership weakness or loss, an
appalling climate, and sense of hopelessness (if for different reasons). It is well
documented that combat imposes over time inevitable ineffectiveness and
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disintegration. 58 Above all, lack of training and familiarisation with weapons meant
that, facing an enemy with greatly superior fighting power, the demanding first combat
experiences of the 14th Brigade truncated the time it took to become ineffective.
After the failures of all attacks on the South West Sector, the HQ 7 th Division war diary
drew a conclusion that „…it is now quite obvious that further major offensive action
cannot be carried out in this area without additional troops.‟ Major General Vasey still
believed that more (and better trained) troops could be effective in the attack under the
circumstances prevailing on the Sanananda road. He was therefore allocated the 163rd
US Infantry Regiment in the first week of January, and the veteran 18thAustralian
Brigade (although its arrival was three weeks away).
When the 18th Brigade arrived on the Sanananda road, Lieutenant General Herring and
Major General Vasey had great hopes. With the undisputed combat effectiveness of its
infantry battalions and the support of the attached troop of Stuart tanks it should
speedily solve the 53 day stalemate at the South West Sector. 59 Its commander,
Brigadier Wootten certainly believed so.60
At the HQ of the South Seas Force at Giruwa, its new Commander, Major General Oda
Kensaku, who had arrived on 19 December,61 had begun to consider a local initiative to
consolidate his forces into a tighter perimeter around the base at Giruwa, by
withdrawing the units in the South West Sector and Central Sector. 62 There they would
await reinforcements. Meanwhile, it is now known that, on
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beachhead in Papua westwards to Salamaua „when the situation allows‟. The 18th Army
at Rabaul did not immediately follow up this order due to consideration of the situation
at Guadalcanal and the need to make preparations at Lae- Salamaua. Finally they issued
orders for a withdrawal between 29 January and 7-8 February.63
The 2/9th Battalion AIF compared with the 36th Battalion
Stage I of the new Divisional plan was to use the US 163rd Regiment as soon as it
arrived at Huggins to cut the Killerton track west of Huggins to prevent the Japanese
resupplying the South West Sector or escaping from it. This was accomplished by 9
January when the roadblock on the Killerton track called Rankin pre-empted Oda‟s
planned withdrawal from the South West Sector back to the coastal defences. In Stage
II, once the 18th Brigade arrived from Buna, the 163rd US Regiment was to co-operate
by offensive action in a southerly direction,64 while the 18th Brigade with tanks was to
capture the area of the South West Sector east of, and including, the Sanananda road in
a close repetition of the attacks made by the 55th /53rd and 36th Battalions in
December.65
The Intelligence staff estimated that, although the map captured at Gona had indicated
that there had been 1800 Japanese in the South West Sector defences on 20 November,
they had by now been reduced to „very approximately‟ 200 to 400 by the heavy
casualties that the Allied attacks had inflicted.66 The Commander of the 18th Brigade,
Brigadier Wootten, decided to use the 2/12th Battalion with the troop of three tanks to
attack the road from the white tree at the apex of the triangle, while 2/9th Battalion
attacked from the north east near Kessels the same enemy positions that the A and C
Companies of 36th Battalion had attacked on 21 December as shown in Figure 9.1.
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The 2/9th Battalion AIF arrived at Sanananda with high credentials for combat
effectiveness. It had been well trained in the Middle East before its first combat
experience at Tobruk. This proven battalion then returned to Australia when Japan
entered the war and was deployed as part of the 18th Brigade to Milne Bay, where it
played a leading role in the Australian counter attacks on the Japanese landings in
September. In December 1942, the brigade was moved by sea to Cape Endaiadere and
mounted a number of attacks which successfully broke the Japanese defences near
Buna. In particular, on 18 January 1943, its C Company suffered a 53 percent casualty
ratio when attacking Japanese bunkers through kunai grass. 67 It was forced to ground,
by such losses, until two tanks arrived to restore momentum to the attack. At the end of
the day, the 2/9th Battalion‟s casualty ratio was greater than 45 percent. It continued
further attacks until 22 December. In the attacks at Buna the 2/9th Battalion lost in five
days 23 officers and 351 men – 56% of total strength and about 89% of its rifle
companies (assuming them to total 400), and 89% of the officers. 68 The 2/9th Battalion
was „battered, bruised and tired after Buna but a sense of mutual pride kept them going
forward and fear of being thought to be afraid kept individuals continuing in heavy
fire‟.69
The truth of this statement is debatable because the core that may have had that attitude
was exhausted and, in principle based on the casualty ratios, must have been
approaching apathy, as argued in Chapter 1. By the time it reached the Sanananda road,
the 2/9th Battalion was not the force it had once been. It urgently needed resting and
recovery but was put back into combat. After receiving three officers and 118
reinforcements on 5 January at Soputa, with strength of seven officers and 405 men, it
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relieved the 49th Battalion on the east of the South West Sector. The war diary does not
disclose the strength in each rifle company, but it may have been an average of 70 men 75-80 at the most, of whom 30 would probably be reinforcements facing their first
combat. 70 The percentage of inexperienced men was similar to that of the 2/33 rd
Battalion at Ioribaiwa (50 per cent), but the combat exhaustion of the experienced men
was acute. They were „mentally flogged‟. 71 The leadership was under stress and the
battalion now depended on junior and inexperienced leaders.72 Their seven officers were
inadequate for 16 rifle company postings. The CO had been wounded at Buna and the
2IC had taken over the battalion.
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Huggins

Kessels

Brown
The red and purple lines show the top
section of the Japanese South West
Sector redoubt as known at the time
of the attack. The largest purple shape
encircles the Killerton track junction
with the Sanananda road (gold). Each

Herwig

small black circle with an arrowhead
indicates a Japanese machine gun.

Figure 9.5: 2/9th Battalion attack on the South West Sector from NW of Kessels.
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A and B Companies of 2/9th Battalion attacked from the area north west of Kessels in a
south easterly direction. B Company‟s western flank was protected by two platoons of
the US Company K, 3rd /163rd Battalion which had come down from Huggins for the
purpose.73 The attack was assailed by the same Japanese pillboxes that had dealt so
severely with the 36th Battalion on 21 December (Figure 9.1) and 28 December (Figure
9.4), and the 2/9th Battalion found itself among the unburied dead of the 36th with equal
lack of success in eliminating the Japanese. Its casualties were eight killed and 25
wounded74 – a very low casualty rate of about 12 per cent. The acting CO later recorded
that he went forward to encourage A Company which was led by a reinforcement
Lieutenant, which had stalled under heavy fire. The Lieutenant could not control the
company, was ignorant of fire and movement, and was soon killed.75
Analysis of the combat effectiveness of the 2/9th Battalion on the Sanananda road
The HQ 7th Division claimed that the 2/9th Battalion decided to delay its attack pending
a further reconnaissance. The 18th Brigade claimed that the 2/9th Battalion made „a
considerable advance‟.76 The unit history claims that the attack was successful but the
war diary reports that the battalion attack had reached breakpoint in the face of
interlocking arcs of fire of Japanese machine guns. A comparison of these conflicting
reports of the day‟s events with the objectives set in the orders, confirms the war diary
version and makes the other claims doubtful. The Battalion had tried hard, but even the
unit history admits that the attack‟… had not been carried through with the same élan as
previous operations‟.77 It had lost much of its fighting spirit with the effect that that the
weakened primary groups in this battalion had not followed their inexperienced leaders
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and assaulted with determination. The 2/9th Battalion had slipped from being combat
effective. Its stall level and breakpoint had been lowered through battle fatigue and the
inexperience of its leaders and many reinforcements.
While they should have come with the basic soldierly skills and some familiarity with
the procedures of sub unit tactical groupings, the 18th Brigade was severely critical of
the training of the reinforcements received in January 1943. 78 They were trained in
weapon handling but insufficiently skilled in tactics and collective training at section
level. Given that there was less than a week for training to improve the skills of the
reinforcements, and the cultural absorption needed to create bonded primary groups, the
Battalion was forced to proceed without it.
It remains a tribute to the secondary cohesion and spirit of the 2/9th Battalion that,
despite severe casualties at Buna it still went back into the line at Sanananda. Although
it did not perform there with determination, it still mounted the attack and carried on
with the 18th Brigade until 23 January.
These attacks by the battalions of the 18th Brigade were the last at the South West
Sector and were failures like the earlier ones. The superior combat effectiveness derived
from the fighting power of the Japanese, even as they planned their breakout, is the
principal reason that the 2/9th Battalion was no more successful on 12 January 1943,
assaulting over the same ground, than the 36th Battalion had been on 21 December
1942.
Brigadier Porter’s memoranda on the 36th and 55th/53rd Battalions
Chapter 8 noted that, after the failure of his renewed attacks from 19 to 22 December,
Porter addressed the performance of the 55th/53rd Battalion and the 36th Battalion in two
memoranda to HQ 7th Division two days apart in which he declared to Major General
Vasey that these battalions were „not fit for war under the present conditions‟. He
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meant that their junior leadership, primary group cohesion and fighting spirit were well
below his standard of combat readiness due to lack of training in Port Moresby. In this
respect he was right, as detailed in Chapter 4. Porter implied that there were three
segments in the battalions. The first segment consisted of some brave individuals; the
second segment consisted of men who were not confident, disciplined or trained;
thirdly, some displayed „cowardice‟. 79
It is apparent that the event which precipitated this action was the failure of the 36th
Battalion in its first attack, as Porter had not taken such action after the combat episodes
of the 55th/53rd Battalion. As discussed in Chapter 8, its primary groups had done quite
well in their first attacks, but were much weakened after that. Nevertheless, while Porter
included both battalions in his critique, he was stronger about the failure to train or
properly constitute the primary groups in the 36th Battalion. Porter recorded that the unit
was totally untrained in minor tactics and that the sections were not internally organised
for tactical tasks or formations for movement. Skills in patrolling, stalking and
consolidating were defective. 80 Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen agreed with Porter: his
battalion lacked individual skills and primary group organisation. He catalogued the
poor individual skills as inappropriate behaviour in proximity to the enemy by failing to
carry weapons at all times, noisy movement and talk. Many had never fired the
Thompson gun or a rifle grenade in training – skills which all infantrymen were
supposed to have. There had been no field firing or battle courses to provide the
training.81
Porter suggested that their previous brigade commander was responsible for the poor
training, not their present COs nor, by implication, himself.82 HQ 7th Division recorded
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Porter‟s narrative and, getting the point of his implication of the role of HQ 14th
Brigade in the lack of training, expressly identified it.

83

Possibly Porter was

constructing a narrative to avoid direct criticism of his seniors - the various generals
who had been in command at Port Moresby, as well as to exonerate the two battalion
COs. An alternative possibility is that he was genuinely anguished by the fate of the
men committed to such battles with so little training, and wished to prevent any
repetition of it. Either way, his memoranda have the overall effect of unfairly blaming
the men for their failures, and not recognising the bravery behind their futile untrained
efforts. Porter did not acknowledge the effect of casualties on soldiers in their first battle
in terms of halting any progression to combat effectiveness.
The coverage given in the Official History to the memoranda might suggest acceptance
of Porter‟s opinion, but McCarthy called them „caustic‟ and „bitterly critical‟ criticisms
of the men, pointing out that „it is doubtful if any Australian units could have suffered
the same percentage of losses in their first action and done much better‟. 84 It is
surprising that Porter appeared to have ignored this casualty factor when judging the
combat readiness of these units, as high casualty rates in a first battle must, as argued in
Chapter 1, inevitably destroy cohesion sooner than a more gradual combat experience
would.
In respect of secondary cohesion, the evidence suggests that the 36th Battalion, unlike
the 55th/53rd Battalion, was ill trained in battle procedure which is the main expression
of secondary cohesion. The 55th/53rd Battalion‟s overnight implementation of Porter‟s
plan for 7 December was a good demonstration of secondary group readiness and there
was no discernible decline of the battalion‟s manoeuvre capacity – C Company of the
55th/53rd Battalion always remaining the exception. In the 36th Battalion, the deferral of
its battalion attack until 21 December and the false starts requiring a triple repeat of the
fire plan, suggest a failure of battle procedure so that the troops were not ready on the
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start line twice when the time available was reasonable. Because of this difference in the
battle procedure competence in two battalions of the 14th Brigade, rather than blaming
their Brigadier, as Porter did, the cause of the lack of effective battle procedure was due
to lack of training and practice by the battalion‟s leadership structure, and the
responsibility of the CO - Brown and then Isaachsen, each of whom had successively
held command for about three months. In Isaachsen‟s case, the quality of the leaders in
the chain of command may have been the real problem.
The cohesion of a battalion was seen by Kirke as the product of a culture which is
initially built up in demanding training, then faces its first test in combat. As explained
in Chapter 4, the common circumstances of the battalions from Port Moresby, now part
of 30th Brigade, were that they had not had the intensive training that brings self
confident cohesion, and their first combat experiences were in severe battles. However,
there seems to have been a difference, because the 55th/53rd Battalion got through its
first battle on 7 December and its second on 19 December before the decline in
cohesion of its primary groups from their quite low starting point, but the 36th
Battalion‟s primary groups in two companies quickly lost fighting spirit after one battle
with heavy casualties; one successful one with very light casualties; and three days of
unrelieved skirmishing, which were only partly successful. Two companies then
mutinied – the ultimate loss of primary group task cohesion and fighting spirit and its
replacement by cohesive behaviour to avoid combat.
As the only common feature with the situation in 55th/53rd Battalion was poor tactical
training, as detailed in Chapter 4, there is reason to suggest that the 36th Battalion‟s
leaders, who had responsibility for its training, were of lesser quality than those of the
55th/53rd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, even though they had been in the same brigade
for some years.
Porter‟s memoranda focused on inept execution and some lack of courage, and not on
the inherent superiority of Japanese fighting power. Lack of training, he wrote, had
produced men who „lack confidence in themselves and their weapons and they lack
discipline…‟ In saying this he identified the wider value of training, not just as
supplying a set of skills, but as creating the collective „battle discipline‟ as S.L.A.
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Marshall would have called it. It assisted men to manage their fear, and enabled the unit
to act cohesively. 85 Porter did not believe the patrol reports of the 36th Battalion
reporting that they had encountered heavy fire over the three days following the
battalion attack, claiming that there had been no contact with the enemy.86 The rescue of
the wounded survivor from the evacuated Japanese post shows that Porter was wrong to
doubt the reports.
Porter‟s solution was re-training in the skills used in section and platoon attacks on
pillboxes after careful reconnaissance, preparation and planning, a policy he
implemented a few days after writing his memoranda. 87 This showed that he still
thought that attacks were feasible if troops were properly trained to discover and to stalk
individual posts, neutralise all embrasures by small arms fire, then rush them with cover
from light machine guns and grenades. Porter‟s memoranda had described the vain
efforts of leaders to do this, but the men had not responded. Thus a spiral of negative
effectiveness was evident which he hoped would be broken by training leaders in minor
tactics. However the success of tactics depended on the thoroughness of the
reconnaissance stage to find the Japanese bunkers and defiladed approaches to them.
The reconnaissance must find other enemy fire positions in mutual support, and
formulate plans to neutralise them. Nevertheless, in the hands of well trained and
determined troops, the tactics seemed to give a promise of success.
In the conditions of the Sanananda road, this promise proved to be illusory. As we saw
in Chapter 8, Porter had originally set up these stalk and consolidate tactics in the
aftermath of 7 December,88 but in his memorandum to himself on 15 December he had

85

Marshall, Men against Fire, p. 124, and p. 133.

86

„Fitness for war‟ Appendix I, p.2.

87

Appendix J dated 25 December „Instruction for special training to be carried out for attacking enemy
strongholds‟ dated 25 Dec 42, AWM52 8-2-30-009 War Diary 30th Brigade Dec 1942 pdf p.29/142.
88

Appendix C Signal to units 9 Dec 42, AWM52 8-2-30-009 War Diary 30th Brigade Dec 1942 pdf p.
15/142.

340

recognised that they were not working. 89 They had failed on 19 December. On 25
December he set up some training in a rear area. He had foreshadowed this in his first
memorandum, even though he thought any major tactical gain from it would be
fortuitous.90 It would seem that Porter either did not know about, or disregarded the
evidence for, the difficulties in locating the enemy weapon installations clearly evident
in the ten patrol reports which have survived in the records of the 55th/53rd Battalion for
the period between the two attacks, and the reports by companies of the 36th Battalion of
attacks where unseen machine guns remained a persistent problem.
When he wrote his training directive issued on 25 December 1942, he did not have a
solution that would work. The December Summary in the 30th Brigade war diary
(signed 26 January 1943) returns to his theme when it stated „our troops were not
sufficiently trained in minor tactics against a strongly entrenched enemy in any other
circumstances than behind an effective barrage‟. But there could be no effective barrage
for reasons which the document explains: mortar and artillery fire could not be directed
at the enemy posts because they were concealed. Because they had overhead cover,
generalised concentrations seldom reached the enemy in the emplacements. Even if they
had, field artillery shells and mortar bombs were too light to be effective.
In the end, the truly unattractive feature of Porter‟s memoranda is blaming the men for
the problems.91 Hamby cites General Montgomery, when commenting on a mutiny of
British veterans waiting to go into combat in 1943, saying that such situations were
nearly always the fault of some officer who had failed in his duty. 92 This point is also
made by Moran.93 In a time sequence the senior commanders in Port Moresby had been
Major General Morris, Lieutenant General Rowell, Lieutenant General Herring and
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General Blamey. The Divisional Commanders had been Major Generals Allen and
Vasey. If Brigadier Smith, the Commander 14th Brigade was a negligent trainer of men,
one of them should have dismissed him.
Finally, it is important to note that Porter‟s opinions expressed in his memoranda were
formed and in writing three days before the mutinies, and that he did not raise them as
fuller proof of the poor training of the 14th Brigade battalions he had been given. Putting
the mutinies in writing would have boosted his claims, and Porter‟s silence about them
is perplexing.
The end of the siege and the inflated Allied claims of success at the South West Sector
The Japanese had lost contact with the South West Sector on 9 January 1943, when the
US 2nd /163rd Battalion crossed through Huggins and established a roadblock on the
Killerton track nicknamed „Rankin‟, in accordance with Vasey‟s orders as explained in
the next Chapter. Although, as discussed in Chapter 7, a Japanese strategic withdrawal
had been ordered and tactical plans to evacuate the Sanananda bridgehead had been
issued, the commander of the South Seas Force, Major General Oda, was shocked to
learn that, on the night of the failed 18th Brigade attack, the Japanese commander in the
South West Sector, without authorisation, broke out to the west with 300 fit men and
headed to the Kumusi River, although only about 185 reached it. 94 Leaving behind the
starving and sick to fight to the end, he realised that starvation was the ultimate fate for
all his men. The American roadblocks had slowly been more effective than attacks. The
Japanese withdrawal was discovered on 14 January, and led to inflated claims that it had
been forced by the 18th Brigade attack on 12 January.
The defeat of that attack was reframed as a success by contrasting it with the failure of
the battalions of the 30th Brigade while the American contribution by inserting the two
roadblocks was ignored. HQ 7th Division‟s war diary entry claimed that the attack
„…succeeded in driving back the forward elements of the enemy and obtained
information about the enemy‟s main position‟. It later claimed that prior to this attack,
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troops had only gained touch with the enemy‟s foremost positions but they had now
been pushed back so that the Australians were against the main position studded with
pill boxes. 95 The 18th Brigade claimed that its activities had proved successful
particularly the soft spot tactics of the 2/9th Battalion. 96 These claims are not supported
by that unit‟s war diary. Taken in detail at the level of comparisons of grid references,
the 2/9th Battalion had not gained more ground than the 36th Battalion‟s A and C
Companies.
On 14 January Vasey personally asserted that the 30th Brigade had been unable to do
this.97 Taken as a whole these boasts demean the achievements of the battalions of 30 th
Brigade and 126th Regiment fighting under Vasey‟s command. They also stand in
contrast to the earlier pessimism in the Australian minds that little progress was being
made in clearing the South West Sector, and that the insertion of Huggins had not
forced a withdrawal. The remarks also ignore the determined resistance still being
shown by the Japanese defenders in the forward defences, who had been without food.
McCarthy, in the official history, did not make the claim made by Vasey and Wootten,
nor did Peter Brune, but McAulay claimed that the attack by the 18th Brigade had been
decisive in breaking the enemy resistance.98 Ham makes a similar claim.99This is the
fallacy that sequence proves causality.
Scepticism is warranted about the degree of American participation in the attack other
than inserting the Rankin roadblock. The ground support on 12 January, which Vasey
had ordered, was not supplied by Colonel Doe, the US regimental commander,
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according to a report prepared on the evening of 12 January by the Australian liaison
officer at Doe‟s HQ. He strongly suggested that Colonel Doe was not co-operative.100
During the attack on 12 January, only the two platoons which assisted the 2/9th Battalion
are mentioned in the file of any Australian war diary. On the other hand, the extra
support was delivered according to a post-war account by the US Army, which also
gives details of the participation of four US companies on 14 January.101
At first glance, the report of the liaison officer shows that the American claims are
incorrect. An alternative hypothesis is that the war diaries of the HQ 18th Brigade and its
units omitted the American actions because they were of little significance to them, but
this would not explain why HQ 7th Division did not record them as the 163rd Regiment
was directly responsible to it. The case that Doe did not obey the orders of his
Australian divisional commander and that the American records should be treated with
scepticism, might best be deferred until the performance of the 163rd Regiment is
discussed in the next chapter.
Conclusion
Lack of training and familiarisation with weapons meant that, facing an enemy with
greatly superior fighting power on the Sanananda road, the demanding first combat
experiences of the 36th and the 55th/53rd Battalion truncated the time it took for the
inevitable ineffectiveness and disintegration that combat imposes. The inevitability of
such disintegration was illustrated by the case study of the highly experienced and
combat effective 2/9th Battalion. It shows that mature secondary cohesion can better
endure severe combat experiences than mature primary group cohesion. The stall level
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and breakpoint of the 2/9th Battalion had been lowered through battle fatigue and the
inexperience of its leaders and many reinforcements. Proper training was a necessity
which was not achievable in less than a week. The few surviving leaders and the core of
experienced men needed an opportunity to train reinforcements and thus impart the
cultural absorption needed to create bonded primary groups. As a result, its combat
effectiveness by 12 January was similar to that of the 55th/53rd Battalion: good
secondary cohesion, but low primary group cohesion.
Chapter 10 will discuss Australian and American troops who were believed to be fully
trained and combat ready. Firstly, the performance the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment in an
attempt to sweep from Huggins roadblock to Sanananda village and beach on 19
December will be examined, and then the January attacks by the 163rd Regiment to
clear the Sanananda road where it was blocked by Japanese defences between Huggins
and the beach.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 9: Task Organisation
HQ 7th Division (Major General Vasey)
18th Brigade (Brigadier Wootten) from 12 January 1943
2/9th Battalion
2/10th Battalion
2/12th Battalion
Troop of tanks
30th Brigade (Brigadier Porter)
36th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Isaachsen) from 19 December.
49th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Kessels)
55th/53rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Lovell)
Major Boerem's detachment (elements of 1st and 3rd Battalions of 126th
Regiment).
Company K astride the road near the big white tree.
Located at 'Riley'
Major Riley (2IC 36th Battalion)
D Company 36th Battalion
One platoon of Company I, 3rd/126th Regiment

Located at 'Hutchison/Kessels, 'Herwig' and 'Brown'
Major Hutchison of 2/3rd Battalion and half a company of troops until
relieved on 20 December.
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Imperial Japanese Army in the South West Sector ('The Tsukamoto Unit')
Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto ( the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 144th
Regiment)
Remaining strength of 144th Regiment
Part of 41st Regiment (300 men cut off there when Huggins roadblock was inserted on
30 November)
Field Hospital patients
A small number of Takasago Volunteers ( Taiwanese labourers)
Total strength of the Tsukamoto Unit at the beginning of December was about 1700.
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Chapter 10: The Australian 2/7th Cavalry Regiment and the
American 1st /163rd Battalion in the area of Huggins
roadblock

The two units used as case studies in this chapter are the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment of the
Australian Imperial Force (operating on foot) and the American 1st Battalion, 163rd
Infantry Regiment. Both units were assessed as being well trained by their commanders
and therefore combat ready. Their first combat experience was on the same ground
(near Huggins‟ roadblock on the Sanananda road) against the same enemy forces
between 19 December 1942 and 22 January 1943.
The 2/7th Cavalry Regiment (hereafter the 2/7th Cavalry) was raised in 1940. The
traditional title „cavalry‟ in this case referred to a specialised unit with the roles of
reconnaissance, surveillance, and observation of enemy location and movement. It
could also carry out a pursuit or a raid.1 The unit normally operated to the front and on
the flanks of the 7th Australian Division, acting as the commander‟s „eyes and ears‟.2 It
served for four months in its reconnaissance role on active service on Cyprus under real
threat of invasion, though not in combat.3 On arrival back in Australia, parts of the unit
conducted extended operations in Queensland before it moved to Port Moresby in early
October 1942. There, the regiment‟s vehicles were removed, and a fourth squadron (D

1

Field Service Regulations, Volume II, Operations-General, 1935, p.6.

2

http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/Reconnaissance/Recce/Inf%20Div%20Recce/british_divisional_
cavalry_regiment%201939%20to%201940.htm , and the Australian War Memorial website at
http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_21889.asp.accessed 11 Feb 2011.
3

Gavin Long, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One, Army, Volume II, Greece Crete and Syria,
AWM, Canberra, 1953. p. 317.
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Squadron) was formed out of the spare vehicle personnel from across the regiment. 4
The whole regiment was retrained for nine weeks near Ilolo, at the Port Moresby end of
the Kokoda Trail, to accustom the men to jungle conditions, new weapons, and live
firing. As well as physically hardening them to operate on foot in jungle,5 this training
would have reinforced the cohesion of the primary groups. It is important to be clear
that its cavalry role had not changed in this process, and it is not correct to regard it as
infantry. Its tasks, particularly if they involved a raid, might well involve ground
combat, but it was not expected to undertake sustained close combat as an infantry
battalion was. The GOC 7th Division, Major General Vasey, after the coming battle,
would report that the 2/7th Cavalry was not as aggressive as AIF infantry battalions in
his experience had been. His expectations of the standard required will be examined in
this case study.
Because of its traditional cavalry role, the designation „regiment‟ was retained. The
regiment, numbering only about 450 men, could deploy a combat strength about half of
an Australian or US battalion. Its four companies were called „squadrons‟ (each about
54 to 60 men) and its platoons „troops‟ (each about 18 at the most). Thus A Squadron
consisted of One Troop, Two Troop and Three Troop; B Squadron consisted of Four
Troop, Five Troop and Six Troop; C of Seven Eight and Nine Troops; and D Squadron
consisted of Ten, Eleven and Twelve Troops.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the time spent in training and its non-combat active service in
the Middle East would have warranted a classification of at least B - efficient for mobile
offensive operations but not experienced. However, as part of the 7th Division, it was
classified A as at 19 July 1942 - incorrectly implying combat experience.6 Despite not

4

Coppock, First action, Chapter 6, pp. 99 and 104.

5

Coppock, ibid., Chapter 3 pages 7 - 13, 21-22. Strength estimates come from Chapter 6 p. 81.

6

Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 302, Appendix 10, „Combat Efficiency of Army units, 19 July 1942‟,
citing file National Archives of Australia 42/401/142, MP 729/6, „Operations Report for Australian
Army‟.

350

having that experience, it was certainly judged to be combat ready by HQ New Guinea
Force in Port Moresby.
The 163rd Infantry Regiment, the equivalent of an Australian brigade, was part of the
41st US Division, National Guard, which had been called out by the US Federal
Government for active duty from September 1940 and had trained the men drafted for
service to bring it up to strength. Draftee strength was about 38 per cent.7 Lieutenant
General Eichelberger, the American Corps Commander, considered the regiment to be
combat ready because the regiments of the 41st Division were well trained at primary
group level and in superb physical condition, unlike the regiments in his other division,
such as the 126th Regiment, 32nd Division. 8 The performance of that regiment, in
particular, Major Boerem‟s detachment, was examined in Chapter 8.
In a letter to General MacArthur‟s Chief of Staff, Major General Sutherland, on 18
December 1942, Eichelberger said that the 32nd Division lacked „… corporals, sergeants
and lieutenants with guts and training…‟. He added, „Marching along a road does not
train men to advance into Japanese machine guns supported by snipers in trees. The
163rd has had much finer training and I am glad it is coming.9 Eichelberger, now that he
was the American Commanding General in Papua, had concluded that courage was not
enough. „Guts‟ without training was the same as the „unskilful aggression‟ that
Brigadier Porter had observed in the battalions of the 14th Brigade which had come
under his command.10 The new regiment‟s commander, Colonel Jens A. Doe, was also

7

Annual Report of National Guard Bureau, 1941, p 29 extracted by Milner in RG 319 Entry P53
VICTORY IN PAPUA,, File „Articles, Notes, Miscellaneous, G3 Reports Dec 42 to Articles, Notes,
Miscellaneous, Box 8.
8

Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 329.

9

Letter Eichelberger to Sutherland dated 18 December 1942 in NARA RG 319 Entry P53, VICTORY IN
PAPUA, File „Victory in Papua Draft 3 [4 of 5] Chapters 14-17 to Warren letters – bulk package #1‟,
Folder „Eichelberger letters‟, Box 3.
10

D McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p.501.Eichelberger used the phrase non judgmentally,
however McCarthy claims that Porter was caustic and critical of the men themselves rather than just their
lack of training.
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highly regarded because Eichelberger wrote to Sutherland on 30 December, „Vasey is
getting a grand officer and a good regiment when he gets the 163rd.‟11
The 163rd Regiment was better trained than the 126th Regiment because the 163rd
Regiment had had about 12 weeks more training (in Australia) – a margin of 43 per cent
over the time spent in training the 126th Regiment. 12 Both regiments, as noted in
Chapter 2, had trained in the United States after 1940, but left for Australia without the
four-month remedial training period that had been mandated late in 1941. On arrival in
Seymour, Victoria in April 1942, the 163rd did 13 weeks training then it moved to
Rockhampton,13 where it completed a further 15 weeks training.14 Some of this training
was conducted by the Australian army at Toorbul Point, Queensland. The regiment had,
after arrival in Australia, received 27 to 30 weeks training which, as shown in Figure
4.1, was necessary for a brigade/regiment to achieve Classification D – efficient in a
static role, and the regiment must have had considerable latent readiness from its
experience in mobile exercises in the United States in 1940-41 which were discussed in
Chapter 2.
The battalions of the 163rd Infantry had also more time to spend on training than the
units in the Australian 14th Brigade and 30th Brigade at Port Moresby because the
Americans‟ training was not interrupted by anti-invasion roles, or base and port duties,
such as labouring, which, it was argued in Chapter 4, had led to the Australian units

11

Letter from Eichelberger to Sutherland dated 30 December 1942 in NARA RG 319 Entry P53
VICTORY IN PAPUA, File „Victory in Papua Draft 3 [4 of 5] Chapters 14-17 to Warren letters – bulk
package #1‟, Folder „Eichelberger letters‟, Box 3.
12

Milner, Victory in Papua , p. 330 citing a letter from General Eichelberger. Writing to General
MacArthur on 12 Jan 43, Eichelberger understated the training time as „four months‟. This would seem to
refer only to the period at Rockhampton after Eichelberger‟s arrival in Australia. The letter is in NARA
RG 319 Entry P53, VICTORY IN PAPUA, File „Victory in Papua Draft 3 [4 of 5] Chapters 14-17 to
Warren letters – bulk package #1‟, Box 3.
13

It was correctly assessed in terms of Figure 4.1, as Classification F (Unit training is not yet complete)
because 21 weeks would be needed to reach this level. Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 302, Appendix 10,
„Combat Efficiency of Army units, 19 July 1942‟, citing file National Archives of Australia 42/401/142,
MP 729/6, „Operations Report for Australian Army‟.
14

A summary of information in three folders in RG 407 Entry 427, 41 st Infantry Division. File 341-INF
(163) -0, History of 41st Inf Div, 163rd Inf Regt: Folder 7 1940-1943, Co. F; Folder 8 Co. A 16 Sep 40 –
Jan 45, Folder 9 Co. B 18 Sep 40 – 1945. Box 9084.
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being unready for combat. Possibly this reflected the status of American units as
destined in the plans of June-July 1942 for „offensive operations‟,15 from which the two
Australian brigades, being Militia, were, at that time, excluded.
To recapitulate the situation along the Sanananda road discussed in Chapter 7: between
the fortified Japanese perimeter called the South West Sector at the Cape Killerton track
junction there had been a 1500 metres less well defended gap to the Central Sector,16
but on 30 November, the 3rd/126th Battalion drove the Huggins roadblock into the
Japanese bivouac area in this gap 1000 metres north of the junction. Huggins was
between a road bend on the Sanananda road and a junction with a faint track leading
north towards Killerton village. Huggins had an inner and an outer perimeter 250 metres
long and 150 metres wide consisting of squad posts at about 15 metre intervals. It was
on sandy ground a little over a metre above the swamps to its east and west. The nearest
Japanese positions were concealed in the jungle about 50 metres away. 17 There were, as
usual for the Japanese, snipers in trees. By 12 December, about half of the 200 or so US
troops from the 3rd /126th Battalion in the roadblock were so debilitated that they could
do little more than hold what they had.18
The 2/7th Cavalry arrived at Huggins on 18 December 1942 to take part in the 7th
Division‟s attack on 19 December, which also involved the 30th Brigade at the South
West Sector. The events there were discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. The 1st /163rd
Battalion arrived at Huggins on 3 January 1943, when the 163rd Regiment was sent to
relieve the weakened 2/7th Cavalry. Each unit‟s first experiences of combat will be
discussed separately after the area forward of Huggins is described.

15

Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 95-96.

16

Bullard, Japanese Official History, p 216.

17

RG 407 Entry 427, 41st Infantry Division. File 341-INF(163) – 0.3, Folder „Unit History 163rd
Infantry‟, History- Unit, Morobe-Salamaua campaign, 14 Dec – 20 Jul 43, document „The Battle of
Sanananda‟ page 3, Box 9085. Hereafter called „Unit History 163 rd Infantry, part 3, The battle of
Sanananda – 163rd Inf‟.
18

Milner, p 224.
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Figure 10.1 shows the sites and places important to both the battles. Where the
Australians and the Americans gave the same places different names, for the sake of
consistency, the Australian names used in Chapter 7 are used throughout this chapter.
Figure 10.1 also shows nicknames `applied by the 163rd Regiment to the Japanese
perimeters. These too will be used to describe events in both battles even though they
were not used by Australians at the time because they had no knowledge of them.
Perimeters Q and R came about when, in response to the insertion of the Huggins
roadblock on 30 November, the Japanese 3rd/41st

Battalion (the Murase unit) was

ordered to drive out the „Australian‟ troops but failed. The 3rd/41st Battalion hastily dug
two perimeters: Q was the smaller on the east side of the road, and R was on the west in
the fork formed by the junction of the track to Killerton village and the Sanananda road.
The eastern side of Perimeter Q was more strongly held than its south. It was about 75
metres deep and stretched along the road in a north-south direction for about 120
metres.19 Perimeter R on the west of the combined area seems to have been larger but
its installations were more dispersed. There was not much depth to the positions, or
development of log covered bunkers and shelters. These perimeters, being relatively
small and without strong overhead cover, were more vulnerable to artillery and mortar
fire than the log bunkers at the South West or Central Sector. 20 No fields of fire were
cleared but the Japanese created fire lanes, not by thinning the foliage, but by setting

19

Center of Military History, United States Army, Papuan Campaign: The Buna-Sanananda Operation
(16 November 1942-23 January 1943), Washington DC, 1990. Sketch No.5, p.71. First printed by the
Historical Division, War Department, for the American Forces in Action series, 1945, obtained from
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/papuancamp/papcpn-fm.htm accessed on 25 May 2011.
20

There are three locations of this information in three separate files all incomplete. It appears to have
originated with the 163rd Inf. RG 407 Entry 427, 41st infantry Division, File 341-INF(163)-0.1, History
41st Div 163rd Inf 16 Sep 40 – Dec 45 (beyond). In folder 10, the map shown above, and Sketch 5 – a
series of beautifully drawn pencil sketches of Japanese structures. Box 9084.
File 41st Div 163rd Infantry Regt, History – unit- Morobe –Salamaua campaigns, 14 Dec 42 – 20 Jul 43.
Folder „Unit History of 163rd Infantry‟ contains a copy of the map shown above and the oval shaped
defence layout found in the next source, but here that oval perimeter has a pencil notation „Position Q‟,
which keys this unlabelled drawing to the map, and the next archival source. Box 9085.
Folder „Photos Maps Charts‟ in RG 319 Entry P53, VICTORY IN PAPUA, 32 nd Div Reports – Bulk
package #2 to Intelligence and supply – Bulk File #3. This folder contains sketches 1-4 of Japanese
structures by the same artist, the sketch map, and the same, though unlabelled, oval perimeter. Box 4
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fields of fire along fallen logs. These logs forced crawling troops hidden in the foliage
to expose themselves when they needed to cross them. Further obstacles were created
by vines and wires, and trip wires with cans gave early warning of a careless
approach.21
The more thoroughly developed defences in the Japanese Central Sector contained the
independent perimeters named by the Americans S, T, U, V and Y. (S-V and Y).
Perimeter S was the forward edge of the main Japanese defensive position blocking the
Sanananda road at a curve. Its existence was unknown to the Allies until 19 December.
By 25 December, its general line was identified through the patrolling activity of the
2/7th Cavalry.22
In Chapter 7 it has been described how, at this time, the Japanese were still defending
these perimeters, because they had received orders to hold the base for future operations
against Port Moresby. They had not yet been advised that on 12 December, strategic
defeat at Guadalcanal had forced an Imperial HQ decision to withdraw to the line
Rabaul-Lae. Furthermore, interdiction of the sea route from Rabaul by the Allied 5 th Air
Force was forcing the Japanese to cut their rice ration, and by mid January they would
be starving and without medical supplies.23

21

ibid., p.6-7.

22

AWM 52-1-5-14-038 War Diary HQ 7th Division GS Br. p 57/128.

23

Griffith, MacArthur‟s Airman, p.94.
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JAMES

27

26
HUGGINS

17

18

19

20

Figure 10.1 Map showing the Sanananda road (in yellow), perimeters of Allied units (with
names of letters A-D), and Japanese perimeters (with letters Q to Y) in the vicinity of Huggins
roadblock in January 1943. The grid is 1000 metres and the eastings align with the edge of the
page. The map is based on the Map Gona Locality (Revised) 5 December 42. The overlay
includes later knowledge of Japanese dispositions than that available at the time of the events in
this case study.24

24

RG 407 Entry 427, 41st Infantry Division, , file 341-INF (163)-0.1 History 41st Division, 163rd Inf. 16
Sep 40 – Dec 45 (beyond), Map in folder 10 Box 9084.
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The first combat operation of the 2/7th Cavalry has been described in different ways.
Major General Vasey‟s intention was to use the 2/7th Cavalry to brush aside resistance
and to seize the beach four kilometres away. The seizure and holding of the beach area
would be a coup de main dependant for success on surprise and swift movement - a
classic cavalry unit raiding mission. The war diary variously called the operation an
advance and an attack, probably because that is what eventuated. The Official History
wrongly called it a „clearing attack‟. 25 The Australian Official Historian adopted the
belief of some26 that the Australians were deceived by a cunning enemy who let them
into the Japanese perimeter and then ambushed them.27 This is not supported by the war
diary and most veteran recollections in the Coppock collection. These conflicting
narratives make it important to compile a revised account of this operation.28
Planning the battle
When planning the 7th Division‟s attack, which was intended to end the two week pause
on the Sanananda road, Major General Vasey concluded that in operations from
Huggins „[b]est results would be obtained by means of surprise (sic) and disorganisation
(sic) of the enemy‟. Vasey based his conclusion on his Intelligence staff‟s assessment
that the Japanese in the Sanananda road defences were near breaking point because they
were very short of supplies and had been pressed by infantry attacks supported by
aircraft, artillery and mortars for a month. 29 For these reasons a supreme effort to
destroy them appeared to be logical but this intelligence assessment greatly

25

McCarthy, South West Pacific – First Year, p.501.

26

Coppock, First Action, Chapter 6 page 72 a wartime diary claims this and postwar
recollections still asserted it on pages 78 and 81.
27

veterans

McCarthy, p502 and p. 503.

28

This narrative is a condensation of events described in the war diary for the dates 19 – 20 December,
and the interviews by Coppock of veterans published in transcript form on the First Action web site.
29

Annex B, Div Operation Instruction No 19, 17 Dec 42, (hereafter 7th Div OI No.19), para 1 b, AWM52
1-5-14-038, War Diary of 7th Division GS Branch, December 1942, pdf p.48/128.
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underestimated Japanese fighting power. The map captured at Gona on 8 December,
discussed in Chapter 7 (Figure 7.4), did not show any Japanese defences in the four
kilometres from Huggins to the coast, and it was specifically acknowledged as the
source of the Divisional intelligence. 30 The Americans of the 3rd/126th Battalion in
Huggins could provide no information about enemy dispositions towards Sanananda
point.31
Probably because the absence of defences marked on the captured map implied that
only the Japanese base area lay beyond the vicinity of Huggins, Vasey decided that the
2 /7th Cavalry would use Huggins as a base from which to seize and hold the beach at
Sanananda, in conjunction with a renewed attack through the South West Sector by the
reinforced 30th Brigade (the subject of the case study in Chapter 9).32 Vasey ordered the
2/7th Cavalry, with an assault force of 220 to 240 men in four squadrons, to advance
rapidly from Huggins to seize and hold Sanananda Point; avoid being delayed by small
enemy pockets; and „to effect maximum interference with, and disruption of, enemy
communications and rear installations‟.33 Once it reached the beach at Sanananda Point,
it was to be resupplied by air and to wait for the arrival of the 30th Brigade, which would
clear enemy pockets en route. Vasey had „particularly‟ discussed this plan with Herring
on 16 December34 and had visited the 2/7th Cavalry on 17 December to give it „an
indication of the types of opposition likely to be encountered‟.

35

While somewhat

cryptic, these entries in the war diary confirm that Vasey did not anticipate serious

30

Intelligence Review No. 1 (Inf[ormatio]n to 5-7 Jan), GSI/978, HQ 7Aust Div dated 7 Jan 43, found in
AWM52 8-2-18-039, War Diary of the 18th Brigade, January 1942, pdf p.111-112.
31

C2118 entry for 16 December 1942, AWM 52/2/2/8 War Diary 2/7 th Cavalry Regiment, December
1942.
32

C2118 Entries for 12 Dec 42 and for 15 Dec 42, AWM52 1-5-14-038, War Diary of 7th Division GS
Branch, December 1942, pdf p.18/128 and p. 22/128
33

Appendix B 7 Div OI No.19 para 7f and 8e, in AWM 52-1-5-14-038 War Diary 7 Div GS Br Dec 42,
page 49/128.
34

C2118 entry for 16 Dec 42, AWM52 1-5-14-038, War Diary of 7th Division GS Branch, December
1942 pdf p.23/128.
35

C2118 entry for 12 Dec 42,AWM52 1-5-14-038, War Diary of 7th Division GS Branch, December
1942, pdf p.25/128.
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opposition to the traditional cavalry operation that he ordered. In accordance with his
orders and the assumption about the light enemy opposition, Lieutenant Colonel Logan
ordered that the regiment would push through to Sanananda Point with all possible
speed brushing aside resistance along the Sanananda road.36 He planned to silently pass
his force around Perimeter R, and then move straight down the road.
Because Vasey believed that it would be the key to success, four preliminary measures
were taken to aid surprise. The first was to conceal the arrival of fresh troops. Australian
personnel gathering information wore American helmets from 16 December to avoid
alerting Japanese observers to the fact that Australian troops were coming in. 37
Secondly, their arrival was delayed to the afternoon before the operation, to avoid any
risk of the Japanese capturing a prisoner or identifying a body. The third element of
surprise was the zero hour set for the 2/7th Cavalry to move off. It was at pre-dawn 0600
compared to 0730 for the 30th Brigade attack. This would enable two things: the
regiment would have one and a half hours start in causing the disorganisation that
Vasey hoped to achieve, and, because there had been a period of American inertia, it
was hoped that the Japanese would not be alert, considering that the risk of an assault in
darkness was very low.38 The Fire Plan contained the fourth element of surprise. There
was to be only a five minute preliminary bombardment because the customary 15
minute preliminary bombardment would warn the enemy that an attack was imminent.
The route to be taken by the 2/7th Cavalry from Huggins is shown in Figure 10.2. 39
While no reason is officially recorded for choosing a route skirting so close to the edge

36

C2118 entry for 17/18 November 1942, AWM 52/2/2/8 War Diary 2/7th Cavalry Regiment, December
1942.
37

C2118 entry for 16 December 1942, AWM 52/2/2/8 War Diary 2/7th Cavalry Regiment, December
1942.
AWM 52/2/2/8 War Diary 2/7th Cavalry Regiment, December 1942. In at least one case a US helmet was
worn in the battle, (Coppock, First Action, Chapter 6, p.77).
38

Letter by Lieutenant General Herring to General Blamey dated 16 December 1942, AWM 3DRL/6643
Series 2 Papers of Field Marshal Blamey, Wallet 135/141.
39

Map 4 in Hartley, Sanananda Interlude, p.45.
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of Perimeter R only about 50 metres west of the Sanananda road, a study of the map in
Figure 10.1 suggests that it may have been an attempt to bypass Perimeter R by use, in
part, of the faint subsidiary track to Killerton village, before cutting back east onto the
Sanananda road. In this Chapter, the path made through the jungle by the passage of the
column of men of the 2/7th Cavalry moving in single file is called the „track‟. It is not to
be confused with the nearby Sanananda road, (a 2.5 metre wide corduroy road, with
deep drainage gutters along each side). This confusion is evident in the narrative in
South West Pacific First Year.
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Approximate position of
Perimeter S, about 200
metres beyond James

General centre line of Japanese
Approximate

distance

perimeters in red. Q on the east

Huggins to James: 330 metres

and R on the west of the
Sanananda road.

Figure 10.2: An enlargement of the area between Huggins and James. Drawn post-war from a
sketch map prepared by the Chaplain of the 2/7th Cavalry, as he conducted burials of the unit
dead in late January 1943. The positions of the bodies were an indicator of the routes taken by
the various Squadrons on 19 December 1942. The „established supply route to James‟ was
initiated from 23 December.40 A general centreline of the Japanese perimeters is indicated in
red, but there were some enemy posts outside these perimeters, particularly to the west and
north east.

40

Hartley, Sanananda Interlude, p.45. The original sketch map of the positions of the bodies is in AWM
52/2/2/8 War Diary 2/7th Cavalry Regiment, December 1942 as a loose leaf overlay on tracing paper.
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The Battle
At 0600 on 19 December the artillery fire fell very close in front of the leading
squadron, lifting after five minutes as the Australians moved off to the north, leaving
Huggins from its north-west corner. 41 The 2/7th Cavalry had priority for artillery and
had a Forward Observation Officer allotted, which gave it flexibility to adjust artillery
fire, 42 so that it progressively fell beyond the moving Australians onto more distant
parts of Perimeters Q and R, forcing the Japanese to take cover, and its noise helped to
conceal Australian movement. Its effect on the Australians was also frightening. One
trooper waiting to move off from Huggins, remembered the fire this way:
…it was highly debatable point as whether they were endeavouring to eliminate
us or the enemy…it was pinpoint accuracy…low over our heads [so as] not to
overshoot the targets…each shell gave a huge crack as it went overhead [and
landed] about 50 yards [metres] ahead… By the time the 5 minute barrage
stopped [lifted] I was damn near at screaming point..43
Led by A Squadron, forward Regimental Headquarters (RHQ) moved off, and was
followed successively by B Squadron, D Squadron and C Squadron in a single file some
hundreds of metres long. The head of the column passed undetected between some
Japanese positions near Huggins, then close between two Japanese positions about 200
metres out, which, based on Figure 10.2, may have been part of the northern edge of
Perimeter R.44 About 100 metres further on, A Squadron came upon a hospital, some
captured vehicles and a stores dump, where some Japanese were cooking breakfast on
the edge of the Sanananda road. The Squadron opened fire on them. This alerted the
Japanese in their nearby perimeters. The Japanese 3rd/41st Battalion in Perimeter R,

41

Hartley, Sanananda Interlude, p 12. It was their first experience of close shell fire.

42

OI Number 19, AWM 52-1-5-14-038 War Diary HQ 7th Division GS Br,. This officer and party had
the communications to communicate directly with the guns to bring fire on targets of opportunity.
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Coppock, First Action, Chapter 6 p. 82.
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This conclusion is reached by comparative analysis of the war diary, Hartley‟s account - particularly
the diagram on p 45 reproduced a figure 10.2, elements of interviews recorded by Coppock, and a close
study of the maps such as Figure 10.1.
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finding a long column of Australians along their perimeter, retaliated with heavy fire
into the forward RHQ and B Squadron. Using the order of march as it was given in the
regimental orders, the events in each squadron will now be examined separately. The
routes they took are shown in Figure 10.2.
A Squadron story
Beyond the stores dump, the leading troop of A Squadron, (Three Troop), stayed on the
left of the road and the remainder of the Squadron crossed over it in the sequence Two
Troop, Squadron HQ, then a 100 metre gap to One Troop. In this formation, urged on
by its OC, Major Strang, the squadron advanced on both sides of the road. A kunai
clearing appeared on the western side of the Sanananda road just before it swings to the
east around a swamp (see Figure 10.1 at grid reference 189268).45 This area however
was covered by the hitherto unsuspected Perimeter S, a well prepared defence position
designed to block the road and the clearing. It was held by the Japanese 41st Infantry
Regiment (less the 3rd Battalion in Perimeters Q and R), and the 15th Independent
Engineer Regiment, which had used its professional skills to design and build the
Japanese Central Sector. 46 Knowing nothing about these prepared defences, and in
accordance with the orders to brush aside what was expected to be light resistance, the
OC A Squadron (Major Strang) sent Two Troop across the clearing in front of
Perimeter S, in what was virtually a suicidal assault fully visible in low kunai. Although
he was a newcomer to his men and his excitable behaviour in action was resented, 47 all
three Troops of A Squadron followed his orders, and pressed on towards Perimeter S.
As the two scouts entered a Japanese cemetery (at 190268, though unmarked, on
Figure10.1), the hidden Japanese machine guns covering the kunai clearing from
bunkers (described in Chapter 7 – see Figure 7.3) opened fire on Two Troop at about 10
metres. The scouts and the Troop leader were killed, and, of its fourteen men, only

45

Coppock, First Action, Chapter 6 p. 86, 87, 88 and 99.

46

Bullard, p.216. and see Figure 10.1.

47

Coppock, First Action, Chapter 6, p. 91.

363

three wounded men survived in holes just behind the cemetery. 48 Major Strang himself
was killed.
In Three Troop on the left, the Troop leader and some of the 15 men were beyond the
kunai clearing and some penetrated Perimeter S, but there were only three unwounded
survivors in that Troop.49 These three unwounded survivors and the 13 wounded hid all
day in the kunai, or inside the Japanese perimeter. The right hand rear troop, One Troop,
protected by the jungle, suffered least but its Troop leader was killed. Since all the
officers in the Squadron were casualties, Sergeant Whitehouse of One Troop took
command and tried fire and movement:
…"A" Squadron was in serious trouble. Ivor's troop [ his brother was in Two
Troop] was up against two pill boxes [bunkers] & my troop [One Troop] was
trying to relieve them. We got to within 20 yds of them & we ourselves were
then taken on by two machine guns & God knows how many snipers, & so we
became pinned to the ground, my troop leader was killed & I was left with the
troop as my responsibility.50

The heavy losses had inflicted a breakpoint on the two of the Troops of A Squadron,
and this attempt by Sergeant Whitehouse to restart his stalled One Troop also reached
breakpoint. Consequently, with A Squadron at breakpoint, the regimental operation
stalled. To restart it, Lieutenant Colonel Logan ordered the two squadrons immediately
behind him – B and D Squadrons - to hook left and right respectively to outflank
whatever was holding up A Squadron in front. He was then severely wounded and died
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later whilst attempting to crawl back to the aid post at Huggins. The Adjutant (in
effective command at forward RHQ) decided to form a perimeter at the Japanese stores
dump about 100 metres beyond the northern edge of Perimeter R. The survivors of HQ
A Squadron with One Troop crossed back to it. The rest of the regiment, along the track
they had made, began to implement their COs orders by passing verbal instructions
from man to man. Such communication links often result in some confusion or missed
details, and did so on this occasion.
B Squadron Story
Behind A Squadron and RHQ, B Squadron was advancing just outside the north-west
corner of Huggins when a now alerted Japanese machine gun opened fire, and the lead
section stalled. A veteran participant recalled his first time under fire:
… we struck heavy machine gun fire and were forced to ground. There was a
log we had to jump that the Japs had a gun lined up on… We seemed to be
pinned down and Cpl Cliff Jensen… was ordered to take his section out to clear
the opposition to our left. They ran into a machine gun nest that was lined up
waiting for them to appear. Walker was killed but the others managed to pull
back. A group of us were lying together keeping as close to the ground as we
could. [Bullets passed through clothing, haversacks and helmets]…Several
others were wounded here… It was very hot lying there in the kunai with the
tropic sun beating down on us. 51

This recollection is an account of how after one section stalled, the Six Troop Commander
(Lt Shilliday) restarted fire and movement by sending forward another section
(Corporal Jensen‟s), no doubt covered by fire from other members of the Troop. They ran
into fire from an undetected machine gun and also stalled. Thus the Troop attack reached
breakpoint because of enemy interlocking machine gun arcs.
However, rather than accept that the breakpoint in Six Troop meant that a breakpoint
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of B Squadron had been reached, the OC B Squadron, Captain James, still on the track
beaten by the passage of the leading elements of the regiment, was able to resume his
squadron‟s momentum and move forward along the track up to his RHQ. He then tried
to reach A Squadron by hooking to the right. Initially blocked by another
Japanese position, the Squadron moved further to the right, found the Sanananda road
and joined up at about 1100 with the perimeter containing the forward RHQ and the
survivors of A Squadron. Captain James took command there.52 In Figure 10.1, this
place is labelled „James‟. Captain James, „in high spirits‟,53 returned along the route he
had found across the Sanananda road to the track past Perimeter R to rally soldiers
who had gone to ground, so that they would work forward to the Australian
perimeter.54
D Squadron story
The most important characteristic of the events in D Squadron was its repeated attempts
to restart stalled assaults. McCarthy‟s narrative states only that the Squadron had
„twisted about the track in day-long efforts to advance‟. 55 In fact, the Squadron
repeatedly attempted to carry out the CO‟s orders intended to restart the stalled
regimental attack by outflanking the enemy position ahead that was stopping the
regiment. Whereas the original orders were to follow the leading elements of the
regiment bypassing the Japanese Perimeter R on the west, the CO‟s orders to restart his
stalled Regiment were for D Squadron to now hook to the right. D Squadron therefore
changed direction as it left Huggins so as to bypass of Perimeter Q on the east. As it
moved off, the Squadron came under fire 20 metres outside Perimeter Q.
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Nevertheless, the Squadron seemed to have found a gap at some point in Perimeter Q,56
because it was moving through it from east to west crossing the Sanananda road in
groups to Perimeter R, when the leading section of 12 Troop encountered two machine
guns and was pinned down. Its attack had reached breakpoint with two killed and 4
wounded (perhaps a casualty rate of 100 per cent). In an effort to restart the attack and
pursue the CO‟s orders, the remainder of this Troop and the D Squadron HQ hooked to
their right and crossed the road into Perimeter R, only to encounter more machine gun
fire. The OC (Captain Cobb) ordered 10 Troop (Lieutenant Cameron), as shown on
Figure 10.2, to work further to his right to try to outflank the Japanese to his front and
there enter Perimeter Q and link up with the Squadron HQ inside the Japanese position.
Showing fighting spirit and determination, three times 10 Troop tried, got across, met
machine gun fire and withdrew. First, it went back along its track for 50 metres, fought
across into Perimeter R but was driven back with one killed and two wounded. The
second time, it tried a point closer to Huggins with the same result including one killed
and one wounded. The third time, from a position nearer Huggins, it moved towards
Perimeter Q but was probably outside its southern edge because it encountered the
pickets from 49th Battalion on the newly established eastern supply track from Soputa
via Kessels. Having realised it could do no more good, it withdrew to Huggins.
Then it was the turn of 11 Troop. About 75 metres wider to the east (along the route
subsequently established as the supply route to James – see Figure 10.2) it circled
towards Perimeter Q striving to reach the rest of the Squadron inside Perimeter R.
Some crossed to Perimeter R, encountered the same machine guns that had stopped 10
Troop, and withdrew back the way they had come, but some could get only as far as the
drain on the western side of the road. The Troop could not contact Squadron HQ (now
isolated amid the Japanese positions) and, on the fifth night, crawled out to Huggins.
The remaining men of D Squadron were trapped inside the Japanese perimeters for
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eight days, but used part of the roadside drain and a hand- dug 80 metre sap (shown on
Figure 10.2), to return to Huggins. 57
This post-war recollection by Trooper Jasch of D Squadron shows the difficulties of
passing instructions along the line of prone men between Huggins and James while
under fire:
By the time we had left Huggins the firing had started up the front. …
At the log just outside Huggins there was sporadic firing. We were crawling at
this point. The Japanese machine gun fixed line was cutting grass just above me
from the left … We waited…behind a big tree. We were firing at the Japs … I
recall this was in about the middle of the day.
Later in the afternoon I could hear [ more firing further forward - probably
because of the manoeuvres of his Squadron]. I was still behind the tree. There
was no firing at this stage [near him].
The message came back for[ Captain James] to come forward. We passed it
back by calling it out. Eventually [Captain James] came up and he said to me
“you had better come with me”. We moved to go across the track, before we got
to it, there was a machine gun fixed line of fire where the Japs were
firing. [Captain James] said: “I will go first.” As he moved off the gun opened
up… 58 [They both successfully got into James]

Trooper Jasch, coming under fire, had taken a firing position at a big tree until late
afternoon and thus lost contact with his Squadron. He apparently received no message
about the outflanking movements, and neither went back to nearby Huggins, nor
worked his way forward, but remained inactive most of the day and separated from his
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primary group. The message for men to work their way forward seems to have become
reversed by the time it reached Jasch. He passed it further back as a call for Captain
James (who was not his squadron commander) to came forward, yet, as we have seen,
Captain James was already some hundreds of metres forward of Trooper Jasch
consolidating the perimeter at James, except when he moved along the line getting men
to work forward to him there. However, when Captain James came back along the track
and found him, Jasch responded to James‟ leadership and was willing to follow Captain
James under fire to the James perimeter, which was further than the relative safety of
Huggins.
C Squadron story
The rear squadron (C), the fourth squadron to move from Huggins, under heavy
machine gun fire from the west, started along the track in the undergrowth made by the
rest of the regiment towards James. The fire became too intense so it returned to
Huggins intending a sweep wider to the right but was ordered to remain with the rear
RHQ at Huggins, probably because it was the only intact part of the Regiment available
to the 21C administering command.
The immediate aftermath of the battle of 19 December
The battle was over. Despite the remarkable acts of courage, the operation was a failure
principally because the captured map had given no indication of the defences at
Perimeter S. That night, beyond James, the remnants of A Squadron in the kunai and
Perimeter S withdrew with their casualties into James. Members of other squadrons
moved forward along the track to James or back into Huggins. All told, about 100
survivors of various squadrons reached the James perimeter, including 13 wounded of
which eight were stretcher cases.59
Casualties had been 40 killed in action and 33 wounded. This was a casualty rate of 41
per cent to 45 per cent of the regiment‟s three squadrons engaged, with casualties
heavily concentrated in A Squadron which had 17 killed in action and at least 13
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wounded.60 This was more than 50 per cent of that squadron. The evidence is that the
measures to achieve surprise at zero hour worked to confuse the Japanese. The Japanese
response only began about 0730 when the leading element (A Squadron) had passed
through the northern fringes of Perimeter R, and had begun firing. The squadron got
that far because of a weak point in the Japanese defended area at its southern end
nearest Huggins, which the Japanese subsequently reinforced with machine guns.61 The
casualties were almost certainly contained by the deception plan and the achievement of
surprise, and, although they caused the regimental operation to stall, they were not at a
high enough level to prevent repeated Australian attempts to restart the regimental
operation and engage the Japanese while consolidating the James perimeter.
Next day, 20 December, was spent consolidating James. That evening, despite initial
orders from HQ 7th Division to withdraw to Huggins,

Captain James made a

submission by radio which persuaded Major General Vasey to agree to move the rest of
the regiment forward to him.62 However, the men could not be made available until a
replacement garrison was inserted into Huggins and the worn- out Americans from the
3rd /126th Battalion were replaced. HQ 21st Brigade (Brigadier Dougherty) and the 39th
Battalion relieved the Americans on 22 December, and Dougherty took command of the
Huggins- James area and its supply route via Kessels on 22 December.
On 23 December, Lieutenant Hordern at Huggins took command of a 107 man force
made up of two Troops of D Squadron and the complete C Squadron. This ad-hoc force
then demonstrated that, despite the events of the battle, the 2/7th Cavalry still had the
fighting spirit to again try to by-pass the Japanese positions – this time on the eastern
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side of Perimeter Q63 – and reach James. Once again determined leaders and substitutes
for leaders, made the operation a success. Navigating by dead reckoning, Hordern‟s
party set out to make a new track to James from the south east, through what came to be
called Moore (see Figure 10.1 map square 1826). Troop sized posts along it were
established by dropping off Troops of C Squadron as the advance proceeded. The party
was led by Trooper Pearlman of D Squadron, a replacement leader of a section. The
section was nervous, but he imposed his will and strengthened their cohesion by
encouraging them to focus on the task with the statement „we have to try‟ to get though
to James. Despite their fears, which cohesion helped them overcome, they led the force,
sighted and avoided Japanese defences, and established the route as Pearlman recalled:
I am point man in my section and mostly our section is point. It is a dangerous
job, exciting, as one can run into anything at any time… All one’s resources and
energy is required, the strain of looking into every tree, every tree hole and bit of
jungle are a nerve strain. Apart from myself there is no-one who can do point
work. I asked Jack Hopping and he refused. [The troop leader] asked me not to
go point, as he is afraid of losing another section leader, but I can’t do anything
else and I know that I am good at it and with luck and (with) the little bit of
intuition I seem to have, may yet keep my troop from getting shot up…[The
troop leader]has persistently put my section in front… My boys are bucking a
bit, and I don’t really blame them… Poor Jack Hopping had thought his last
moments had come. 64
As the result of this bold action by Hordern‟s group, by 25 December the 2/7th Cavalry
at James consisted of 19 officers and 205 men, and the wounded had been evacuated. In
its first days of combat, the 2/7th Cavalry had demonstrated combat readiness for action
in very daunting circumstances of superior enemy fighting power, because it had
continued to manoeuvre and fight despite leadership losses.
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Brigadier Dougherty ordered continued aggressive patrol action from the enlarged
James roadblock. Other episodes that followed demonstrated how combat readiness can
grow towards combat effectiveness.
Growth in combat effectiveness
Patrolling was the primary role for which cavalry regiments had been trained. From the
morning of 21 December, men from both Huggins and James had begun to patrol by
day and night to locate the enemy in Perimeters Q, R and S, and find routes to link the
two Australian perimeters.65 On 22 December a patrol from James went right up to
Perimeter S and identified its eastern edge where it touched the Sanananda road. This
same day, a patrol from Huggins found that the old supply track from the west had now
been cut by Japanese in defences with fire lanes. These defences were both raided and
shelled. Other patrols found that the east side of the area was clear of Japanese defences,
although they met an enemy patrol in the area on 24 December.
The professionalism of this patrolling can be illustrated by the details of patrols on
Christmas

Eve

and

Christmas

Day.

66

On

Christmas

Eve

night

three

reconnaissance/fighting patrols were organised to confirm the details of earlier
patrolling. With reference to figure 10.1, Patrol A was to go to 190268 (the southern
edge of Perimeter S) at 2400, patrol B was to go to the edge of Perimeter R at 186267
at 0200, patrol C was to go at 2400 to 188269 which was on the subsidiary track to
Killerton village just west by north of James. They found that from 188267 to 190268
the Sanananda road curved from north east to south east for a considerable distance
before it resumed a north easterly route to Sanananda Point. It was at this curve that the
Japanese had constructed their fortifications called Perimeter S shown in Figure 10.1.
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Thus by 25 December, Perimeters S and U were detailed for the first time on the 7 th
Division map,67 and the information was distributed on 7 January 1943.68
A participant in Patrol A recalled post-war that the moon was just past full, so visibility
in kunai clearings was good. Patrol A found the Japanese store dump on the first bend
of the Sanananda road which had been set on fire and destroyed by Allied mortar fire on
21 December.69 The position of the Japanese cemetery was identified 30 metres north of
and parallel to the road at 189268. This was the point reached by the scouts of Two
Troop of A Squadron when the machine guns pinned them down on 19 December.70

Among the men, combat effectiveness was now apparent. Despite the misgivings about
its usefulness 71 there is no record of not patrolling and attacking as demanded. A
lieutenant volunteered to lead a composite group on a raid on 20 December. 72
Reconnaissance patrols were conducted every night from James. Even so patrols were
very frightening „wandering about in the dark on a compass bearing‟. 73 The experience
of combat soon honed skills and aggressive instincts. Another veteran recalled
…we had become cunning animals with our hearing, eyesight and sense of smell
developed to an unbelievable degree. Sometimes they would get one of our men,
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but they paid a terrible price. The jungle cover was working for us now as we
went after them with successful patrols… 74
In pursuit of the commanders‟ aggressive demands, patrolling led to raids, but it became
clear that they would not work without disproportionate casualties. 75 This became
evident when, on 29 December, Lieutenant Capp led the 19 men of his Troop in a raid
at first light against a position on the northernmost edge of Perimeter Q which
threatened the James-Huggins supply track. The silent assault in extended line crossed
the Japanese trip wires, but this alerted the Japanese defenders, who killed five and
wounded four, one of whom was Trooper Jasch (the man who Captain James had
needed to encourage on 19 December). Even after losing 47 per cent of his force, Capp
had believed he could succeed next day with the whole squadron, commanded by
Hordern. However, in the second attack, seven were killed and nine wounded so
Hordern called it off. Although these two raids had nothing to do with Porter, they were
an example of his stalk and consolidate tactics and show how hard they were to
implement without disproportionate casualties, and the high risk of failure.
These aggressive attacks against Perimeter Q led by Lieutenant Capp and his squadron
commander, Lieutenant Hordern, on 29 – 30 December were resolutely carried out even
though the men doubted their usefulness and the extraordinarily high casualty rate the
previous day had reached, on a theoretical basis, the point at which the squadron might
well have moved into apathy. Hordern realised that the cost was too high and cut the
second raid short. 76 The fighting spirit displayed is evident in the primary group
cohesion, determination by Capp and the troopers, the use of shock action, fire and
movement, and also devotion to rescuing the wounded at the cost of life, and ultimately,
failure. It is evidence of the „willingness if necessary to die‟ that van Creveld called the
essence of fighting spirit and therefore of combat effectiveness. Even after the relief by
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the Americans had been announced, a patrol by Lieutenant Hurst discovered position U
(see Figure 10.1) and an ambush party still acted aggressively.77
The 2/7th Cavalry in James was relieved on 3 January by 1st/163rd US Infantry Battalion,
which is the next subject in this case study. This relief after two weeks is in contrast to
the much longer exposure of Major Boerem‟s detachment and the 55th/53rd Battalion at
the South West Sector, and it is not possible to tell whether the fighting spirit so evident
in the 2/7th Cavalry could have been sustained for a longer period, during which almost
universal infection with malaria would have begun to erode the force.
Analysis
As noted earlier, McCarthy, the author of the Australian official history, misconstrues
the operation conducted by 2/7th Cavalry from 19 December, both in terms of its
intention and the Japanese reaction. The most persuasive evidence that the official
history is misleading about the intention of the operation is Lieutenant Colonel Logan‟s
plan: it accurately interpreted the task Vasey had given him. The route selected by
Logan (shown in Figure 10.2) avoided the Japanese Perimeter R. This would be a
nonsensical plan had the operation been intended, as McCarthy claimed, to clear the
enemy from Perimeters Q and R. Had the existence of Perimeter S been known to him,
Logan probably would have tried to skirt it too. The actions of A Squadron were
consistent with the orders to brush aside resistance, although the result was a disaster for
the Squadron when it charged Perimeter S.
McCarthy‟s misunderstanding enabled him to suggest that an attack which penetrated
450 metres into the Japanese positions was a superior achievement to any on the
Sanananda road before it. There are a number of reasons as to why this is not valid: the
Japanese were in Perimeters (Q and R) which the regiment was attempting to bypass,
not in a linear position which it had penetrated; quick attacks made by A Squadron
against the unexpected Perimeter S fortifications resulted in similar casualties to those
incurred by the Allies at the South West Sector; and the distance gained is an irrelevant
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measure of success if the enemy does not also fall back. In reality, the coup de main had
been defeated, resulting in another roadblock – an envelopment tactic which had not
been intended by Vasey and which both he and Brigadier Porter had criticised when it
was used by the Americans.
Dudley McCarthy described dashing leaders who sacrificed themselves and men who
struggled to save their wounded cobbers. He quoted from the unit history by Hartley,
more elegiac than heroic in tone, to bolster this style of narrative. While the essence of it
is true, the effect is to conceal the fact that this mission was a failure by emphasising the
bravery and determination of those young Australian fighting men in their first battle.
He had done this for the Catterns „epic‟ and some activities in the 2/7th Cavalry, like the
raid by Lieutenant Capp were similar, but this heroic style exalts the concept of fighting
spirit to the point of ignoring casualty rates which demonstrate the superior enemy
fighting power. The Whitehouse letter, already quoted, illustrates how fire and
movement is impossible against machine guns at close range, sometimes as little as
about 10 metres.78 Restarting a stalled attack by fire and movement could only occur if
there were not too many casualties and some defiladed space to manoeuvre, which
seems to have been the case in B and D Squadrons.
Major General Vasey was disappointed. The 2/7th Cavalry had been classified as well
trained enough to be combat ready before it arrived at Huggins on 18 December 1942,
yet General Vasey reported that, because this was its first combat experience, the 2/7 th
Cavalry did not possess the same combat effectiveness as AIF infantry battalions. The
principal difference was that it had not shown „that aggressiveness necessary for
successful action‟. 79 Perhaps he thought the casualty rate was on the low side. His
remark could be read as blaming the soldiers for the failure of the plan, but perhaps he
was recognising that a first combat experience lacked that „aggressiveness‟ which is
learnt by experience as a unit moves from that first combat experience to combat
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effectiveness, as had happened in other AIF units. If so, he was reflecting the distinction
made in Chapter One between combat readiness and combat effectiveness.
Alternatively, it could be argued that this was an initial view which he had formed
before he had a chance to see the formidable Japanese positions (in January).
The combat readiness of the 2/7th Cavalry was much higher than Vasey conceded. The
behaviour of the various squadrons shows that the 2/7th Cavalry‟s secondary group
cohesion was strong. Despite Lieutenant Colonel Logan‟s death, his orders were
followed. Captain James immediately assumed command forward in the James
perimeter, and Major Wilson assumed command of the regiment by radio during the
battle. Others took over leadership roles below that level. In Kirke‟s terms, the formal
command structure was strong, and had the resilience to withstand the casualties within
it. This is surprising because much of the unit had entered the operation under
unfamiliar leaders. Kirke‟s loyalty/identity structure (the importance of which was
described in Chapter 1) was evident here, in cohesive synergy to strengthen the formal
command structure where it was weakened by unfamiliar new leaders. The operating
structure was thus intact and continued to support aggressive fire and movement until
enemy resistance made the formation of the James perimeter necessary. This itself was
an aggressive act, which is why Vasey was initially hesitant to approve it.
A negative aspect of Kirke‟s loyalty/identity structure was that outsiders like the
replacement CO, Lieutenant Colonel Moses, were not made welcome once he arrived
on 27 December.80 He recorded that he „felt like an intruder in a family circle‟.81
However, in accordance with Kirke‟s theory, the men acted within the formal command
structure as, despite these feelings, they obeyed his orders for aggressive action.82 Until
he could earn the men‟s trust, and be appropriately incorporated into the informal
structure, the new CO depended on the formal command structure and only partially on
the loyalty/identity structure.
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The regiment had shown that its primary groups could endure the high stress of
casualties, its Squadrons could manoeuvre under fire, and its Troops re-organise to
restart stalled assaults. In the 2/7th Cavalry‟s operation on 19 December, the casualty
rate was 41 per cent to 45 per cent of the regiment‟s three fighting squadrons engaged,
but heavily concentrated in A Squadron, where it was more than 50 per cent, because A
Squadron accepted the orders of its unpopular OC (Strang) and made a suicidal assault
that was broken by hidden machine guns in Perimeter S. Trapped in the kunai grass and
with all officers dead, attempts to regroup were still made by leaders like Sergeant
Whitehouse. Determination was shown by B Squadron first trying to outflank to the left,
then crossing the road and rallying in the Australian perimeter at James. The aggressive
actions of D Squadron, despite its casualty rate being just above 30 per cent, caused
confusion once inside the single line of enemy machine gun posts which made up
Japanese Perimeters R and then Q. D Squadron‟s four attempts to penetrate Perimeters
Q then R are very impressive examples of determination and fighting spirit considering
that D Squadron was an ad hoc group of men drawn from across the regiment when the
vehicles they drove were withdrawn in Port Moresby, 83 and who had limited training
with their newly-formed Troops and Squadron. But they still fought very effectively,
constantly restarting stalled attacks in a determined effort to comply with orders. This
kept casualties tolerable, possibly because of the confusion. Finally they reached
breakpoint with many men trapped inside the Japanese perimeters for days.
However, primary group cohesion was not a uniform sentiment in every member of a
group, but an aggregate characteristic, as discussed in Chapter 1. It should not be
assumed that every man was equally aggressive. One trooper self inflicted a wound
before the attack began to avoid participating. 84 However, strong leadership could
restore cohesive behaviours. This is illustrated by a post-war reminiscence by two junior
officers who were glad that Logan was not at James as he would have made them push
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on towards Perimeter S and lose more men.85 They were recognising that the CO would
have provided the leadership to restart the advance to the beach thus restoring the
regiment‟s secondary cohesion and pursuit of the mission. They and their men would
have managed their fear and followed him despite the risk of repeating the losses that A
Squadron had suffered, but their post-war view was one of gratitude that this had not be
asked of them.
Sometimes individuals lost contact with their Troop and legitimately moved back to the
area of the start line at Huggins. 86 Others such as Trooper Jasch became, at least
temporarily, inactive. The leadership by Captain James restored Jasch‟s self-confidence,
because his narrative continued:
I was picked to go out on patrol with Toby Baker. We went out that night
patrolling to find out where the Japs were. We were out one hour and found out
where they were. It was pitch black; we walked in a crouched position. You
would walk for about 10 feet and you would be sopping wet with nervous
perspiration.87

It is evident that primary group cohesion is created by leadership and maintained by
substitutes emerging for casualties among leaders. Sgt Whitehouse in A Squadron is an
example. Trooper Pearlman of D Squadron, (not even an NCO, and disgruntled at not
getting the two stripes that he considered he deserved)88, was able to impose his will on
his nervous section and lead the Hordern force into James. Pearlman demonstrated not
just pride in his own capacity to take the strain, but also his concern for the feelings, and
a tolerance of the variability of the men he had to handle. He demonstrated the
persuasive power of a natural leader to create cohesion. His men then displayed
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cohesion as they did the tasks he demanded, despite their reluctance and fear. Leaders
at the officer levels like James, Capp and Hordern were also prominent in the cohesive
behaviour of the regiment. Not all men are as brave but most will follow such men.
Brave leadership such as that shown by Captain James is needed, rather than
demonstrations of individual valour. The activities of Captain James and Trooper
Pearlman are examples of not only individual bravery but also what SLA Marshall
described as „concentric leadership‟, meaning its focus was inwards on the group of
followers to provide them with an organisation and plan. Individuals sometimes
„unravelled‟ but could be calmed by good leaders.89

The American 1st/163rd Battalion – the attacks from 5 January to 21 January.
As Stage I of the 7th Division attack, planned for January 1943, to destroy the Japanese
forces in the Sanananda base along the coast, the 163rd Infantry Regiment had three
tasks. Firstly, it was to relieve the 2/7th Cavalry around Huggins and James on 2 January
1943. It was then to clear the Japanese perimeters between Huggins and James. 90
Thirdly, by nightfall on 9 January, it was to cut the Japanese line of communication and
possible escape route between the Japanese base and the South West Sector, by placing
a battalion astride the Killerton track west of Huggins. (This was successfully achieved
by the establishment of „Rankin‟ (Figure 10.1) by the 2nd / 163rd Battalion.) Stage II of
the divisional attack was to use the 18th Brigade to reduce the South West Sector on 12
January (some aspects of which were discussed in Chapter 9). In Stage III, the 18th
Brigade was to advance along the Killerton track to the coast, and the 163rd Regiment
was to continue the attack by advancing northward along the axis of the Sanananda road
and prevent the enemy retreating or escaping in a westerly direction.
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This case study is concerned with the combat readiness of the 1st/163rd Battalion in the
operations to clear the Japanese between Huggins and James, and then to clear the road
to the beach at Sanananda, attacking the Japanese where necessary.
The HQ 1st /163rd Battalion, Company B and two platoons of (Heavy Weapons)
Company D relieved the Australian troops at Huggins. Company C and the other
platoon of Company D relieved the 2/7th Australian Cavalry in James. To the American
battalion‟s six 81 mm mortars and four medium machine guns, the regiment added
some 81 mm mortars and two 37 mm guns. These direct fire guns had armour-piercing
rounds for use against bunkers, canister rounds for use against attacking enemy troops,
and high explosive rounds. Company A garrisoned Moore and the other security posts
on the supply track to James via Huggins and Kessels (replacing the Australian 49th
Battalion in that role). The strengths of the American companies were Company A, 172;
Company B, 181; Company C, 185; and Company D, 172. 91 This was a numerically
much stronger and more heavily armed force than the Australians it relieved. Whereas
the squadrons of 2/7th Cavalry had started with a strength of barely 65 men strong, each
of the nine American rifle platoons was closer to 50 strong, so that an American
company could assault with about 145 men, more than twice the size of an Australian
squadron.
The end of operations at Buna on 3 January released more Australian artillery, which
was brought well forward along the coast into range of the operations on the Sanananda
road. It included a troop of four 4.5-inch howitzers (of special value in destroying
bunkers) and an additional battery of 25 pounder field guns. 92 Australian Forward
Observation Officers accompanied American commanders on the ground, and air
Observation Posts were widely used. However, the line of fire from the direction of
Buna was, at times, towards infantry near the Sanananda road advancing east or north
east, requiring greater safety distances with corresponding longer exposure of men to
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Japanese ground fire, which imposed some limitations on the envelopment tactics
favoured by the US Army.
Initial operations
On 5 January 1943, a 40-man rifle platoon from Company B attacked known Japanese
pillboxes 40 metres from the perimeter of Huggins on the western side of the road at the
edge of Perimeter R. It was stopped by crossfire from two other previously unseen
machine guns with one man killed in action. 93 This attack was a repetition of the
difficulties of attacking machine gun posts but the single death in action suggests that
that Company B lacked the fighting spirit to press the attack. The 2004 account by
Martin Kidston gives graphic detail, including veterans‟ names, and reports two
platoons as being stopped by four machine guns and casualties of 8 men dead and 3
wounded.94 These two versions of events cannot be reconciled and the wartime version
is preferred because it is contemporary.
The unit continued to patrol against the same pillbox, but the information reported by
American patrolling is so precisely detailed that it arouses some doubt. If the reports are
true, then the 1st/163rd Battalion was very proficient in patrolling. One patrol reported
twenty Japanese moving and two mounds, apparently dumps, in the rear of the pillbox.
Two armed Japanese guards and five carriers moved to the pillbox. Working parties
were heard nearby and there were eight Japanese snipers seen in trees around the
pillbox, but these apparently did not see the American patrols. 95 Other patrols
discovered that there were two Japanese Perimeters Q and R, 96 although this was
already known to the Australians. Looking forward briefly on this theme, on 12 January
detailed patrolling was recorded, but expressing locations by eight figure grid references
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is not credible. This is because in each half of a grid reference, the first two digits
position the user within 1000 metres square (on the map‟s printed grid), the next digit
within a 100 metre square, and the fourth digit (when used), within an area 10 metres
square. Positioning oneself so precisely was unlikely in such country. Another cause for
scepticism is the highly accurate recording of Japanese dead and wounded in both the
unit diary and the journal, yet the enemy dead lay in areas where they could not safely
have been observed and counted.97 Moreover, these patrol reports are inconsistent with
the events in the subsequent attack when unseen machine guns commenced firing after
the assault had gone only a few metres.
The battalion attacks by companies
Colonel Doe ordered the 1st /163rd Battalion to reduce Perimeters Q and R on 8 January,
and then advance through James to contact the presumed Japanese main position (the
Central Sector) indicated on Figure 10.1 by the curved line running from position S to
U. The 163rd Regiment was a recipient of the Intelligence Review of HQ 7th Division
dated 7 January 1943, which, at Appendix A, showed this curved line and described it
as containing the enemy‟s main strength. However the Review described the Perimeters
Q and R as „pockets‟ with an estimated strength of 100 men, which seems at odds with
the inability of the 2/7th Cavalry to subdue them. It did stress that these estimates were
very approximate.98
The CO of the 1st/163rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harold M. Lindstrom) wished
Company B to again attack Perimeter R, not where the platoon attack of Company B
had failed on 5 January, but from the west. However, due to difficulties with angles of
artillery fire from the troop of guns from the south east, it again attacked from the south
i.e. from Huggins.99 Company C was to attack converging on Perimeter Q on an axis
from north east to south west from between James and Moore, probably near where the
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Lieutenants Capp and Hordern of the 2/7th Cavalry had raided Perimeter Q. As noted in
earlier chapters, this plan to attack from two directions reflected a general American
tactical preference for envelopment manoeuvre in preference to a concentrated assault
by several companies in depth, which was the most common Australian practice for
battalion attacks.
After the usual fifteen minute artillery preparation by the guns, but supported by large
volumes of their own mortar and machine gun fire, Company B gained only about 20
metres before it was caught in heavy Japanese cross fire, stalled then reached
breakpoint. The previous American platoon attack, and the allegedly careful patrolling,
had not yielded results in avoiding the interlocking arcs of machine gun fire. The
historian, Martin Kidston, has claimed that the battle stopped with seven killed and 10
wounded.

100

However, the official casualty sheet shows one killed and three

wounded,101 and the unit diary agrees with that. 102 So did the historian of Company B,
who recorded that casualties „had not been too high‟.103 Kidston may have been relying
on recollections of veterans which cannot be substantiated in contemporary records.
The attack by Company C, and a mistimed the artillery barrage, led to the assault from
the north east stopping in flooded swamp under enemy fire. When Lieutenant Colonel
Lindstrom ordered another attack, the Company Commander refused because of the
risks. First Lieutenant Harold R. Fisk was killed, and Kidston claimed that seven others
were killed and 13 wounded. 104 Again, the casualty figures are not supported by the
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wartime records, except for the death of Lieutenant Fisk. Kidston‟s work is shown again
to be unreliable.
The regimental HQ blamed the set-back to Company B on the angle of fire from the
troop of Australian artillery, forcing the use of a frontal attack. 105 This was not
reasonable as the safety requirements of the line of fire of the guns were well known:
the fragments fly in a fan-shape forward of the point of impact of the shell. Thus
artillery fire is safest to attacking troops when shells come directly overhead from guns
behind them, so that they can move close to the targeted point of impact, but shells
coming from guns forward of a flank will require larger safety margins. The 2/7th
Cavalry veteran‟s narrative, given earlier, shows that the Australian artillery was adept
at this. Blaming the Australian artillery also suggests that the HQ was not correctly
using the Artillery Forward Observation Officer as an advisor during planning. The
training of the HQ may have been deficient.
Doe also criticised the Australian artillery fire in 1951, claiming that the shells merely
exploded under the ground surface; the criticism was unwarranted because delaying
fuses were needed if bunkers were to be destroyed. 106 As a general observation, the
combat experienced Australian artillery fire support was likely to have been as
proficient as it was for the 2/7th Cavalry, despite Doe‟s criticism. The problems facing
the artillery here were no different to those anywhere else in the sector – there was little
chance of scoring a hit on a bunker, and if a round landed on or close to a bunker, a
delaying fuse was the more destructive because it might penetrate the roof before
exploding or similarly destroy the walls. The problem was that artillery fire from field
guns, while it might keep the enemy below ground, could not suppress machine guns
firing from the protection of bunkers.
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The day‟s casualties for the whole 1st/163rd Battalion should be accepted as one killed
and three wounded, in accordance with the wartime records. It seems that the attacks by
Company B and Company C met the same fate as other frontal attacks on machine gun
posts since 21 November. They stalled because the men were pinned down and their
leaders could not move to restart the assault, so that the unit‟s „fine training‟ was of no
avail in this situation where the enemy fighting power was so strong. The Company B
historian‟s informal account quoted above is a good description of the inevitable
breakdown of primary group cohesion in such conditions. He wrote:
It was here that we learned a lesson the hard way. The Nips showed us the value
of a machine gun in a defensive position in the jungles. The fire of their
automatic weapons pinned us down while tree snipers went to work. It was a
really tough position to be in.…The officers and non-commissioned officers
found that it was utterly impossible to keep control of their men, so men carried
on using their own initiative.…many of our men fell and still the pillbox was not
taken [and] …we might lose too many men trying to knock out the stronghold.
We decided to return to our perimeter… [which was] another difficult task.107
However, some opportunities soon arose to learn better combat skills when the Japanese
began to thin out Perimeters Q and R to consolidate their line at Perimeter S. Possibly,
this was a response to the 1st /163rd Battalion attacks on 8 January, even though these
had been defeated, but another possible reason may be that, as post-war records show,
the Japanese were not supplied with any food in the period 8-12 January and were
planning a consolidation into the Central Sector anyway.
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As part of this

consolidation, on 10 January, the Japanese abandoned Perimeter Q which was promptly
occupied from the James resupply track by a platoon of Company A. A particularly
gruesome discovery in Perimeter Q was the evidence that starvation had led the
Japanese to cannibalism of the body of Lieutenant Fisk from Company C, killed in the
attack of 8 January. The Company historian‟s account of the situation within the
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Japanese perimeter will serve as an example of what was found in all the Japanese
perimeters in the battles on the Sanananda road, and the truly appalling conditions on
this battlefield. Many American and Australian dead were also unable to be buried until
after the campaign. In terms of combat effectiveness, the newly introduced units had an
initial task of mastering their revulsion at the sight and smell of the dead – frequently of
their own Army:
As we advanced we were forced to occupy the conquered, annihilated and death
ridden Japanese perimeters. The stench was unbearable and in many instances
we had to move our position however slight to eliminate actually sleeping with
their dead. …it was impossible for the enemy to bury their own. The climatic
conditions [meant that] decomposition set in immediately and the gruesome,
distended bodies were everywhere, crawling with vermin and maggots‟.109
Company A then planned to attack Perimeter R cross the Sanananda road. On the
morning of 13 January, preceded by a bombardment using mortars and artillery, the
Second Platoon of Company A, led by the company commander, raided Perimeter R
from Q. Unknowingly contradicting Colonel Doe‟s opinion, the historian of Company
A described closely adjusted Australian artillery fire:
Any slight miscalculation of the firing range of the artillery would have been
disastrous to our own forces. The precission (sic), time, and accuracy of this fire
was something beautiful to witness.110
Crossing the Sanananda road, the platoon fought through some bunkers with grenades,
in the process learning that bowling underarm was a better method than the over-arm
lob they had been taught. The platoon lost only one killed. The success of this raid led
to planning for an attack on 15 January to gain a permanent foothold in Perimeter R.
Two platoons were used, and for the loss of three killed, Company A crossed into the
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south part of Perimeter R around 0730 on 15 January. 111 Company B closed off its
western flank, and a platoon of Company C from James completed the encirclement of
Perimeter R. However, the 1st/163rd Battalion could not maintain this momentum and
press further into Perimeter R before 1530 on 15 January, when Colonel Doe issued
orders for the next day‟s attack, which General Vasey had demanded. Then the 3rd/163rd
Battalion‟s Company K took over the final clearance. Meanwhile, the fit men of the
Japanese 3rd/41st Battalion were ordered to withdraw from Perimeter R back to reinforce
Perimeter S during the night of 15 January, leaving it to be held by the sick until
annihilation.112 Despite the encirclement, the fit Japanese got away undetected, and the
sick held Perimeter R until the afternoon of 16 January.
Company A had demonstrated a higher degree of primary cohesion and fighting spirit in
achieving these results at Perimeters Q and R than the other companies, even though the
Japanese were thinning out their fit men leaving the unfit to hold the position. The
initial training of Company A had been appropriate and the soldiers could adapt
techniques, such as throwing a grenade, to the particular situation.
However, the (regimental) unit diary account of these events is a considerable
exaggeration.
…the 163rd Infantry… executed a successful attack against Jap positions north
of the Huggins perimeter. The reduction of enemy resistance [in Perimeter R by
Company K] was accomplished according to the plan…113
It glossed over how slowly and circumspectly the Battalion had proceeded with
piecemeal efforts by platoons and companies on this first task Vasey had set. The
regimental diary ignored the facts: after earlier platoon and company failures, the attack
by the 1st/163rd Battalion on 8 January had failed; the unopposed occupation of
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Perimeter Q had occurred on 10 January; the raid on Perimeter R on 13 January, and
capturing the south part of R by 16 January had taken two days.
This slow fragmented progress weakened the institutional cohesion of the Allied forces
under the command of the HQ 7th Division. As previously noted, Stage III of the
divisional orders required the 163rd Regiment to attack northwards to Sanananda point,
while preventing the Japanese retreating to the coast or in a westerly direction. The
timing of this was not in the orders but probably was to be determined by the
completion of Stage II, that is when the enemy had been destroyed at the South West
Sector and the 18th Brigade had broken through the South West Sector onto the
Killerton track. It would be tactical orthodoxy that the progress of the American attack
would protect the Australian brigade‟s eastern flank and line of communication once it
passed through Rankin, west of Huggins. This had occurred on 14 January, as discussed
in Chapter 9, and the brigade reached a point of the Killerton track well to the north
west of the Americans by 15 January (Figure 7.6). However, the 18th Brigade Liaison
Officer reported to HQ 7th Division that Colonel Doe would not attack northwards until
after 14 January,114 which would leave the 18th Brigade without flank protection. (At
that point, Perimeter R had not yet been attacked.)
When no word had been received from the Americans by 1100 15 January about action
being taken, General Vasey, using the Sanananda road now open to jeeps between
Huggins and Soputa, arrived at noon to direct that the main position ( the Central
Sector consisting of Perimeters S to U) be attacked the next morning („not later than
0730‟).115 Vasey felt forced to specify a precise deadline (which Doe did not actually
comply with, attacking at 0900 hours). 116 Vasey‟s approach was consistent with the
orders from General MacArthur. The regimental plan is illustrated in Figure 10.3.
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Route of 2/163rd
Battalion

Attack by 1/163rd
Battalion

163rd Regt (-) at Huggins

Figure 10.3 The regimental plan for the attack on 16 January 1943, shown in blue. The
final locations of 2nd/163rd Battalion on the Sanananda road are also shown (E-H) after
its turning movement from the Killerton track. The attack by 1st / 163rd Battalion was
unsuccessful and it moved to position A-D, less its Company A which remained pinned
down in front of Perimeter S until nightfall.
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After Vasey‟s intervention, the 163rd Regimental attack plan for 16 January was to
secure the area from Huggins to James with the 3rd/163rd Battalion as regimental
reserve; use the 2nd/163rd Battalion, now following the 18th Brigade up the Killerton
track, in a turning movement of the western flank and rear of the Japanese positions
beyond James, while the 1st/163rd Battalion frontally attacked – the US term was
„penetrated‟ - Perimeter S. Companies of the 1st Battalion were grouped to fight
together for the first time under their CO.117 All the regiment‟s 81 mm mortars from
Companies D, H and M were regrouped at Huggins into a base of fire of fifteen 81 mm
mortars. The regimental supporting fire plan not only included these mortars, but also
the 60 mm mortars of 3rd/163rd Battalion firing from the south west, and its tripod
mounted machine guns firing a barrage from the south onto the 1st Battalion‟s objective.
All the Australian artillery was in support and, for direct fire at bunkers, two 37 mm
anti-tank guns and two Stuart tanks (which had similar armament) were provided.118
The 1st/163rd Battalion was to penetrate Perimeter S from a line of departure west of
James. The axis was east-north-east with the battalion boundary to the left of the
Sanananda road. Night reconnaissance patrols had established an approach for
Company A to crawl from the line of departure through kunai grass with its right flank
on the road. This seems to be the same kunai clearing across which Three Troop and,
nearer the road, Two Troop, of A Squadron 2/7th Cavalry had charged Perimeter S on 19
December. If so, the kunai grass was about 1 metre high in the clearing, which was
about 200 to 250 metres square, surrounded by jungle.119 Company C was on the left of
Company A, presumably to assist it by striking at the flanks and rear of Perimeter S,

117

The Field Order is in Unit History 163rd Infantry, Part 3, Battle of Sanananda , p. 9. The American
terms used in this description are from FM 100-5 Operations, Chapter 9, Infantry (1942 edition),
paragraphs 460-468. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/FM-100-5-9.html accessed
on 5 November 2011.
118

Unit History 163rd Infantry, Part 3, Battle of Sanananda, Field Order No 4 on p. 9-10.

119

Recollections of survivors of A Squadron, 2/7 th Cavalry in Coppock, First Action, Chapter 6 pp. 87 –
88.

391

because it extended beyond the western edge of Perimeter S. Company B was in
reserve. 120
Despite the considerable fire support, Japanese machine guns in the bunkers of the
position S were again not suppressed. Company A nearer the road was „pinned down
most of the morning‟121 because the Japanese „…had set up a light and heavy machine
guns that laid down a very effective cross fire…at the base of the grass that was
moving…‟. At least four machine guns stopped the attack within 20 metres of the
enemy bunkers. In the kunai grass, heat exhaustion affected 2 officers and 18 men. The
company was able to withdraw under the cover of darkness. Company C did not attack
but, as shown in Figure 10.1, moved around the Japanese flank into position A-D
without assisting the battalion mission. Instead, the CO used a platoon of his reserve,
Company B, to assist Company A but it was also pinned down.122 The remainder of
Company B (the battalion reserve) and HQ 1st/163 Battalion followed Company C to
the north „with practically no losses‟ as any Japanese outside their perimeters „had
moved further back‟.123 The result was an outflanking envelopment out of contact with
the Japanese into a bivouac to rest and feed the troops at position A-D.
There the battalion was joined by 2nd /163rd Battalion, which moved on to cut the
Sanananda road at positions E-H and then patrolled up the road to the north where, next
day, contact was made with Australians of 18th Brigade (the 2/9th Battalion) coming
down the Sanananda road from the north. It had, like the 2nd/163rd Battalion, crossed
over from the Killerton track to the north-west. In effect, another roadblock was in
place.
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In Company A there were 9 killed - the company historian recorded each man‟s name
so these numbers are correct 124- and 15 were wounded. Company A was about half
strength by this time due to casualties and heat exhaustion,125 and it had started the
assault with not more than 86, from which the 20 heat exhaustion cases must be
subtracted. Therefore, 66 available men suffered the 24 battle casualties, a rate of about
36 per cent. There may also have been casualties in the platoon of Company B when it
was pinned down. There were 22 killed or died of wounds and 27 wounded in the
regiment on 16 January,126 and Company A had incurred at least three quarters of them.
If some of the others were in the platoon of Company B that assisted Company A, then
the above casualty rate for Company A may be somewhat high.
Attempting to attack machine guns in Perimeter S across the kunai clearing had resulted
in a breakpoint at a maximum casualty rate of 36 per cent. This was a level at which, as
argued in Chapter One, a breakpoint was likely but not inevitable. It was at the low end
of those which caused breakpoints in the 30th Brigade on 7 December, which had been
between 43 per cent and 91 per cent. A casualty rate of 50 per cent had been incurred in
A Squadron, 2/7th Cavalry, on this very site. The breakpoint of this American company
was, therefore, just about at the minimum level acceptable to a tough judge like Vasey.
However, it continued to operate against the bunkers at Perimeter S over the following
days.
The attack objective was very vague („seize the woods‟) unless specific detail was
pointed out at the time. If not, either the patrolling had been inadequate or ineffective, or
the 2/7th Cavalry had not been asked before it left for the detailed information its patrols
had obtained on enemy positions, which was described earlier in this chapter.
Additional support was available from the two Australian tanks and the two 37 mm
guns but they were not given any orders by the CO 1st/163rd Battalion. While the ground
conditions would have prevented manoeuvre of the tanks, their direct fire and those of
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the 37 mm guns may have been able to destroy bunkers provided the infantry could see
targets and indicate their location using the signals in the orders. The Australian
Brigadier Wootten had earlier observed to General Eichelberger that „…two Japanese in
a bunker could wipe out a company unless the bunker is taken out by mechanical means
[i.e. tanks], 127 yet neither Doe nor Lindstrom made use of the 37mm weapons.
The 1/163rd

Battalion, as noted, was fighting together for the first time, which

contributed to poor secondary cohesion when Lindstrom did not manoeuvre Company C
to support Company A pinned in the kunai, but used a platoon of his reserve (Company
B). All the rest of the battalion moved to a bivouac at position A-D without attacking
the specific objectives. Nevertheless, primary group combat effectiveness was slowly
developing. The writer in Company A recorded that after this fight:
we were not bloodthirsty but we knew that complete destruction, annihilation
and extermination was absolutely necessary to assure our survival…we looked
on them as animals to be killed off with even greater ease [than they had felt
before seeing the Japanese living conditions and „cunning‟ combat tactics].128
The (regimental) unit diary account of events on 16 January again exaggerated in
claiming that „…the Jap right flank was crushed as far as the MT road‟ [Sanananda
road].129 The diary claims that the main position was penetrated, which is untrue. It
claims that the bulk of the regiment was „far in rear of it‟: in fact it was only 300 metres
away. 130 Colonel Doe‟s claim that his mission was complete that day is false,131 for the
Japanese positions in Perimeter S remained to be taken to achieve Vasey‟s order to the
regiment to attack along the axis of the road, and Doe had, as yet, only manoeuvred his
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regiment to cut the Japanese off from their base. The regimental history truthfully noted
that enemy forces south and east of the road had been bypassed and remained
unlocated, 132 but did not record that Perimeter S, which was north of the road and
dominated it, was still intact.
Major General Vasey was therefore very dissatisfied with the results of 16 January. That
evening a signal message was sent to the 163rd Regiment, instructing it „to take
energetic action to clear the enemy from the Soputa-Sanananda track [road] as far north
as possible‟. 133 Vasey backed this up by sending his principal staff officer, Colonel
Pollard, to personally press Doe for a speedy result. 134 The choice of the phrase „to
clear‟ is more specific that the original order „to attack‟ as it makes explicit the
divisional commander‟s intention. Next morning, Vasey told his American superior
commander, Lieutenant General Eichelberger, that the 163rd Regiment lacked „offensive
spirit‟. This was not true in respect of Company A‟s frontal attack, but again showed
that Vasey did not favour US tactical doctrine which preferred manoeuvre over frontal
attack.135 However, he did see that, unless the result was an enemy withdrawal from
positions which blocked the road, frontal attacks would be necessary, as indeed US
doctrine foreshadowed.136 He probably felt that the 163rd Regiment was avoiding these.
Unknown to the Allies at the time, however, they had gained an unexpected advantage.
The 163rd Regiment‟s cutting of the Sanananda road on 16 January behind the Central
Sector occurred in the new Japanese strategic setting discussed in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 9. On 14 January, orders had reached the Japanese in the remaining Papuan
beachhead at Sanananda to withdraw by sea to Lae commencing from 29 January.
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Doe‟s manoeuvre tactics had led to isolation of the Central Sector, which had ruined
their plan to pull back to barges on the beach at Sanananda Point. They would be forced
to attempt to break out westwards through Allied cordons and march overland towards
the mouth of the Kumusi River. As this would take longer, the Japanese holding the
Central Sector were ordered to bring forward the date and time to 2000 hours on 20
January.137
If Colonel Doe, on 17 January, had taken the energetic action being demanded by
Vasey, with hindsight, he might have destroyed the enemy before they escaped, but the
regiment was neither swift in action nor determined in the assault. There was little
success to report on 17 January. To remedy the failure of Company C to attack
Perimeter S on 16 January, the two other companies made further attempts. Company B
moved south onto the rear of Perimeter S until it was stopped by enemy fire dominating
a four metre wide chest-deep stream, but stayed in contact with the Japanese defences.
At dusk, the hard-worked Company A mounted an unsuccessful assault on a pillbox on
the western edge of Perimeter S. One man was killed before darkness intervened and the
Company returned into the A-D bivouac perimeter.138
Finally, the fighting power of the whole battalion, its depleted numbers made up by
attaching 3rd/163rd Battalion‟s Company K, was concentrated. On 18 January, 1st/163rd
Battalion, demonstrated considerable secondary cohesion as its CO manoeuvred his four
rifle companies to clear the Sanananda road by eliminating Perimeter S. Company B got
one platoon across the stream and destroyed one bunker to its front before supporting
fire from other Japanese positions forced it back.139 About the same time, Companies A
and K, in total a strength of one company, 140 moved south from position A-D to
envelope Perimeter S from the east astride the road but were held up en route by
striking the apparently unknown Perimeter T.
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On 19 January, Lindstrom moved Company C down in the few hundred metres gap
between his two other groups, to revive the envelopment of Perimeter S from the east,
but it was stopped by Japanese fire. An example of fire and movement tactics now
worked: a platoon leader and a squad, under covering fire from the rest of his platoon,
crossed the creek. The platoon leader and the squad leader, covered by fire from the rest
of the squad, destroyed the enemy in six bunkers in succession with grenades. This was
a display of individual gallantry rather than primary group cohesion. The rest of
Company C then joined them. While this threat from the east was distracting the
Japanese, Company B from the north also crossed, but the Japanese were able to hold an
interior line of bunkers and the momentum of both companies was lost. 141 On these
three days, American casualties were less than five each day despite slowly breaking up
the Central Sector, but it still blocked the road.
There were no further moves by 1st/163rd Battalion on 20 January, and the fit Japanese
escaped in a rainstorm that night. The following night, they got through the patrols on
the Killerton track provided by the 2/7th Cavalry, which HQ 7th Division had deployed
to prevent their escape.
On 21 January, with the fit Japanese gone and with considerable artillery and mortar fire
support, Company A and Company K easily penetrated Perimeter T then wheeled west
astride the Sanananda road, so that the four companies of 1st/163rd Battalion then rapidly
cleared Perimeter S. The whole regiment only suffered one killed and six wounded that
day, showing that the sick Japanese only feebly resisted.
The battalion showed it had learned how to use artillery and mortar fire support, which
was „well co-ordinated‟ with „perfect timing‟. 142 It is unlikely that the Australian
artillery had changed its procedures, but the American CO had learned that an effective
command post needed a close working relationship with his artillery Forward
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Observation Officers.143 That relationship was now so close that the Australians were
making tea for Lieutenant Colonel Lindstrom and themselves in his command post,
when it was attacked and he was lightly wounded.144
The 163rd regiment never did advance to Sanananda Point. Colonel Doe had failed the
test of institutional cohesion in respect of conforming with MacArthur, Eichelberger
and Vasey‟s orders and wishes. It is not difficult to imagine Vasey‟s true feelings when
he sent the congratulatory message that the regiment‟s operations were „extremely
successful‟ and „resulted in the overthrow of all organized resistance in accord with the
task allotted‟. 145 The pressure after 15 January was due to Vasey‟s concern for the
difficulties being faced in supplying the 18th Brigade via the Killerton track, when it was
already north of the Americans and the Japanese on the Sanananda road, leaving its
main supply route open to a flank thrust from the east. Yet ironically, Doe‟s tactics have
been revealed in the Japanese official history as the more effective in bringing forward
the Japanese strategic decision to withdraw.
Analysis
The 1st/163rd Battalion was not cohesive until 15 January because Colonel Doe split it
up by companies. This was contrary to American doctrine, which stated that the basic
tactical unit was the battalion, designed to function complete. 146 In the early 1950s,
when the American Official History was in draft, adverse comments were made by
Major Holley, a member of the staff of the US Center of Military History, about
Colonel Doe‟s method of directly bypassing battalion COs and giving orders to
companies. He contrasted it unfavourably with the Australian opposite practice. 147
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These comments were apt, although, as Chapter 9 revealed, Brigadier Porter had been
criticised for doing the same.
In Chapter 1 it was explained that the decision regarding combat effectiveness was the
subjective judgement of the senior officer responsible for training. General Eichelberger
had referred to the excellence of the 163rd Regiment‟s training and fitness and the fine
quality of Colonel Doe, but his judgement may have reflected a subjective standard of
combat readiness that was well below the extremely high standard of General Vasey.
Vasey‟s experiences with Colonel Doe made the Australian general dissatisfied with the
regiment‟s performance. It is unlikely, however, that faster direct assaults in greater
strength would have achieved more than those of the Australians, which Vasey, by 12
January, had belatedly recognised as „the failed tactics of 1915-1917‟. The events of
Stage I of the Divisional attack by 18th Brigade on 12 January had appeared
(incorrectly) to prove otherwise because the Japanese had withdrawn from the South
West Sector by 14 January. Perhaps this success somewhat explains Vasey‟s change
back to the failed tactics by demanding more American attacks.
The American attacks fell into three periods. The frontal attacks by companies of the
1/163rd Battalion in the period 8-15 January were no more successful than Australian
frontal attacks had been. However, their stall level was reached after fewer casualties
than those incurred by the 2/7th Cavalry in similar attacks, or by the Australian
battalions of the 14th Brigade and Major Boerem‟s detachment (after its initial attempts).
This thesis has argued that primary groups with sufficient fighting spirit to be classed as
combat ready must possess a toughness to tolerate casualties and still function, and
therefore the casualty rate can be one measure of this fighting spirit, although
mathematical determinism is inappropriate. The lower point of the casualty rate that will
cause a stall level was about 30 to 33 percent. Beyond 33 per cent, a breakpoint is very
likely. At the upper end, permanent slip into apathy and depression (battle fatigue) can
be expected at about 50 percent. For example, on the low side, Vasey and Porter had
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found breaking off an attack with casualty rates less than 30 per cent unacceptable, but,
on the high side of the range, Lieutenant Capp, a Troop commander in 2/7th Cavalry,
encouraged an attack next day at a site where he had lost 47 per cent of his Troop. Only
once did a casualty ratio in the 1st/163rd Battalion enter this range, when Company A
reached breakpoint at a maximum battle casualty ratio of 36 per cent, and 20 cases of
heat exhaustion among the survivors precluded further action.
The companies of the 1st/163rd Battalion demonstrated that they did not initially possess
the fighting spirit to regroup under leaders and resume the assault. The prompt
occupation of Perimeter Q by Company A was unopposed after the Japanese withdrew
from it, but then Company A‟s use of it as a firm base to raid Perimeter R on 13 January
showed that either Company A had adapted to the circumstances and its fighting spirit
was growing, or some leaders were setting an example. However it was less successful
when trying to clear Perimeter R on 15 January.
In the second period, for the attack of 16 January, the 1st/163rd Battalion was regrouped
to fight as a unit. It was not initially cohesive, leaving Company A unsupported at
Perimeter S, and moving out of contact with the enemy. As usual on the Sanananda
road, the mission was not accomplished because it was impossible in the face of
superior Japanese fighting power from the bunkers, despite the Japanese plans to escape
to the west.
In the third period, individual company attempts against Perimeter S showed some good
attempts at assault but failed for lack of primary group cohesion, despite some displays
of leader gallantry. The battalion fought as a whole and showed good secondary
cohesion as its rifle companies closed in on the Japanese from the north, but primary
group cohesion did not match the cohesion of the secondary group. In the ensuing
battle, the primary groups also showed little progress at fire and movement, until the
Japanese escape on the night 20/21 January meant that the destruction of the remaining
enemy came easily. However, Milner described this last day as a climactic battle with
heavy fighting, no doubt accepting the unit diary reports. This was unlikely as the 163 rd
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lost only one killed and six wounded. Colonel Doe was awarded the Distinguished
Service Cross for his courageous leadership under fire on 21 and 22 January. 148
Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been shown that the 2/7th Cavalry and the 1/163rd Battalion had
spent ample time in training, and had been assessed by senior commanders as combat
ready. Those primary groups which could restart stalled assaults on well-prepared fixed
defences should possess fighting spirit, as van Creveld defined it. That assessment was
tested in close combat. The 2/7th Cavalry from 19 December demonstrated that it could
do this and also combat readiness can grow towards combat effectiveness even when
the first battle is the cause of high casualties. There was professionalism in patrolling,
leading to raids until it became clear that they would not work without casualties
disproportionate to results gained. There is little record of primary group cohesion in the
1st/163rd Battalion. Its absence is confirmed by the many company attacks which have
low breakpoints.
The American battalion tactic of envelopment depended on secondary group cohesion
more than the concentrated attacks favoured by the Australians, but the Japanese did not
withdraw. Combat effectiveness came to the 1st/163rd Battalion only after hunger caused
a decline in Japanese fighting power followed by the withdrawals of the fit Japanese for
strategic reasons. This case study has verified that relative fighting power was the
critical determinant when, from bunkers at Perimeter S, Japanese fighting power could
inflict breakpoints on A Squadron 2/7th Cavalry on 19 December and on the attacks of
the 1st/163rd Battalion until the very end.
The primary group cohesion of the 2/7th Cavalry was very high and was sustained by the
formal and substitute leaders in the face of casualties. The 2/7th Cavalry‟s combat
readiness was confirmed. It had high stall levels, as a result of its fighting spirit and
strong primary group cohesion. The primary groups of the 1st/163rd Battalion are never
recorded in the unit records or by Kidston as possessing this level of fighting spirit until
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the Japanese fighting power declined. Company A demonstrated some degree of
primary cohesion and fighting spirit in attacking and entering Perimeters Q and R. From
13 January, when Company A was able to raid Perimeter R, the relative fighting power
began to equalise and the lower fighting spirit of the Americans could prevail.
Looking at secondary group cohesion, the behaviour of the various squadrons shows
that the 2/7th Cavalry‟s secondary group cohesion was strong. In its first days of combat,
the 2/7th Cavalry had demonstrated combat readiness for action in very daunting
circumstances of superior enemy fighting power, but not so superior that restarting
stalled squadron or regimental attacks was impossible. Its Squadrons and Troops had
continued to manoeuvre and fight despite losses of leaders, including the CO.
Secondary group cohesion was not as strong in the 1st/163rd Battalion, in part at least,
because Colonel Doe gave orders direct to companies, bypassing its CO. On 16 January,
the 1st /163rd Battalion was fighting together for the first time, and the novelty of that
probably contributed to poor secondary cohesion when manoeuvring its companies.
From 18 January until the Japanese collapse, however, the 1st/163rd Battalion
demonstrated considerable secondary cohesion as its CO manoeuvred four rifle
companies. However, by this time there was a combination of declining enemy fighting
power and the American units adapting their training to the circumstances.
This thesis has argued that the 2/7th Cavalry certainly was combat ready, but the
standard of performance of a fully trained unit was subjective. Vasey, a hard judge, was
dissatisfied with the 2/7th Cavalry and the 163rd Regiment. Eichelberger was very sure
the 163rd Regiment met his standards. Judging who was correct is clouded by hindsight.
At the strategic level, the Japanese withdrawal was influenced more by defeats in the
Solomon Islands. It is now known that the air and sea interdiction imposed the supply
difficulties on the Japanese that brought them close to starvation. The envelopment
attacks of the 163rd Regiment coincided with the decision of the Japanese to withdraw
their fit men. This meant Japanese fighting power was quickly eroding, and helps to
explain the success of the 1st/163rd Battalion in eventually clearing all the Japanese
perimeters with low casualties. While, this method of fighting at the regimental level
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was different from the Australian method of direct assaults in brigade strength, the
envelopment tactics were, perhaps unintentionally, successful siege tactics, rather than
the constant attacks at great cost with little result. The American manoeuvre tactics in
inserting Huggins, Rankin and cutting the road north of the Central Sector forced the
tactical issue more than the repeated frontal attacks and the fit Japanese escaped at times
of their own choosing. The fighting spirit of the sick Japanese was so high that they
never surrendered, and the campaign ended in them being overrun and killed.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 10: Task Organisation

HQ 7th Division (Major General G A Vasey)
2/7th Cavalry Regiment from 18 December 1942 until 3 January 1943
(Lieutenant Colonel Logan then Lieutenant Colonel Moses from 27 December)
3rd /126th Battalion elements at Huggins until 22 December.
21st Brigade at Huggins from 22 December until 3 January 1943 (Brigadier Dougherty)
39th Battalion
163rd Regiment (Colonel Jens Doe) from 3 January 1943 until 21 January 1943.
1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Lindstrom)
2nd Battalion (Major Rankin)
3rd Battalion

Imperial Japanese Army
In the Central Sector (perimeters S - V and Y)
15th Independent Engineer Regiment (approximately 300 troops commanded by Colonel
Yokoyama)
3/41st Battalion (Major Murase) less troops in perimeters Q and R
Elements of South Seas Force Mountain Artillery Battalion
Elements of 47th Field Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion
The 'Murase Unit' in perimeters Q and R
remainder of 3/41st Battalion
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Conclusion
Christopher Pugsley has shown that democracies without large standing armies
inevitability must undergo a painful journey as they forge effective combat forces from
their civilians. Pugsley contrasted the poorly trained and badly organised citizen
soldiers of 1915 at Anzac with the tough professionals of 1918, and pointed out that this
was a costly achievement in loss of life as an army learns combat effectiveness. 1 In the
Papuan campaign the Japanese had a highly trained army of two-year conscripts but the
Allies were citizen soldiers, so the costly journey to effectiveness was commenced once
more in Papua in 1942-43.
The case studies
Five major conclusions about combat readiness and the transition to combat
effectiveness flow from the case studies. The first conclusion is that the explanation of
variation in combat readiness did not lie in the amount of time available for skills
training up to secondary group (battalion-level) exercises, but in whether the training
resulted in fighting spirit based on the socio-psychological bonding of primary groups
under tested leaders. Its test was the degree of fighting spirit demonstrated by the
cohesive behaviour of the primary groups in their first combat experiences.
Two units stood out as exceptional in first combat and represent the opposite ends of a
spectrum of primary group cohesion: at the highly cohesive end was the 2/7th Cavalry
Regiment and the low end, the 36th Battalion. The 2/7th Cavalry maintained its primary
group cohesion throughout its first combat experiences. Already well trained and
cohesive after its overseas non-combat service, the intensive training given to the 2/7th
Cavalry in close country over nine weeks shows what a difference to cohesion this

1

Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, pp.307, 309.

405

training made. Its leadership was extremely strong, and substitute leaders quickly
replaced those who had become casualties.
Another unit with high primary group cohesion like that of the 2/7th Cavalry, was the
2/33rd Battalion.

This was derived from its complete training before Papua, after

combat experience in the Syrian campaign. As a result, the unit quickly recovered from
the confusion of the first night at Ioribaiwa, and then mounted effective counter attacks
by companies during the battle there. The primary groups in the 2/33rd Battalion
performed well.
At the middle of the range, the 55th/53rd Battalion showed that a range of primary group
cohesion can exist in a battalion. It was variable across the companies, with B Company
being always strongest, D Company on 19 December was very good, but C Company
was weak (the company commanders Gilleland and Spring provided contrasts in
leadership skills). Primary groups are the most heavily affected by casualties as the
experience of the 55th /53rd Battalion showed on 7 December. Finally, the 55th/53rd
Battalion‟s operating social structure became very weak.
Further along the spectrum, the 3rd Battalion lacked primary group cohesion, (assuming
that the failure of cohesion in 17 Platoon applied across the battalion). However, it had
not been confronted with other than local enemy superior fighting power.
Major Boerem‟s detachment of the 126th Regiment demonstrated little primary group
cohesion but was confronted with the same superior enemy fighting power that
prevailed at the South West Sector. There seemed to be some elements with better
primary group cohesion than others, so it is likely that in the detachment, there was
variation across the companies. Primary group cohesion quickly collapsed except for
isolated examples or platoons which continued to help Australian units.
The 1/163rd Battalion was unable to demonstrate primary group cohesion until Japanese
fighting power began to fall away. A possible exception is Company A, which showed a
degree of aptitude in seizing Perimeter Q and later crossing over the Perimeter R.
Nevertheless, in the face of superior fighting power from Perimeter S it met a similar
fate to the 2/7th Cavalry at the same site.
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The 2/9th Battalion had a casualty rate of 89 per cent in its rifle companies just before
the Sanananda operation and received ill-trained reinforcements to replace them. It was
ineffective in the attack at Sanananda, because it was not given time to integrate the 50
percent reinforcements into its primary groups and reconstitute their performance.
The 36th Battalion, at the furthest end of the spectrum, did not even have individual
skills training, or its primary groups properly constituted, so it had no possibility of
being cohesive. The mutinies in the 36th Battalion are examples where the informal
structure was socially cohesive enough to persuade most of the men in two companies,
A Company and C Company (twice), to disobey orders, but its operating social structure
broke down quickly.
Primary group cohesion is created by leadership at the platoon level, and this is where
the weakness in the battalions lay if compared to the depth of leadership in the 2/7th
Cavalry and the 2/33rd Battalion, both of which showed that even inexperienced leaders
can maintain cohesion if they have been well trained,. This depth was also evident in
some companies of the 55th /53rd Battalion showing that the variable quality of leaders
can make a difference.
Leaders of primary groups failed to supervise their men in D Company of the 3rd
Battalion thus contributing to the surprise achieved by the Japanese company. This
suggests that the leadership in the 3rd Battalion was not proven in training. The leaders
in the 36th Battalion were extremely weak, and those in the 2/9th Battalion were mostly
new (at Sanananda) and unskilled. Lieutenant General Eichelberger had said that the
leadership in units of the US 32nd Division was lacking at the platoon level, and this
variation affected Major Boerem‟s detachment.
Experience in Papua indicated that the impact of the CO, once the battalion was in
combat, can be overstated, especially in close country warfare. Leaders like Lieutenant
Colonels Cameron and Buttrose had some advantage of proximity to their unit and
terrain which enabled them to grasp the situation, but the flat terrain near Sanananda
made this harder. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonels Lovell and Isaachsen were
personally effective in command close behind their troops, despite this being their first
combat in that role. Major Boerem was, for a short time, an adequate leader of his ad407

hoc group. The CO of the 2/7th Cavalry was so close to the fire fight as to be killed in
action, but the regiment remained highly cohesive under substitute leadership. The
American Lieutenant Colonel Lindstrom was unable to initially exercise effective
command over his companies due to Colonel Doe‟s method of direct command of
companies.
Better trained leaders were needed throughout many of the primary groups. Brigadier
Porter expected too much of untested leaders, or even of those tested in combat such as
Henderson and Ahern, because their men had not been given the opportunity to develop
a relationship of trust in them. That some failed the leadership test in their first combat
should not have been surprising. Major Boerem‟s companies were, like the Australian
ones, short of good platoon level NCOs and officer platoon commanders, and thus
primary group cohesion was never good. The evidence of poor leadership in 1st/163rd
Battalion is conflicting. The many company attacks failed with insignificant casualties
(except in A Company in the battalion attack on 16 January). This indicates a general
lack of fighting spirit and leadership.
This leads to the second conclusion: most of the units studied demonstrated good
secondary cohesion, which suggests that secondary group cohesion can be developed in
a short tme and is easier to maintain. Indeed, as Siebold has pointed out,2 secondary
cohesion must be in existence to train the primary groups, so it must be created first. It
takes less time to do so because so few individuals are involved in the vertical structure
of a battalion – about 80 made up of 30 officers and 50 NCOs and WOs, many of whom
are fairly experienced already (through prior training or service experience).There are
techniques for training this group separately from troops. The Militia had used these
secondary groups in its battalions repeatedly in 1940 – 1941 to train the conscripts, and
then placed the secondary group constituting each battalion on full time service from
September 1941. In the US Army, there had been recognition at the highest level that its
emphasis on secondary cohesion before Pearl Harbor had led to neglect of the training
of primary groups. It follows that combat readiness as a term applicable to a whole
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battalion is too generalised, because units with high secondary cohesion exhibited
marked variability in primary group cohesion.
The secondary group cohesion of the 3rd Battalion was good in the withdrawal
operations and the occupation of the defensive position on Ioribaiwa. In conducting the
defence, despite the loss of 17 Platoon area, the battalion remained cohesive, denied the
enemy his aim and acted as a firm base for the counter attack by an adjoining battalion.
Here the terrain was such that brigade-level secondary cohesion demonstrated by
mutual support from the adjoining battalions could have an influence. The secondary
group cohesion of the 2/33rd Battalion was at all times evident in the manoeuvre for
several counter attacks and their successful prosecution.
Major Boerem was able to forge secondary cohesion out of his disparate components,
but morale fell after the first week, and the detachment was unco-operative with the
Australian divisional and brigade commanders‟ wishes, showing a serious lapse of
secondary group cohesion even in matters affecting its own troops, such as the conduct
of ration parties to Huggins.
The 55th/53rd Battalion was exemplary in its secondary group cohesion (except C
Company), and contrasts with the failure in that regard, of the 36th Battalion. The 36th
Battalion seems to have had some particularly weak leaders and its lack of training and
organisation was so far below that of the 3rd Battalion and the 55/53rd Battalion from the
same brigade that there must be some other explanation for its poor cohesion not found
in the research. Possibly the variation in quality of leaders already noted in some
battalions, was, in the 36th Battalion, well below the average in the Militia in 1942 when
uniform standards had not been possible.
The 2/9th Battalion retained secondary cohesion despite very high casualties among its
leaders in the battles at Buna before coming to Sanananda .The 2/7th Cavalry secondary
group cohesion likewise was exemplary, but the 1st/163rd Battalion struggled to act
together until the last phase, when the Japanese were withdrawing. Yet, as both had
spent ample time in training, the problem must have been the lack of rigour in the
training, and, perhaps, familiarity with the jungle.
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The third general conclusion about combat readiness and effectiveness is that neither is
a stable state and must be acquired again to suit conditions in different theatres or even
different combat settings in the same theatre.

The 2/33rd Battalion had to make

adjustment from its combat experience in Syria to conditions in Papua. Without specific
re-training, the 14th Brigade battalions had to adapt to the jungles of Papua after their
training for static defence against seaborne invasions. Only the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment
was trained for the jungle conditions it would meet. Readiness and effectiveness must
be adjusted to the demands of specific situations; they decline over time if numerical
strength is not maintained and must be restored by absorbing reinforcements into their
primary groups.
The fourth conclusion is that, while a battalion needs both secondary group cohesion
and primary group cohesion to be combat ready, they are not always equally important
to effectiveness. Their relative importance varies with what are normally summarised as
the four broad types of combat operations– advance, attack, defence and withdrawal.
Primary group cohesion comes to the fore in only some of them. Secondary group
cohesion is more critical in the advance, the occupation of a defensive position, or in a
withdrawal – all tests passed by the 3rd Battalion at Ioribaiwa. If a defended position is
assaulted, primary group cohesion becomes initially more important (and was lacking in
17 Platoon of 3rd Battalion at Ioribaiwa). Likewise, in an attack, when the fire support
cuts out, there is a distance to the enemy positions over which the assault takes place,
and this is the point at which primary group cohesion is critical and must continue as the
„fight through‟ occurs. When an enemy is prepared to fight to the death, as the Japanese
were, primary group cohesion was even more critical than it was against an enemy who
might surrender or withdraw on seeing the assault troops approaching. On the other
hand, secondary group cohesion remains important after it has made the preparations,
gets troops to the start line and co-ordinates fire support until the last possible moment
as they assault. It then manoeuvres rifle companies, provides further fire support from
resources it controls, and combat service support such as casualty evacuation,
ammunition replenishment and food. Under the COs control, the reserve may be
committed to influence the battle.
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It is more likely that in the Papuan campaign the cohesion of the primary groups was
the more important element in combat readiness because they would often fight without
this external support. Primary groups had to act more independently than in European
theatres, or in anti-invasion roles in Port Moresby or on the Australian mainland. In
those theatres, a less intensive bonding of primary groups may have been sufficient for
combat effectiveness because close combat took place in a context of combined arms
support in the form of artillery, tanks and aircraft, when it occurred at all.
As Japanese fighting power declined and their withdrawals began, the 18th Brigade and
the 163rd regiment were able to prevail over them. This suggests that secondary
cohesion would be sufficient when one‟s own fighting power was superior to that of the
enemy, but not when his fighting power was superior to yours. Then high levels of
primary group cohesion were needed to conduct fire and movement under fire and, at
the least, avoid disintegration.
The possibility that, in some theatres, secondary cohesion is of higher importance than
primary cohesion may also have led the most senior Australian and American
commanders, none of whom had fought in jungle conditions, into training their troops to
a standard of combat readiness unsuited Papuan conditions. A commander could easily
be misled by the presence of high secondary group cohesion.

The commander‟s

decision about combat readiness for Papuan conditions should have been based on more
detailed consideration of how rigorous the training of the primary groups had been,
rather than the mere passage of time, or the presence of secondary cohesion in noncombat settings like inspection parades.
The fifth conclusion about the nature fighting spirit is that it is relative to the combat
setting. Combat readiness, once it encountered conditions on the ground, did not
inevitably lead to combat effectiveness or progress in a constant way towards it.
Assessments of combat readiness or effectiveness should not be based on taking alone
any of the fixed factors in Table 1.1 because they form a dynamic whole. The combat
setting can be expressed as an aggregation of the variable factors in Table 1.1. Thus, if
the first variable factor, enemy fighting power, was greatly superior, progress to combat
effectiveness was impossible. In that case, the variable factor of the casualty rate before
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reaching a breakpoint was a useful proxy to assess a battalion‟s fighting spirit in terms
of the ability to maintain cohesion in spite of the superior enemy fighting power.
For example, in an attack, the elements of fighting spirit that van Creveld called
toughness and morale would be evident in the casualty rate which the primary groups
could surmount before the attack stalled. If fighting spirit existed, a designated or
substitute leader would regroup the survivors and they would follow him to resume a
determined attack. If that failed, the breakpoint was reached and the attack stopped. The
case studies examined evidence of combat readiness using the broad parameter that a
casualty rate of 25 per cent to 30 per cent in rifle companies or platoons is the minimum
acceptable to demonstrate fighting spirit. If the rate is below this level when either an
attack reached breakpoint or a defensive position was abandoned, prima facie sufficient
fighting spirit was not displayed. The judgment by commanders that a breakpoint had
been reached with „too few‟ casualties assumes that more determination on the part of
attackers would have caused sufficient casualties to push the defenders to their
breakpoint first. When casualty rates occurred which were at, or over, the 25 percent to
30 percent level, there was a wide variation in fighting spirit (breakpoints when the
casualty rate lay between 40 percent to over 70 percent). Other variable factors were
then examined.
In the first case study at Ioribaiwa, the 3rd Battalion, supported within a brigade setting,
had superior fighting power. By standing its ground, it denied the enemy his aim
because its secondary cohesion compensated for the loss of primary group cohesion in
17 Platoon due to its casualty rate of just over 33 per cent. Other factors brought to bear
were lack of training, supervision by leaders and the generally good visibility over the
battalion area, despite patches of dense jungle and kunai.
The situation at Sanananda was very different. Fighting from prepared defences in very
difficult terrain for an attacker, the Japanese commanded a fighting power which was
much higher than the Allies could match until the Japanese withdrawal began. Major
Boerem‟s detachment with a casualty rate around 40 per cent reached breakpoint in its
only attack, then lost its effectiveness. The 55th/53rd Battalion conducted two major
attacks each with casualty rates of about 40 percent separated by minor attacks and
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patrolling over 12 days. By that point its primary groups had suffered a cumulative 50
per cent casualty rate and its morale dropped. The effects of the casualty rate on the
55th/53rd Battalion contrast with those in the 36th Battalion. The 36th Battalion suffered
an overall 29.3% casualty rate during a seven day exposure, but it is probable that the
mutinous C Company suffered well over 40 per cent in its first assault. The conclusion
about these two ex-14th Brigade battalions must be that only the 55th/53rd Battalion
possessed enough fighting spirit to tolerate a casualty rate above the level whilst the 36th
Battalion did not. The high casualty rate in C Company 36th Battalion may be an
exception to that proposition but it shocked the troops into mutiny. There was also
evidence that the factors of skills and leadership were significantly weak.
At the highest end of the range of fighting spirit as assessed by casualty rates, Catterns‟
surprise attack on the South West Sector and the attack on Perimeter S by A Squadron
of 2/7th Cavalry showed that, in these circumstances, even combat effective troops with
high fighting spirit suffered prohibitive casualty rates (74 per cent and about 50 per cent
respectively) and, despite their determination, quickly reached breakpoint.
This confirms that, if the enemy has superior fighting power, the possession of fighting
spirit is irrelevant to the outcome. The superior enemy fighting power on the Sanananda
road dictated casualty rates, and the factor of variations in Allied fighting spirit was
irrelevant. No attacks were successful. This was essentially van Creveld‟s point:
German fighting spirit could make no difference to the outcome of the campaign in
North West Europe, in the face of Allied superiority in fighting power. Similarly, along
the Sanananda road, Allied fighting spirit had little effect against superior Japanese
fighting power.
At first sight, this finding is contradicted by the success of the primary groups in D
Squadron of the 2/7th Cavalry in temporarily penetrating perimeters Q and R by
resuming stalled assaults. The reason for this is that these perimeters had been hastily
prepared when the Japanese 3/41st Battalion‟s counter attack after 30 November failed
to penetrate the newly established perimeter at Huggins. The Japanese fighting power
from perimeters Q and R was less strong, and soft-spot tactics employed by determined
troops could work. With exemplary fighting spirit but suffering only an overall 30%
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casualty rate, 2/7th Cavalry found them and exploited them but was ultimately driven
out.
Rather than making a battalion combat effective as Generals Herring and Vasey
believed,3 it would seem that too many casualties in the first combat experiences had the
opposite effect: they weakened the essentials of primary group cohesion and broke the
fighting spirit of a unit, by causing units‟ morale to collapse within one to two weeks.
This severe introduction to combat meant that the core of survivors could not make
progress towards effectiveness in the face of such losses. Dudley McCarthy, referring
particularly to the battle on 7 December but making a point that is generally valid,
expressed doubt that any Australian units could have suffered the same percentage of
losses in their first action and „done much better‟. The same might have been said of the
American units.
Brigadier Eather, in contrast to the senior generals, used the phrase „rounding out‟, to
refer to the effect of exposure to combat on a combat ready unit. 4 Probably, Eather
meant that experiencing the first casualties will generate toughness and confirm in
individuals their self management of fear and their confidence in their primary group.
But this could only be true when relative fighting power was more favourably balanced
that it was on the Sanananda road. It was true, for example, of the 3rd Battalion at
Ioribaiwa. Hardening by experiencing some casualties, such as in the 2/33rd Battalion in
Syria, gave what its historian, Bill Crooks, called a „core of moral strength‟ and weeded
out men unsuited to close combat. Weeding out was a necessary step. Leaders were
proven or replaced. Thus the battalion‟s culture was strengthened and was passed on by
the survivors, who made up this core of veterans, to newcomers.
A battalion may thus acquire a battle hardened quality to its combat effectiveness if its
secondary group is cohesive, and it contains a set of primary groups with a sufficient
core of combat experience to carry reinforcements through the first combat. The 2/33rd

3

Horner, High Command ,p.99. They held that view as Brigadiers in the Middle East.

4

In a 1944 interview with Gavin Long cited by Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders, p. 76.
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Battalion showed this when, after initially faltering, primary group cohesion was
quickly restored. But this argument can be pushed too far, and even a very effective
battalion may lose effectiveness through suffering excessive casualty rates. The 2/9th
Battalion, exhausted after suffering a casualty rate of about 89% of its rifle companies at
Buna, and not given time to absorb its reinforcements, was no longer combat effective
at Sanananda and reached breakpoint at a very low casualty rate of about 12 per cent.
Nevertheless it continued for another ten days to fully participate in the 18th Brigade
operation to conclude the ground campaign. In contrast to these combat veterans, the
2/7th Cavalry showed in its first battle, the extent of hardening that can be achieved by
intensive training, and that good leadership can move such a unit towards combat
effectiveness.
Taken together, these five conclusions indicate that secondary group cohesion and
primary group cohesion can differ in intensity and can move differently when put to the
test of combat. It was found in the case studies that primary and secondary cohesion
interacted, changed in different ways, and sometimes moved in opposition to one
another because of the variation and aggregate effects discussed above. This made it
difficult in the case studies to simply classify a battalion as combat effective, and some
better approach is needed to express how combat effectiveness is not constant but
relative.
The Standard Model of Cohesion was found to be a useful analytical framework to
assess the combat readiness of infantry battalions for the combat situation Papua, but
needs to give more emphasis to the importance of primary groups and primary group
cohesion for some combat situations. It can be expanded by expressing a more dynamic
and differentiated relationship between primary and secondary groups. Only when both
primary group cohesion and secondary group cohesion increase at the same time does a
unit move towards combat effectiveness, but sometimes primary and secondary
cohesion proceeded at different speeds or directions.
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In jungle warfare, primary group cohesion rose in importance. This may also be true in
other settings which have demanded close combat such as fighting in built up areas, 5 but
may be less true in open warfare, where combined arms fighting predominates. Thus,
this study found that, when the Standard Model was applied to an infantry battalion, the
behavioural evidence of cohesion was best analysed firstly, by concentrating on the
cohesion of the elements involved in close combat (primary groups), and then on the
cohesion of the whole (secondary group).
Adapting theory
A more adaptable theoretical model can extend the explanatory value of the Standard
Model. Let us start with the simplistic view that cohesion is an attribute of the whole
battalion, but visualise the possibility of the movement of combat effectiveness in a
negative direction if the senior officer‟s aggregate assessment of combat readiness is
wrong. This is depicted in Figure 11.1

5

John C. McManus, Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War II through
Iraq, NAL Caliber, New York, 2010. Fighting in built up areas is discussed in Chapter 3: Aachen 1944,
p.103; and Chapter 9: Fallujah 2004, p.335.
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Combat
ready?

Combat Effectiveness Spectrum

Effective relative to expected
situation but inexpert

Figure 11.1 A simplistic view of combat effectiveness as a spectrum showing the
situation when a senior officer classifies a battalion as combat ready.

In its first experiences the unit, as shown by the examples in the case studies, may move
along the spectrum as shown in Figure 11.2, towards combat effectiveness. Or it may
move negatively as shown in Figure 11.3, as the cases of two companies of 36th
Battalion showed.
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Combat
ready?

Combat Effectiveness Spectrum

Mutinous

Effective relative to
expected situation but
inexpert

Figures 11 .2 and 11.3 show how combat effectiveness may move either way on a single
spectrum.
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However, the single spectrum approach treats combat effectiveness as single variable.
To express the finding that primary group cohesion and secondary group cohesion can
move differently, separate spectra for each level of cohesion are proposed in Figure
11.4. The mid-point on each of the two spectra represent the judgement of combat
readiness by the appropriate superior officer.

Secondary
group combat
effectiveness
spectrum

Primary Group Combat Effectiveness Spectrum

Figure 11.4 Separate spectra for primary and secondary group cohesion

With the two spectra laid on each other at right angles about their mid- points, a set of
four quadrants emerges as shown in Figure 11.5, into one of which the battalion might
move in its first combat. By placing the primary group effectiveness spectrum
horizontally, a line is created above which battalion combat effectiveness is possible,
and below which it is very unlikely.
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Figure 11.5 The Quadrants of combat effectiveness

If primary group cohesion was to the left of the mid-point, the unit with high secondary
group cohesion will be in Quadrant 1. This means that the battalion manoeuvres, but
close combat does not occur when it would have been necessary to achieving the
mission. Only when primary group cohesion is high enough to engage in close combat,
will the unit be in Quadrant 2. In summary, a unit in Quadrant 1 does not deliver
determined and aggressive attacks; a unit in Quadrant 2 does. The ideal direction of
movement is towards the top right, as cohesion improves in both primary and secondary
groups. This is expressed by an arrow and indicative definitions of each Quadrant in the
following Figure 11.6.
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not supported

Secondary
Cohesion
Low

Figure 11.6 Details of behaviour of a battalion using the quadrant theory. The ideal
development of both secondary and primary cohesion is to the top right.
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Applying this model to the case studies, a battalion may move around the midpoint
before settling into a direction, or there may be gains and setbacks. The primary and
secondary group cohesion of the 2/33rd Battalion dropped temporarily putting the
battalion into Quadrant 4 („Disintegration‟). It quickly re-asserted itself under its skilled
leaders and moved to the positive side of the primary spectrum, and upwards into
Quadrant 2 („Combat effectiveness‟).
The secondary group cohesion of 3rd Battalion placed the battalion potentially in
Quadrant 1 or Quadrant 2. However, the failure of primary group cohesion in 17
Platoon had the potential to drop the battalion into Quadrant 4 until the secondary group
support moved the battalion towards Quadrant 2.
The inadequate training of Major Boerem‟s detachment meant that the primary group
cohesion was the left on the horizontal spectrum. The secondary group cohesion of the
American detachment should be represented as being above the midpoint on the vertical
spectrum. Major Boerem‟s detachment was therefore in Quadrant 1. As secondary
group cohesion deteriorated after 5 December, the detachment can be represented as
moving down into Quadrant 4, because of ineffectiveness short of disintegration.
The 55th/53rd Battalion on 7 December possessed such high secondary cohesion that it
could launch an early First World War style assault into the face of the enemy machine
guns in a heroic but futile attack. This places it in Quadrant 2. However, it stayed low
in Quadrant 2 because of the skills and cohesion at primary group level seemed to be
unevenly distributed. Some primary group activities over the next two weeks showed
that the 55th/53rd Battalion moved slightly upwards in Quadrant 2. In the attack on 19
December, secondary group cohesion remained good, and some of the primary groups
reached the objective. The battalion was confirmed as being in Quadrant 2 but it did not
last. The next day, with a total casualty rate of 50 per cent since 7 December, morale fell
and the combat effectiveness of the battalion should be placed low in Quadrant 1.
The 36th Battalion started the battle on 19 December in reserve and with two companies
dispersed to the 49th Battalion. Then its first attacks were a failure. These events gave it
somewhat negative primary and secondary group cohesion, and was thus in the edge of
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Quadrant 4. Only if its primary group cohesion improved, could it get to Quadrant 3.
The incidences of mutiny showed that it had, at least temporarily, moved down in
Quadrant 4 towards disintegration. Secondary cohesion was lost when the two
companies mutinied. It is usually argued that cohesion is lost when the task is ignored
but the group acts together. 6 This battalion must be placed well to the left on the
primary group spectrum and well down in Quadrant 4. However, the CO treated the
men sympathetically rather than punitively and thus led the battalion through a slow
recovery into Quadrant 1.
The 2/9th Battalion retained sufficient secondary group cohesion to mount its attack, but
the low casualty rate suggested that there had not been enough time to recover the
primary groups‟ cohesion. The battalion could not accomplish the task. It had therefore
slipped out of Quadrant 2 into the top of Quadrant 4, showing how a combat effective
unit lapses into ineffectiveness. This unit was struggling to remain effective.
The fourth case study compared two apparently combat ready units. The 2/7th Cavalry
Regiment demonstrated both types of cohesion to a high degree, and was always in
Quadrant 2. The 1st/163rd Battalion was slow to develop secondary group cohesion, and
seemed to have untrained primary groups, placing it low in Quadrant 1. Not because it
had improved but because the enemy fighting power was weakening over this period,
the 1st /163rd Battalion had moved across from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 2 by 21 January.
In a different way to the Standard Model, the Kirke model addressed the complexity of
combat readiness and effectiveness by approaching them as a matter of creating and
maintaining an organisational culture. Cohesive behaviour should be embodied in the
battalion culture, in which four social structures contribute to an operating structure in
every primary group made up of shared basic assumptions that form the rules and

6

There is a scholarly debate about whether adherence to orders is inherent in the definition of cohesion,
or whether „social‟ cohesion should be distinguished from „task‟ cohesion. Neither Siebold nor Kirke
support the distinction. The definition of cohesion they prefer entails the pursuit of the mission. Kirke
acknowledges that this is artificial, as troops can work against the system (as the two companies of the
36th Battalion did), but this would be a failure of cohesion. See Charles Kirke, Military Cohesion, Culture
and Social Psychology‟, Defense and Security Analysis, 26, 2, July 2010, pp 145 and 153. Also Guy
Siebold, „The Essence of Military Cohesion‟, Armed Forces & Society January 2007, 33 (2):p.292.
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conventions of soldierly behaviour in combat. In an infantry battalion, this culture was
created by the founding commanding officer or maintained by his successors and
adapted to fit emerging circumstances. It was maintained by the leadership network in
the battalion during intensive training.
The Australian and American training in 1940-1942 failed to develop the bonding and
proficiency in the operating groups (the primary groups) expected to undertake close
combat. This was, perhaps, initially understandable because an emphasis on formal
command and loyalty structures was needed to weld together the previously part-time
soldiers in these units, but, when that was completed, their leadership was not given the
opportunity during collective training to create the operating structures containing the
mutual bonds of trust that are essential to combat performance.
Kirke‟s model provides an explanation of the absorption of reinforcements. The culture
and cohesion is reforged as reinforcements or transfers lose their separate identity and
absorb the social structures of the battalion. In the 2/33rd Battalion before coming to
Papua, 50 per cent of the unit had combat experience in Syria, and those without combat
experience had trained with the battalion in Australia. Although not closely related to
the conditions of Papua, the training rebuilt the social structures and provided the
necessary cohesion. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 55th Battalion needed to absorb
transfers in Port Moresby from the 53rd Battalion even though the unit was not yet
intended for a combat role, and was given no time for training with them.
The 3rd Battalion‟s organisational culture had a strong formal command structure which
could accept the loss of a well liked CO (Paul) and his replacement by another
(Cameron). However, the operating groups were quite weak because the combat
functional operating structure was embryonic. Possibly what was strongest was the
informal structure from the Battalion‟s long pre-war existence, and the loyalty/identity
social structure based on its regional origins and First AIF record. Luckily, the first
combat experience was not so intense as to shake the organisational culture, and the
Battalion was able to strengthen it by the experience.
The 36th Battalion and the 55th/53rd Battalion both had similar long histories to the 3rd
Battalion, but it had different results for their cohesion. The secondary cohesion, mainly
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based in the informal and loyalty/identity structures cannot operate without the
functional structure of primary groups suited to combat. Both had combat experienced
COs but these had not long been with their units. The 55th/53rd Battalion did well,
because its secondary cohesion was strong and its primary cohesion adequate, but, at the
other extreme, neither secondary nor primary group cohesion were strong features of the
culture of the 36th Battalion (by then under Isaachsen), which was not even organised
for combat. Yet its informal social structure was strong enough in two companies to
mutiny. Why it is exceptional is a mystery, but, following Kirke‟s theory, there must
have been be a failure of the leadership by the earlier CO (Brown) to reform the culture,
not recognised by the senior commanders, or, if recognised, not corrected, in Port
Moresby.
Some American battalions which served in Papua had even longer histories than the
Militia. Australian literature seldom notes that the US battalions in Papua were, like the
Australian Militia, part-volunteer and part-conscript: 54 per cent of the 32nd Division
and 62 per cent of the 41st Division were volunteer National Guard.7 By the time they
reached the Sanananda road, the formal command structures had been affected by the
replacement of some National Guard Officers with regular officers such as Tomlinson,
Doe and Boerem.
Comparison of the combat effectiveness of the AIF, the Militia and the US Army in
Papua
Dudley McCarthy maintained in South West Pacific- First Year that the AIF was an
elite force but he also asserted that the Militia and the American units deployed to
Papua in 1942 were not as far short of being combat effective as the contemporary
critics believed. He called for a closer examination of this evaluation, yet historians
have taken for granted that the AIF per se was combat effective; that its effectiveness
was greater than that of the Australian Militia battalions, and that both components of
the Australian army were more combat effective than the American battalions.

7

Extract from „Annual Report of the National Guard Bureau, 1941 Table VII‟ by Samuel Milner in
NARA RG 319 Entry P 53, VICTORY IN PAPUA, File „G3 Reports Dec 42 to Articles, Notes,
Miscellaneous‟, in Folder „Articles, Notes, Miscellaneous‟. Box 8.
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McCarthy framed his discussion of the fighting on the Sanananda road in a way that
suggested the superior combat effectiveness in the AIF. He began by attributing success
to Catterns‟ company in penetrating the Japanese defences, with the aid of surprise.
Despite the heroism displayed, it reached breakpoint with a casualty rate of 74 per cent,
and was withdrawn. McCarthy rightly praises the fighting spirit of Catterns‟ group but
ignores its futility in the face of Japanese fighting power. The operation of the 2/7th
Cavalry is portrayed to reflect AIF superiority by making the claim that the 2/7th
Cavalry had been successful in getting as far as Perimeter S, thus making a greater
penetration than any other unit on the Sanananda road. The claim that McCarthy made
for the 2/7th Cavalry was based on a misunderstanding of the task they had been given,
and has been dealt with fully in Chapter 10. Finally, McCarthy‟s account, in this case
understandably, supports the mistaken claim by Vasey and Wootten that the attack of
the 18th Brigade enabled the capture of the South West Sector made in ignorance of the
self-initiated Japanese withdrawals. McCarthy‟s narrative structure is therefore
inconclusive evidence for intrinsic AIF superiority. The specifics of each situation make
questionable any general claim from these instances.
The assumption of McCarthy and other historians that, when AIF units were sent to
Papua, they were elite because they were hardened by combat experience, is challenged
by evidence in three case studies. At Ioribaiwa, combat veterans made up only 50 per
cent of the 2/33rd Battalion, and many of its infantry leaders, including two company
commanders, were without combat experience, even though they had been on active
service. This battalion‟s combat readiness seemed to lie in its better training in Britain
and the Middle East, and in the opportunity to absorb reinforcements in Australia by retraining with the core of combat experienced individuals, so that it quickly adapted to
the new conditions in Papua.
The 2/7th Cavalry Regiment had no combat experience but, as argued in Chapter10, was
found to be highly combat effective. This unit had extended training and active service.
The 2/7th Cavalry demonstrated that their primary group skills had been developed to
the standard envisaged in the doctrine manuals, even though Major General Vasey did
not think so. The critically different element that distinguishes the combat readiness of
the 2/7th Cavalry from other non combat-experienced units was the nine weeks training
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in steep country with live firing of new weapons after reorganising to operate on foot in
jungle conditions. The primary groups worked together and were physically hardened.
The combat performance of these two AIF units suggests that proper training which
brings out fighting spirit in primary groups was at least as important as AIF status or
combat experience.
The third AIF unit studied was the highly experienced 2/9th Battalion on the Sanananda
road. Its operations against the South West Sector showed that secondary cohesion can
survive heavy casualties, but an influx of inexperienced reinforcements without retraining of primary groups leads to ineffectiveness. This unit had lost most of its combat
effectiveness despite the inflated claims for it made by Brigadier Wootten. It broke off
the attack described in Chapter 9 without pressing it with determination, and Wootten
accepted that this was because further reconnaissance was necessary. Its casualty rate at
about 12 per cent is well below the level for a breakpoint, so other factors must have
been more relevant, for example, its primary groups lacked cohesion because of
inexperienced leaders and unabsorbed reinforcements. Its core, which might have
warranted the use of the term „battle hardened‟, was all but gone after the 89 per cent
casualty rate suffered at Buna. Even if it had been in the condition it was before Buna,
the superior enemy fighting power as late as 12 January most probably would have still
prevented it from penetrating the northern side of the South West Sector.
Ranking the combat readiness of the Militia battalions is more complex. Chapter 1
explained how historians and commanders judged fighting spirit by the factor of AIF
enlistment by members of the Militia while continuing to serve in their unit. There were
three categories of militiamen: volunteers, universal trainees (conscripts) and, emerging
from either, volunteers for the AIF. Thus, the increased percentage of AIF volunteers in
a Militia unit was seen as an indicator of the unit‟s combat readiness, but not apparently
the volunteers for service in Australian territory. Contemporary critics believed that
only men who had volunteered for the AIF possessed the necessary courage, tenacity
and initiative to make a unit combat effective. This voluntarist ideology meant that even
a Militia unit with 53 per cent AIF volunteers (including 100 per cent of the officers)
was considered by McCarthy to be of „uneven temper‟.
427

However, there was no command intention to train the six battalions in the two Militia
infantry brigades at Port Moresby to a standard of combat readiness such as that which
had applied to the combat experienced AIF units and even to the, as yet untried, 2/7th
Cavalry AIF. The Militia units were used on labouring tasks building the base while
manning fixed defences in open country. For a defence role, where secondary cohesion
was paramount, their training may have been sufficient (as the 3rd Battalion
demonstrated at Ioribaiwa), but not for an offensive combat role.
As argued in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, the Militia units were then given what was to be
a subsidiary role to AIF units attacking the Japanese beachheads. How ready they might
have been for that more demanding task was never demonstrated because the
circumstances changed when the planned divisional flanking attack from the west was
found to be impracticable. Their task thus changed to making inadequately supported
frontal attacks against superior Japanese fighting power from fixed defences. These
defeated all Allied troops: AIF units, Militia units and American units. They were the
failed tactics of 1915-1917, as Vasey belatedly realised.
Not training the Militia to the required standard for an offensive combat role against the
Japanese in the jungle turned out to be a mistake. Errors of judgement made under
wartime conditions can be understood, but senior Australian commanders who had been
in Port Moresby in 1942, took little care post-war to explain their reasons for not
training the 14th Brigade battalions, and allowed the blame for lack of combat readiness
to fall on the militiamen.
Some, like Porter, used the voluntarist argument i.e. conscripts lacked fighting spirit as
well as sufficient training; or like McCarthy, that their mere presence in units reduced
fighting spirit. While McCarthy believed the Americans were the least well prepared for
combat in Papua, their mix of volunteers and conscripts could also warrant a voluntarist
interpretation, such as Porter‟s. Paradoxically, no such measure was applied to the US
Army in Papua in either the Australian or American official histories, despite similar
mixes of conscripts and volunteers. However, chauvinist interpretations of inadequate
American tactical performance were offered by Australians including Blamey, Vasey
and McCarthy.
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The Americans had already acknowledged their faulty training policy in 1940 -1941
before Pearl Harbor, and the suspension of remedial training caused by transit to
Australia. These are better explanations of defective combat readiness than McCarthy
offered. The American literature fully covers the reasons for the failure to train the
126th Regiment and reveals its low combat readiness, but the United States, rather than
blame the men, recognised their efforts with a Distinguished Unit Citation. The
detachment of the 126th Regiment under Major Boerem did not perform in attacks as
well as the 55th/53rd Battalion, but the insertion of the Huggins roadblock, the defeat of
the Japanese counter attack and the holding of Huggins was an achievement which
materially aided the campaign.
There was less evidence in its first combat operations for Eichelberger‟s belief that the
163rd Regiment was better trained or that Colonel Doe was a very competent regimental
commander. The more extensive training of the 163rd Regiment did not make its 1st/
163rd Battalion cohesive until he allowed it to operate without his interference. Then its
secondary group cohesion grew only slowly, and the absence of determined attacks
suggests that its primary group cohesion was defective until Japanese fighting power
began to wane. An aggregate assessment would place the fighting spirit of the 1 st /163rd
Battalion not as high as the 2/7th Cavalry, or the 55th/53rd Battalion.
It is not obvious that the 1st/163rd Battalion, despite longer training, was as good as
Major Boerem‟s detachment of the 126th US Infantry Regiment. Nevertheless, the 163rd
Infantry was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation for its part in the campaign, which is
a higher award than the 126th Infantry‟s Distinguished Unit Citation. This indicates that
Eichelberger remained very satisfied with the effectiveness of the 163rd Infantry, as he
had been with its combat readiness before its arrival, and he had disagreed with Vasey‟s
complaints to him about its lack of combat effectiveness. It also confirms the inherently
subjective nature of such judgements.
McCarthy was not correct to generalise when he argued that the Australian Militia
infantry component was more effective than the American infantry. There was no
simple ranking of Allied combat readiness in the Papuan campaign. The AIF units were
not as battle hardened as that term implies, but were quickly combat effective until
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exhausted by casualties. Their preparatory training was a decisive element. The Militia
and American units present a more complex picture. The 55th/53rd Battalion's combat
performance on 7 and 19 December places it in the front rank or both competence and
heroism. The 3rd Battalion was successful in defence. Major Boerem's detachment, and
the elements of 126th US Regiment, did well in creating Huggins roadblock and in
deadly frontal attacks, but were quickly exhausted. The 1st/163rd Battalion showed a
capacity to adapt but, at that time, the Japanese were withdrawing, so no conclusive
judgement could be made. It was not up to the standard that might have been expected
after the time spent in training. Because of long term poor leadership, the 36th Battalion
had serious defects of readiness for its first battles. Its combat experienced AIF CO
arrived with too little time to make a difference.
Kirke‟s four social structure model has been shown to be a useful tool for analysis of
the Australian army of 1942, if combined with a cultural stripe to modify its social
structures to reflect the surrounding Australian society and the cultural influence of the
reputation of the First AIF.
Both primary group cohesion and secondary group cohesion are important, but not
equally so depending on the phase of war. Close combat in close country warfare
demanded very high primary group cohesion. It has been challenging to write at the
level of the infantry battalion and below, where ignorance of the bigger picture is
pervasive, yet where primary group cohesion is of paramount importance. The cohesion
of the Militia was greatly weakened during the years 1940-1941 by the flux of
personnel leaving it for the AIF, universal trainees joining it for their compulsory three
months training and standing down after it, and the placement of its married men into a
Militia reserve. Nevertheless it sustained a core of latent readiness nurtured by
substitute First War Veterans until their reposting in March 1942.The posting to it of
experienced leaders from the AIF often proceeded in a dilatory fashion.
Fighting from fixed positions or in open country demanded excellent secondary group
cohesion spreading from the headquarters to manoeuvre tactical groups and co-ordinate
the layers of fire support from outside the unit.. Apart from mangrove swamps, the
terrain around Port Moresby is open grassland. The Militia at Port Moresby had been
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deployed in a strategically subsidiary role protecting, developing and labouring at the
Allied base to be used by other troops for the proposed offensives, or to defend it as a
strategic back up should the Japanese succeed in the Solomon Islands. The secondary
group cohesion of the Militia may have been sufficient for the defence of Port Moresby
from fixed defences which they had prepared and with which they were familiar. They
were supported by two regiments of artillery and their own integral medium machine
gun platoons. Later, these machine guns were removed because the British
establishments did not require them. This is one case of fortuitous delay in
interoperability. The airfields were on the spot, and the Allied air force could have
played a vital role as it did at Milne Bay.
Specific training and shared experience was necessary for primary group cohesion in
very testing environments. In this training the soldier's primary group must acquire
socio-psychological properties by which he learns to trust his comrades and control his
fear by continuing to fight with his group. He must acquire intense loyalty to that group
and be sustained by loyalty to its respected leaders. Primary group cohesion is a
psychological phenomenon of relationships and behaviours shared by all and felt by
each in the primary group. It could only be acquired during intensive training exercises,
which also imparted the necessary skills.
Given their poor level of training it is surprising that the primary group cohesion of the
Militia and the US Army was as good as it was. The poor training was no fault of the
men in the Militia and they have been unjustly blamed, particularly by Australians who
echo the AIF prejudices founded on a belief that voluntarism was an ingredient, perhaps
the crucial ingredient of combat effectiveness. Due to unforseen (but not unforeseeable)
circumstances, Militia battalions were then deployed into tactical combat roles which
were intended to be in support of the better trained and combat experienced AIF. Once
deployed, the tactical situations changed. At Ioribaiwa, instead of being rear area
security for the 21st Brigade, the 3rd Battalion was placed in defence with the remnant of
that brigade, on ground vital to holding the ridge. At Sanananda, the 30th Brigade,
instead of acting in support of the AIF Brigades attacking Sanananda from the west,
found itself in a frontal assault role against fixed defences. Similarly, the US 126th
Regiment was intended as the holding force for the AIF western envelopment, but,
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incomplete due to air transport difficulties, was committed to the role of main attack on
the defences. Its regimental commander chose regimental envelopment over frontal
assault, which, in the long run, made a significant contribution to Japanese defeat.
However, his troops too had to perform frontal assaults in their first combat
assignments.
The Americans of the 126th Regiment and the 32nd Division generally were victims of a
misguided preference for high level manoeuvres at the expense of battalion level
training, and when this was discovered on the eve of Pearl Harbor, were not given the
opportunity for proper remedial training. It was a major misjudgement of MacArthur‟s
to commit them to battle. At least their efforts were officially recognised by the
Distinguished Unit Citation. When the 163rd Regiment of the 41st Division, which had
been given longer training, reached the Sanananda road it did not demonstrate combat
readiness. Its success was achieved as the Japanese conducted planned withdrawals. Its
recognition by the Presidential Citation is questionable.
The alliance relationships were difficult between the two armies of different cultures.
Neither side understood each other‟s way of war, and they were not interoperable.
Differences between the tactical approaches of the Australians and Americans explained
much of the tension in 1942, exacerbated by the placing of American troops under
Australian command at brigade level. According to Bergerud, the US Army was more
careful than were the US Marines or the Australians. It emphasised manoeuvre and
supporting firepower at every level and did not repeat failed attacks with casualties.8
Describing the campaign chronologically, as most accounts do, can create the
impression that in the first phase, the Americans failed to emulate Catterns, then, in a
second phase, the Militia also failed and finally the AIF succeeded. This approach is
based on acceptance of the inflated claims first made by Wootten and Vasey that the
18th Brigade forced the Japanese to withdraw. However, this thesis has argued in
Chapter 9 that the failure of the 18th Brigade on 12 January 1943 convincingly
demonstrated that unsupported infantry attacks could never have succeeded. Unless the

8

Bergerud, Touched by Fire, p.182.
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earlier attacks are re-evaluated in the light of that failure, the disparagement of the
American 126th Regiment and the Australian 30th Brigade in their attack performance is
allowed to stand without review, only occasionally noting that unburied Allied dead
from the earlier attacks were found on the ground on the 18th Brigade objectives. This
confirms the social presumptions of 1942, which this thesis questions, and is not
supported in the accounts in the Japanese official history of Japan's strategic decision to
withdraw.
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Map Appendix
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Figure 2.1: General map of Papua between Port Moresby and Buna
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Figure 5.1: 1942 map of Ioribaiwa area plotted from an air photo of 3 September 1942.1
The area without brown markings on this map was obscured by clouds when the air
photo was taken. The brown markings are not contour lines but land forms which are
misleading, and the hand drawn tracks are not always correctly related to the ground. A
preliminary version of this map with a different grid (See Figure 5.6) became available
for planning the routes of the incoming 25th Brigade, but did not reach the commanders
on Ioribaiwa until after the ridge was occupied. The accuracy and detail of this map was
quite unsuitable for tactical operations at brigade level and below.

1

Map Kagi-Naoro(sic), [undated] September 1942, scale one inch to one mile. War Diary of 25th Brigade
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Figure 5.2 : HQ 25th Brigade sketch 3 showing relative platoon dispositions in 3rd Battalion on
an unreliable depiction of the topography.2

2

AWM 52 8/2/25 War Diary HQ 25 Bde. It is one of a numbered series of sketches of the layout of the
battle area prepared by an unknown draftsman. Pdf page 20/99. Sketch 4 on the other hand is more
topographically accurate but less detailed in layout of troops. Bede Tongs on 19 July 2010 verified the
relative positions of the platoons in his own B Company.
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Peak

Figure 5.3 2010 map of Ioribaiwa area with the 1942 tracks and place names from Figure 5.1
scaled onto the more precise topographical detail available in 2010
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project

438

Main track to Nauro
(Kokoda Trail)

Police track to Nauro

Route over peak

Figure 5.6: Part of the map provided to Brigadier Eather while being given his orders to take
offensive action as far forward as possible along the Kokoda Trail. Scale is 2.2 inches to one
3
mile.

3

Map Kagi-Naoro (sic) 2.2 inches to the mile referenced in HQ 7 Div HQ 7 Div typed OP[eration]
INSTR[uction] (confirmatory order) Number 10 dated 11 Sep. AWM 419/3/9 3 DRL 2381, Papers of
Major General Allen, 4/7.
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Figure 5.7: The 25th Brigade plan to move around Ioribaiwa and some positions of the
21st Brigade.
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FIGURE 5.8 Australian unit locations on Ioribaiwa ridge before the Japanese attacked.
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project.
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Figure 5.9: The Japanese depiction of the planned attack on Ioribaiwa superimposed on a
modern map although the execution by the Japanese left flank was changed and its route may
have been closer to the centre.
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project.

442

FIGURE 5.10 2/16
Battalion sketch map of
company locations at
Ioribaiwa aligned so the
grid lines run north-south
on the page.

443
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450 metres
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Positions of likely
Knob

re-entrants

Figure 5.11 Engineer sketch of Ioribaiwa ridge showing estimated contours and a clearing It is
aligned to north with the page.4

4

AWM 52 1-5-14-032, War Diary of 7th Division, October 1942, Part 3, „Intelligence summary No 10‟
App B pdf p. 120/164. This more legible section was cropped from the copy in AWM52-8-3-1-028, War
Diary of the 2/1st Battalion, Nov- Dec 42, pdf p.44/160.
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Possible location of 17
platoon of D Company 3rd
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Possible

area
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flanking elements and site of
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CHQ

Figure 5.12: A less precise and detailed sketch by the 2/6 Field Company of area around
Ioribaiwa village. It happens to show the rear and forward re-entrants („steep gully‟) and
other terrain features described by CQMS Brown of D Company 3rd Battalion.5

5

AWM 52 8/2/25 War Diary HQ 25 Bde. pdf p. 7/119. Kennedy, Port Moresby to Gona Beach, p.50.
As CQMS, Brown was at the company HQ at the time.
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Figure 5.13: The Japanese incursion and the Australian counter attacks 15-16 September.
With thanks to Peter Murray of DiZign Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, who developed the maps this for this project
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Figure 7.1: Terrain and disposition of Allied forces approaching
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the Japanese beachhead. 6

Figure 7.2: Indicative layout of the three Japanese perimeters forward of the Sanananda
base area. 7

6

Milner, Victory in Papua, Map VI downloaded from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-PPapua/maps/USA-P-Papua-VI.jpg.
7

Bullard, Japanese Official History, Army Operations, p. 258. Downloaded from page 230 of the pdf
copy available at http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/JpnOperations/. The online version has a
different layout and page numbers to the printed version because of the inclusion of detailed references.
The page numbers in this thesis are from the printed version.
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Figure 7.4: Translation of a Japanese
sketch

map

of

installations

and

strength at the Killerton track junction
on the Sanananda road captured when
Gona fell to the Australians on 8
December 19421
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Rankin
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Murase unit
perimeters

South West
Sector

Kessels

Figure 7.5: An American marked map showing the locations along the Sanananda road.8
The South West Sector in fact extended across to Kessels.

8

NARA RG 319,Entry P53, VICTORY IN PAPUA, Interviews – Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua –
Milner, in Folder „Photos Maps Charts‟ Box 5.
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Figure 7.6: Sanananda front – last phase 15-22 January 19439

9

Milner,Victory in Papua, map 17, p.352.
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Enemy main supply route along
the Sanananda road marked in
gold.

Killerton track junction
within South West Sector
redoubt outlined in red.

Figure 8.1: American sketch map from a period later in 1942 shows the terrain and the
left flanking attack by 126th Regiment which created Huggins‟ road block (centre top)10.
The location near the Killerton track junction, incorrectly marked on this map as
„Riley‟, was most likely the location of an Australian outpost from which the 126th
Regiment‟s right flanking attack by Company L was launched.

10

Folder „Photos Maps Charts‟ in NARA RG 319,Entry P53, VICTORY IN PAPUA, Interviews – Bulk
File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner,in Box 5.
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2/3rd Battalion outpost
later called „Hutchison'
then „Kessels‟.
the
General line of 2/3rd Battalion
troops with attacks of Major
Boerem‟s detachment shown as
blue arrow

Figure 8.2: Sketch of the area of the South West Sector at the Killerton track junction with the Sanananda
road. The V shape in red shows the understanding at the time that the general line of the Japanese South
West Sector redoubt was V shaped although it was triangular. The red V represents the edge of the
11
bunkers in the Japanese redoubt which actually had irregular outer edges.

11

The coloured base detail is from a sketch by Private J Neenehan, 36 Bn I[ntelligence] Section dated 5
Jan 43. Appendix H „Map showing area of 36 Battalion attacks Reference Gona 4 inch to 1 mile‟ in
AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion pdf p. 64/86.
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Figure 8.3: The location of the tip of the South West Sector.
In the otherwise featureless terrain, a clearly noticeable big white tree stood inside enemy
territory near the tip of the V (grid reference 179248). This tree was used as a reference point in
the documents in 1942 and will be a repeated reference point in the next two chapters.
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49th Battalion: Objective
grid reference 183258.
Hutchison

Brown
wig
Herwig

36th Battalion in reserve
55th/53rd Battalion axis (arrow)
and objective (oval)

Figure 8.4: The upper map shows the
plan for the attack of the 30th Brigade
on 19 December 1942. The place
names in tan arise from the names of
officers of 2/3rd Battalion who
commanded outposts in those
locations from 10 to 20 December. 1
The lower map shows that patrolling
had increased Australian knowledge
of the forward edge of the enemy
defences which is shown in blue.1
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18
th

Layout of the 36
Battalion attack is in
black and red. Known
enemy machine gun
positions are in blue.
'SL' is the starting
line.
The
black
arrows point to the
same location on the
lower enlargement

Hutchison/Kessels

25

18

26
The red and purple lines show the top
section of the Japanese South West
Sector redoubt as it actually was. The
largest purple shape encircles the
Killerton track junction with the
Sanananda road (gold). Each small
black circle with an arrowhead
indicates a Japanese machine gun.
The light blue arrow indicates the axis
of the attack.

Brown

Herwig

Figure 9.1: The attack by the 36th Battalion on 21 December.
The top sketch comes from AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion Oct-Dec 1942 pdf p. 66/86. The
lower map comes from AWM 52 War Of 7th Division GS Branch Jan 1943.
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18

Kessels

25

Section of overlay of attack.
A platoon from 55th/53rd
Battalion and Company K were
to co-operate by providing
pressure on the enemy from
their
positions.
Enemy
positions are in dark blue.

Company K
3rd/126th
battalion
(US)

Kessels

According to this sketch map on
which the above overlay was to
fit, this track formed the axis of
assault for about 500 m to the
objective on the Sanananda road.
The starting line ('SL' above) was
at right angles to this track at the
arrow head.

Figure 9.2: the attack plan of the 36th Battalion on 26 December. 12

12

The coloured base detail is from Appendix H „Map showing area of 36 Battalion attacks Reference
Gona 4 inch to 1 mile‟ in AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion pdf p. 64/86 sketched by Private J
Neenehan, 36 Bn I[ntelligence] Section dated 5 Jan 43. The top diagram is one of the overlays to the base
detail: „Sitmap 3 26 Dec 42 1230 hrs‟ from AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion pdf p. 63/66.
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The foliage depicted in green
reflects an air photo. This
sketch is rotated to align the
north-south gridlines with the
edge of the page. The locations
of the grid lines and scales are
imprecise. The next sketch
(Figure 9.4) depicts the result.

Figure 9.3: the attack plan of the 36th Battalion on 28 December. 13

13

Appendix I to AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion.
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Figure 9.4: the result of the 36th Battalion attack on 28 December. An enlargement of the area
from the start line and shows that the attack stopped at a clearing dominated by Japanese
pillboxes and machine guns.14

14

Appendix J depicting locations after the attack. AWM 52 8-3-75 War Diary of 36th Battalion.
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Huggins

Brown
Kessels

The red and purple lines
show the top section of
the Japanese South West
Sector redoubt as known
at the time of the attack.
The largest purple shape
encircles the Killerton

Herwig

track junction with the
Sanananda road (gold).
Each small black circle
with

an

indicates

arrowhead
a

Japanese

machine gun.

Figure 9.5: 2/9th Battalion attack on the South West Sector from NW of Kessels.
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JAMES
27

26
HUGGINS

17

18

19

20

Figure 10.1 Map showing the Sanananda road (in yellow), perimeters of Allied units (with
names of letters A-D), and Japanese perimeters (with letters Q to Y) in the vicinity of Huggins
roadblock in January 1943. The grid is 1000 metres and the eastings align with the edge of the
page. The map is based on the Map Gona Locality (Revised) 5 December 42. The overlay
includes later knowledge of Japanese dispositions than that available at the time of the events in
this case study.15

15

RG 407 Entry 427, 41st Infantry Division, , file 341-INF (163)-0.1 History 41st Division, 163rd Inf. 16
Sep 40 – Dec 45 (beyond), Map in folder 10 Box 9084.
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Approximate position of
Perimeter S, about 150
metres beyond James

General

Approximate

centre

line

of

Japanese perimeters in red.

distance

Q on the east and R on the

Huggins to James: 330 metres

west of the Sanananda road.

Figure 10.2: An enlargement of the area between Huggins and James. Drawn post-war from a
sketch map prepared by the Chaplain of the 2/7th Cavalry, as he conducted burials of the unit
dead in late January 1943. The positions of the bodies were an indicator of the routes taken by
the various Squadrons on 19 December 1942. The „established supply route to James‟ was
initiated from 23 December.16 A general centreline of the Japanese perimeters is indicated in
red, but there were some enemy posts outside these perimeters, particularly to the west and
north east. Another view is given on next map.

16

Hartley, Sanananda Interlude, p.45. The original sketch map of the positions of the bodies is in AWM
52/2/2/8 War Diary 2/7th Cavalry Regiment, December 1942 as a loose leaf overlay on tracing paper.
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27

26

James perimeter
19

18

27

Route taken by A and B Squadrons to
James is marked by red dashes. Route
by D Squadron in red dots.
The two green arrows show the attack
on Perimeter S by A Squadron

19

Australian positions shown on supply
route in red. Japanese perimeters Q
and R in blue ovals.

Huggins

Ancillary view of material in Figure 10.2 overlayed on enlargement of Map Gona
Locality (Revised) found in AWM 52 1-5-14 January 1943. During the war, red
signified Allied troops and blue signified the enemy.
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Route of 2/163rd
Battalion

Attack by 1/163rd
Battalion

163rd Regt (-) at Huggins

Figure 10.3 The regimental plan for the attack on 16 January 1943, shown in blue. The final
locations of 2nd/163rd Battalion on the Sanananda road are also shown (E-H) after its turning
movement from the Killerton track. The attack by 1st / 163rd Battalion was unsuccessful and it
moved to position A-D, less its Company A which remained pinned down in front of Perimeter
S until nightfall
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